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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Michael R. Chambers
Whither South Asia? This is not a question that has troubled
many Americans, although the number has been growing over the
last few years. The nuclear weapons tests of 1998 and the Kargil
crisis of 1999 helped to increase that number. But as this is written in
June 2002, perhaps more Americans than ever are concerned about
the future of South Asia. This, of course, is a result of the attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11 as it is often referred
to) and the resulting war on terrorism that has been conducted in
part through Pakistan. It is also a result of the December 13, 2001,
attack on the Indian Parliament by Islamic militants out of Kashmir,
and the escalation of tensions that followed between India and
Pakistan. By June 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed
on the threshold of war.
In an attempt to answer this increasingly pressing question, the
Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International
Security and Cooperation of Stanford University joined the U.S.
Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute to cosponsor a
conference on January 4-5, 2002. This volume consists of revised
versions of papers presented at that conference. While there are
numerous ways to approach the question of “whither South Asia?”
the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic
balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date.
This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not
only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but
also about the role of extra regional powers and issues such as social
and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture,
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and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative
power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and
hostility.
The Effects of 9/11
The attacks of September 11 had a very profound effect on this
conference. First of all, the conference was originally scheduled for
September 14-15, 2001, but had to be postponed in light of the
events. Second, and more substantively, the attacks and the resulting
war on terrorism led to important changes in the South Asian region
and in U.S. policy toward the region that affected the discussions.
Possibly most significantly, it ended America’s relative isolation of
Pakistan and its tilt towards India in the regional system. Because of
the need to conduct the war against the Taliban regime and the al
Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan at least in part through
Pakistani territory and airspace, the United States quickly
reestablished military relations that it had severed a decade earlier.
Moreover, the United States was not merely more intensely engaged
again in South Asia, it was seeking good, cooperative relations with
both India and Pakistan at the same time—something it had not
done previously.
Besides this new American engagement in South Asia, the events
of September 11 also forced changes in Pakistan, albeit changes that
may have already been in the works in the few months previous to
September. The Pakistani government—or at least the Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (ISI)—had helped to create the Taliban regime in
Kabul and maintained close relations with it. Islamabad had also
colluded with Islamic militants in Kashmir to keep pressure on India
to end its rule in this disputed territory. When asked on September
12 whether Pakistan would be with the United States or against it in
the war on terrorism, President Pervez Musharraf chose to side with
the United States, severing Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban and
cracking down on Islamic militancy within his country. Following
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the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament, and under
pressure from the United States and the international community, he
cracked down on Islamic militant groups in Pakistan—including a
ban on the two groups that allegedly carried out the December 13
attack and the arrest of their leaders. Subsequently, in June 2002
Musharraf pledged to “permanently” end the infiltration of Islamic
militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir.1 The combination of these
developments—the new policies in Islamabad and the new
involvement of the U.S. in the region—led many conference
participants to express optimism that perhaps the situation in South
Asia could finally be turned from one of conflict and animosity
between India and Pakistan to one of more cooperation.
Common Themes
This cautious optimism, that relations between India and
Pakistan might finally be put onto a more cooperative path and that
several of the outstanding issues between them might be resolved,
was enunciated by several participants, including Sir John Thomson
and Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan. Both of these participants
discussed a scenario of the future based on such assumptions and
argued that this would be the best path for the region. But this was
just one possible scenario for both participants, and they each
included a scenario in which the pre-September 11 dynamics
returned to the fore, with continuing tensions as the result.
A second common theme was the difficulty in making
predictions about the future of South Asia. This caveat was claimed
by, among others, Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen, Aaron
Friedberg, Sumit Ganguly and Teresita Schaffer. As several of these
participants noted, there are too many variables—political,
economic, and social, and at both the domestic and international
levels—to confidently state what India will look like politically in 18
years (never mind Pakistan), or what the nuclear weapons posture of
these countries might be, or even what shape India’s patterns of
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alignment might take. Nevertheless, by focusing on the set of
variables and factors that each thought to be most important, they
were able to lay out for the other participants a range of scenarios
that they believed to be the most likely.
A third common theme was the importance of the region to the
United States. An economically prosperous and politically stable
South Asia is very much in the U.S. interests. For some participants,
such as Shripad Tuljapurkar and Vijay Kelkar, this importance is
based on the fact that South Asia is home to one-sixth of the world’s
population and that there is great economic potential in the region,
particularly in India if it can capitalize on favorable demographic
trends and follow through on the next generation of economic
reforms. For others, including the three flag officers who presented
U.S. military perspectives on South Asia as well as Scott Sagan, the
effects of South Asia on U.S. and global security demand such
importance. As was demonstrated again during spring 2002, India
and Pakistan have too regularly found themselves in crises, and with
both possessing nuclear arms, there is great apprehension about a
conventional war escalating to the point of a nuclear exchange.
Moreover, any negative behavior by these two countries could have
demonstration effects in other countries that would undermine the
global efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally,
several participants, among them Thomson and Thomas Simons,
noted the important role that Pakistan could play in providing a role
model for Muslim states in the Middle East. Since it is an explicitly
Islamic state, yet one that is secular and seeks to modernize, the
United States should help Pakistan achieve this goal so that it can
demonstrate to other Muslim states a path that leads into the future
rather than back into the past, with all of the repression and troubles
that path has demonstrated in countries such as Afghanistan.
The converse of this theme is the importance of the U.S. to South
Asia, and this was also stressed by several participants. A number of
participants, civilian and military, noted that the U.S. abandonment
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of Pakistan in 1990 contributed to a sequence of events that led in the
end to the creation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its
cooperation with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, including the
attacks of September 11. The U.S. should consider this history and
not precipitously withdraw from the region again when our
objectives are achieved in Afghanistan. In particular, as emphasized
by all three flag officers participating as panelists, Washington
should maintain the military-to-military relations that have been
growing in the case of India and reestablished in the case of
Pakistan. The United States can also play a role in stabilizing the
nuclear balance between India and Pakistan. As noted by both Khan
and Sagan, the United States can provide expertise as well as
technologies that would strengthen Islamabad’s and New Delhi’s
command and control over their nuclear arsenal to prevent
accidental launchings without giving one side an advantage over the
other. Finally, Washington can use its influence with the leaderships
in both countries to contribute to a resolution of their political
differences. In the new triangular relationship that was formed last
September, the United States is in the pivot position, having better
relations with both India and Pakistan than they have with each
other. It can use this leverage to promote the resolution of political
conflict in the region. American influence, exemplified in the June
visits of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and of Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, along with the diplomatic efforts of
countries such as Britain, China, Japan, and Russia, appears to have
contributed to the reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan
in early-mid June.2
Organization of the Volume
As will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion, strategic
balances and alliances are relations of cooperation between countries
that are directed (implicitly or explicitly) against real or potential
adversaries. These axes of amity and enmity are based on past
relationships with other countries, on current assessments of relative
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power and threat, and on the expectation that others will threaten
the security of your country in the future. The chapters that follow
shed light on various components of national power in India and
Pakistan, on these countries’ perceptions of threat, and on their
relations of amity and enmity that will shape the strategic balances
and alliances of South Asia in 2020.
Part I of this volume contains two “scene setting” presentations,
delivered by Sir John Thomson and Thomas Simons, which were
intended to provoke thought and discussion. Thomson’s
presentation (Chapter 2) was delivered at the opening of the
conference as a way to get the participants thinking about the future.
In this presentation, he sketches three scenarios of the future with
varying degrees of optimistic divergence from a path based on the
status quo in South Asia on September 10, 2001. Simons’
presentation ( Chapter 3), offered before dinner on the first night of
the conference, provides an overview of the changes in South Asia
based on the nuclear tests of 1998 and the events of September and
December 2001. These papers have different orientations, one more
forward-looking while the other tries to draw more on the past.
Nevertheless, they reach two similar conclusions. First, the United
States needs to remain engaged in South Asia if the region is to have
any hope of rising above the tensions and conflict which have
plagued it these last 50 years. Second, Pakistan represents a potential
model of a modern Islamic state for other Muslim countries, and the
United States should do all that it can to assist this enterprise.
Part II considers the political, economic, and demographic factors
that will affect the relative power capabilities of India and Pakistan
over the next 18 years. In Chapter 4, Teresita Schaffer examines some
of the changes taking place in India’s domestic political system, such
as the growing importance of coalitional politics and the coming
leadership changes in both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the
Congress Party, as well as demographic changes and potential
economic performance to suggest what future Indian foreign policy
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might look like. Deriving three basic scenarios from these factors and
speculating on Indian foreign policy in each, Schaffer concludes that
it is too early to tell which of the scenarios is most likely, due to the
contradictory evidence as of spring 2002.
The economic prospects of South Asia, and of India in particular,
are the focus of Chapter 5 by Vijay Kelkar. Surveying the progress
that has been made in the region so far, particularly in the 1990s as
India liberalized its economy and launched economic reforms,
Kelkar notes that the region still has far to go in comparison to the
economies of East and Southeast Asia, and proposes a multilayered
second-generation reform effort to point India in the right direction.
Chapter 6 by Shripad Tuljapurkar discusses the demographic
trends in South Asia that could help to fuel continued economic
growth. Comparing India and Pakistan to China, Tuljapurkar also
notes the significant improvements in South Asia, particularly in
terms of declining fertility and infant mortality, and increasing life
expectancy and literacy. However, significant differentials continue
to exist based on gender, region, and the urban-rural divide. If these
differentials are not addressed, they could lead to political instability
in either India or Pakistan.
Part III takes up the role of nuclear weapons and regional
security. The chapters by Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen and
Feroz Hassan Khan consider the nuclear futures of India and
Pakistan, respectively. Noting the multiplicity off actors affecting
India’s future nuclear posture, Basrur and Cohen propose three basic
scenarios and then consider how variations in ten of the most
important factors—including India’s relations with Pakistan and
China, the role of the United States, and the number and types of
nuclear weapons—could shape which of the three ideal-type
scenarios India will most closely approximate. In Chapter 8, Khan
points to the importance of the Indian nuclear weapons program in
generating the push for Pakistan to develop such weapons itself. He
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also proposes a restraint regime for India and Pakistan that could
prevent a damaging nuclear arms race between the two neighbors.
Such a restraint regime may well be crucial. In Chapter 9, Scott
Sagan argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia
could be very dangerous. Challenging the arguments of
“proliferation optimists” who posit that nuclear deterrence will
reduce the chances for war in the region, Sagan draws on
organization theory to show that deterrence may fail, and provides
evidence of several of the expected pathologies already emerging
within the Indian and Pakistani bureaucracies that control the
nuclear weapons.
Part IV begins to move us away from power resources to the
realm of perceptions. Chapter 10 relates U.S. military perspectives on
South Asian security. This is a summary of the views expressed by
the three flag officers serving on the panel, Rear Admiral Jay
Campbell (ret.), Major General Kevin Chilton, and Brigadier General
Karl Eikenberry. All three emphasize the importance this region has
for U.S. national interests—and not just security interests. The three
panelists also agree on the need to maintain the military-to-military
relations that the U.S. has established with the region because they
promote American interests.
Part V examines the role of strategic culture in shaping threat
perceptions in the region—including China, because of its role in the
patterns of amity and enmity in the region. In Chapter 11, Kanti
Bajpai discusses the three competing strands of strategic culture in
post-Cold
War
India—Nehruvianism,
neoliberalism
and
hyperrealism—focusing in particular on the elements of grand
strategy in each. Indian grand strategic thinking has moved away
from Nehruvianism during the 1990s, and Bajpai concludes that it
has moved toward hyperrealism in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11 and December 13. Such a shift could lead to
a harder-line Indian foreign policy.
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Hasan-Askari Rizvi assesses Pakistani strategic culture in
Chapter 12, noting the deep insecurity and strong distrust of India
that are major components of this mind-set. Rizvi also discusses the
relationship of Islamic beliefs to Pakistani strategic culture, and how
many Pakistani security policymakers have come to favorably view
the use of Islamic militants to put pressure on India in Kashmir.
In Chapter 13, Andrew Scobell argues that Chinese strategic
culture is driven by a “cult of defense” in which China is prone
toward using force but always sees itself as acting in self-defense.
Moreover, Scobell warns that Chinese strategic thinkers see India as
an expansionist, hegemonistic power that seems to have designs on
Tibet. Such views seem at odds with the warming of Sino-Indian
relations over the last several years, leading Scobell to conclude that
tensions continue to simmer below the surface, with the possibility
that the Sino-Indian rapprochement could yet collapse.
Part VI considers alliance politics in Asia, focusing on India and
Pakistan but also considering the broader Asian context. In Chapter
14, Sumit Ganguly surveys the potential alliances India may form by
2020, including those with the United States, or Russia, or even with
Russia and China against the United States. Ganguly finds that,
based on external threats to Indian security, an alliance or a less
formal alignment with the United States is the most likely
relationship, although domestic factors might prevent this from
taking place.
If a U.S.-India alignment remains only a potential, John Garver
finds in Chapter 15 that the current Sino-Pakistani entente is nearly
certain to continue to 2020. Garver notes that, despite the forces at
work since the end of the Cold War, including the Sino-Indian
rapprochement, China has not significantly reduced its strategic
commitment to Pakistan. Moreover, its continuing interests in a
balance of power in South Asia, along with Pakistan’s continuing
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desire for assistance in balancing against India, should sustain the
Sino-Pakistani partnership.
Looking at Asia more broadly, Aaron Friedberg suggests in
Chapter 16 that we are likely to see a Sino-American rivalry for
predominance in Asia. This rivalry will have economic, military and
political-diplomatic aspects. While this rivalry will be focused
especially in East Asia, Friedberg warns that it could have spill-over
effects into other parts of Asia, including South Asia. In particular,
the threat of rising Chinese power coupled with Beijing’s efforts to
maintain the Sino-Pakistani entente could lead India to balance with
the U.S. against China.
Chapter 17 tries to tie these various pieces together to arrive at
some conclusions about the prospects for strategic balances and
alliances in South Asia in 2020. Drawing on alliance theory and the
analyses of domestic and international trends that have been
discussed in the preceding chapters, it will be suggested that we are
likely to see at least a loose configuration of the United States and
India against China and Pakistan. The conclusion will also suggest
some policy recommendations for the United States—as well as
India and Pakistan—drawn from the analyses in the previous
chapters.
ENDNOTES
1. Erik Eckholm, “Pakistan Pledges to Bar Any Groups Linked to Terror, “
New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. 1; Glenn Kessler, “A Defining Moment in
Islamabad,” Washington Post, June 22, 2002, p. A1.
2. For example, see John Lancaster, “India to Recall Warships, Name Pakistan
Envoy,” Washington Post, June 11, 2002; and Thom Shanker with Seth Mydans,
“Rumsfeld Says Threat of War Over Kashmir is Receding, “ New York Times, June
14, 2002.
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Part I

SETTING THE SCENE
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CHAPTER 2
POLICY PATHS IN SOUTH ASIA:
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND LOCAL
Sir John Thomson
The events of September 11 have severely shaken the South
Asian kaleidoscope. As we peer into it, trying to discern the patterns
of the next twenty years, we see a region in motion: the pieces
remain much as they were before 9/11, but their relationships are
altering. If the war against terrorism is prolonged, as it may be, the
chances increase that September 11 will turn out to be one of the
three or four major influences shaping the patterns of international
relations in the early twenty-first century. Its chief influence will be,
presumably, on U.S. policies, and this will be a principal theme of
my presentation.
Naturally, South Asian patterns will be pushed and pulled by
additional external influences, by the forces of globalization, for
instance, and by Chinese policies. But it is beyond my present scope
to consider all possibilities. Here I must single out merely a handful
of local and global influences and judge the effect of their
intersections.
That said, September 11 is the appropriate place to begin, for it is
having a huge effect on South Asia. While it has resolved some
issues, it leaves others more unsettled than before. This arena for the
first major action in President Bush’s global war against terrorism
and for the first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty contains material for more conflict.1 If the only superpower
sees military action in South Asia as its top priority and puts
together a world coalition to support it, there is no gainsaying the
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global significance of South Asia.
Yet South Asia did not seek it. Importance was thrust upon it by
forces more or less beyond its control. That the headquarters of al
Qaeda, a movement with cells in at least sixty countries, should have
been in Afghanistan, verges on the accidental. Bin Laden might well
have taken refuge in Sudan, Somalia, or even Saudi Arabia. After all,
it was not Afghans but Arabs who struck at New York and
Washington. So, at one level, South Asia appears unlucky in being
caught up in a war to which it was not an original party. However,
at a deeper level, local conditions in South Asia bear significant
responsibility for this fate.
What were—and to some extent still are—the conditions in South
Asia that attracted first the terrorists and then the U.S. lightning?
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s was a ruined state given over to
warlords, drugs and poverty. The depth of its degradation can be
measured by the welcome given to the harsh, obscurantist Taliban.
People knew where they stood under the Taliban. Order, it was felt,
even by the women robbed of freedom and dignity, was preferable
to chaos. Afghanistan provides a vivid illustration of the conditions
that support an organization like al-Qaeda.
If the Taliban rule, despite its brutality, was tolerable in already
ruined Afghanistan, the same was far from true in Pakistan. That
country, still not fully consolidated after fifty years of alternating
civilian and military rule, was struggling to avoid ruin and to find a
future to which all its citizens could rally. The founding fathers
intended Pakistan to be at least as modern and progressive as
Ataturk’s Turkey. They correctly perceived that many varied shades
of Christianity could be successful; so, they supposed, Islam too
could adopt forms suitable to the needs and culture of the people
concerned. History justifies this supposition, and if Muslim countries
are to become successful in the modern world, adaptation is needed.
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Islamic countries must not isolate themselves as the West goes from
strength to strength. To “catch up, “ Pakistanis need help and
favorable circumstances, whereas in reality they have scant natural
resources, a feudal society, a country deeply and unevenly divided
by ethnic groups, enormous poverty, and hugely mounting debts.
Unfortunately, a passionately felt quarrel with India causes them to
skew their priorities. Resources that should go to health, modern
education, and economic development go instead to military
expenditure and debt servicing. The Army has become the only
modern institution in which the whole nation takes pride. Thus, after
fifty years of disappointing failure to meet their objectives, some
Pakistanis wondered whether the “Talibanization” of their society
might be inevitable or even desirable. And the Islamic mercenaries,
mainly Arabs, who flocked to enlist in anti-Western terrorism had
everything to gain by venting their fury in somebody else’ s country.
In their own Middle Eastern countries, they had failed to overthrow
the poverty, elitism and Western customs they found humiliating.
Another lesson here is that while it is too soon to be certain, it looks
as if firm action by the global coalition against terrorism may be
helping the Pakistani regime to prevent the Talibanization of their
society.
While it may be an accident that the global war against terrorism
began in Afghanistan, we can be certain that it will continue
wherever grinding poverty, disappointment, ignorance, illiteracy,
and resentment exist. Our struggle cannot succeed for long if it is
restricted to fighting armed terrorists: we must also overcome the
conditions that breed terrorism. Otherwise, the war may deteriorate
into skirmishes between the West and developing peoples in many
parts of the world. We are fortunate, in a way, that this struggle
concerns terrorism, for terrorists are criminals, and all societies
oppose criminals. More nationalistic, more culturally specific issues
could make it harder to mobilize a broad coalition.
Professional observers in the West blame themselves and their
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political masters for failing to deter and prevent September 11. We
did not put enough resources into understanding conditions in
South Asia and the Middle East, and we did not pay enough
attention to what we could see was going wrong. Evidently, the
West cannot afford a hands-off policy. But it takes two to reach
understandings. If the West is blameworthy, so are some South
Asians and also many Middle Easterners. Their level of understanding of the West is dangerously low. Of course, I am not talking
about their knowledge of say, medicine or engineering: professionally, they are well versed. But the typical Indian politicians, for
instance, underestimate the damage their actions cause to Western
interests. I am thinking, for instance, of nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear safety, of failures to deal with AIDS and drugs and illiteracy,
of offenses against human rights, of arms exports, and of quarrels
over Kashmir. Naturally, there will be Western reactions.
I began by saying that September 11 had settled some issues and
unsettled others. Nothing better exemplifies this dictum or is more
important for the next 20 years than U.S. foreign policy. Change
there certainly is, but what does it mean? President Bush is fond of
saying “everything has changed.” That assessment—or should I say
sentiment—is widely shared. It is easy to believe when Mr. Putin has
become one of the President’ s best friends and when Mr. Jiang
Zemin is an ally, not a competitor. But so far, I have not found
anyone who will tell me authoritatively what “everything” means.
Hence, we confront a paradox. We are supposed to come up with
comments that will help to guide U.S. foreign policy on South Asia—
and by extension the policies of many other governments—but the
most important input, U.S. global policy, is highly uncertain. That
uncertainty necessarily shadows all my speculations and prescriptions.
Yet the paradox itself imposes certain conclusions which I would
like you to bear in mind throughout my description of three

16

scenarios.
My first conclusion is that the U.S. will enormously influence its
policy towards South Asia by the way it shapes its global policies.
This is bound to happen in the long run, but the sooner left
hand/right hand coordination is achieved, the better.
My second conclusion I state tentatively, and will return to later.
It is that U.S. policy toward South Asia will have some reciprocal
influence on U.S. global policies.
Third, the present uncertainty in the global line-up brings with it
exceptional opportunities for shaping the longer-term future of
South Asia. The explosion of evil and bitterness on September 11,
together with the worldwide response to it, has produced such a
moment as occurs not more than four or five times in a century. The
world situation currently has a fluidity that comes, usually, only at
the conclusion of a major war. Things that were politically
impossible or at least very unlikely on September 10 are within our
grasp today, if we stretch for them. I have in mind particularly the
relationships between the Great Powers, as well as the future of
Indo-Pakistani relations. I will come back to that, but at present, I
want to stress not only the fluidity of the world situation but also its
fleetingness. Even as we speak, government actions are forming
patterns that will mold international relations for decades to come.
What we do and don't do in 2002 may be decisive for 2020.
I would like to add a fourth conclusion, though it is not drawn
directly from the paradox. The geographical definition of South Asia
has expanded. If we had any doubt before, September 11 has made it
clear that we have to take into account Afghanistan and its
neighbors: Iran to the west, all the former Soviet republics to the
north, and China to the east. The geographical context for South Asia
may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely, I believe—that
we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe it. So, to
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a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can be
connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential
extension of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately,
by the spiraling disaster in Israel-Palestine.
I ask you to bear these thoughts in mind as I take you through
three scenarios.
The first assumes that the world reverts as much as it can to pre9/11 conditions. This means that for one reason or another the
present coalition comes to an end or becomes dormant, that U.S.
foreign policy returns to that proclaimed by President Bush during
the presidential campaign and his first months in office, and that
trends in South Asia settle down approximately on the tracks they
were following before September 11. The heart of the problem as
always is Indo-Pakistani relations, a subject that preoccupies most
Pakistanis most of the time. By contrast, few Indians outside the
northwest are bothered about Pakistan except in moments of
drama—for example, an attack on Parliament or a hijacking. Indeed,
many are more concerned with the continuing Tamil insurrection in
Sri Lanka coupled with political instability in Colombo, or with the
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, or with the spillover of Bangladeshis
into Assam and the northeast. This imbalance of concern reflects not
only different geographies but also different views of time.
Most Indians feel that time is on their side. So long as they
continue to hold what they have in Kashmir, they can continue
indefinitely on the present course. True, they suffer some discomfort
both at home and abroad from brutal events in Kashmir and on the
Siachin Glacier, but not enough to change course. The Pakistanis, on
the other hand, aware that for most people possession is nine-tenths
of the law and conscious also that they have failed to garner
significant international support, are facing an increasing erosion of
their position.
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There are other reasons, too, why time favors India. Virtually all
economic trends look better for India than for Pakistan. Before the
December 2001 meeting of the Paris Club and the earlier promises
from the IMF, Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy, whereas
India has good reserves and relatively low debt. In recent years,
India’s growth rates have been superior to Pakistan’s. And with a
fertility rate a shade below 3%, compared to Pakistan’s 4% or above,
India has not had to spread its growth as thinly. Besides, in the last
few years India has had considerable success with rates for literacy,
infant mortality and life expectancy, while Pakistan has not.
Moreover, several factors have led to a definite U.S. tilt toward
India accompanied by neglect of Pakistan: Indian restraint over
Kargil; U.S. suspicion of China; and the burgeoning recognition by
Western—especially American—business that India offers huge
potential markets while Pakistan does not. Since September 11, India
has sought to disguise its dismay at the crucial role Pakistan has
played in American and coalition plans and operations. But this first
scenario assumes that for one reason or another Pakistani
prominence fades quickly and that her only real gain is in greatly
improved debt arrangements.
On this basis, India’ s pre-September 11 complacency is likely to
return, together with Pakistan’s sense that only dramatic events will
shake the Indians out of this complacency or engage Western
concern. Timings are unpredictable, but I believe that sooner rather
than later, there is significant risk of an Indo-Pakistani clash. The
root cause might be Kashmir, or perhaps a renewal of serious
economic weakness in Pakistan or, in the longer term, major political
instability in Pakistan, possibly aggravated by a new wave of Islamic
militancy. It may also be some combination of these influences,
together with tensions arising from the growing gap between the
privileged and the poor.
Whatever the causes, the outcome of a clash could be disastrous
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now that both sides have nuclear weapons. I have the impression
that the Pakistanis have thought through how to deploy and to use
them, whereas the Indians are dangerously vague. I am not saying
that a clash will inevitably lead to the explosion of a nuclear weapon,
but I do think that the risks for the rest of the world are too great to
dismiss.
Apart from the appalling physical consequences of the use of a
nuclear weapon—or more than one—there is no telling what the
ramifications might be. They could severely jolt the relationships of
the Great Powers, they could inflict a mortal wound on nonproliferation policies, they could severely complicate relations with
the Islamic world, and so on.
My analysis has led me, somewhat to my own surprise, to the
conclusion that the first scenario is the most dangerous, and
unacceptably so. I therefore suggest we should rule out a return to
the pre-September 11 conditions and policies.
Unfortunately, such a reversion is all too realistic. It is hard to
escape from old attitudes and assumptions, even while declaring
that “everything has changed.” Unless we make conscious decisions,
reversion, for a time at least, to pre-September 11 conditions is
possible. In that case, we risk major sadness before 2020.
My second scenario sounds more risky than the first, but actually
is less so. It postulates a classical balance of power in Asia. The big
players are China, Japan, Russia, India, probably Pakistan and, of
course, the United States. The key assumption is that American
policy is neither the hands-off, let’s-not-get-involved attitude of
President Bush prior to September 11, nor the buddy-buddy
relationship with Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin of October and
November. It would be half way between—a sort of pax Americana,
intervening actively and forcefully but intermittently in accordance
with the doctrine that Washington knows best. So there would be no
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permanent commitments and no permanent consultations.
The main theme in this scenario would probably be tension
between China and the United States, with Taiwan as the principal
flashpoint. Russia will probably spend most of the next 20 years
seeking to establish and maintain a cooperative role with the United
States and especially with Europe, overwhelmingly its largest
trading partner and best customer. Japan will wish to avoid
unnecessary engagement in a power struggle, having much to lose
both with the United States and China, but like Russia it will feel
obliged, from time to time, to show support for the United States.
India, on the other hand, is likely to become a reliable friend of the
United States though maintaining the prickliness for which the
Ministry of External Affairs is famous. Faced with a fairly consistent
U.S.-India-Russia axis, China is likely to support Pakistan.
As with many classical balances of power, over a 20-year period
there will be instabilities and sudden emergencies. Since all the
parties, except perhaps Japan, will possess nuclear weapons, misunderstandings and crises that get out of control could be
exceedingly dangerous. Remembering Austria-Hungary in 1913-14,
one cannot exclude the possibility of a weaker player trying to drag a
stronger partner into its quarrels. But it does not seem likely that a
crisis would get totally out of hand. China would restrain Pakistan,
and the United States and Russia would restrain India. That is why,
essentially, the second scenario is less dangerous than the first.
A subsidiary reason lies in the economic assistance that Pakistan
and India would in all likelihood receive from their allies. This
would bind them politically and give them incentives for avoiding
crippling defense expenditures. Economic growth would help,
particularly in Pakistan, to avoid internal instabilities.
Following this line of reasoning, it is quite possible that in
periods of relative harmony, their respective allies would strongly
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urge India and Pakistan to resolve their differences on Kashmir.
Such periods could recur fairly frequently, given that the future of
Taiwan is the only clearly defined issue that could plausibly lead to
Great Power military conflict. Even if America were to play its hand
badly, that would not seriously affect the position of the United
States as the number one global power. Conversely, even in relative
weakness, China’s position is secure. No one is going to try to
conquer it or take it over. China’s main risks are internal ones,
scarcely touched by the balance of power internationally.
As I have said, the only really big threat to stability is Taiwan (
and to a lesser extent the South China Seas) and there is no
convincing reason to suppose that Taiwan, which has been managed
successfully for fifty years, cannot continue to be managed. Maybe
that is a mite optimistic, given certain tendencies both within the
PRC and Taiwan, but at least the risks look lower than those
associated with Kashmir.
My third scenario is the most benevolent for all parties, but until
September 11, most people would have described it as the least
probable. Now it must be taken seriously. Its basis is the present
coalition against terrorism. Provided the United States will take the
lead, the coalition could be given an enlarged mandate, refined and
made more systematic. Specifically, I suggest that the United States
invite a few Great Powers to engage in a daily diplomatic dialogue
with a view toward reaching consensus on international affairs
whenever they can. No new institutions would be required, nor
would any, such as the Security Council, be altered. No formal commitments would be required, merely mutual undertakings to discuss
international problems and where possible to reconcile positions.
Each Power involved would retain freedom of action, and even
when acting as the result of a consensus, would act individually.
Which Powers? There is no magic number and one could argue
at the margins. My choice would be the United States plus eight,
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namely Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, and the three Europeans
—Germany, France and Britain—who by 2020 might instead appoint
the European Union.
Together these nine countries represent a shade over half of the
world’s population and contain a good mix of developed and
developing nations. None, I believe, would reject an invitation from
the United States. So, the crucial point becomes the U.S. attitude. I
leave that to you, but I would point out that with those states
working together, it would be foolhardy for any nation to think of
attacking one of them whether openly or indirectly via terrorism,
whether conventionally or with weapons of mass destruction.
Besides, discussion amongst the Nine would be an effective way of
getting at the big problems of development: the provision of capital,
lowering fertility rates, coping with AIDS and drugs, conserving
water and protecting the environment, raising standards in education and health, dealing with debt, protecting human rights and
other measures to increase economic activity and reduce poverty.
The cooperation of the Nine would be handsomely justified if it
produced effective action on even half of these problems.
To make the Nine work, big bilateral problems would have to be
resolved. But as I have already said, apart from Taiwan there are few
of these in Asia. And Taiwan, I suggest, is neither so dangerous nor
so difficult as is sometimes made out. With the incentive of joining
the Nine, it should be possible for China and India to resolve their
boundary differences and for Japan and Russia to settle the fate of
the four islands.2
To join the Nine, India would also need to resolve its dispute
with Pakistan. India would then be involved in politics on a global
scale and so could give up its preoccupation with dominating its
neighbors. Defense expenditures could be reduced, and terrorism
suppressed. All the countries of the area could benefit from
improved developmental programs.
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Consensus among the Nine would not always exist, and even
when it did, it would not necessarily solve all problems or prevent
new ones from arising. The cost of funding development would
probably be greater than in scenarios one or two, but there could be
offsets, for example, in security and probably via improved market
access. Constant consultation would reduce misunderstandings and
promote a common outlook. So although not a panacea, I judge
scenario three to be preferable to one and two.
In conclusion, I return as promised to two or three points I
mentioned earlier.
I suggested tentatively that U.S. policy towards South Asia will
have some reciprocal influence on U.S. global policies. I believe the
analysis in the three scenarios shows this is correct. If the IndianPakistani differences are too dangerous to be viewed with indifference, international cooperation to resolve them is required. Such
cooperation can be effective only if the United States exercises
leadership. Probably it also requires the involvement of Russia,
China and Japan, as well as Europe. Provided the action is kept
confidential and heeds the susceptibilities of the South Asian
countries, it can forward the true interests of both India and
Pakistan. Each now has as strong a government as can be reasonably
expected over the next decade or more, and yet they have repeatedly
failed to reach an agreement on their own. Even if there were no
nuclear issues involved, this failure makes it irresponsible to assume
that time is a healer. Lesser governments would find it even harder
to establish a permanent international boundary and acknowledge
the special status of the Kashmiris.
Another point to which I promised to return has a bearing on the
Kashmir issue as well as importance on its own terms. I refer to the
problem of confrontations between the West and Islamic countries.
This will continue to plague us as long as the central issues between
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Israel and Palestine remain unresolved. Action here is as necessary
as over the Kashmir issue. It would help in both cases if a major
Muslim country became modern and efficient. Hopefully, in due
course they all will. The prospects for Bangladesh and Malaysia have
recently improved. The same cannot be said of Indonesia, but that
country is so rich that all it needs is honest, efficient government and
a low fertility rate. However, these countries east of India will have
relatively little influence on the Islamic heartlands to the west.
Within a generation, Iran and one or two of the Arab countries may
look successful, modern and still Islamic. But at present, only two
major Muslim countries west of India seem to have realistic though
still doubtful prospects for success in the next decade. The two, of
course, are Turkey and Pakistan. The West should make a big effort
to help both.
Finally, I return to the most crucial point: the fleetingness of our
present opportunities and the question of what U.S. global policy
will be in, say, six months or a year. Tell me that, and I will tell you
how South Asia will fare in 2020.
ENDNOTES
1. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an armed attack on one
member of the alliance shall be considered an attack on all, and that the other
members shall join with the attacked member in collective defense.
2. Referred to by Japan as the Northern Territories, these islands consist of
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets.
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CHAPTER 3
THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS
Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
The Basics
Our discussions so far have underlined how much events over
the next weeks and months will determine projections for South Asia
in 2020, how critical the India-Pakistan relationship is for everything
that happens in the subcontinent, and how many variables there are
in the current situation. Yet it seems to me possible to identify a
number of basic features of the India-Pakistan situation over the past
half-century that can serve as a baseline for some thoughts on what
changed and what did not change with the nuclear explosions of
1998, and what has changed and not changed with September 11.
Briefly put, these basic features are the following. These two
countries have much in common, but more divides them. They
began their national existences in 1947 with different self-definitions.
India emerged as a necessarily secular democracy, inheriting much
of the apparatus and some of the ethos of the British Raj. Pakistan
was the world’s first intentional Islamic state, basically a refuge for
Indian Muslims from second-class citizenship in a free but Hindumajority Indian Union. Their experiences have not given their elites
persuasive or compelling reasons to change these definitions or
narrow these differences. On the contrary, the differences have been
sustained by the persistent hostility of the two countries, especially
by the differences in size and power between them, and most
especially by their dispute over the former princely state of Jammu
and Kashmir.
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In fact, since independence India and Pakistan have actually
grown further apart in basic structural terms, and that fact cannot be
masked by rhetoric about 5, 000 years of common culture or their
shared need to put aside conflict in order to concentrate on development. As time has gone on, they have become more and more
different countries. And there is also nothing inevitable about their
convergence on any common denominator in the future.
That said, it is also true that India and Pakistan have gone in
roughly the same directions in terms of economic and social
development: economic growth, urbanization, literacy, absorption of
technology. These imply proliferating linkages within their societies:
more and more, previously isolated and disconnected people now
connect with others on a continuous basis. And as new connections
become new dependencies, opportunities multiply both for greater
harmony and for greater friction—economic, social, cultural and
political.
These processes do not supersede politics. In particular, even if
India were to perform more successfully against these criteria
compared to its neighbors, Indian regional dominance would not
automatically follow. These processes do not guarantee outcomes
independent of politics. In fact, they can give politics new salience in
the life of the region. The reason is that they are producing growing
middle classes, both property-based and state-dependent, and the
makings of “new masses.” As more and more people and groups
enter “the system,” they develop stakes in the system. They awaken
to new hopes of gaining, to new fears of losing. And they have new
means—technical and conceptual as well as economic—to mobilize
for action to advance those hopes and/or to allay those fears. Joining
different kinds of people for common purposes in society becomes
more conceivable, and modern mass communications provide ways
to make it happen.
These processes cut in contrary directions when it comes to social
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and political results: they can exacerbate distinctions of caste, ethnic
origin, and communal affiliation; but they can also supersede these
distinctions with more modern nationalisms. That is why in India we
are seeing the emergence both of regional and caste-based parties and
of a powerful new nationalism. And it helps explain the nationalism
of India’s new private media, which one of our speakers alluded to.
Yet nationalism is a problem as well as a solution, as the history
of 20th century Europe attests. It is an ideology like any other,
existing in time, expressing and responding to human needs, with
many variants. There is nothing “given” about it. In today’ s
subcontinent, the chief variant, a kind of middle ground between the
narrow self-definitions of the past and the broader communities of
the future, is of course modern nationalism with a religious
component. We are seeing it in both countries. In Pakistan, an
Islamic component has been built into national feeling from the
beginning. Islamic piety and Islamist revivalism have appeal not just
in the civil and military bureaucracies that have always been the
backbone of the Pakistani state and the core of its middle classes, but
beyond them. The largest Islamic organization in Pakistan is not
Jama’at-I-Islami or any other political party, but Tablighi Jama’at,
which promotes individual and family piety and renewal, something
like Moral Rearmament in our early 20th century. In an almost allMuslim country, it has proved easier to mobilize Muslims for
reconversion to a purer and more disciplined “Islamic” personal and
family life than for “Islamist” politics, at least up to now. (Of course,
if Pakistan ever embarks on a path of rapid development which
pushes millions of peasants quickly into the outskirts of cities with
collapsing infrastructure, that could change.) In India the religious
component has taken more muscular political forms, in the Hindu
radicalism of core elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and
its constituencies.
It is true that there is no guarantee of peaceful development in
these trends. On the contrary: highly destructive nationalism may
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now be part of Ireland’s past, but it is almost certainly part of the
subcontinent’s future. Yet it is also true that in both countries you
find a growing consciousness that joining the world is not just
necessary but desirable.
In India, new global aspirations are setting new standards of
conduct. Being what Pervez Musharraf has called a “responsible and
dignified” member of the world community—as both countries
desire to be—means you cannot treat your neighbors or your own
people as arbitrarily or brutally as you did when you lived in
subcontinental isolation. Pakistan has always wanted to draw the
world into the subcontinent as a counterweight to India, but there
too the new global standards are now sharpening the country’s
original dilemma. The original Pakistan movement of the 1930s and
1940s was a coalition of three different kinds of Indian Muslims:
Western-educated professionals, for whom Quaid-I-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah may stand as the exemplar; East Bengalis
who wished to rid themselves of their Hindu landlords and
moneylenders; and (latest of all, beginning only in the mid-1940s),
powerful feudal and tribal leaders in India’s Northwest and their
religious allies, mainly the shaikhs and pirs of the Sufi traditions. All
wanted an Islamic country that would protect Indian Muslims from
Hindu domination, but they had no common vision or definition of
what it meant to be an “Islamic” country. And although the actors
have changed, in 54 years of independent existence no such common
vision or definition has ever emerged. Pakistan has stayed locked
into its point of departure: it is a refuge for Indian Muslims that
needs to be defended, but its positive Islamic identity remains
contentious and poorly defined.
What Changed and Did Not Change in 1998
It may be useful to sketch out the impact of the crises of 1998 and
2001 on these basic features. Let us begin with the nuclear explosions
of May 1998.
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In India, going overtly nuclear sharpened the discourse already
underway on the country’s proper global role. Some who promoted
overt nuclearization had high hopes that once the deed was done the
doors of the world’s top club would simply swing open for India.
But at least in the first months after the explosion, the sounds of
doors slamming shut against her reverberated in Indian ears. And
Pakistan somehow remained attached to her destiny like a tin can
tied on by a naughty deity. In Pakistan, going overtly nuclear
sharpened the perennial discourse on the country’s original
dilemma: was the Islamic Republic now more secure from Indian
domination, or did it need—and could it afford—to strike out with
new vigor? The result was Pakistani oscillation between the horns of
that dilemma. Being an overt nuclear power gave Pakistan the
confidence to be wise—to negotiate with India at Lahore in February
1999—and then the confidence to be stupid—to put regulars as well
as irregulars across the Line of Control (LOC) at Kargil a few months
later.
A s was the case with going overtly nuclear, the Kargil crisis of
spring and summer 1999 also had contradictory results. If India
believed after May 1998 that being nuclear would make it immune to
Pakistan’ s low-intensity warfare in Kashmir, the incursion put paid
to the thought. But if Pakistan thought that being nuclear would
neutralize India’ s conventional superiority and make the world safe
for low-intensity conflict in Kashmir, the Indian reaction—the threat
to cross the LOC in force—at least put that in question.
Nevertheless, neither lesson was clear. Politically, the lessons of
Kargil were muffled by the fact that India had not crossed the LOC
and by the stab-in-the-back theory that spread in Pakistan, the myth
that politicians had stolen a victory from the military. Kargil should
have shown both countries that in contemporary South Asia, the
really dangerous threshold of conflict, the line beyond which conflict
enters a new and more dangerous stage, is not between conventional
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and nuclear war but between low-intensity and conventional war.
But even after Kargil, the focus for actors and onlookers alike has
continued to be the point at which one side in a conventional conflict
uses nuclear weapons. So Kargil did not change the basics.
What Changed and Did Not Change in 2001?
It seems to me that September 11, the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, and December 13, the attack on the Indian
Parliament, should, taken as a sequence, finally demonstrate to both
India and Pakistan that the critical threshold in their region is the
one between low-intensity and conventional conflict. That seems to
be the direction in which events and thinking are taking us.
Much of what we have seen and heard over the month since
December 13 has been traditional: high-decibel rhetoric and
invective; ultimata and conditionalities that can be very dangerous if
taken literally, as they often are in politics; a lot of grandstanding for
the outside world. As one contributor has pointed out, both
countries are in fact giving peeks at their nuclear card for political
advantage. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that Pakistan’s decision
to join the world and the world’s decision to join Pakistan in
September have laid the basis for a non-traditional outcome to the
phase of the crisis that opened on December 13. Pressure from India
and the world have been moving Pakistan along a path that its
leadership had already chosen in September and stuck to through
three hard months. This path was toward a definition of what it
means for Pakistan to be Islamic that derives from the country’s
founding fathers, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the
other professionals from India who did so much to establish the
Pakistani state, rather than the definitions offered by Islamist radicalism—either the home-grown, North Indian variety associated with
the Deoband school or the imported variety that has surged onto the
world scene out of the Middle East since 1970.
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And India, meanwhile, appears to be realizing that the issues
involved in the current crisis are not black-and-white, not zero-sum,
not all-or-nothing: because the world cannot do and will not do
without a viable Pakistan. Using force to eliminate the problems
caused by Pakistan, or even just making Pakistan a pariah, are not
realistic options for India.
In fact, when it comes to India, the most striking change that the
crisis has wrought up to now (January 2002) has been India’s new
willingness to entertain a close relationship with the United States
and strong U.S. involvement in the subcontinent.
Obviously much depends on the durability of the world’s
engagement in the region. Right now both India and Pakistan are
making decisions that assume sustained international engagement in
the subcontinent. If they begin to make decisions once more on the
assumption that the United States and others will once again leave,
both are likely to revert to their bad old impulses and policies, and
probably to cruder, even more dangerous versions of them.
Just as obviously, much also depends on whether the threshold
from low-intensity unconventional warfare to conventional warfare
can be recognized as the potential trigger for nuclear use (at one
remove) that it really is. Pakistan’ s low-intensity warfare against
India is rooted after all in political disputes of which Kashmir is
simply the most salient example. If the key threshold between
unconventional and conventional warfare is to be raised and
(especially) stabilized, the two countries and their friends must begin
to deal with those disputes. If they cannot do so, the original
dilemmas are likely to reemerge.
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Part II

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
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CHAPTER 4
A CHANGING INDIA
Teresita C. Schaffer
About ten years ago, I went for lunch to the home of an Indian
friend. His neighborhood, in trans-Jamuna Delhi, had few cars but
plenty of motorcycles, scooters and three-wheelers. Leafy trees
shaded neighborhood shops. I had not been there in many years, and
was utterly taken aback at the billboard that loomed over the main
shopping street. It advertised an automatic washing machine. The
makers of an expensive, power-eating machine evidently thought
they could find buyers in a neighborhood I would have considered a
far better market for traditional laundrymen. This was the moment
when I realized how much middle-class India had changed.
In the decade since this mini-moment of discovery, India has
begun major transformations in its politics, economy, foreign policy,
and security outlook. These may not manifest themselves in similar
“light bulb moments,” but they will profoundly affect India’s future.
Their impact will be affected as well by whether they are joined by a
fifth transformation—in governance, in the transparency and effectiveness of India’s judicial, administrative and civic institutions.
This essay analyzes the likely changes in India’s politics and its
foreign policy over the next decade. These will be driven, however,
not just by strictly political factors but also by India’s economic
progress. Coalition politics, leadership transitions within India, and
economic change will profoundly affect both India’s internal
dynamics and its behavior on the international scene. The analysis
begins with a brief look at where India is now, including the
demographic changes that are likely during the next ten years. Next,
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it presents three possible scenarios for India’ s evolution, and finally
the policy lessons we should learn.
WHERE IS INDIA NOW?
Changing Political Landscape
The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its Hindu
nationalist ideology, the weakening of the once dominant Congress
Party and its moderate socialist and secular philosophy, the
increasing power of regional parties, and the rising profile of castebased parties represent a major reshaping of the Indian political
landscape.
The Congress Party and the BJP remain at center stage of Indian
politics, but their ability to stay there is not assured. They are
currently the only two parties with national reach and ambition. The
BJP’s support across a wide range of demographic groups appears to
be strengthening. The only populations where the Congress and its
allies outpolled the BJP and its associates in 1999 were illiterate
voters, scheduled castes, and Muslims. The number of illiterates is
shrinking rapidly, and Congress’s lead in these traditional “votebanks” is shrinking. The BJP coalition’s lead was particularly strong
among voters under age 25, urban voters, well-educated voters, and
upper-caste voters.
More importantly, Congress and the BJP together still poll only
about half of the votes in India’ s national elections. Votes for the BJP
as an individual party actually fell in 1999 compared with 1998, and
its aggregate votes as a party fell below those of Congress (24% to
Congress’s 28%).1 The BJP is vulnerable at the state level: its own
geographic base is narrow and its record in state government
unimpressive. Moreover, the power of incumbency is much weaker
in India than, for example, in the United States. Out of 545 members
of parliament elected in 1999, 183 were new, and this in an election
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that did not make major changes in the parliamentary numbers.2
The two biggest systemic questions facing the Indian political
system in the next decade are the impact of coalition politics,
including the role of state-based parties, and the issue of leadership
change within parties.
Coalitions. The last three Indian governments have been
coalitions, and in all likelihood this pattern will continue at least over
the next ten years. India’s elections increasingly revolve around local
or regional concerns and power dynamics between social groups,
and partly as a result, parties based in only one state have become
increasingly important. Taken together, such parties polled almost as
much as the combined votes of the BJP and Congress. Their
increasing power has also increased the bargaining strength of the
states with the center, with an impact on national economic and
foreign policy as well.
This change in India’s political center of gravity affects India’ s
two large parties differently. Thus far, the BJP has had an easier time
making alliances with the regional parties. At least for now, it is
counting on these alliances, and has given upon establishing itself
more firmly in the states of the south and east, where it is weak.
Congress has difficulty making alliances with regional parties, since
it often has to compete with them for power at the state level. It seeks
allies instead among India’s “leftist” parties. At present, this gives
the BJP a structural advantage in building coalitions, but the
Congress has a persistent advantage in projecting an all-India
appeal.
Coalition building means that even parties with a strong
ideology, such as the BJP, need to govern from the center. This has
not been an easy transition for the BJP. However, in one important
area—economic policy—the ideological differences between the
major parties have almost vanished. As a result, the key factor in
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determining how a government deals with economic policies is not
so much its party profile as its stability. A government that expects
to last four or five years will make more reform-oriented policy than
one whose cohesion is under threat and whose members may be
interested in using economic is sues for demagogic purposes. The
coalition strains that followed the March 2002 communal violence in
the state of Gujarat illustrate the problem. Several of the coalition’s
members voted against the government on a censure motion regarding the government’s handling of the violence. The scramble for
enough votes to survive completely preoccupied the government for
two months, and was a major factor in the government’s decision to
cancel some of the rather modest austerity measures proposed in its
budget.
Leadership. In the coming decade both the BJP and the Congress
will undergo a transition in leadership. The BJP has a fairly deep
bench, but it consists largely of older men, less flexible by reputation
than Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee. Unless they change their style,
they may have difficulty holding on to power or forming new types
of coalitions. The Congress, on the other hand, is likely to have great
difficulty moving outside the Nehru-Gandhi family for leadership,
or dealing with the demonstrated weakness as a national standardbearer of Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born daughter-in-law of former
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and widow of Rajiv. The Congress
will be a very different party depending on whether it is able to
grow new leadership outside the Nehru-Gandhi family or whether it
waits for Sonia Gandhi’s daughter, Priyanka, to join the political
race.
Regional politics could be the key arena for developing a new
generation of politicians. Some of their leaders, such as Chief
Minister Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh, are progressive
and dynamic. Others have perfected the art of patronage. The combination of low economic growth, huge populations, and patronageoriented politicians gives states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP)
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considerable power to disrupt national economic reform policies
they find painful.
Thus far, however, the state party leaders have primarily acted
as spoilers on the national scene. To make a real play for national
power, they would have to allow someone else to run their state
power bases, and they have been reluctant to make this move. They
would also face the challenge of extending their own geographic
reach, either by working with a national party that would have a
larger parliamentary presence to start with, or by starting their own
political party, with all the challenges that implies.
Foreign Policy and Security: India in a Changing World
India’s foreign policy has moved away from its ideologically
grounded Nehruvian roots. It still rests on a strong consensus that
India must remain an autonomous actor in the world, one that no
larger power can take for granted, and that it prefers a multipolar to
a unipolar international political and security structure. Leadership
in the Non-Aligned Movement once was the principal means of
gaining international status, and Russia was the primary extraregional friend. Now, India has joined the “nuclear club,” and seeks
a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The United
States has emerged as its key extra-regional relationship. India’s
preoccupation with Pakistan remains, as does its desire for
unchallenged dominance in South Asia. But far more than in the past
couple of decades, India finds South Asia too small a stage.
Three big question marks hover over India’ s foreign policy
orientation in the next decade. First, to what extent will it accept the
U.S. global leadership role, or to put it another way, how
assiduously or successfully will it seek out partners in creating a
more multipolar order? Second, how will the future evolution of
China and Russia affect India’s strategic goals? And finally, and
most importantly, will India be able to resolve its differences with
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Pakistan, or will it remain tethered to its past and to a static position
in the region by a continuing dispute across its western frontier?
Relations with the United States. The India-U.S. relationship is
central to the new Indian foreign policy. For the United States,
changes in East Asia—the rise of China, the changing dynamics of
the Korean peninsula, the prolonged slump in Japan, the dislocation
in Indonesia—and India’s own rapid growth in the past decade have
awakened the U.S. government to India as a major factor in the
larger Asian regional picture. For India, the increasing importance of
economics in their foreign policy, the end of the Cold War, and a
series of governments with pragmatic foreign policies have raised
the priority accorded to ties with Washington. Both countries
acknowledge a growing overlap in their strategic interests in the
Middle East, Central Asia and increasingly Southeast Asia, in
contrast to India’s traditional misgivings about the U.S. military
presence in Asia. Both countries oppose having a single power
dominate Asia, and both are carefully watching a rising China. Even
in the contentious nuclear area, they are quietly discovering a
common interest in stemming further proliferation of weapons
technology, and India’s strategists see in the Bush administration’s
disenchantment with international nonproliferation agreements an
opportunity to sidestep some of the traditional U.S.-Indian nuclear
disputes.
The U.S. decision to reengage Pakistan after the attacks of
September 11 raised questions in India about whether the “bad old
days” of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance were returning. Since that time, a
steady parade of high-level visitors between New Delhi and
Washington have made it clear that despite the new U.S.-Pakistan
ties, the United States and India are far more productively and
intensely engaged than at any time in the past half century. How
both countries manage that relationship—both the common interests
and the inevitable continuing disagreements—will to a large extent
shape the role that India plays in the region and the world.
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W hither Russia? Despite the reduction in its international role,
Russia remains India’s largest foreign source of military supply, and
will remain so at least for the next decade. It is a significant trading
partner, and if Russia’s economy revives, trade is also likely to grow.
But perhaps its greatest importance for Indian policymakers is as a
potential power center in the multipolar world Indians would prefer
to see develop in the next decade or two. A revived Russia is
unlikely to accept continued U.S. dominance without making some
effort to push back. Russian leaders have encouraged India to think
of itself as an important power center as well—something that
hardly needs encouragement in Delhi. Whether the India-Russia
connection fits peacefully into the network of relationships the
United States is now trying to build or whether it instead becomes a
thorn in the side of the United States and a threat to American ties
with India depends in large measure on how valuable both India
and Russia find their respective relations with the United States.
A Rising China. India-China relations have changed less with the
end of the Cold War. The two countries share the longest disputed
border in the world and fought a war over it in 1962. India’s loss in
that war left a chronic sense of insecurity vis-à-vis China. More
recently, Indians resent the discrepancy in the way the world
regards India’s and China’s nuclear programs. Their position as two
rising states next to one another is likely to sustain their rivalry
despite both countries’ efforts to manage their disputes peacefully.
China and India both have troubled and vulnerable peripheries:
Tibet and Xinjiang for China, Kashmir and the Northeast for India.
China’s continuing nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan suggests that
China wants to keep India somewhat concerned about its western
frontier. Its failure to support Pakistan’s Kargil incursion in 1999,
however, indicates that China does not want to see its two nuclear
neighbors go to war. On the other side of the ledger, India has
caused China angst by allowing the Dalai Lama to live in
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Dharamsala since he fled Tibet in 1959, and more recently by taking
in the Karmappa Lama. Although the Tibetans’ activities are
restricted in India, their presence there is nonetheless a source of
irritation to China.
Future Sino-Indian relations will be influenced by both countries’
leadership changes, by their overall economic health and potential
for an outward-looking foreign policy, and by their success in
tackling internal instability. At present, China is far more important
to India’s security than the reverse. India may narrow the gap
between its and China’s economic performance and regional profile
in the next ten years, but is not likely to overtake China, barring a
major economic disaster in China. Both will carefully watch the
Indian Ocean sea routes through which their oil is imported. An
Indian naval build-up and closer ties between India and the United
States, or India and the ASEAN states, which form China’s strategic
periphery, could arouse concerns in China.
The “Pakistan Trap.” The hardy perennial in India’s foreign
relations is its unresolved dispute with Pakistan, which keeps both
countries trapped in the past. This “Pakistan Trap” is one of the
principal impediments to India’s fulfilling its ambitions for a higher
profile international role. For both countries, Kashmir embodies
basic questions of identity, symbolizing for Pakistan the Muslim
majority area that it was deprived of, and for India the demonstration of its secular character. Besides this central issue, the two
countries dispute a laundry list of “normalization problems”—visas,
trade problems, and the like. These specific problems are magnified
by Pakistan’s and India’s asymmetrical views of their place in the
world. Pakistan suffers from chronic insecurity and a 50-year quest
to move out of the shadow of India’s superior size and strength.
India, on the other hand, resents being equated with Pakistan and
seeks recognition as a world power. With nuclear weapons in both
countries, the volatility of India-Pakistan relations takes on greater
international importance.
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At present, the India-Pakistan relationship remains at more or
less the same impasse where it has festered for the past 10 years. If
this continues for another 10 years, it will severely depress India’s
chances of making good on its economic and international potential.
Escaping the trap will require strong leadership in both
countries. The big danger for India remains the institutional weakness and threat of fragmentation in Pakistan. Following the attacks
on the United States and especially following the attack on the
Indian parliament in December 2001, Pakistan has reversed its
Afghanistan policy and banned several militant groups active in
Kashmir and within Pakistan. If this policy change is seriously
implemented and sustained, it will represent an opportunity to put
both Pakistan and its relations with India on a different course. In
the short run, however, the impact of the attack on the Indian
parliament has been a dangerous increase in tensions between these
two nuclear-armed countries.
In looking at scenarios for India’s future, I have tried to identify
the opportunities and assets India could mobilize in solving this
stubborn problem, but this remains the biggest drag on India’s
potential development.
Demographic Change by 2010: Building Blocks for the Future
India’s 2001 census records remarkable demographic changes in
the past ten years, changes that are likely to herald even more
dramatic ones in the next decade. A few trends are likely to have
particular political importance:
• Population: Population growth has slowed dramatically.
India’s population is projected at 1.18 billion in 2010—only 18
percent above its current level.3 Population growth may
stabilize in three of India’s states in the next 20 years—Kerala,
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Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. On the other hand,
population growth has been accelerating in Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar and the normally more progressive Haryana and
Gujarat.4
• Literacy: Literacy has grown rapidly in the past ten years, and
primary school enrollment figures suggest that it will continue
to do so. The census shows male literacy at 76 percent. The
growth of female literacy is even more dramatic—up by 15
percentage points to 54% nationwide. Male literacy could be
nearly universal in ten years. Regional variations in literacy
rates are even more striking, with some of the most
economically and socially laggard states—Rajasthan and
Madhya Pradesh—having nearly doubled literacy.5 This has
the makings of a social revolution. Less heralded is the
increase in secondary school enrollment. United Nations (UN)
data for 1996 show 59 percent of boys and 39 percent of girls
enrolled in secondary school. While primary education starts
the social revolution, secondary education provides the
potential economic boom.
• Urbanization: Cities continue to grow faster than the
countryside. Today’s urban population accounts for about 25
percent of India’s population. The Indian census projects urban
population at 32 percent of the national total by 2011. Literacy
is markedly higher in cities than in the country as a whole;
even states with literacy rates well below the national average
have solid majorities that are literate in the cities.6 Cities
incubate both a rootless working class population and the new
middle class. Their political allegiances follow different
patterns. A larger and more volatile urban population may
also magnify the political reaction to potential future political
or security setbacks.
• Inequality: Economic growth has been unevenly distributed
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among India’s states. Growth rates in the 1990s ranged from
over 8 percent (Gujarat) to 2.7 percent (Bihar).7 The fastest
growing populations have the slowest growing economies.
Some of today’s laggards—notably UP and Bihar—are
showing few signs of progress, and their large size means they
can extract a considerable political price on the nation’s
economic reform efforts. On the other hand, the acceleration of
literacy in some of the traditionally backward states shows that
these trends cannot be taken for granted. They also argue that
decentralization may be a good remedy for some of the social
ills that have resisted progress thus far.
• The Wild Card–AIDS: The growth of AIDS is the biggest
demographic wild card—and the one where statistics are least
reliable. According to an estimate calculated by the National
AIDS Control Program in India, in 2000 there were close to
four million people infected with HIV in India. Many experts
believe that the disease is massively under-reported; estimates
of the real incidence run as high as 10 million. The rate of
increase could be as large as one to two million per year, with
the total number of infected doubling every 2-3 years. These
figures could result in as many as 100 million infected people
by 2010.8
The scenarios given below do not factor in the rate of HIV/AIDS
infection. But if it reaches anything like this faster pace, it will have
devastating economic and social consequences. Based on the experience of the most heavily infected countries, when infection reaches 5
percent of a country’s population, economic growth is affected, and
at 10 percent, growth can be halted altogether.9 Due to the weak
health infrastructure in India, life expectancy after infection is likely
to be only 4-5 years. Success in containing AIDS and caring for the
infected depends critically on governance.
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THREE POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS
These political trends and demographic changes may combine in
any number of ways in the next 10 to 20 years. I would like to
discuss three possible scenarios, focused on the next 10 years. The
first two are largely driven by different economic growth rates; the
third is driven by major changes in the political leadership and
structure. They tell very different stories about how India may look
in the future, and how it will manage not only its domestic problems
but its foreign policy and security as well. Scenario building is of
course speculative, but I will try to distill some useful lessons from it
at the end.
Scenario I: The “Well-Fed Tiger.”
In this first scenario, India continues to enjoy high economic
growth, reaching 7 to 8 percent per year by the end of the decade. By
2010, its per capita income has doubled, reaching roughly the level of
today’s Peru. This is accompanied by significant improvements in
the efficiency and integrity of governance; indeed, it is almost
impossible to expect this kind of sustained growth without a major
push for good governance. The more dynamic and successful states
surge ahead; in the process, they expand their political margin for
maneuver vis-à-vis the center, and the result is greater
decentralization without any formal constitutional change.
The economic success of the BJP is mirrored at the polls. The
parliamentary elections of 2004 return a BJP government, with a
stronger coalition, still based heavily on parties based in the more
economically successful states. The next generation of BJP leaders
takes over, its hard-line instincts somewhat tempered by the need to
keep a coalition together and win votes outside of the BJP’s home
territory.
But this political and economic success comes at a price. The
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politics of northern India, largely left out of the economic boom,
become increasingly dysfunctional. The large parliamentary delegations from Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar and some of the other large
states of the north become increasingly resistant to decreases in subsidies and insistent on increasing their share of the resources redistributed by the central government. Dealing with their demands
becomes an increasingly time-consuming chore for the government,
and strengthens the sense that there are at least two Indias
developing in different ways.
Both the growing economy and the strong defense orientation of
the government result in a steady increase in defense budgets,
especially in the first half of the decade. The first focus of this
defense buildup is power projection capability. The missile program
accelerates, with the Agni being deployed in 2006, and the navy
benefits from a surge in procurement. The second key area is stateof-the-art border monitoring and control, including Phalcon aircraft
from Israel and sensor technology. A growing number of India’s
military supply contracts are with Western or Israeli suppliers,
reinforcing the importance India attaches to those political
relationships.
A government of this sort will take a fairly tough line toward
Pakistan. It will respond harshly to cross-border incidents, though a
combination of monitoring equipment and a decision to allow
international monitors have resulted in a significant decrease in
infiltration. However, if the government becomes convinced the
dispute with Pakistan is interfering with its broader goals, it would
have an opportunity to change the relationship with Pakistan. The
de facto decentralization of the political system could make it easier
to bring in real autonomy in Kashmir, and this could become part of
an expanded compromise agreement with Pakistan. An economically successful BJP government would be well placed to face down
domestic critics of its peace overtures. The big obstacles to such a
happy outcome would be the new BJP leaders’ own hard-line
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instincts and the difficulty for a still fragile Pakistan to reduce its
goals in Kashmir.
The booming economy will also make energy diplomacy an
important priority for India. Here, the government’s nationalist
instincts might conflict with the kind of sensitive handling needed to
negotiate gas and hydroelectric supply agreements with Bangladesh
and Nepal.
Outside the region, India’s policy under this scenario will be
pragmatic. Relations with the United States will remain key, and will
prosper. India’s economic success will expand both trade and
investment with the United States, a central ingredient in any really
significant U.S. relationship. In addition, the security dialogue begun
after the Clinton visit in 2000 is likely to grow, with special emphasis
on Indian Ocean security and on the broader Asian security picture.
In the nuclear field, India will work pragmatically with the United
States to find ways of participating in international efforts to reduce
the further spread of nuclear weapons.
The India-China rivalry will remain, but will be driven primarily
by the stability of the Chinese and the Indian periphery and by
Chinese internal stability. A Sino-Indian breakthrough is unlikely.
Internal trouble in China would lead to a more brittle Chinese
approach to India. China will maintain a strong relationship with
Pakistan, but will not seek to provoke an India-Pakistan crisis.
Indications that China is meddling in India’s troubled northeast
would spark a crisis in India-China relations; the same would be true
of any indication that India was involved in Tibet or Xinjiang.
In general, economic ties will be a more important feature of
India’s foreign policy outlook. This means that India will give
heightened priority to its relations with Southeast Asia, with its oil
suppliers in the Middle East, and with potential new suppliers in
Central Asia. This could lead to disagreements with the United
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States over how to deal with Iraq and Iran, though that will also
depend a great deal on how U.S. policies develop.
Scenario II: The “Hungry Tiger.”
In this scenario, India’s rapid economic growth of the past
decade falters, and a series of cautious budgets leave India at middecade with slightly reduced growth (4 to 5 percent). The government’s fiscal problems have severely constrained investment in
public infrastructure, the more so since parliamentary log-rolling has
prevented any significant reduction in subsidies. The result is far
from disastrous, but certainly does not represent a breakthrough in
reducing India’s poverty. Nor can one point to any significant
improvement in governance. There is little change in the relationship
between the center and the states. This helps various state-level
coalition governments avoid trouble, but also depresses growth in
more dynamic states.
The BJP is re-elected in 2004, but its weak economic performance
contributes to a reduction in both the BJP’s individual showing and
the strength of the coalition. Within a year, political polarization in
the states of UP and Bihar coupled with a backlash from
“progressive” states leads to a successful Congress move to unseat
the new government on a motion of no-confidence.
A weak and fractious Congress coalition takes over, dependent
on mutually antagonistic coalition partners. Its new leader, Priyanka
Gandhi, excites the popular imagination, but has little experience
and inherits many of the “old guard” advisers that had remained
close to her mother. They are reluctant to undertake more vigorous
economic reforms, given the fragility of their political base and the
importance to it of the traditional leftist parties. They are also eager
to show that their foreign policy is more nationalistic than that of the
outgoing BJP. By the end of the decade, Priyanka is beginning to
shift to a new group of advisers, but she never expands her working
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majority in parliament enough to make possible a bold approach to
policy.
The BJP in opposition reverts to its more militant tradition,
demanding stronger policies vis-à-vis the neighbors, and pressuring
the government to continue its expensive military build-up. They
also resurrect aspects of their cultural and communal agenda that
had been put aside during the years they ran the government.
The new government maintains a tough stand on Pakistan. In
contrast to the previous scenario, however, India’s lackluster
economic performance and highly visible political squabbling leads
the Pakistan leadership to conclude that India’s strength is waning in
very fundamental ways, and that it can afford a more aggressive
stance on supporting the militancy in Kashmir. India-Pakistan
relations become even more crisis-prone as a result. The possibilities
for a misunderstanding or faulty intelligence leading to a nuclear
face-off are significantly higher under this scenario than under the
previous ones.
The government’s defense build-up is constrained by its
economic woes. It focuses on a few high-profile items. The missile
program is a high priority. Procurement from the West does not
increase, largely because of the cost of Western equipment. India
extends its nationalistic approach to policy beyond the region as
well. Relations with the United States stagnate, partly because of an
increasingly contentious Indian posture in multilateral negotiations
and partly because the private economic relationship is going nowhere. Trade remains at about the same level; investment falls, with
a couple of contentious investment disputes and the unfavorable
economic policy climate scaring away new investors.
India makes a major bid to revive its relations with Russia. The
impact of this effort depends to a large extent on what happens in
Russia during the next decade. If Russia’s economy has revived and
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its foreign policy has become more active, it would find in the
“Hungry Tiger” India a partner interested in scoring points against
the United States on a variety of global issues.
Relations with China, on the other hand, do not change very
much. China essentially ignores India, reinforced in its view that
India is not in the same league. India’s relations with Southeast Asia
also stagnate, lacking the economic stimulus the relations thrive on.
Scenario III: “The Tiger Regroups.”
This is the most speculative of the scenarios, and unlike the other
two is driven by changes in the political structure rather than
economic growth. As the 2004 elections approach, splits in Congress
and the BJP shake up the political system. Two groups could gain
from such a scenario.
The most interesting potential “winners” are the state-based
parties. Those in southern India have been a source of pragmatic and
savvy political leaders. However, taking advantage of this type of
opportunity would require wrenching change in those leaders’
modus operandi: if they made a bid for national political office, they
would probably have to leave their state Chief Minister position to
someone else. Moreover, they cannot run the country without the
north, and would therefore have to find allies among parties with a
base there.
The other potential winner is the Congress, or more precisely
parts of the Congress. The present weakness in Congress leaves a
vacuum at the center-left of the Indian political spectrum that might
attract a new combination of Congress and non-Congress politicians
looking for a new political base.
In the short-term, political regrouping would be a recipe for
inward-looking politics. Forming and maintaining coalitions would
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become the overwhelming preoccupation of political parties. This
creates an environment that is bad for economic growth, bad for
foreign policy, and bad for relations with the U.S. in the short term.
The question is whether it can be an opportunity in the long term, by
bringing some new faces on to the national scene. A shakeup of this
sort could also encourage de facto decentralization and be a turning
point in center-state relations, especially if the new leadership were
drawn from state-based parties.
While a messy scenario like this one is not a good backdrop for
peace initiatives, it is interesting to speculate on how a peace
initiative might arise. Perhaps a leader from outside the north comes
to power determined to reach a settlement with Pakistan so as to
position India better to pursue its international agenda. Not
beholden to Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah and the
Kashmiri politicians with whom India has worked over the years,
he/she succeeds in bringing a broader range of Kashmiris into
discussions and eventually into the electoral process. This opening to
the Kashmiris is matched by a serious offer of discussions with
Pakistan, starting with an equally dramatic gesture—perhaps a
proposal to resolve the Siachen Glacier problem, long a bone in
Pakistan’s throat.
Another element in this hypothetical peace initiative could be a
vigorous effort at energy diplomacy. Energy trade represents the
greatest untapped economic benefit for the South Asian region. India
is one of the two fastest-growing energy markets in the world;
Bangladeshi gas, Nepali and Bhutanese hydropower, and oil and gas
transported from Central Asia and Iran through Pakistan could all
help meet India’s demand provided the political obstacles can be
overcome. Here too, new leadership in India might be able to shed
some of the historical baggage Indian governments have accumulated by cultivating a more supple and less overbearing approach to
India’s smaller neighbors. On the Pakistan front, provided India and
Pakistan first make some political progress on their larger dispute,
54

an energy transit agreement could strengthen the peace constituencies in both countries.
The fundamental question in trying to assess the prospects for a
peace initiative is how Pakistan would react. Would it take a
similarly bold approach, or would it try to take advantage of India’s
internal “messiness”? The answer depends in part on Pakistan’s own
internal coherence, and in part on its leaders’ willingness to redefine
the position on Kashmir they have maintained for half a century.
Predicting Pakistan’s future goes well beyond the scope of this
paper. The policy changes President Musharraf undertook after the
attacks on New York and Washington, and especially after the attack
on the Indian parliament, could provide a chance that Pakistan will
start the kind of revival that would make possible a constructive
policy toward India. The signs since then are mixed.
SIGNPOSTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Which of these scenarios is most likely? At present, the indicators
are not clear. The economic performance of the 1990s would be
consistent with the “Well-Fed Tiger,” but the past year has seen
economic activity slump. Turmoil in the BJP-led coalition following
the communal riots of March 2002 suggests that India could be
headed toward “The Tiger Regroups.” Perhaps the most concrete
indicator over the next few years of the direction in which India is
headed will be whether the government is able to tackle the
multilayered problems of the electric power industry. This can be
taken as a proxy for economic reform, governance, and the vitality of
decentralization efforts.10 On the political side, one important indicator will be the ability of the two major parties to bring in new blood.
Another is the concentration or fragmentation of votes at the state
level in India’s major states: will the BJP and the Congress revitalize
themselves in the major states, or will parties based in one state or
drawing from one caste group continue to proliferate and to expand
their collective role in national life?
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On one point, the prognosis is more discouraging. Nothing in
current trends provides much optimism that India and Pakistan will
make real progress toward a settlement. This should be a major
priority for both. The scenarios as well as more conventional projections make it clear that the continuing dispute extracts a heavy price.
For India, it stands in the way of a much-prized greater role on the
world stage, and tends to pull down both economic growth and
national integration. For Pakistan, the impact is much more severe:
the domestic strains that have come close to tearing the country
apart as well as its international isolation during the 1990s are both
traceable to the country’s involvement in the Kashmir insurgency.
Predicting which scenario will come to pass, however, is less
important than assessing the policy conclusions that arise out of all
three. Four lessons are particularly important.
Lesson 1: The Economy is Key.
High growth is likely to produce greater political stability and
more constructive international policies than stagnation. It fosters
trade and investment and encourages outward-looking policies. It is
particularly beneficial to India-U.S. ties. India’s emerging relationship with Southeast Asia (India’s “Look East” policy) was a result of
its new economic policies and the foreign policy that flows from this
economic diplomacy. Politics in India will always be messy, and
inequality between states will cause some backlash. But the
problems of success are preferable to those of economic stagnation.
Low growth leads to confrontational and poisonous politics. The
“Hungry Tiger” scenario, with a combination of low economic
growth and attempts at military expansion, is the most dangerous,
and is a recipe for India-Pakistan miscalculation. Low growth in the
“Tiger Regroups” scenario compounds the political upheavals built
into the scenario.
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Lesson 2: Political Leadership is Essential.
In trying to assess what backdrop is most favorable to dynamic
economic reform and statesmanlike stewardship of India-Pakistan
relations, one cannot escape political leadership. Prosperity may be
the most promising condition, but it cannot do the job by itself. That
is why we should focus on the coming leadership and generational
transition in the big parties. It will have an impact on national policy
as well as on the character of the parties themselves. Leaders of state
parties will become more powerful at the center, and will seek a
national role. Their success and scope will depend in large part on
the alliances they build, as well as their ability to deal with the large
and backward states like Bihar and UP, whose high populations give
them enormous electoral power.
To provide leadership in the next decade and beyond, the
political system needs to develop new talent. And it may be—as
illustrated by the “Tiger Regroups” scenario—that the price of
developing long-term leadership is short-term instability.
Lesson 3: The Mismatch Between India’s Policy Goals and Its
Capabilities Will Continue.
India’s foreign and military policies show a curious imbalance
between ambitions and capabilities. Published policy documents and
private conversations, for example, both suggest that India is much
more dedicated to the goal of achieving permanent membership on
the United Nations Security Council, for example, than it is
committed to any particular course of action once it gets there. Its
military plans in the past few years have involved ambitious
procurement and technology upgrade goals, but the link between
these and its immediate operational requirements has sometimes
been weak.
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This disconnect is most dangerous in the low-growth scenario,
where it can contribute to disastrous miscalculations (for example,
between India and Pakistan) . A high-growth scenario would make it
easier for India to fill some of these gaps in the next decade. In the
meantime, it is worth thinking about whether a more operationally
savvy defense policy could increase India’s power, as well as save it
money. It is also worth reflecting on the mismatch between military
plans and India’s diplomacy. A continued high defense build-up will
backfire without a deft foreign policy outreach in the Indian Ocean
region.
Lesson 4: The External Dimension: Deal with Pakistan.
While India’s basic orientation will be based chiefly on what
happens inside India, the unresolved dispute with Pakistan is the
biggest sea anchor on India’s international ambitions. These
scenarios suggest that dealing with it will probably get harder with
time. If India is successful in this effort, it will be able to focus more
of its attention on its relations with the world’s major powers; if not,
it is likely to be pulled back toward its preoccupation with Pakistan
at regular intervals.
The scenarios discuss the opportunities and constraints for India.
The obstacles to a vigorous and effective Indian peace policy become
more severe if India goes through a messy political leadership
change. An extended period of lagging economic growth also makes
it more difficult for India to make a serious move toward peace,
partly because it will make the Indian government more concerned
about being driven from off ice, and partly because it could lead to
miscalculation by Pakistan of where India really stands. None of
these conditions is likely to improve with time. If there is a moment
of opportunity, in other words, it is now.
But prospects for a successful peace effort also depend on
Pakistan. Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to say that the
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prospects for international stability in South Asia depend chiefly on
Pakistan. The sources of instability in Pakistan are many and
complex: an anemic economy, weak political institutions made
weaker by persistent military intervention in politics, divisions
among provinces and religious communities, and policies in
Afghanistan and Kashmir that have encouraged the growth of
militant organizations that operate with little respect for the state.
This last point is probably the most fundamental issue.
Since September 11, President Musharraf has reversed his
government’s Afghan policy and announced action against the
militant groups’ activities within Pakistan. Will the logic of this
action extend as well to cutting off the infiltration of militants into
Kashmir? The policy changes have been well received in many parts
of the Pakistani electorate, but have provoked a vocal and violent
challenge from some of the militants. How will this play out? The
April 30 referendum on President Musharraf’s continued tenure as
president left a sour taste in many Pakistani mouths and weakened
Pakistan’s already troubled political institutions. What will be the
impact of the parliamentary elections expected later in 2002, and will
they provide the political legitimacy the current government lacks? If
the answer to these questions is positive, then Pakistan will
gradually become a steadier and more coherent country, and a better
bet for a serious peace effort—provided its leadership is prepared to
go down that road.
A successful effort to take advantage of today’s opportunities
will require imagination, forbearance and steady nerves in India,
and even more so in Pakistan, where a 50-year sense of grievance
and insecurity and the reality that its ambitions are unlikely to be
met will make the peace effort more painful. It will require an
extended effort, a process that can be sustained through the
inevitable interruptions, and leaders willing to keep the effort going.
It will also, I believe, require active, sophisticated and discreet
encouragement from a third party, and since its reengagement with
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Pakistan, the United States is for the first time in decades uniquely
placed to play a constructive role. But the first step out of that trap is
to recognize that this is something important for India, not a favor to
Pakistan or the rest of the world, and that there is a problem that
needs solving even during periods when the violence in Kashmir
ebbs.
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Enron investment at Dabhol, in Maharashtra, is a particularly conspicuous
example.) The central government, acutely conscious that the power sector is
responsible for a major portion of the combined massive and growing fiscal deficit
of the center and the states, has tried to implement a package of policy reforms
that would give states a positive incentive to address the problems of their
respective power sectors. In the final analysis, however, corrective action depends
on the hard work of each of the state SEBs and state governments.
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTH ASIA IN 2020: ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Vijay L. Kelkar1

Rapid economic growth and successful poverty reduction in
South Asia, the home for the largest number of poor people in the
world, is of strategic importance to the global community, as a
prosperous South Asia would vitally contribute to global peace. This
paper deals with the challenges in achieving accelerated economic
growth in South Asia in this age of globalization. The first part
covers long-term economic trends in South Asia in general and in
India in particular. The second part develops a growth scenario for
the South Asian region for the year 2020, focusing on the challenges
faced by India—the predominant economy in the region—in
accelerating growth as well as discussing the reform prospects of
other major countries of the region such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka.
PART I: SOUTH ASIA: A PROFILE
The countries of South Asia vary in size and complexity,
particularly in terms of social stratification. The seven countries of
the region—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka—are spread over an area of half a million square
kilometers (sq. km.). Presently about 1.34 billion people live in South
Asia, accounting for 22 percent of the world’s population. About one
billion of these live in India, making it the world’s second most
populous country after China. The estimated gross domestic product
(GDP) generated by all the South Asian countries in the year 1999
was about US$593 billion, accounting for less than two percent of the
63

global GDP, with India’s contribution being US$449 billion (about 76
percent of the regional total).2
Demographic Profile.
The size and structure of the South Asian population have been
changing. From 1960 to 2000, the regional population increased from
about 562 million to an estimated 1.34 billion, making its combined
size larger than that of China (data for this section is presented in
Table 1). The four countries of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka together constitute 96 percent of that population. As the most
populous among these four countries, India has more than 75
percent of the region’s population. The annual population growth
rate in South Asia has come down from 2.30 percent in 1961 to 1.89
percent in 1999. And in the next two decades, as can be seen from
Table 1F, the annual population growth rate is projected to gradually
slow to 1.1 percent in South Asia and 1 percent in India. Though the
demographic transition of the past four decades has led to a
reduction in the dependency ratio (number of dependents per 100
working-age population) from 78 to 67 and brought about a
substantial increase in the size of the labor force in all of the
countries in the region, its late arrival, to some extent, has worked
against fast economic growth in South Asia. However, with reduced
birth rates and consequent demographic changes, the dependency
ratio by the year 2020 is projected to come down to about 49 in South
Asia and to about 47 in India. Such a low dependency ratio would
imply that the economically active population in the South Asia
region would increase from about 800 million in 1999 to about 1.2
billion by 2020 and bring in its wake associated advantages of
demographic transition. What this means is that over the next few
decades, the South Asian region will have the world’s largest
economically active population. These trends have profound
implications for the increased potential for achieving a miracle of
rapid economic growth through higher savings and investment.
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Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia
World
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
China

Table 1A
Trends in Population, 1960-99
1960
1970
51
67
435
548
46
61
10
13
562
712
3019
3676
25
32
8
11
667
818

(in millions)
1980
87
687
83
15
903
4430
38
14
981

1990
110
850
108
17
1122
5252
43
18
1135

Table 1B
Dependency Ratio (No. of dependents to 100 working-age population)
1960
1970
1980
1990
Bangladesh
80.8
95.7
97.9
90.3
India
76.1
78.8
74.2
68.8
Pakistan
92.3
97.9
89.6
84.7
Sri Lanka
84.0
83.6
65.5
60.8
South Asia
78.1
82.2
78.1
73.0
World
73.9
76.6
71.2
64.2
Korea, Rep.
82.7
83.0
60.8
44.6
Malaysia
94.9
92.3
75.4
67.2
China
77.8
78.7
67.4
49.8

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia
World
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
China

Table 1C
Population Growth (annual %)
1960
1970
1980
2.45
2.73
2.46
1.85
2.31
2.25
2.43
3.01
2.91
2.51
2.12
1.83
2.30
2.43
2.34
1.25
2.17
1.73
3.09
2.13
1.56
3.02
2.54
2.35
1.83
2.76
1.25

1990
1.99
2.02
2.54
1.11
2.09
1.77
1.15
2.97
1.47

Note: Population growth data of South Asia and the World are for the year 1961.

Table 1. Population Statistics of Selected Countries.
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1999
128
998
135
19
1329
5978
47
23
1254

1999
72.9
63.8
82.7
49.6
67.2
60.0
39.6
62.5
47.9

1999
1.61
1.80
2.41
1.10
1.89
1.36
0.92
2.36
0.91

Table 1D
Population Projections (in millions)
2005
142
1,091
156
20
1,467
6,418

2015
166
1,222
193
23
1,676
7,086

2020
176
1,281
210
24
1,772
7,403

Table 1E
Dependency Ratio Projections (No. of dependents to 100 working-age population)
2005
2010
2015
Bangladesh
59.1
57.5
54.4
India
57.2
52.7
49.2
Pakistan
73.7
66.9
61.4
Sri Lanka
46.2
46.7
48.6
South Asia
59.8
55.6
51.9
World
54.4
51.8
50.5

2020
49.5
46.9
56.9
49.6
49.2
50.5

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia
World

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia
World

2010
155
1,160
174
21
1,576
6,758

Table 1F
Population Growth Rate Projections (annual %)
2000-05
2005-10
2010-15
1.8
1.7
1.4
1.2
2.4
2.3
1.1
1.1
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia
World

2015-20
1.4
1.1
2.0
1.0
1.2
1.0

1.2
1.0
1.7
0.9
1.1
0.9

Table 1G
Projected Life Expectancy at Birth (in years)
2000-05
2005-10
2010-15
62.1
63.6
65.2
62.9
63.2
64.7
63.9
65.1
66.8
74.1
75.2
76.2
62.7
63.2
64.7
66.7
67.2
68.4

2015-20
66.7
66.0
68.3
77.2
66.1
69.4

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom)

Table 1. Population Statistics of Selected Countries. (concluded)
Natural Resources.
Unlike other regions, such as Africa, West Asia or Latin America,
South Asia is not well endowed with critical natural resources such
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as land, water, minerals and hydrocarbons. For instance, presently
the per capita arable land in South Asia is 0.16 hectares, much lower
than the world’s average of 0.24 hectares. Similarly, the South Asian
region accounts for just 2 percent of the world’s forest cover, which
is essential to maintain ecological balance and biodiversity, despite
having 3.8 percent of the world’s total surface area.3 Presently
782,000 sq. km. of forest area in this region account for only 15
percent of its total land area, as compared to 29 percent of land area
covered by forests in the world. Further, the rate of forest depletion
in South Asia has been the highest in the world.4
With respect to fresh water, although three large watersheds (the
Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus) serve the region, the per
capita availability of fresh water is much lower compared to other
watersheds in the world. The per capita fresh water availability is
estimated to be only 2,854 cubic meters (m³), as compared to the
world average which exceeds 8,000 m³.5 With increasing
urbanization, the most critical challenge for the region will be that of
water. Further, if no significant changes in the environmental
protection policies are made in the next 10-15 years, the devastating
consequences of environmental degradation will pose the most
serious challenge to the economy of the region.
With respect to energy, which is so essential for industrialization
and economic growth, South Asia fares poorly. The estimated
reserves position, particularly that of oil and gas in the region, is not
very encouraging. For instance, crude oil reserves are estimated to be
just six billion barrels of the world’s 1,009 billion barrels (0.6
percent). In per capita terms this comes to 4.6 barrels compared to
169 barrels per capita in the world. The region has only 85 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas reserves out of the world’s 5,016 trillion
cubic feet of total gas reserves (1.69 percent). The coal reserves in the
region, amounting to 195 billion metric tons out of the world’s 1,427
billion metric tons (13 percent), give its people 147 metric tons per
capita in contrast to the world average of 235 metric tons.6
67

Consequently, in the energy sector as a whole, South Asia is a major
energy-importing region. The growth in population, urbanization
and incomes will lead to further increase in energy imports, with
greater dependence on the Persian Gulf region. This will have a
considerable influence on the politics of the region. The relative
scarcity of critical natural resources in South Asia has profound
implications for regional growth strategies, calling for much greater
participation in international trade as well as deeper integration with
the world economy.
Economic Performance.
The four populous countries of the region, viz. Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, share a common legacy of British rule.
Soon after attaining independence around the middle of the 20th
century, the South Asian countries adopted a strikingly similar
planned approach to development by as signing a major role to the
public sector and focusing on self-reliance and import substitution.
They succeeded in achieving considerable economic progress
compared to the period of colonial stagnation. Over the last 40 years,
the GDP of the region as a whole increased from US$105 billion in
1960 to US$593 billion in 1999—an increase of 5.6 times.7 However,
as can be seen from Table 2, the overall growth rate of only 4 percent
over the 3 decades between 1961 and 1989 is much lower in
comparison to the generally observed growth rates of the countries
of East Asia—including China. During the pre-reform period of
1961-89, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the South
Asia region grew at an average annual rate of 2.25 percent. However
in the subsequent period, i.e., 1990-99, the per capita GNP grew at
the rate of 3.44 percent per annum. In a comparatively brief period of
10 years, when economic reforms were underway, the increase in
percentage terms was almost equal to half of what had been
achieved in the first 40 years. In sum, for more than 3 decades
following independence, the output growth in the region—especially
that of India—was lower than that of global growth. However
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during the past 20-year period (1980-99), output growth has been
out-performing the global growth rate. Further, during the latter
period, economic performance remained more stable than in the
preceding 30 years, confirming the belief that the economy has
reached a qualitatively new phase.
Table 2A: Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia

1961-89
3.10
4.23
6.14
4.33
4.32

1990-99
4.87
5.62
4.01
5.26
5.34

Table 2B: Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP)

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
South Asia

1961-89
0.76
2.36
3.07
2.50
2.25

1990-99
3.71
3.77
1.63
3.99
3.44

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom)
Table 2. Average Annual Growth Rates of Selected Countries
of South Asia, 1961-99.

Trends in Trade.
The countries in South Asia began opening up their economies in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, much later than the East Asian
countries which followed an export-led industrialization strategy
from as early as the 1960s. Even China initiated such reforms in the
late seventies. Among the South Asian countries India was a
latecomer, initiating reforms only in 1991. The economies of South
Asia were relatively closed until the late 1980s. In the year 1980, as
shown in Table 3, the trade-to-GDP ratio of the South Asian region
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was 21 percent, while for India it was only about 16 percent.8 By
comparison, the ratio was 74 percent for South Korea and 45 percent
for the East Asia and Pacific region as a whole. At that time South
Asia’s share of world exports was at the very insignificant level of
0.7 percent. Generally the countries in South Asia not only followed
a high tariff regime but also resorted to comprehensive quantitative
restrictions. Even until the 1990s, the average tariff rate of 80 percent
was almost four times higher than the rates prevalent in East Asia
and twice that of China. The reasons for the slow growth of trade
were rooted in the trade policies pursued by the South Asian
countries.
In the 1990s, the boom in world trade and reduced protectionist
policies helped to increase South Asia’s trade growth to a rate of
about eight percent per annum as compared to six percent for the
world. During the 1990s, the value of trade (exports plus imports) in
South Asia increased from US$84 billion in 1990 to US$162 billion in
1999.9 In almost all the countries of the region, tariff barriers and
import restrictions were reduced. For instance, the mean tariff rate in
Bangladesh came down from 110 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in
1999; the Indian tariff rate came down from 80 percent in 1990 to 32
percent in 1999; and in Sri Lanka it came down from 28 percent in
1990 to 19 percent in 1999. Nevertheless, the countries across the
region experienced greater divergence in their trade performance
(see Table 3). Smaller economies had a larger share of trade as a
Bangladesh
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Korea, Rep.
South Asia

1970
17
8
13
22
54
37
12

1980
20
16
30
37
87
74
21

1990
20
17
32
39
68
59
22

1999
32
27
53
35
78
77
30

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom)

Table 3. Share of Trade as Percentage of GDP―Selected Countries.
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percentage of GDP. For instance in 1999, Sri Lanka’s trade as a
percentage of GDP was as high as 78 percent whereas the
corresponding figure for India, which accounts for three-fourths of
the regional economy, was only 27 percent. For the region as a
whole, trade as a percentage of GDP went up from 21 percent in 1989
to 30 percent in 1999, signifying increased openness. Despite this
increase, the share of South Asia’s exports in the world increased
only marginally from 0.8 percent in 1990 to one percent in 1999. By
comparison, the countries that form the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) increased their share of world trade from
4.3 percent to 6.5 percent during the same period.10
As for trade within the South Asia region, India was the
dominant exporter, accounting for 75 percent of total exports. In 1990
the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC)
countries generated exports of only US$863 million among
themselves, constituting a mere 3.2 percent of their total exports. In
the subsequent 10 years there was some improvement. The exports
within the SAARC countries went up to US$2.68 billion in 1999,
constituting 4.7 percent of their total exports.11 However, compared
to the countries of ASEAN, the South Asian region has yet to make
any significant progress toward increasing trade within the region.
The intra-regional exports among the ASEAN countries even in 1990
totaled US$28.7 billion, constituting 19.8 percent of their total
exports. By 1999, these figures were US$82 billion and 22.2 percent,
respectively.12
As the countries in the South Asia region generally opted for
state-led industrialization for the major part of their 40 years of
development, relying primarily on domestic resources and markets,
their attitude toward foreign investment was lukewarm and their
policies were restrictive. Consequently the flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) of US$464 million in 1990 constituted a mere 0.23
percent of total FDI in the world. Subsequently, in 1999 the FDI
inflows into South Asia went up to US$3.1 billion, i.e., an increase of
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6.7 times. However, this still constituted a mere 0.34 percent of the
world’s total FDI and remained much smaller than the FDI flows
into China or other East Asian countries. For instance, the FDI into
China went up from US$3.49 billion in 1990 to US$38.7 billion in
1999. This resulted in an increase of its share of the world’s total FDI
from 1.7 percent in 1990 to 4.4 percent in 1999. In contrast the FDI
inflows into India increased from US$162 million in 1990 to US$2.17
billion in 1999.13 The success of China in attracting FDI was, inter alia,
attributed to its liberal regulatory regime and the expansion of the
special economic zones (SEZs). The SEZs offered attractive
incentives such as preferential tax and administrative treatment of
foreign enterprises, more advanced infrastructure and a liberal
business environment, and consequently the direct contribution of
FDI to GDP growth in China has been the highest in these provinces.
In fact, China has emerged as the most favored destination for FDI
flows. The success of the SEZs was evident from the fact that 40
percent of all FDI flow into China during 1990-97 was accounted for
by the three provinces (Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan) with SEZs.
A recent IMF study shows the considerable contribution of FDI to
the dynamics of growth in China. It is estimated that FDI has led to
an increase of 3 percent in the GDP growth rate of China. This
successful example of China harnessing FDI to accelerate economic
growth merits emulation by the countries of South Asia.14
Human Development Indicators.
The region’s human development indicators are improving, but
at a relatively slow pace.15 Over a period of three decades the
combined adult literacy rate increased from 32 percent in 1970 to 51
percent in 1997, which is rather depressing when compared to the
achievements of developing countries as a group (from 43 percent to
71 percent during the same period). A comparison with China (91
percent) and other East Asian countries like Korea (99 percent) and
Thailand (97 percent) is even more striking. The health indicators
show some improvement but also highlight the gaps. For instance,
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the infant mortality rate (IMR) has declined from 128 in 1970 to 69
per 1000 live births in 1999, but it is still very high when compared to
East Asian countries (32/1000). During the last 30 years the life
expectancy of South Asians has risen from 50 years to 62 years, but it
is still short of the world average of 66.4 years.
On the whole range of social indicators—such as life expectancy,
access to safe drinking water and sanitation, infant mortality, and
child malnutrition—the countries of South Asia (except for Sri
Lanka) are far behind most of the East Asian countries. The picture
looks even more disturbing when one moves away from the social
indicators to a broader range of indicators. For example, in 1999
India had only 75 TV sets per one thousand people, compared to 292
in China, 289 in Thailand, and 361 in Korea. In terms of telephone
lines per thousand people, there were only 27 in India as compared
with 86 each in China and Thailand, and 438 in Korea. In the same
year, there were only two mobile phones per thousand people in
India while China, Thailand and Korea had 34,38 and 500
respectively. If we take the case of internet hosts, India had only 32
internet hosts per one million people in 1999 as compared with 69 in
China, 884 in Thailand and as many as 10, 065 in Korea. While India
and other countries in South Asia are in the lowest 20 percent of all
countries in terms of the Human Development Index, the East Asian
countries are among the highest 20 percent.
Poverty Reduction.
Despite the fact that South Asia’s GDP grew at a rate of over 4
percent per year on average in 1961-89 and of over 5 percent in the
1990s, and that GDP increased more than five-f old from US$105
billion in 1960 to US$593 billion in 1999, the countries of South
Asia—except India—have witnessed increasing poverty. In fact, the
number of absolute poor in the region has increased from 270 million
in 1960 to approximately 515 million in 1995. This trend is
particularly disheartening because in the 1960s, all of the countries of
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South Asia (save Sri Lanka, with a poverty rate of only 37 percent in
1963) had over half of their population living in poverty. As the lone
exception to the trend, India reduced its poverty rate from 53 percent
in 1973-74 to 36 percent in 1993-94.16
Again, South Asia’s performance stands in contrast to East
Asia’s. Like their South Asian neighbors, the countries of East Asia
had poverty rates of over 50 percent in the 1960s. However, within a
span of 15-20 years (starting from 1965) these East Asian countries
experienced a remarkable decline in poverty. Estimates indicate that
Korea had just 5 percent (1984) of its people living in poverty, while
Indonesia had 17 percent (1987) and Malaysia had 15 percent
(1984).17 In subsequent years there was a further reduction in
poverty in these countries. For instance, in 1993 Korea had just 2
percent of its population surviving on less than a dollar a day, while
the corresponding number in 1999 for Indonesia was 7.7 percent.18
With their earlier integration into the global economy, the East Asian
economies have reaped the advantages of growth and eliminated
poverty in the long run.
While South Asia has not made as much progress in reducing
poverty as East Asia, it does not suffer from the higher levels of
inequalities in the distribution of wealth affecting these neighbors.
For instance, if we consider the Gini index, which summarizes the
distribution of income or consumption in an economy, the four
major countries of South Asia had a lower index than China and the
other East Asian countries, with the exception of South Korea.19 The
World Bank’s World Development Report 2001 shows an index of 40.3
for China, 49.2 for Malaysia, and 41.4 for Thailand. By contrast,
Bangladesh has an index of 33.6, India has 37.8, Pakistan has 31.2
and Sri Lanka has 34.4. Based on these data, South Asia has
experienced a lower level of inequalities than the countries of East
Asia, and lower even than many developed countries including the
United States.20
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The most noticeable features in India’s poverty profile are that
poverty remains predominantly rural and there is a wide disparity
across Indian states, with uneven progress in poverty reduction.
Since the mid-1970s, the growth rate has risen, poverty has declined
and social indicators have improved. India has reduced the
percentage of its population living in poverty mainly through faster
economic growth (particularly that of agriculture), a rise in
agricultural wages, lower inflation, and human resource
development. In a recently published paper by Prof . S. R. Hashim,
who was a member of the Indian Planning Commission, the Gini
index was found to be improving during the pre-reform period (i.e.,
prior to 1990), albeit marginally.21 This implies that the reasons for a
large number of people remaining in poverty are embedded in the
slower growth of the economy as well as of productivity, rather than
in income inequalities. The faster pace of poverty alleviation with
high economic growth in the countries of East Asia shows that high
economic growth facilitates a more rapid progress towards poverty
alleviation. The dramatic reduction of poverty levels in India in the
reform period of the 1990s, a period associated with higher growth
rates, further reinforces this conclusion.
India and South Asia.
The relative size of the Indian economy and its population
implies that the changes taking place in South Asia reflect the
changes in the Indian economy to a large extent. Further, the growth
profile and the structure of the Indian economy is also identical to
that of the region. During the past 40 years per capita income in
India and South Asia increased more or less uniformly. The
correlation coefficient between the average annual growth rate of
GDP per capita for India and that of the region as a whole is very
high. During the long history of the pre-reform period (1961-89) as
well as in the relatively short reform period (1990-99), the changes in
the GDP growth rate in India and South Asia were strikingly similar.
We also notice similarities in the changes in the structure of output,
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such as the relative shares of agriculture, industry and the service
sector in GDP.22 These trends show that developments in India
parallel those in the other countries of the South Asia region.
Accordingly, the projections for India are taken as a base for future
projections of economic performance in South Asia as a region.
PART II: INDIA: ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND POLICY
CHALLENGES
Reform in the 1990s and Economic Trends.
The mixed economy model of development adopted by India,
with the state at the commanding heights, was successful in many
respects during the first four decades. Until the 1980s India had
combined a highly dirigisme approach to economic development
with conservative macroeconomic policies. The development
strategy was aimed at building a largely public-owned heavy
industry sector, leaving the production of consumer goods and
agriculture to the private sector in a highly regulated regime. As the
initial massive investment in import substituting industries
subsided, the pace of economic activity was dominated by low
productivity and inefficient public enterprises leading to slow
economic growth. The key assumption in this choice of postindependence development strategy was the generation of public
savings, which could be used for higher and higher levels of
investment. However, during the last two decades the public sector
became a consumer of community savings instead of being a
generator of savings. Compared to the successful economies of East
Asia, the growth rate remained slow, the productivity level was low,
and progress toward poverty reduction remained rather limited.
Thus low productivity rather than inadequate savings explains the
weak growth performance of the decades until the 1990s.23 During
the second half of the 1980s the macroeconomic situation was
characterized by growth reversal and a fiscal deficit financed by
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borrowings, both external and internal, that reached unsustainable
levels.
By 1991, India suffered macroeconomic weaknesses, with the
central government’s revenue deficit reaching 3.5 percent of GDP, a
combined fiscal deficit of the states and the center that exceeded 10
percent of GDP, a current account balance that ran into a deficit of
3.2 percent of GDP, and a steadily increasing rate of inflation that
exceeded 16.7 percent by August 1991. Further, by 1991-92 the
outstanding liabilities of the central government exceeded 69 percent
of GDP. The interest payments on the public debt represented nearly
70 percent of the center’s fiscal deficit. At the heart of these macroeconomic imbalances were the rising public sector deficit in the late
1970s and the subsequent sharp rise in public debt and consequent
increase in interest payments in the 1980s.24 These adverse
developments in the economy were further compounded by two
unexpected external shocks: the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Gulf War that caused an increase
in oil prices. The collapse of the USSR brought uncertainty to the
export market, since until then it had been providing an assured
export market. The war in the Persian Gulf had almost frozen
remittances from Indian workers in the Gulf region and also caused
a run on Non-Resident Indian (NRI) deposits held in Indian banks.
The high price of oil and the loss of workers’ remittances weakened
India’s current account position by US$1.5 billion, and the external
current account deficit widened to 3.5 percent of GDP. Despite
purchasing US$1.8 billion from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in early 1991, official reserves declined to US$2.8 billion. By
March 1991 the import cover of foreign exchange reserves reached
just 1.3 months of imports. For the first time, the foreign exchange
reserves touched the extreme lowest level of less than one billion
U.S. dollars, not even sufficient to cover India’s import requirements
for 2 weeks.25 The deteriorating fiscal situation and mounting
current account deficit precipitated an unprecedented macroeconomic crisis in 1991.
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The Indian authorities responded to the 1991 crisis by launching
a bold program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural
adjustment buttressed with assistance from the IMF. The firstgeneration reforms that began in 1991 were a historic turning point.
Though the reforms started as a response to the prevailing crisis,
they went beyond conventional macroeconomic stabilization
measures. The reforms aimed at reorienting the economy from a
statist and highly controlled economy to a market-friendly one, “relinked” to the international economy through freer international
trade. Consequently, the Indian economy moved to a distinctly
higher growth path.
Over the decade since the reforms were first implemented, the
real GDP averaged 6.4 percent growth per year, placing India among
the top ten growth performers in the world. Excluding the growth of
1991-92, the average annual GDP growth rate during the subsequent
5-year period (1992-97) was 6.7 percent. This started decelerating in
subsequent years, with an average annual growth rate of 5.8 percent.
The higher growth profile emanated from a sustained improvement
in total factor productivity—a clear break from the past trend.
Coupled with a slowdown in the population growth rate, per capita
income also registered an impressive increase with an average
annual growth rate of 4.4 percent during the 1992-97 period.
Moreover, the improved growth performance has been accompanied
by distinctly lower inflation rates, e.g., less than five percent in
recent years compared to an average inflation rate near double digits
for the period 1970-1990.
The 1990s witnessed important strides in relinking India’s
economy with the world economy as it saw India’s share in world
trade increasing—once again a trend reversal from the experience of
earlier decades. The share of trade in gross domestic product also
increased steadily, and this share for the merchandise sector now
exceeds 30 percent. During this decade, the peak tariff levels were
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reduced from 270 percent to 35 percent and all quantitative
restrictions (QRs) on imports were abolished. These developments
are of fundamental importance for sustaining productivity growth.
The decade of the 1990s also witnessed a very significant
acceleration in financial sector reforms–covering the banking sector
and the capital markets, as well as the insurance sector. Most
importantly, the 1990s were marked by a virtual elimination of
financial repression, leading to the removal of the implicit taxation of
financial intermediaries. From a long-term perspective, the
cumulative transformation of the Indian economy has been
substantial. Indeed, the Indian economy in the year 2001 was a very
different one from that of the year 1991.
Further, the first generation of reforms in the 1990s has had a
perceptible impact in placing the development process on a
distinctly resilient footing. There are several indicators to this effect.
First, the variability in the growth rate and the volatility of inflation
rates, as measured by the relevant coefficients of variation (CV),
have been much lower in the 1990s compared with the earlier period.
Second, the traditional dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon
has come down significantly, with the dramatic decline in the share
of agriculture and allied activities from as much as 55 percent of
GDP in 1950-51 to only 25 percent in 1999-2000. 26 The share of the
service sector has pari passu shot up from 32 percent to 53 percent
during the same period with information technology (IT) being a
leading engine of growth for exports, employment and GNP. The
remittances in the year 1999 went up to US$12 billion or about onefifth of total export earnings. The conventional external vulnerability
indicators show a decisive improvement over the decade of 1990s. It
is not a coincidence that the Indian economy could withstand the
recent oil price rise and the resulting significant terms of trade losses
without precipitating a crisis. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil crises
invariably led to macroeconomic crises in India. This time was an
exception. The oil import bill shot up from US$6.4 billion in 1998-99
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to US$12.6 billion in 1999-2000 and further to US$15.6 billion in 200001, signifying a cumulative terms of trade loss in excess of two
percent of GDP. But this loss was effectively financed through higher
exports and innovative financing instruments. Flexible exchange rate
policies coupled with a cautious approach towards short-term
borrowings insulated the Indian economy from the effects of the
Asian crisis in 1997, the Brazilian crisis in 1998, and the Russian crisis
in 1999.
During the 1990s India made remarkable progress toward social
development and poverty reduction. The poverty ratio—the
proportion of the population below the poverty line—has declined
significantly in the 1990s under the impact of the first generation of
reforms. Poverty estimates released by the Government of India
indicate that the poverty ratio has declined from 36 percent in 199394 to 26 percent in 1999-2000, implying that more than 120 million
people have moved up over the poverty line. However, double that
number are still estimated to be below the poverty line.27 This means
there remains a long way to go to fully overcome the challenges of
poverty.
The 1991 crisis has compelled India to deregulate industry and
liberalize trade and investment. The macroeconomic reforms,
outward oriented policies and improved performance opened up
new opportunities for the integration of the Indian economy into the
global economy. There is no doubt the overall economic reforms
have generated positive results by increasing opportunities.
However, the “great question” remains: Are these trends of
accelerated growth sustainable so that India can meet its strategic
objectives of removing poverty and playing its rightful role in the
world by becoming a source of growth and stability for the global
economy? Recent setbacks to India’s growth performance make the
question relevant and urgent. For example, the real GDP growth rate
has shown a steady decline since 1997-98, with the annual average
growth rate during the last three years being less than six percent.
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The growth estimates for 2002 have already been scaled down to five
percent.28 A quick glance into the basic data sources on the Indian
economy reveal that the industrial production growth rate, which
peaked at 12 percent in 1995-96, started decelerating and remained
sluggish during 1997-98 and 1998-99, and was estimated to grow at
merely 2.1 percent during the year 2001-2002. The gross domestic
investment rate, which was 26.8 percent of GDP in 1995-96, declined
to 23 percent in 1999-2000. The capital markets, an important source
for mobilizing investment, witnessed a slump during the second half
of the 1990s. For instance, the total number of primary issues (shares
and debentures) by non-government public limited companies has
declined from a maximum of 1,678 in 1994-95 to 79 issues in the year
1999-2000. The growth rate of exports, in U.S. dollar terms, fell from
22.6 percent during 2000-2001 to 1.9 percent during 2001-02. The
performance of the agriculture sector is much more alarming with
respect to its annual growth, which peaked at 9.3 percent in 1996-97,
and is projected to be negative in 2001-02 due to a fall in the
production of food grains from 209 million tons in 1999-2000 to 196
million tons. On the fiscal front, the combined fiscal deficit of the
center and the states in 1999-2000 has already exceeded 10 percent of
GDP—almost reaching the level of 1990-91. In fact the average fiscal
deficit of 9.2 percent during the period 1997-2000 is considerably
higher than the average of 7.5 percent of GDP during the period
1991-97. Similarly, the combined revenue deficit has reached 6.2
percent of GDP, exceeding the deficit level of 4.2 percent recorded in
1990-91. The ratio of central and state government debt stands at a
significantly higher level of almost 70 percent of GDP. The external
debt as a percentage of GDP has declined from 30.9 percent in 199495 to about 21 percent in 2001. However, external debt exceeding the
US$100 billion mark and declining export receipts are going to take
the debt-to-export ratio to the levels that prevailed in 1991. All these
indices point to the main problems confronting the economy and the
likely challenges India has to face in the medium term. Thus the
economy, which is entering into a decelerating phase, needs urgent
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steps to restore its growth momentum in an adverse environment
due to the current slowdown in the world economy.
In these circumstances, if India continues with the “business-asusual” approach in the management of the economy, ignoring the
need for an accelerated investment in infrastructure, the present
economic slowdown may not only lower the growth rates to
politically unacceptable levels but also lead the economy into a
domestic debt trap. A recent IMF study shows the likely serious
implications of this trend in the absence of fiscal adjustments.29 In
the absence of fiscal adjustments, the scenario projected for the year
2020 shows an exploding debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 140 percent; a current account deficit of six percent of GDP; and an overall
public sector deficit of over 24 percent of GDP. In such a scenario the
public debt burden would explode, leading to macroeconomic
instability. Further, with the increasing size of the labor force and in
the absence of investments, unemployment problems would be
grave, and the resulting social tensions would undermine political
stability. Clearly, therefore, the business -as-usual approach is not a
sustainable growth path at all. This has to change.
Fortunately, there is a growing public awareness about the need
to accelerate GDP growth. The elaborate menu of policy reforms
suggested by the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council in
February 2001 and the Planning Commission’s “Approach Paper for
the Tenth Five Year Plan” are indicative of this trend.30 Moreover, at
the political level the National Development Council (NDC) in India,
consisting of leaders from different political parties, approved the
objective of reducing poverty by 20 percent during the Tenth Five
Year Plan period (2002-07) and doubling per capita income in the
next ten years; it also implicitly recognized the need for accelerated
reforms to achieve the growth level required to meet such
objectives.31 Real GDP growth rates in the range of eight to ten
percent are contemplated as part of the strategy, with emphasis on
measures for increasing openness, enhancing productivity and
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implementing a viable plan to reduce poverty. Consequently, the
strategy of a reform-led high-growth path based on secondgeneration reforms is receiving increasing attention.
Second-Generation Reforms and “Reform-led” Growth.
Economic growth and poverty reduction require increases in
investments as well as factor productivity. In order to overcome the
problems of low productivity and the consequent poverty, and to
achieve and sustain a double-digit growth rate, the reform process
needs to be widened and intensified. Today, India is at a crossroads,
with a choice to proceed either on a “business-as-usual” path or the
“reform-led growth” path. The second-generation reforms will need
to consist of comprehensive measures which complement each other.
I will now discuss what should be the contents of these reforms.
Macro-, Meso-, and Microeconomic Reforms. The policy measures to
be undertaken in such a reform-led growth strategy can be broadly
identified as follows:
• Macroeconomic reforms that ensure increased transparency
and fiscal consolidation at the central and state levels, and
acceleration of the privatization process that includes redefining the
role of the government in the economy. These measures will lead to
the reduction of real interest rates, spur investment, and also lead to
an exchange rate regime that supports trade reforms.
• Mesoeconomic reforms that raise efficiency, productivity, and
private investment in infrastructure industries such as energy,
transport, telecom, and higher education and put in place a new
institutional architecture for the improved governance of the
economy.
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• Microeconomic reforms that promote competition in product
markets, factor markets, and the services sector, by allowing free
entry and freer international trade and by providing a “level playing
field” to all entities.
Macroeconomic Reforms: Improving Fiscal Health. In the process of
transforming the economy, the most important reform is improving
the fiscal health of the state. In this regard the Fiscal Responsibility
Bill, which is currently under consideration in the Parliament (spring
2002), provides the legal and institutional framework to ensure
intergenerational equity in fiscal management and long-term
macroeconomic stability. It also provides corrective measures to
eliminate the revenue deficit and to reduce the fiscal deficit to not
more than two percent of GDP over a period of 5 years. Thus, the bill
is set to reduce the growth of public debt, prescribe a limit on debt
stock, and stabilize debt as a proportion of GDP in a set timeframe.
Such fiscal legislation needs to be designed so that the government’s
ability to undertake counter-cyclical measures through fiscal policies
is not restricted. Further, in order to bring about fiscal discipline, it is
necessary to impose obligations to increase transparency in fiscal
operations, reduce secrecy in budget preparation, and regularly
review trends in receipts and expenditures every three months—and
to place the outcome of such reviews before both Houses of
Parliament. In this context the need for fiscal discipline in the state
governments, whose combined expenditure is as much as that of the
central government, is of equal importance. By 2000 the combined
deficit of the center and the states had exceeded 10 percent of GDP,
and the public debt by 70 percent of GDP. Almost 40 percent of the
fiscal deficit is due to the poor condition of state finances, which
needs to be rectified. Therefore the legislative initiative taken by the
center needs to be followed at the level of the states as well. The
outcome of such a fiscal correction would be the reduction of longterm real interest rates from the current high level of six to eight
percent to three to four percent, which would reduce the cost of
capital, promote investment and technological innovations, and thus
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trigger a spectacular growth boom throughout the economy. Such a
reduced interest rate regime would also enable an exchange rate
regime that is supportive of trade liberalization.
An important area to focus on for promoting fiscal health is
related to a reduction in expenditures and an increase in revenues.
Both the center and the states are showering subsidies through direct
budgetary expenditures or through foregone revenues. The growth
in subsidies has been very high. In 1971, the total explicit subsidy
provided in the budget amounted to three percent of GDP, and
within three decades this share has increased four-fold, exceeding 12
percent. The merit subsidies—yielding more social benefits than
social costs—are estimated to be less than one-third of total
subsidies. Further, there are implicit subsidies in the form of the
under-performing public sector as well as indirect subsidies through
cross-subsidization. For in stance, by 1998-99 the central government
investment in the public sector reached about US$63 billion. The
post-tax rate of return on the investment was below three percent. If
these enterprises had achieved returns comparable to efficient
private enterprises, the rate of return would have been at least two
or three times higher. Therefore, to reduce the subsidy to inefficient
enterprises and also to release investment locked up in such
enterprises, India needs to pursue privatization vigorously. Further,
increasing user charges for services provided by the public sector
enterprises, such as power and water, would enable the states to
recover their costs, make their operations sustainable and in the long
run attract private investment and release government funds. These
measures would enlarge the supplies of needed infrastructural
inputs and reduce their costs to the economy, thereby spurring
growth in industry and agriculture.
On the revenue front, there is a need to increase the tax-GDP
ratio, which is presently very low. India’s tax-GDP ratio (center and
states) at 14 percent in 1999-2000 was lower than other Asian
countries like Korea (17 percent), Indonesia (15 percent), and
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Malaysia (19 percent) . This ratio needs to be increased so as to
reduce the revenue and fiscal deficits. The tax-GDP ratio needs to be
increased through 1) improved tax administration by using
information technology; 2) drastically pruning the tax exemptions,
e.g., small-scale sector exemptions from excise taxes; 3) bringing the
services sector into the value added (VAT) system of taxation; and 4)
widening the tax base. An improvement of four to five percent in the
tax-GDP ratio is needed.
Now let me turn to the size of the government. One of the
biggest drags on India’s development is increasing government
expenditure, particularly the ever-increasing wage burden. Therefore, another important policy initiative would be to redefine the role
of the government, reduce its size, and reduce the structure of
employees’ compensation. With the implementation of the recent
Pay Commission decision, the public sector wage bill (government
employees plus public sector employees) has increased by two
percent of GDP. Besides bringing down the wage bill, a downsizing
of government would also mean privatization of nonstrategic public
sector enterprises, including the banking sector. Only those public
sector enterprises which are strategic in nature, such as atomic
energy, space and defense production, should not be permitted in
the private sector. All other enterprises should be privatized.
Privatizing the existing public sector enterprises by selling them
to strategic investors whether domestic or foreign can be one
possible route. But this has a very limited role at least in the near
future, as the political economy of India requires a somewhat
different strategy for privatization from those adopted by the
countries of Latin America, East Asia or Central Europe. Therefore,
the process of privatization would have to be transparent and lead to
an industrial structure that becomes more competitive and less
concentrated. Hence the privatization process would need to ensure
that major public sector undertakings such as oil companies, telecom
companies and steel companies become widely held. They would
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also need to be professionally managed by organizations observing
the best standards of corporate governance, maximizing value for
shareholders, and protecting the interest of all stakeholders
(including employees, suppliers and purchasers). Such aggressive
privatization will not only reduce fiscal stress but also considerably
increase efficiency in the economy.
Mesoeconomic Reforms: Infrastructure Sector. The next wave of
reforms that will be of crucial importance are the mesoeconomic
reforms, i.e., sectoral reforms covering major infrastructural sectors
such as energy, communications, transportation and financial
sectors. Currently, all these are under the public sector and in some
cases these are monopolies. Poor infrastructure is a major contributory factor to the lower competitiveness of India. The poor
performance of most of these enterprises is due to managerial
inefficiency and the poor realization of user charges. For instance,
the massive losses of the state electricity boards are attributed to a
combination of low prices for certain categories of users, like
farmers, and massive leakages in distribution due to inefficiency and
corruption. State road transport corporations also incur losses due to
setting uneconomic prices. These have become a drain on fiscal
resources, defeating the very purpose for which they have been
established: capital accumulation. India requires a mammoth level of
investment if it is to achieve higher growth rates in the next twenty
years. The estimated cumulative investment needs in the infrastructure sector by 2022 could be in the region of US$1.6 trillion to
US$3.6 trillion. If privatization and competition are introduced in
these sectors, it would not only facilitate rationalization of prices and
pave the way for efficient use of resources, but also promote
investments from the private sector. Consequently, the gains to the
economy are likely to be quite spectacular. Even in advanced
economies such as the United States, which liberalized the transport
and energy sectors over the last 20 years, efficiency gains have been
as high as 10 to 15 percent of the sectoral GDP. Some studies suggest
that the benefits of these mesoeconomic reforms to the Indian
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economy could be as high as three to four percent of GDP per
annum.32 In this regard, Chinese policy that successfully leveraged
infrastructure to induce foreign direct investment is an example to
emulate.
Mesoeconomic Reforms: Regulatory Institutions. The next wave of
reforms should reach the factor markets—e.g., land markets and
natural resource markets such as water—as well as institutions that
nurture and regulate various markets. The “mother of all markets”
—the financial markets—are still vulnerable to the actions of
individuals and/or small operators. The recent developments in the
Indian stock markets have shown the deleterious impact of the
actions of one private bank, one cooperative bank or the management of a major stock exchange.33 Such impacts can be avoided only
by a strong regulatory regime. In a rapidly integrating world, the
risks to the stability of the financial markets get amplified if regulatory regimes are weak. To cope with such problems, reform
measures must involve the banking sector, securities markets, the
foreign exchange market, and the insurance sector. Such a new
institutional architecture should include an independent monetary
authority—independent along the lines of authority enjoyed by the
U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England in the United
Kingdom—and a council of financial regulators consisting of the
Central Bank, the Securities and Exchanges Board of India, and the
Insurance Regulatory Authority for coordination and supervision of
all financial markets.
The institutional reforms should also include state and quasistate institutions as well as the judiciary and civil society. The
reforms in this sector would strengthen the social capital base as well
as the physical and human capital bases of the economy. Pushing
policy reforms further to strengthen the physical and human capital
bases of the economy requires consensus among the major players in
the economy—politicians, businessmen, labor unions, social organizations, etc. Therefore, introducing measures to strengthen the social
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capital base will facilitate this process. Although many leading
economists are skeptical of “social capital,” coming from India, I find
the concept as elaborated by Francis Fukayama quite appealing.34
Mesoeconomic Reforms: Reforms in Education. In addition to its
intrinsic value, education is also valued for what it can do in terms of
human resource capabilities. It is this sector that could make or break
India. Compared to 1951, when more than four-fifths of its adults
were illiterate, India reached a remarkable level of achievement by
1997, when almost two-thirds of its adult population had attained
literacy. Compared to China, however, the gap is huge: with an
equally large population and similar size of illiterate population in
the 1950s, the PRC has now virtually eliminated illiteracy among its
younger population and raised adult literacy to 80 percent. To
reduce such a gap requires an enormous effort with resources on a
matching scale. It is estimated that an additional amount equal to 1.9
percent of GDP would be required annually to provide schooling to
those who are not currently in school.35 Thus, demand for state
support is going to mount pressure on the fiscal resources.
University-level education, currently funded by the state, is
another area that will require huge amounts of investment in a
growing economy. Currently the barriers for investment in higher
education are many. These institutions face enormous constraints in
terms of financial resources and operational freedom. Reforms that
can attract private investment into universities and institutions of
higher learning would reduce the funding burden of the state and
improve the quality of their output. With these reforms and a
supportive public policy on science and technology, Indian
universities would have the potential to become part of a coherent
framework in advancing technological innovations for economic
growth. Such innovations could also contribute to the global pool of
knowledge and technological progress.
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Mesoeconomic Reforms: Quality of Governance. So far, I have
discussed the need for policy reforms for economic growth, which
obviously have to be promoted by the government. A critical issue
that is intertwined with sustainable growth is the quality of
governance. Governance encompasses a whole range of issues—
from the formation of the institutions of government to the quality of
the checks and balances in the relationship between such institutions
on the one hand and the citizens on the other. The quality of
governance directly and indirectly affects factor productivity, the
general quality of life and the liberty of the people. Weak governance
leads to poor service delivery and excessive bureaucratic control,
thereby impeding development. It leads to the centralization of
bureaucratic systems, distortions in public expenditure, the
deterioration of physical infrastructure, the reduction of public
revenues and increases in the parallel economy.36 The state
apparatus, such as the legal system and the police, come under the
influence of a few people with vested interests. In India, while the
role of the state has increased, its capacity to deliver has declined.
There is an increasing recognition that successful implementation of
reforms needs efficient institutions of governance that can deliver
public services and promote policies to mitigate the negative impact
of a market economy. Consequently, many states in India have
initiated reforms to improve the quality of governance and
introduced measures for the empowerment of the people. States like
Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Rajashtan have introduced innovations in the fields of education and health services. Information
technology is being put to intensive use to empower the people and
increase quality in the delivery of services; it is also being used in the
monitoring of development works. The state of Andhra Pradesh has
been doing pioneering work in this regard. In some states like
Rajasthan, people are empowered with the right to seek and the
means to get information on public works. In states like Kerala,
people are becoming involved in the local-level planning, thus
increasing the stakeholders’ participation in allocation decisions. A
number of states are now competing to provide improved services.
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This trend needs to be extended further across India. Improving
governance is a key challenge to India’s political system.
Microeconomic Reforms. Microeconomic reforms would promote
competition in product markets and services. Allowing free entry
into these markets and freer international trade are central for
achieving sustained productivity growth. To achieve this, one of the
foremost policy measures would be to reduce the tariff and
investment barriers, and let the winds of international competition
blow freely. Today, with a 34 percent tariff rate, India continues to
have one of the highest tariff barriers in the world. India needs to
accelerate its program of tariff reduction to reach East Asian levels
by 2010, and the levels of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) members by 2020. By that time India
could also achieve tariff-free intra-regional trade in South Asia. If the
quantitative trade barriers are reduced by 50 percent, it has been
estimated that the gains would be 1.5 percent of India’s GDP.37 The
complete elimination of non-tariff barriers and the reduction of
tariffs will lead to even greater welfare gains. These gains could be
achieved through increased allocative efficiency and would not
require any new physical investment or new capital.
In the legal arena, the laws relating to competition policy, the
provisions governing bankruptcy and liquidation under the
Companies Act, and the provisions in the Sick Industrial Companies
Act are fundamentally flawed, as these sustain systems that restrict
competition and make the revival of sick companies extremely
difficult. Therefore, in order to correct such a situation, India needs
new competition as well as comprehensive laws on bankruptcy. The
combined effect of these reforms will provide the springboard
needed for further dynamic gains, particularly by attracting new
investments and associated productivity growth.
The role played by the small-scale industries (SSI) sector is of
vital importance due to its potential to increase employment and
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reduce regional imbalances, especially in rural areas and in the nonfarm sector. This sector acts as a valuable entry point for
entrepreneurs who start small and grow big.38 India’s unique policy
of reservations of certain small industrial activities and investment
limits to the SSI sector prevents this sector from becoming strong,
viable and able to successfully face international competition. This
policy of reservations needs to be reconsidered, as many expert
studies have found them to be irrational in the face of competition
from imports, and concluded that such reservations have hurt export
capability in many areas.39 Although the SSI reservations issue is
sensitive, the ambitious recommendations suggested by the Abid
Hussain Committee need to be implemented in a phased manner,
initially abolishing reservations for select products in which India
has a strong export potential.40 A reformed SSI sector, with the
flexibility to increase investments, can opt for efficient technologies
and grow larger networks of units that assure international buyers of
quality products, adequate quantities, and timely supplies. In the
background of dismantling the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA)
regime in textiles by 2005, the recent decision to dereserve garments
is timely as it removes the garment exports from textile quota
protection and prepares them to face competition. This logic should
apply to other products too.
In India, a major shift in attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI) started with the changes in the regulatory framework of FDI in
1991. India opened up sectors previously closed to foreign investors,
including power generation, followed by other sectors such as
telecommunications, cable networks, etc. As a result of the changing
investment climate, the net inflow of FDI shot up from US$74 million
in 1991 to US$3.6 billion in 1997—the year in which India benefited
from its highest level of FDI. However, in comparison, China also
experienced a peak inflow of FDI during 1997, attracting US$44
billion—i.e., twelve times that of India. China’s share of FDI that
year constituted about ten percent of the total FDI in the world. In
India’s case it was less than one percent. The FDI flows have a
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positive impact in accelerating GDP growth in China as FDI brought
in new technologies, managerial know-how and indirectly enhanced
its impact by augmenting total factor productivity.41 Similarly, India
should tap the advantages of globalization by reducing barriers to
investment through a better handling of challenges related to the
investment climate. These challenges include improving the quality
of infrastructure, providing sound regulation of industry, removing
entry and exit barriers for the firms, and addressing the inefficiency
and corruption that cause delays. Thus, if overall gains from internal
liberalization, privatization of public sector monopolies and
improved investment climate are also included, the benefits referred
to earlier would be even more substantial. The technology
revolution, based on all-purpose information technology, is going to
yield manifold macroeconomic benefits through its contribution to
productivity growth, followed by falling prices that encourage
capital deepening and the reorganization of production around
capital goods.42 Therefore, if you take into account the dynamic
efficiency gains arising from new investments and new technologies,
supported by investment promotion policies, the gains would be
truly spectacular.
In the factor markets, reforms in the labor market are very
important. Although India’s present labor welfare legislation for
organized labor appears to have served the laudable objective of
protecting employment, the actual effect has been quite the opposite
as it discourages labor-intensive industries. Some of the legislative
provisions discourage foreign direct investment, especially in laborintensive industries, and put the Indian industry at a disadvantage
in the era of globalization. Some of the strategies adopted by
entrepreneurs make industry less competitive. Reforms in this sector
are needed to balance labor interests with the need to increase the
performance of enterprises. Therefore, legislative reforms that are
underway should encourage labor productivity and provide
employers with sufficient flexibility to reduce the volume of
employment or restructure their units to reflect changes in market
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conditions. They should also encourage employers to continuously
update technology. These reforms would provide growth
momentum to the Indian economy on the basis of increased factor
productivity and capital accumulation. While the first-generation
reforms focused essentially on macroeconomic policies, the secondgeneration reforms, with the synergetic effects of macro-, meso- and
microeconomic reforms, would accelerate overall economic growth
through sustained growth in total factor productivity, and thereby
achieve the goal of eradicating poverty.
One may recall that the miracle economies in East Asia and
China achieved high growth when their proportions of the
population working were the highest, resulting in increased labor
supply, increased savings and investment, and accelerated
productivity growth.43 In India, with a higher share of the population working, the changing demographics offer a similar opportunity
now. The policy reforms in Korea and China during the last 20 years
were almost synchronized with their demographic transition, and
the present state of the Indian demographic transition offers a
similar conjunction. Just as China and South Korea brought their
dependency ratios down from over 60 percent in 1980 to the 40-48
percent range by 1999, it is feasible for India to reduce its current
dependency ration of about 62 percent to about 47 percent by 2020.
This could help achieve higher rates of savings, investment and
economic growth. What India needs is high-velocity reforms to make
use of this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
The Growth Scenario: South Asia in 2020.
The synergetic effect of macro-, meso-, and micro-economic
reforms with favorable demographic dynamics would enable India
over the next two decades to achieve a GDP growth rate of eight to
ten percent—similar to the one achieved by the miracle economies of
East Asia and China—and raise its GDP to US$3 trillion by 2020.44
Such growth would lead to increased per capita income at least 3.5
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times that of the present level. The second-generation reforms
involving concerted action and radical departures from present
practices would also result in the enhancement of human well-being
through improved access to basic social services, especially in
education, health, availability of drinking water and basic sanitation.
In such a scenario the poverty ratio would likely decrease to ten
percent by 2012, leading to the removal of absolute poverty by 2020.
The reform-led growth would also bring India’s share in world trade
to a much higher level. The experience of economies like China and
South Korea over the past 20 years indicates that successful
economic reforms and consequent accelerated growth led to export
growth of 14–15 percent every year. With intensified reforms and
increased openness, the South Asian region could also attain a
similar growth in its exports. Thus, the reform-led growth would
likely boost India’s exports from the present level of US$51 billion to
about US$800 billion by 2020.
In the energy sector the countries in the region rely on a
significant level of imports. These fuel imports constitute about 18
percent of the total value of imports into the South Asia region. The
import of fuel by India and Pakistan is now in the range of 20-21
percent of the value of their respective imports. With the accelerated
economic growth, there would be a corresponding increase in the
demand for energy. In this regard, the International Energy Agency
projections on “oil balance” indicate that India’s reliance on
imported oil from the Middle East is bound to grow significantly. By
the year 2020 it is estimated that more than 90 percent of India’s oil
requirements will be met through imports that would be equivalent
to more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s present production.45 With
such an increase in hydrocarbon imports, India would become a
major player in the world oil market and consequently would need
to develop strategic, economic and political relationships with
countries in the Persian Gulf region.
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In the service sector, in the 1990s India’s share in the global
services trade doubled from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent, pointing to
the emergence of India as an influential player in global services,
perhaps similar to what China has become in manufacturing exports.
We have already seen an enormous increase in India’s export
earnings associated with the Information Technology (IT) sector,
which has grown at more than 60 percent per annum during 1992-99.
The Taskforce on Information Technology has stated that “with a
potential US$2 trillion global IT industry by the year 2008, policy
ambiance will be created for the Indian IT industry to target for a $50
billion annual export of IT software and IT services by this year. ...”46
Although such a goal in the IT action plan sounds ambitious, the
recent performance of the IT industry proves the potential of this
sector. For instance, the Indian software industry, which employed
400, 000 professionals by the end of 2000, has zoomed from a mere
US$20 million 10 years ago to US$8.7 billion in 1999-2000. It is
estimated that this sector is likely to employ over 2 million people by
2008.47 Keeping in line with the trends in software exports, the
remittances from the Indian diaspora are estimated to have increased
from about US$1.7 billion in 1991 to about US$11.5 billion in 1999,
constituting about 2.5 percent of Indian GDP. Already in the 1990s,
India’s share in global services trade doubled from 0.6 to 1.2 percent,
while that of goods exports barely increased from 0.6 to 0.7 percent.48
Thus, with the increasing contribution of the service sector, led by
engineers and professionals from institutions of higher learning, on
the one hand and the increased competitiveness that will follow
second-generation reforms on the other, attaining sustained growth
in exports is well within India’s reach.
At the regional level, the need for increasing regional trade has
been recognized by the countries in South Asia. The South Asian
Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), which started in 1993, was
very cautious in tariff reduction. Under SAPTA, Bangladesh, India,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka committed to establish preferential trade
arrangements among themselves with respect to 300 commodities.
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The constraints in its implementation are complex and numerous,
ranging from the existence of poor communications and
infrastructure to security concerns. But once the SAPTA is fully
operational, the gains in the entire region would be substantial.
Further, with the changes in the structure of the Indian economy that
follow second-generation reforms, exports would be competitive due
to an increase in productivity. This would help to diversify the
composition of India’s merchandise. For instance, exports would
shift to more capital-intensive products such as textiles, software,
machinery and equipment, light manufacturing, and heavy
manufactures.49 On the strength of increased openness associated
with all these reforms and by virtue of the implementation of
SAPTA, as well as other measures proposed by the countries in the
region, the intra-regional trade share is expected to increase. Even if
it achieves only 50 percent of the levels achieved by other regional
trade arrangements in Asia such as ASEAN, whose intra-regional
trade constitutes about one fifth of their total trade, the intra-South
Asian trade in 2020 will be as much as US$120 billion.
In recent years other major countries in the region such as
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have also embarked upon
reform programs. With assistance from international financial
institutions including the IMF, Sri Lanka has initiated economic
reforms to restore macroeconomic stability and develop a poverty
reduction program.50 Under the aegis of a new IMF facility (the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), Pakistan adopted an
economic program in 2001 to increase growth through sound
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms.51 Similarly, the new
government in Bangladesh is taking steps to improve governance
and implement decisive reforms on the basis of a Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP). The development partners supporting
Bangladesh are prepared to increase assistance to the country in its
pursuit of a broad-based program of macroeconomic stabilization
and structural reforms.52 Thus, with all the major countries in the
region pursuing reforms at the same pace, if not faster than India, an
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increasingly open and more integrated South Asian economy would
be able to increase the region’s GDP from the present level of US$593
billion to as much as US$4 trillion by the year 2020, and
consequently also substantially improve the region’s overall human
development index score. If the world economy continues to grow at
an annual rate of three percent, as witnessed during the 1990s, South
Asia’s regional share in world GDP would increase from the present
level of only one percent to more than five percent.53
Thus by 2020, the South Asian region, with India leading on the
reform front, has the potential to become one among the top four
economic giants. At this juncture, given the large size of its
population and its current stage of demographic transition with the
consequent advantage of a low dependency ratio, the resource-poor
South Asian region is uniquely positioned to promote policies for
accelerated growth. These policies would build on the success of the
reforms that began in the 1990s and make up for the delay of the last
four decades. The South Asian countries, the latecomers in the
“game” of reform-led growth, would also be in a position to tame
the challenge of poverty in the coming two decades. The journey of
miracle growth, which began in the late 19th century in Japan and
spread to the East Asian countries and China in the second half of
20th century on a “flying geese” pattern, would now cross the Indian
Ocean to make South Asia a “new growth miracle.” This would
make the South Asian region more prosperous, with intensified
intraregional interdependence from increased levels of trade and
investment flows. It would also provide the region a durable peace.
Only then could South Asia play its rightful role in the world
economy and global affairs.
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CHAPTER 6
DEMOGRAPHIC FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA THROUGH 2050:
POPULATION, ECONOMY, AND HEALTH
Shripad Tuljapurkar
Introduction.
This chapter surveys trends in demography and related aspects
of human capital and economic change in China, India, and Pakistan
centered on the start of the 21st century. Although this chapter is
concerned with South Asia, it is motivated by questions—security,
strategic balance, alliances—that make it essential to include China
in order to provide context and comparison. The first goal of this
chapter is to describe the large demographic shifts that have
occurred and continue in these three countries, and to describe their
implications for policy. The second goal is to describe some changes
in aspects of human capital and economic change, particularly
literacy, employment, and infrastructure. This chapter does not
directly address strategic questions but rather the backdrop against
which those questions need to be examined. The chapter concludes
with a summary of the factors and trends considered here and their
likely impact on the future of India and Pakistan.
The chapter begins with discussions of fertility and mortality
change and their trends and forecasts. Mortality change is closely
tied to health status, and this connection is briefly discussed. Given
these changes, the chapter considers age structures today and their
changes over the next 50 years. The focus is on features that are not
commonly appreciated, including the certain prospect that the
growth rates of important age segments will change dramatically
over the coming decades. The chapter then turns to literacy and
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education, which are the important elements of human capital, and
considers trends and projections of these and the differences to be
expected across the region. Next, the chapter considers labor force,
employment, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and some related
indicators of economic capacity. The final section summarizes the
overall outlook suggested by the factors that are discussed below.
The discussion here relies on a range of sources but an effort is
made to point out the limitations of the data and analyses where
necessary.
Fertility Decline.
It is now commonplace to observe that in 2000 China and India
together make up nearly a third of the global population, up from
about one-fourth in 1950.1 This relative growth was the result of
many decades of relatively high fertility in both countries. Yet the
past three decades have seen a substantial and sustained decline in
fertility in China and India, and Pakistan appears to have begun a
fertility decline as well in the past few years. To indicate the trends, a
useful summary measure of fertility in any year is the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR), which is essentially the total number of children that an
average woman would have in her lifetime—if she were to live her
life in the conditions of that year. It is obvious that fertility is at a
“replacement” level if every woman has a TFR of about two, which
will result in a population staying roughly constant in number.
In all three countries, efforts have been made to reduce the TFR
from a high value of about six in the early 1950s towards
replacement—Figure 1 shows the trends and forecasts for all
countries. In this and other cases, the forecasts used here are taken
from the World Bank projections;2 these are largely similar to those
of the United Nations (U.N.). Between 1970 and 1990, China made a
remarkably quick transition to replacement TFR via the one-child
policy, and its TFR has since fallen below replacement to near 1.8,
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Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Past and Present.
India’s TFR has fallen at a slow but steady pace since 1970, and is
currently about 3.2. (In this chapter the word “about” is used to
qualify values that have margins of error of a few percent but where
it is unwise to be more precise without a great deal of additional
detail.) In Pakistan, fertility has been resistant to change: several past
studies have declared that TFR is falling, only to be followed by
subsequent measurements that show TFR to still be at a high level.4
It now seems fairly certain on the basis of several independent
assessments that Pakistan’s TFR, currently the highest of the three
countries at about 5.7, has finally started to decline.
Figure 1 also shows projections of future fertility, partly based on
assumptions by the World Bank. China is shown at a TFR of 1.8 for
the next 50 years, which is lower than World Bank estimates.
William Lavely discusses the problems of correctly estimating
current TFR from Chinese census data which are subject to “adjustment” for official purposes.5 A value of 1.8 or lower for TFR seems
likely for several reasons: informal indications are that China’s TFR
has fallen below replacement; China’s policy commitment to the one107

child policy has been firm in recent years; and urban TFR and rural
TFR in the majority Han population are declining or steady. It is
possible that TFR will be unstable over time as the last large cohorts
of only children hit their childbearing years, and as China
experiences economic cycles, but the level of TFR seems certain to
stay low. Regional variation in China’s TFR is smaller than in the
other countries—there is higher rural fertility than urban but only by
half a child or so. The minority Chinese populations are permitted to
have more than one child and often do, but their contribution is
small and even their fertility is following the national trend.6
India’s TFR has been declining for decades, accelerated by
increases in literacy, educational attainment, and contraceptive use.7
The government now has a formal population policy that includes a
commitment to reach replacement TFR by 2010. Uncertainty about
this goal is due to the well-known problem of the “BIMARU” (sick)
states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh,
where high TFRs of well above four are coupled with low literacy
and high mortality. The Planning Commission of India appointed an
Expert Panel that made projections in 1996 which are based on
excellent demographic analyses, and they predict that these problem
states will not reach replacement until about 2030. But the remaining
states should reach a TFR of 2.1 by 2015 or 2020—this without any
impetus from a national policy. An overall target of 2010 to 2015 is
optimistic but may well be achievable with political consensus.
Pakistan’s TFR is now falling and analyses of fertility transitions
in other countries suggest that rising literacy, declining mortality
and increasing contraceptive use are likely to lock the trend into
place.8 The rate of decline shown for Pakistan in Figure 1 is that
assumed by the World Bank in their latest projections and is similar
to what the U.N. Population Division assumes. It is clear that the
assumptions for Pakistan parallel what happened in India but with
decline accelerated by about a decade. However, there is substantial
uncertainty about Pakistan’s future TFR: the economic environment
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has had a definite effect in the past, and continued steady growth is
probably necessary to achieve the projected TFR. Also, there is a
great deal of variation between urban and rural populations, and
between provinces. Of the forecasts in Figure 1, then, the one for
Pakistan is most uncertain; the other two are well-supported but
remain uncertain with regard to level and timing. In practice, it is
best to visualize the uncertainty in projected TFR in terms of an
uncertainty “band” around the projected values: over the period
shown in Figure 1, we may rely on other analyses to argue that the
width of such a band will be about 0.5 for China, 0.75 for India, and
2.0 for Pakistan.9
Mortality and Health.
The three countries have also experienced mortality declines in
the past three decades. Table 1 displays two standard measures of
mortality: infant death rates per 1000 live births and life expectancy
for each of the specified years. The values in Table 1 are for both
sexes combined, and include the U.N. projection for 2050. For
comparison, note that in the year 2000 the values for the United
States are an infant mortality of seven and a life expectancy of 77.5
years.
It is clear from Table 1 that China has made rapid progress in
reducing mortality in the past decade, that India and Pakistan have
also made regular progress but at a slower rate. The numbers for
Pakistan are probably close to those for India. It is worth noting that
the projected values for India and Pakistan may be too pessimistic.
Recent data from India (from a large national sample, the Sample
Registration System10) indicate that declines in infant mortality were
slow in the 1990s but have speeded up in the past few years.
Experience with long-term analysis of mortality change in other
countries suggests that long-run rates of mortality decline can
provide a better assessment of prospects than short-run slowing
down or speeding up—on this argument, the long-run prospects
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may be comparable in the three countries.

Year
1990
1995
2000
2050

Infant
Infant
Death
Life
Death
Rate
Expectancy Rate
China
India
43
68.4
80
35
69.9
74
29
71.4
65
13
79.0
25

Life
Expectancy
57.2
60.6
62.5
75.4

Infant
Death
Life
Rate
Expectancy
Pakistan
106
56.7
93
59.1
82
61.1
36
73.7

Sources: World Bank, World Population Projections: Estimates and Projections with
Related Demographic Statistics, Baltimore: published for the World Bank by Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994; United Nations, World Population Prospects: The
2000 Revision, New York: The UN, 2001.

Table 1. Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy.
In all these countries, the decline in infant mortality is a useful
indicator of the effectiveness of health policy aimed at child health.
Assessments of the health care systems in India and Pakistan by the
World Bank show that poor nutrition remains a widespread problem
for young children (under 5 years) in both countries, and also among
low-income women and mothers.11 India has made substantial
efforts to immunize children against communicable and infectious
diseases, which probably accounts for the lower infant mortality rate
as compared to Pakistan. But facilities such as safe drinking water
and ready access to low-cost primary care remain a challenge. The
public health sector in both countries is large but relatively inefficient, and the private health sector is focused on high-income
groups.
The other numbers in Table 1 are the expectation of life at birth
as computed from the age-specific probabilities of death in a given
year. These values are correlated with infant mortality, but they also
depend strongly on mortality conditions of children between the
ages of 1 and 15, and of older adults at ages 45 and up. Here, too, it is
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clear that China has much lower levels of mortality, with India and
Pakistan showing much higher and similar mortality. For many
years in India and Pakistan, female mortality at all ages was
atypically higher than male mortality (relative to all industrialized
countries). This differential was clearly related to the lower status,
lower economic capacity, and poorer health conditions of women.
But the differential has narrowed and female mortality has been
falling faster than male mortality over time in both countries.
A potentially large impact on mortality in all three countries will
result from the spread of HIV through the sexually active population. In India, there is wide public and official recognition of the
issue, and a reported 3.5 million infections exist in 2000. The Indian
government has a policy to treat infected cases and reduce the
spread of new infections. India is also in the unusual position of having a strong local pharmaceutical industry that is active in the
production of antiviral drugs and other treatments. In Pakistan,
there are few reported infections, but the country certainly is
vulnerable to the spread of HIV. Given the experience of other
societies, including India, there is reason to think that HIV may
spread to a large number of people before it is officially recognized
as a problem in Pakistan. In China and India, HIV will produce a
sizeable lowering of the projected life expectancy, perhaps by about
3 years by 2025. Much of this increased mortality will be felt among
the younger male population, not overall.
All three countries report unusually high male-biased sex ratios
at birth. In a population without a strong bias towards male children
and against female children, good data show that the sex ratio at
birth is 105 males to 100 females. Natural (genetic, environmental)
variation around this ratio is small. So a population in which this
ratio is significantly different is almost certainly one where females
are “missing.” They may simply be missing from official counts
because people do not report them when they are very young, or
really missing because of infanticide, sex-selective abortion, and so
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on. It is well known that the sex ratio at birth in China has been
increasing rapidly since the advent of the one-child policy and is
now about 122. In India the data are consistent with a ratio of about
110.12 Pakistan’s sex ratio is in the same range as India’s.13
This sex-ratio bias is an indicator of the low status of women,
and can be traced to higher female than male infant mortality rates
and abortion rates. The implications of these unbalanced sex ratios
for the condition of female infants are grave. Aside from that, there
will be a shortage of females in the marriage markets in these
countries over the next few decades. We may hope that the impact of
this imbalance on female status and roles will be positive.
Population Age Distributions.
Fertility and mortality together determine population age
structure, which can be summarized in a population pyramid
showing how many (or what proportion of) people there are at
different ages. In any given year, the population structure of a
country is a summary and reflection of the history of fertility and
mortality rates in past years. In some countries, like the United
States, immigration is an added and important factor, but it is not
important for the countries we discuss here. Figures 2 and 3 show
population structures for the three countries in the 1990s. China’s
structure shows dramatic variation with respect to age. There is a
population “bust” between ages 30 and 40—this is the signature of
the Great Leap Forward and famine of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
A second “bust” is centered at age 15 and reflects the one-child
policy starting in the 1980s. The relative “boom” just below age 10
was generated by the “bulge” of people shown at age about 30—
these were the cohorts sandwiched between the Leap and the onechild era. India shows just the one sizeable “bust” at ages 5 and
below, reflecting the sizeable decline in TFR in just the past decade.
For Pakistan (Figure 3), where the TFR decline has barely begun, the
age structure shows only a steep decline with age. The shape of the
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Figure 2. Age Structures Compared: China and India.

Figure 3. Age Structures Compared: India and Pakistan.
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age structure in Pakistan reflects the classical pre-transition demography of high fertility and mortality. During a demographic transition, fertility declines result in baby “busts” that are inevitably
followed some years later by “echo” baby booms. Mortality decline
is also a characteristic of demographic transition, and results in a
longer-lived population so that the old-age tail of the population
structure elongates. For populations in transition, the age structure
will be noticeably variable with peaks and troughs at different ages.
Projections. The World Bank projections (used below) and U.N.
projections rely on the fertility and mortality projections discussed
above. As fertility and mortality fall, the population structures will
start to flatten at the younger ages (as birth rates decline) and display
increased weight at the highest ages (from increasing life
expectancy). The economic consequences of these trends are substantial. One way of assessing the trends is in terms of dependency
ratios—ratios of the number of young (under 20) or old (over 65)
people to the nominal labor force (people 20 to 65). Figure 4 shows
the projected dependency ratios for all three countries, with the U.S.
2000 values marked in for context. The dependency ratios are a good
indicator of “support” burdens—the fraction of labor wages earned
by the 20 to 65 age segment that is needed to support the young and
the old. Economists use the term “transfers” to describe such expenditures from private and public sources. Clearly, lower transfers
imply that a higher fraction of labor income is available for increased
consumption or savings, and thus imply a higher contribution to
economic growth.
Figure 4 shows that the total dependency ratio (adding the
displayed fractions in the two panels) should decline substantially
over time in both India and Pakistan, by as much as 30 percent. This
decline represents a major demographic window of opportunity
during which effective government policy can stimulate savings
rates and economic growth. Successful examples of such economic
stimulus include many East Asian countries.14
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Figure 4. Young and Old Dependency Ratios
Projected into the Future.
A different perspective on the economic potential of demo-graphic change is
obtained by examining projected rates of change in age segments. Consider just
one example, the age group 15 to 20, which includes persons who are completing
education and prepar-ing to enter the labor force. This age segment is an
important focus for government policy in terms of education, occupational
training, creation of jobs, and so on. Figure 5 shows projected annual percent-age
changes for the 15 to 20 age segment in the three countries. Note that India and
Pakistan will experience a substantial decline in the growth rate of this segment of
the young population, with long periods when the growth rate will be zero or
slightly negative. For governments, such declines represent both an opportunity—
because, for example, expenditures on education will not have to increase forever
and may be freed up to spend on other priorities—and a challenge, because
resources will need to be allocated in an efficient manner to anticipate changing
needs. These structural shifts will be a serious preoccupation of government,
education, and business over the coming decades.
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Figure 5. Projected Annual Percentage Change by Age Group:
15 to 20 years.
Human Capital and Labor.
We now turn to a comparison across the three countries of some
elements of human capital and labor. A useful basic index of human
capital is literacy, which has been rising in all three countries
especially in recent years. Table 2 displays the percentage of the
population of each sex that is illiterate.15 Literacy is on the rise most
rapidly in China, while India and Pakistan still have substantial
percentages of the population illiterate. There is a substantial
difference favoring males over females in all countries, but it is
especially large in Pakistan. More detailed assessments show that in
India literacy is rising far more rapidly at the youngest ages and in
the past few years, whereas World Bank data show that Pakistan is
still making only slow gains in this area.16 Both India and Pakistan
are characterized by large rural-urban differentials in literacy,
although the differences in India are declining somewhat.
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1996
China
India
Pakistan

Female 15+ Illiterate Percent
1997
1998

27
58
73

26
58
72

Male 15+ Illiterate Percent
1997
1998

1996
China
India
Pakistan

25
57
71

10
34
44

10
34
43

9
33
42

1999

2000

25
56
70

24
55
69

1999

2000

9
32
41

8
32
40

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP), information available online at http://www.unescap.org/stat/statdata/
apinfig.htm.

Table 2. Illiteracy Percentages.
Pre-Primary
1997
China
India
Pakistan

28
5
16

Primary
1980 1997
113*
83
40

123*
100
--

Secondary
1980 1997
46
30
14

70
49
--

Tertiary
1980 1997
2
5
2

6
7
4

*Note: percentages over 100 are possible because these percentages are relative
to specific target ages, and can exceed 100 percent if children at older ages are
enrolled in a given category.
Sources: United Nations (UNICEF) data available online at http://www.unicef.org/
statis/; and Vinod Ahuja and Deon Filmer, “Educational Attainment in Developing
Countries: New Estimates and Projections Disaggregated by Gender,” Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1489, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995.

Table 3. Enrollment Percentages.
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Education per se at primary, secondary, and higher levels is also
on the rise. Data in Table 3 show rapid increases in primary
enrollments in China and India.17 Pakistan is moving much more
slowly towards increased enrollments—the sources above provide
no estimate for Pakistan in 1997, but informal accounts suggest that
there has been only modest change since 1980. Secondary enrolments
are also rising rapidly in China and India, much more slowly in
Pakistan. India is at about seven percent enrollment in higher
education, compared to about six percent for China, reflecting a
historical emphasis on higher education in India. Pakistan is at about
four percent at the tertiary level. There are significant male-female
differences in enrolment, and these are projected to persist by the
World Bank and other agencies even though there are efforts
underway to change this.
The growth rate of the potentially employable labor force is a
matter of the supply of people in different age segments. But actual
employment remains dominated by agricultural employment in all
three countries. Table 4 shows the numbers of persons employed in
non-agricultural jobs (formal employment), the percentages
employed in agriculture, and the percentages of females employed.
Missing entries are reported as unknown by the UN. Sample surveys
in India show that labor force participation rates (including
agricultural work) are higher in rural males than urban males at ages
through 25—there are a rather large absolute number of young
unemployed males in urban India.18 Socially this is and will remain a
challenge. These studies also show that labor force participation
remains high through age 60 years—higher than is now typical in
the rich industrialized countries. Historical data show that India’s
overall participation rates have stayed roughly constant for nearly 20
years—this translates into the observation that India has successfully
added work opportunities in proportion to the growth in its work
force.
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China
Pop. employed, nonagricultural (entities
with > 10 employees
In agriculture
Female Labor force
India
Pop. employed, nonagricultural (entities
with > 10 employees
In agriculture
Female Labor force
Pakistan
Pop. employed, nonagricultural (entities
with > 10 employees
In agriculture
Female Labor force

Thousands

1980
19,930

1990
63,350

1998
40,719

Percentage
Percentage

68.7
43.2

60.1
---

50.1
---

Thousands

241,534

315,152

360,713

Percentage
Percentage

69.7
27.2

64.0
---

-----

Thousands

Percentage
Percentage

24,606

52.7
10.4

30,180

46.79
11.39

34,590

47.25
13.92

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), information available online at
http://www.unescap.org/stat/statdata/apinfig.htm.
Table 4. Employment.
Employment data for China are varied and hard to interpret
consistently.19 At an aggregate level, unemployment is about eight
percent in urban China (an “official” figure of about 3.5 percent is
artificially low because it does not include laid-off workers). Rural
unemployment in China is thought to be massive—even official
reports say that there are 100 to 150 million unemployed in rural
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areas now, with a possible rise to two or even three times that
number over the next two decades. Large numbers of the rural
unemployed form a transient “floating” population that finds
occasional work in urban areas. China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) may exacerbate the problems of unemployment.
Finally, we consider the economic status of workers in all three
countries. Table 5, from a study by H. Dagdeviren et al., shows the
per-capita income for all three countries in the 1990s.20 There is some
trend information in the World Bank’s Development Indices,21 but
the essential comparisons have not changed. The third column of
Table 5 displays the Gini coefficient—this is given here on scale from
0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality), and is estimated from
a set of aggregate indicators and an assumed functional distribution.
The last column of Table 5 gives the proportion of the population
that is below the poverty line of US$1 per day. China has the highest
Gini coefficient and thus the highest wage inequality, but lies
between India and Pakistan on the percentage of poor. India and
Pakistan have a similar level of inequality, but there are far more
poor in India.

China
India
Pakistan

1995
1992
1991

Per Capita
Income US$

Gini Coefficient
of Income
Inequality

972
460
850

41.5
32.0
31.2

Percent
Population
Living on <1
US$ Per Day
22.7
47.9
11.8

Source: H. Dagdeviren, Rolph van der Hoeven, and John Weeks, “Redistribution
Matters: Growth for Poverty Reduction, ” International Labor Organization
Working Paper, Geneva: ILO, 2001.

Table 5. Income and Inequality.
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Conclusion.
We have seen that demographic changes will reshape the
population age distributions in South Asia and in China over the
next few decades. India’s population structure already reflects the
first major change, as the youngest age cohorts are the smallest that
have been born for many decades. Pakistan’s fertility has begun to
fall but remains much higher than India’s. Mortality has improved in
both countries and should continue to do so at roughly similar rates.
It is clear that India can look forward to a demographic “bonus” as
the growth rate of its youngest members declines, freeing up
resources for additional investments in literacy, education, and
capital investment. If Pakistan stays on course with fertility decline, a
similar change should occur there but delayed by a decade or two.
Both India and Pakistan evince substantial differences between
men and women in terms of mortality, literacy, educational
enrollment and employment rates. These differences are much
stronger in rural than urban segments of both countries. But in India
they are also regionally concentrated. Reduction of these differences
is going to remain a challenge for government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the coming decades. These
differentials are also a source of political and social tension and
potential instability. For example, a large unemployed population of
young people is a segment of population susceptible to political
manipulation.
India has achieved relatively high rates of secondary and tertiary
education that should enhance its labor force and economic performance in the coming years. Pakistan is clearly in need of stronger
initiatives in these areas, because it lags far behind at all levels of
education. Labor force participation rates for the population as a
whole appear to be roughly comparable in the two countries. In both
education and employment, women remain strongly disadvantaged
relative to men in both countries.
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India and Pakistan have made progress in the economic welfare
of their people. Pakistan enjoyed a period of rapid growth in the
early 1990s, but this has slowed substantially in recent years.
Economic progress is sensitive to the political instability that seems
to have a more episodic nature in Pakistan. The absolute numbers of
poor people have declined in both countries, and Pakistan has fewer
truly poor people than India does, even though their income
distributions appear to be similarly unequal. There is an ongoing
debate about the relative importance of redistribution vis-à-vis
growth as a path to reducing poverty, but it is likely important to use
both policies so as to increase the overall size of the economic pie
while also trying to divide it in a reasonable way.
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Part III

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
REGIONAL SECURITY
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CHAPTER 7
BOMBS IN SEARCH OF A MISSION:
INDIA’S UNCERTAIN NUCLEAR FUTURE
Rajesh M. Basrur
and
Stephen Philip Cohen
It is our contention that India’s nuclear future may be impossible
to predict with any confidence. At best, it might be possible to set
forth a range of futures and develop policy recommendations, but it
would be unwise to assume that even a straight-line projection of the
present will yield a reliable vision of the future.1 This conclusion has
two important implications. The first is that policies made now on
the basis of a fixed vision of the future are as likely to be proven
irrelevant or misguided as they might be correct. The second is that
the wide range of possible futures, and the uncertainty as to which
will materialize, should lead to a degree of humility among analysts
and policymakers. Low risk and low cost (if things should go wrong)
policies should be favored.
Our skepticism about the ability to foresee the future is based, in
part, upon our understanding of past efforts. Outsiders and regional
experts had been predicting the nuclearization of South Asia for
decades, yet when it came, it was still a surprise. Then, it was widely
assumed that having “gone nuclear, ” India and Pakistan could no
longer engage in armed conflict. Indeed, some argued that the
possession of nuclear weapons by both states would freeze their
hostility, and that time would eventually lead to a reconciliation of
their outstanding differences. These expectations have proven false:
India and Pakistan did become embroiled in a military conflict of
significant proportions in 1999, and despite their declared nuclear
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status, they seem to be no closer to a real accommodation now than
they were before Kargil, or before the series of nuclear tests each
conducted in 1998. The military buildup and confrontation that
occurred after the attack on India’s parliament on December 13,
2001, confirms this assessment.
However, this analysis is also based upon our understanding of
the complexity of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad. It is unlike the
Cold War nuclear standoff, or any other nuclear “set.” Neither the
European case, nor that of Israel, nor that of China provides many
clues as to the future direction that India and Pakistan will take in
their nuclear programs and how those programs will contribute to
peace and war in South Asia. Nor is the India-China nuclear
equation well-understood. Finally, we argue that the region’s two
nuclear relationships may also be transformed if key variables at the
global and regional levels change significantly.
This chapter first presents a “baseline” projection of the current
strategic status of the region, briefly examines ideal-type alternatives
within which we might expect to locate India’s posture in 2020, and
then shows how variations in each component of the baseline
posture might shape actual outcomes. In these projections, we try to
exhaust the likely (and unlikely, but important) alternative futures.
A final section offers a few comments on the policy implications of
our analysis.
Baseline Projection: The “Expected” Future.
Many expert observers of India’s nuclear trajectory would agree
on the following projection:
• There will be no breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations, but
no war either. The future will see frequent crises, but nuclear
deterrence will remain robust and escalation to nuclear war
inhibited.
128

• There will be no significant change in the course of the IndiaChina relationship. A nuclear dyad will gradually emerge, but
it will be a stable one. China will continue to “balance” India
by providing nuclear support to Pakistan.
• The global balance of power and the strategic relationships
among the major players will remain substantially the same.
There will be no serious rivalry or tensions among the big
three–the United States, Russia and China. In short, there will
be no dramatic systemic impact on regional nuclear dynamics.
• Though the United States will retain an interest in cultivating
long-term relationships with India and Pakistan, it will not
intervene directly in the region, except during crises when
Washington will play the role of crisis-manager.
• All of the region’s nuclear players–India, China, and Pakistan–
will remain internally stable. There will be no major change in
the internal politics of any one of them that causes disequilibrium in the regional strategic relationships.
• There will be a gradual increase in the numbers of nuclear
weapons possessed by India and Pakistan, and limited deployment of these weapons may occur. India and Pakistan may
move to deploy mobile launchers. In 20 years, it is conceivable
that India will have developed a sea-based deterrent, perhaps
mounted on a surface vessel. China will have a relatively more
robust arsenal, but it will not be seen as threatening by India.
• India’s and Pakistan’s command and control arrangements will
be somewhat better than they are now, presumably keeping up
with the slow accretion of numbers and increased dispersion
of their nuclear forces.
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• There will be little likelihood of a preemptive attack by India
against Pakistan or against India by Pakistan or China, in part
because the numbers will make such an attack difficult, and in
part because of mobile basing. In the India-Pakistan case, both
sides will be worried about miscalculations. Also, as the
numbers increase, the possibility of significant fallout on one’s
own country from even a successful attack will increase. Both
factors thus enhance self-deterrence.
• There will be continued uncertainty and ambiguity over
different escalation scenarios. It will remain unclear to outside
analysts as to where Pakistani (or Indian) “red lines” are
drawn, i.e., where a provocation crosses a certain threshold
that triggers a nuclear response. Indeed, it is likely to remain
unclear to Indian and Pakistani policymakers themselves, and
both sides will continue to rely on ambiguity, coupled with
verbal threats, to enhance deterrence.
In brief, the future could look pretty much as it does today. In
contrast with relatively stable India-China relations, India-Pakistan
relations will regularly enter a crisis state. But the two countries are
likely to move back again to long-standing “cold war” positions
through their own common sense or the intervention of friendly
outsiders. There remains a small possibility that they will not move
back, and that a crisis will “go all the way.” At the time of writing
(early 2002), India and Pakistan are in the midst of their most
extended crisis, with well over a million men facing each other along
the international frontier and the Line of Control in Kashmir. This
crisis, and likely future ones, will always have nuclear overtones,
which is why concern will remain about the South Asian nuclear
balance. Quantifying the risk of actual war is important, but beyond
the scope of this chapter. It may be analogous to the risk of a nuclear
exchange during the Cold War or, perhaps, of a North Korean
nuclear weapon falling on Seoul. Even if one could measure the risk
at a particular moment in time, is it likely to increase over the years
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as the Indian and Pakistani arsenals grow steadily? Or is the
likelihood of a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons balanced by
an improvement in the quality of command and control structures,
and, above all, by the enhanced deterrent effect of an increase in the
destructiveness that such larger numbers would bring?
Variations: Three Ideal-type Models.
While it is tempting to assume that this baseline projection is
accurate, if for no other reason than the lack of expectation that
things will dramatically change, sharp divergence may occur. Some
attempts have been made in the past to present alternative nuclear
futures for the region. Most prominent among these is Ashley
Tellis’s set of five models, ranging from nuclear renunciation to the
establishment of a “ready” arsenal.2 Our own models go beyond the
operational focus of Tellis’s models and are based on a wider set of
criteria that integrate operational variations with changes in doctrine
and arms control preferences.
Table 1 presents three ideal-type models which India’s nuclear
posture may approximate, given changes in the numerous variables
that determine the expected future projection. (Needless to say,
similar models could be developed for Pakistan.)
The models are devised so as to reflect likely futures in terms of
four criteria: conceptions of deterrence, the size and sophistication of
the arsenal, the relationship between levels of armed conflict, and the
status of arms control. The static model envisions a period of modest
growth in India’s nuclear arsenal until operational capabilities are
sufficient to convince political decisionmakers that no more
expansion is necessary; this could occur at any time up to 2020. The
model envisages a steady state in which deterrence is existential (i.e.,
the mere existence of undeployed weapons is considered as
sufficient to deter by both sides); the arsenal remains relatively small
and a sea-based subsurface capability is eschewed; only marginal
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subconventional conflict is considered feasible (and perhaps even
that is eschewed); and a stable framework of arms control is in place.

Table 1. Three Ideal-Type Models.
In the creeping growth model, minimum deterrence is conceived of
as having relatively larger numbers on the basis of some notion of
redundancy against the event of a first strike; at least partial
deployment is seen as perhaps necessary because “credibility” is
equated with visibility; a limited conventional war is thought
possible under the nuclear shadow; and there is little or no
significant development in arms control, though there may be an
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underlying stability based on tacit understandings. Both of these
models are not far removed from the current trend, but the
trajectories they represent diverge significantly over time.
Finally, the robust expansion model represents a shift to MADoriented thinking (i.e., mutual assured destruction based on second
strike capability) and a more ambitious conception of limited
deterrence–a smaller arsenal cast in the image of the American and
Russian ones–accompanied by an open-ended acquisition and
development process and a perception that a full-scale conventional
war and a limited nuclear war are possible. In this model, there is
limited interest in arms control because of doubts arising with
respect to unilateral verification. On the vertical axis of Table 1, it is
seen that the three ideal types are placed along a continuum from
nonoffensive defense to offensive defense.
Potential Changes Resulting from Shifts in Major Variables.
The ten components of the baseline projection embody a number
of variables that may shift in different directions, thereby altering the
trajectory of the projection as a whole. Of the ten variables we
consider, the first five are political, the next four are military, and the
last is a combination of both.
The India-Pakistan Relationship. The period from 1947 to 1971 was
an era of war between India and Pakistan. Thereafter, following a
relatively mild interregnum, the period from the mid-1980s has been
one of repeated crises and constant border skirmishes, with tensions
aggravated by the nuclearization of both countries. Recent
developments have been less than encouraging. The matching
nuclear tests of 1998 were followed by the short-lived bonhomie
represented by the Lahore Declaration of 1999. However, the
atmosphere was quickly vitiated by the Kargil conflict. The U.S.
campaign in Afghanistan, ironically, has, for the first time in their
troubled history, placed the two countries on the same side, but the
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tension has actually risen instead of subsiding, as each seeks to use
its closer relationship to the United States to force Washington to
pressure the other. Could things get worse?
The terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative
Assembly in October 2001 and on the Indian Parliament in
December are indicators of the potential for further deterioration in
the relationship. It is conceivable that the secessionist problem in
India may not only persist over time, but become worse. Should this
be the case, domestic pressures may impel the Indian government to
retaliate by using some form of force, such as quick strikes against
terrorist bases in Pakistan, or by a tit-for-tat game of fomenting
trouble in the Pushtun community that straddles the PakistaniAfghan border. The result could be the ratcheting up of tensions and
the beginnings of a nuclear arms race as hardliners on both sides
gather support and press for stronger forces to counter the visible
threat from the other. On the other hand, it may equally happen that,
learning from the risks their confrontations create, Indian and
Pakistani leaders bridge the gulf that prevented a détente at the July
2001 Agra summit. A really serious nuclear crisis, which is not
inconceivable, could compel the two countries to seek a more stable
relationship. One characteristic of India-Pakistan relations has been
an increase in the number of crises and sub-war conflicts; another
has been the series of high-level summits that have taken place, and
the general acknowledgement, even by Indian and Pakistani leaders,
that South Asia needs–and may actually have–a “peace process.” In
brief, while there have been repeated crises, and both countries seem
to be driven by a fear of losing that is even greater than the desire to
win, there is also a powerful understanding among them that the
present hostility over Kashmir is dangerous and damaging to their
respective national interests.
Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility of a general
settlement on Kashmir, even if it is only an agreement to disagree.
How would this affect the development of each country’s nuclear
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program? All things being equal, it is doubtful whether a settlement
on Kashmir will lead to a reduction in weapons or anything but a
slower pace in the development of new designs and delivery
vehicles. However, a general peace might reduce pressure to resume
testing and perfecting new kinds of weapons, especially if
international pressure against testing were to continue. Without new
designs, and with the prospect of a lessening of general tensions
between them, both India and Pakistan might be content to freeze
their systems qualitatively and quantitatively.
The India-China Relationship. The India-China relationship is not
entirely predictable in the long term. For a pessimist, there is plenty
of reason to expect the deterioration of the relationship. The border
dispute lingers, and is complicated by China’s refusal to recognize
India’s sovereignty over its northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh
as well as by the fact that Pakistan has allowed a part of Kashmir,
where the Karakoram highway has been constructed, to come under
Chinese control. China’s propensity to use force in resolving some of
its international disputes (for instance, with Vietnam, Taiwan, and
over the Spratly Islands) might still come into play. Both China and
India have the potential to come under the control of more
aggressive regimes in the event of domestic turbulence. Specific
events could also aggravate the tension between them. If Tibet were
to be inflamed by a burst of secessionism, a rightist Indian regime,
irked by the sustained China-Pakistan nuclear missile nexus, might
be tempted to exploit the situation to enhance its bargaining power,
thus provoking an angry Chinese response. An India-China
confrontation would likely have a nuclear dimension, with India–
under a more direct threat– motivated to seek a higher level of
deterrent capability than the baseline projection envisages. That in
turn would, of course, invite a similar response from Pakistan,
though not necessarily so if the Indian nuclear upgrade is confined
to the judicious deployment of intermediate-range missiles.3
Alternatively, an unstable success or regime in China might be
tempted to consolidate its position by adopting an aggressive stance
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toward an insurgency-ridden north-eastern India or by assuming a
hawkish posture in an India- Pakistan crisis, thereby precipitating
the same result.
From an optimist’s perspective, the long-term trend in SinoIndian relations is distinctly positive and unlikely to be reversed. It
may even be reinforced. Over the years, the two countries have
agreed not to allow their border dispute to prevent steadily growing
cooperation on trade, and they have reached a broad consensus on
the desirability of a multipolar world. The possibility of a loose
understanding among India, China, and Russia cannot be ruled out,
particularly if the United States continues to exhibit its current
proclivity toward unilateral decisionmaking on key international
questions. In such a setting, China may prefer to assuage India’s
anxieties by gradually reducing its support for Pakistan, pushing for
a quick resolution of the border dispute and, reversing its current
stand on India’s nuclearization, launching arms control talks. At a
minimum, the rising trend of India-China cooperation would be
sustained, and perhaps be placed on a steeper incline. Indian nuclear
hawks would have one less argument for a more robust posture.
The Global Strategic Environment. The post-Cold War global
environment has been in flux, with conflict and cooperation
coexisting. Different scenarios are conceivable that could impact
significantly on India’s (and Pakistan’s) nuclear posture. On the
positive side, there is an accelerated integrative process of
globalization that has brought more and more nations into a
seamless web of information flows, investment, production and
trade. The winding down of the Cold War has simultaneously
reduced great power tensions and the threat of a global nuclear
holocaust. As Russia seeks a stronger European identity, its relations
with the United States and Europe are showing signs of
improvement in spite of its dissatisfaction with the American
abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the U.S.
determination to proceed with its missile defense program. But there
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is a greater element of uncertainty with regard to China’s response
over the long term. And worse still, the threat of terrorism has had a
dramatic impact on global security following the events of
September 11, 2001.
One negative scenario for India involves growing U.S.-China
rivalry and tension. Chinese leaders have shown a willingness to
extend limited cooperation to the West on specific issues such as the
hunt for Osama bin Laden and the campaign against the Taliban. But
China’s overall objective is to become one of the world’s
independent power centers, toward which end it is engaged in a
major program of military modernization. There are important
divergences of strategic interest between China and the United
States over Taiwan, and over the U.S. missile defense programs.
There are also significant differences over China’s treatment of
political dissenters. Specific events, such as the 1989 Tiananmen
Square incident, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade, and the collision between an American surveillance
aircraft and a China fighter over the South China Sea in April 2001
have created a lack of trust between these two states. To many
Americans it appears that China sees itself as the successor to the
Soviet Union, as the new challenger to American hegemony. Some
have also argued that China’s strategic culture embodies a tendency
to use force in its approach to difficult external disputes and that a
future cold war cannot be ruled out.4 In that case, the U.S. might
decide to resume nuclear testing, and pursue the fast-track
development of missile defense, possibly providing Taiwan with a
theater missile defense (TMD) umbrella. A crisis over Taiwan may
occur. In such a deteriorating situation, China may expand its
arsenal rapidly and assume a more aggressive posture.
China’s direct response–deploying more inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), many or all with multiple warheads–may
not directly threaten India, but the overall threat environment would
encourage India to move toward a more robust posture, particularly
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if India-China relations are initiated by continuing Chinese nuclear
and missile assistance to Pakistan. A Chinese perception that India is
part of a U.S. strategy to contain China would raise Sino-Indian
tensions several notches. A more aggressive and unstable nuclear
relationship may emerge as a result. A strong Indian nuclear
response to changes in its relationship with China would inevitably
raise the strategic temperature between India and Pakistan.
On the other hand, a cooperative global trend might also emerge.
The present American tendency toward unilateralism may diminish
over time as the United States adopts a multilateralist strategy,
perhaps in a continuing effort to counter new terrorist threats, or in
the event of the destabilization of the present Saudi regime. Growing
costs and technical difficulties could well cause a moderation of the
U.S. missile defense program. The United States, Russia, and China
may draw closer together and pay more attention to economic issues
while cooperating on common threats like terrorism and
communitarian radicalism. A renewed interest in arms control could
bring a new agreement on cuts, the beginnings of a multilateral
framework on arms control and a new era of strategic stability. In
that case, India’s own strategic environment would become
generally more stable, even if regional conditions are not entirely
congenial. In general, the existence or otherwise of global strategic
equilibrium is likely to have a significant effect on regional strategic
developments.
An American Role? The United States has changed its South Asia
policy a number of times over the past 50 years, siding weakly with
India or Pakistan against the Soviet Union and/or China. This
pattern could continue, but there are more radical possibilities.
Washington could decide to side with India against Pakistan,
providing technical and military assistance to the former, and even
nuclear assistance, should the international nonproliferation regime
break down. If Pakistan is viewed as a failing state, and if it is seen as
part of the problem rather than as part of the solution so far as
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terrorism is concerned, the United States might think it is time to
side entirely with India on the Kashmir problem, and undertake a
containment strategy against an increasingly unstable and radical
Pakistan. This would lead American strategists to the contemplation
of different strategies for containing or transforming Pakistan, and
could also lead to Indian-American discussions about still another
alternative: the breakup of Pakistan into its constituent provinces.
Should India and the United States draw close together, Pakistan
would be under great pressure to adopt a more conciliatory posture
toward India and negotiate a stable arms control regime with it.
Though the probability is not great because of the difficulty it would
have in resisting U.S. pressure, it is also possible that Pakistan would
continue to maintain a hostile stance by drawing closer to China.
What about the converse? Less likely, but conceivable, would be
a return to a pro-Pakistan policy, especially if India were to decline
the role of balancer against China. It seems improbable now, but one
could imagine India undergoing enormous political change as a
result of its many and simultaneous economic, cultural, political, and
ideological transformations. This could conceivably be an India with
a very large nuclear potential. Such changes might even alienate the
large and increasingly influential Indian-American community,
which has hitherto been a “lobby” for closer U.S.-Indian relations.
If it were to transform its identity, become more politically
unstable at home and more aggressive abroad, India might well
undertake an extensive nuclear testing program and seek a close
strategic relationship with other major powers, especially Russia,
whose technology would be valuable. In such circumstances, the
U.S. might view India as the state that needed containing, especially
if China were to cease being a strategic threat in the minds of
American strategists. India’s likely response would be a radical
strategic shift to something like the Robust Expansion Model.
Projections of nuclear technology and capabilities are constrained by
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physical and technical factors, but even these could be altered
quickly were a major power to decide that it would assist India or
Pakistan to enhance its nuclear arsenal and related delivery systems.
Political Stability in India, China and Pakistan. India, China, and
Pakistan have each undergone periods of profound political
instability in the past. India underwent an “emergency” in the 1970s
that turned it into a virtual dictatorship. China experienced a prolonged internal upheaval in the form of the Cultural Revolution in
the 1960s and 1970s. Pakistan has oscillated between military rule
(sometimes with martial law) and weak civilian governments for its
entire history. Further, Pakistan was physically divided in 1971, and
all three face several separatist threats, sometimes encouraged by
each other.
As a variable, political instability affects their nuclear futures in
two ways. First, there is the question of control over nuclear
weapons—a state driven by political conflict may have problems in
storing and safeguarding, let alone using, its nuclear weapons and
fissile material stocks. Second, there is the question of perception:
does political instability in one state raise the prospect in the mind of
its adversary that a moment of great opportunity or danger is
approaching?
While in the short run it seems improbable that instability in
India could be of a magnitude that would affect the nuclear balance,
it is not unimaginable. It would be especially likely in the aftermath
of armed conflict or serious economic crisis. India is metastable, but
a chronically weak center, or disorder in states where there were
significant nuclear assets, might raise questions concerning India’s
ability to protect its nuclear assets and its vulnerability to nuclear
blackmail.
A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is
a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While we
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may have no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is
important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject
to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakups of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged
many members of the former communist bloc, are examples of what
could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet
and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement, and a party torn by
factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation. A
vulnerable Chinese leadership, determined to bolster its shaky
position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States,
or both, might become involved in a major crisis with India, and
perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage
India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly with American
assistance.
Pakistan today seems to present the most immediate problem. Its
non-Punjabi provinces are deeply resentful, its economy is teetering
on the edge of collapse, it has undergone a traumatic reversal of
policy in Afghanistan, and its political parties seem to be stuck in
their personalistic rut. There is no credible civilian leadership
emerging among the younger generation of politicians, and the two
civilian leaders of the 1990s, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, are
distrusted by the military.
One political development must be singled out as critically
important. This is the coherence of the Pakistan army. For decades,
the unwritten “golden rule” of the officer corps has been that the
army sticks together against the political order. This rule was acted
upon when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to assert control over the
military, and more recently in 1999 when Nawaz Sharif tried to
insert his own man as army chief .
This pattern of army unity could be undone in one of two ways.
First, the Pakistan army might suffer a military setback that created a
division within the higher ranks of the officer corps. Second, a
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politician might be successful in splitting the officer corps, perhaps
along ideological rather than linguistic/ethnic lines. In either case, if
the army lost its political coherence, there might be immediate
consequences for Pakistan’s nuclear program, and in turn, for Indian
calculations of risk and gain.
A politically divided Pakistani army might come under a
military commander who is a demagogue or dictator. Wracked by
domestic turbulence, Pakistan might worry less about the future of
Kashmir than the future of the Punjab heartland. It would be
obsessed with access to the sea, particularly with control over
Karachi and Sindh, and would treasure its nuclear weapons as the
“last resort” against an Indian intervention designed to create more
Bangladeshes. However, would a Pakistani regime take this step?
Even if it hesitated to unleash a massive nuclear attack on India
would it be able to prevent some officers from acting without orders
and using nuclear weapons against Indian cities in such a crisis?
Here, the standard of command and control that might be sufficient
for a whole, united Pakistan might not be adequate to prevent
unauthorized use.
For all the negative possibilities outlined above, actual developments may be far more positive and reassuring. All three countries
may experience relatively stable development, including the growth
of greater democracy. At the very least, more stable orders are
conducive to less external tension. Translated into the realm of
strategy, this could mean an overall picture of restraint, the absence
of major crises and the adoption of more dove-like nuclear postures.
Numbers and Types of Nuclear Weapons. Numbers do count, as do
the kinds of weapons in the possession of nuclear weapons states.
Given the fissile material production capabilities of each state, it is
possible to predict the numbers of bombs in their arsenals 5 or 7
years ahead, but this could change dramatically if new production
facilities were created or India were to start “mining” its spent fuel
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stocks. Further, the (presumably) first-generation designs tested by
both countries could be perfected over the years, although this might
require additional testing or assistance from states with more
advanced nuclear programs. The expansion of China’s nuclear
capability in itself is unlikely to affect the subcontinent. The Chinese
modernization program has not elicited anxieties in India. But, in
conjunction with other factors, such as the deterioration in bilateral
relations outlined above, an enhanced and more alert Chinese
posture could result in a chain reaction in India and Pakistan.
Numbers and types of nuclear weapons matter in several ways.
1) Larger numbers create command and control problems if more
weapons are deployed. There are still greater problems if they are
suddenly deployed during a crisis. 2) The greater the number and
the larger their size, the more potential there is for massive civilian
damage. At the higher levels expected over the next 20 years, a
nuclear war would lead to the virtual destruction of Pakistan as a
state and the permanent crippling of India. 3) At higher numbers
and larger yields, with adequate delivery systems, either the Indian
or the Pakistani systems or both could intersect strongly with nearby
emerging nuclear sets. Paul Bracken has described the process by
which a number of regional nuclear systems could be intertwined in
a larger interactive nuclear web stretching from Israel to North
Korea, and including China.5 At still farther ranges, the United States
and Europe might be included in Indian or Pakistani nuclear
targeting doctrines. At the very least, the nuclear politics of the two
countries would have a new and complicating dimension.
The Quality of Command and Control in Peacetime and Crisis. We
draw a distinction between command and control in crisis and noncrisis periods. A system that is reliable in ordinary circumstances
may not be so during a crisis, and a weak command and control
system may generate the fear that a state is planning a first-strike
attack. Further, the quality of command and control must also be
considered in terms of changing technologies and strategies: a
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system that is adequate for five or fifty first-generation weapons may
be inadequate for a hundred advanced, mobile systems that are
widely dispersed.
In times of peace, the nature of deployment has diverse
implications for command and control. For instance, if bomb cores
are separated from their casings and other components, the risk of
sabotage is higher, whereas integrated weapon systems are relatively
more vulnerable to unauthorized launch, thus putting command and
control systems under pressure. In times of crisis, there would be a
natural inclination to disperse weapons as widely as possible, which
would mean delegating launch authority or accepting greater
vulnerability to a first strike, each of which is associated with a
higher level of risk. The conjunction of policymakers’ decisions,
operational decisions, and the actions of adversaries make for a
range of possible outcomes―from the stable to the catastrophic―that
are impossible to predict.
This is a subject that has received a considerable amount of
attention, and the possibility of assisting either the Indian or
Pakistani governments to improve their command and control
systems has been raised. A s many observers have noted, a
distinction has to be made between assistance that increases the
reliability and stability of a nuclear force and the ability of the
government to maintain control over its use, and that which
enhances its strategic choices.
Strategic Warning Time and Robustness of Deterrence. Strategic
warning time refers to the length of time a country has to prepare its
forces for a response to an attack, or to ready them for a first strike,
once that decision has been made. Strategic warning time can range
from seconds―in the case of highly alerted, deployed and rapid
response forces hooked up to a sophisticated detection system―to
days, in the case of weapons that are disassembled and dispersed. If
we combine this with deterrence robustness―the assurance that a
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response to a first strike will be effective, in that the right kind of the
right number of weapons will be delivered to the right targets (and
the other side knows this to be true) ―then essentially four different
“states” are created: 1) a very stable situation in which a long
strategic warning time is combined with a robust nuclear force
(deterrence is credible, but not provocative) ; 2) a very unstable
situation in which a short strategic warning time is combined with a
less-than-credible deterrent force; and two intermediate states, 3) one
in which deterrence is robust but strategic warning time is short (and
thus very sensitive to the shift from non-crisis to crisis); and 4) one in
which deterrence is less credible, but strategic warning time is very
long (and also sensitive to the movement from non-crisis to crisis) .
Of course in all four cases, perceptions count, and hence some
degree of transparency may be necessary to convey the robustness of
deterrence and/or the ability to respond at leisure, as opposed to a
hair-trigger response. Again, these diverse possibilities allow for a
range of outcomes, particularly in crisis situations, and it is
impossible to predict the decisions that will lead to one or another.
Conceptions of Deterrence and the Intersection of Conventional and
Nuclear Conflict. At present, there are areas of convergence as well as
divergence in Indian and Pakistani thinking on deterrence. They
have in common a conception of deterrence that involves relatively
small arsenals, a pre-deployed posture, and a positive orientation
toward arms control. However, they also differ on significant issues.
One is the feasibility of covert military action under the shadow of
nuclear weapons, which creates a “stability-instability paradox.”6
The Kargil conflict was one manifestation of this, ratcheting up
tensions sharply between the two countries and raising the prospect
of uncontrollable escalation into nuclear war. Pakistan’s overall
experience in the Kargil conflict was not an encouraging one. On the
one hand, it did not place India under sufficient pressure to
compromise at the negotiating table in Agra. On the other, Pakistan
was branded an irresponsible nuclear power by world opinion and
compelled by U.S. pressure to call the venture off, which in turn
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brought domestic ignominy. However, Pakistan may have been a
victim of its own initial success: a less glaring intrusion would have
brought a smaller conflict, keeping the Kashmir issue alive without
raising immediate fears of a nuclear denouement. In the future, a
Pakistani decisionmaker will be tempted to use the interventionist
strategy from time to time to keep the Kashmir issue on the table―a
strategy that will mean constant tension, periodic crises, and the
possibility of a nuclear confrontation.
Second, the idea of a limited nuclear war is embedded in
Pakistani nuclear thinking, whereas it is rejected by most Indian
strategists. But the Indian position could change. The issue is not
closed, particularly in view of the fact that some of the 1998 tests
were evidently for low-yield counterforce weapons. A critical factor
in nuclear decisionmaking in both states, especially Pakistan, is the
relationship between the conventional military balance (or imbalance), and the nuclear balance. If sub-kiloton nuclear munitions are
developed by India or Pakistan, they might be useable tactically in
the plains, and even in mountainous terrain, where they could
substitute for conventional forces. If nothing else, their presence
would make it difficult for one side or the other to bunch up armor
or mass large numbers of troops. Despite the obvious importance of
this linkage, we know of no adequate study of the connection
between the conventional and nuclear dimensions. At present, it is
not clear what direction the conventional-nuclear linkage will lead
the India-Pakistan relationship over time. There seems to be less
likelihood, though, of a similar problem with respect to the IndiaChina relationship. Neither country has articulated the possibility of
limited nuclear war or nuclear warfighting vis-à-vis the other.
Despite these differences in their conceptions of deterrence, as
both India and Pakistan operationalize their respective arsenals,
there will come into play a technical imperative toward a more
expansionary, perhaps even MAD-oriented, posture than is evident
now. These pressures will be backed by those who will ultimately
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operate the nuclear weapons—the armed forces. In both countries,
the understanding of “credible” deterrence tends to reflect some
amount of MAD thinking about the adequacy of second strike
capacity.
None of the above is inevitable. On the contrary, it may be that
the stability-instability paradox is put to rest by an appreciation of its
counter-productiveness, or because the Pakistan leadership decides
that all terrorism is a threat, or because there is movement toward
compromise between the subcontinental rivals. The difference
between the two countries on limited war may not, in practice, be
more than conceptual. Finally, the political awareness of the risks
and economic costs of an ever-expanding nuclear inventory may
induce greater restraint.
Surprise Events: A Nuclear Incident? In recent months, we have
seen how a single incident can transform the behavior and
perceptions of many states. A nuclear incident in South Asia might
have a comparable impact on Indian and Pakistani behavior, and
could influence the world’s perceptions of both the region and the
dangers of nuclear weapons. A nuclear incident elsewhere in the
world might also cause regional planners to rethink their nuclear
strategies and capabilities.
What is a nuclear incident? We define it as an event short of
nuclear war in which a device is accidentally or deliberately
detonated, or fissile material is used in such a way that it creates a
radiation hazard for a large population. We do not regard a nuclear
threat as an incident—these have been coming fast and furious from
both sides for several years. However, a threat that was backed up
by actions that indicated a high probability of use, which was
publicized, and which was taken seriously by decisionmakers on
both sides, would almost certainly have a significant impact on the
future course of India-Pakistan nuclear planning. Such an event
would be a South Asian equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It
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would also affect attitudes towards nuclear weapons elsewhere in
the world. There is also the possibility that a significant nuclear
event would be asymmetrically perceived, with one side viewing it
as a crisis and the other ignoring the gravity of the event. IndiaPakistan relations are replete with such asymmetric crises, notably
the 1962 India-China war―dismissed by Pakistan’s leaders as an
unimportant event caused by a provocative India―and the impact of
the loss of Bangladesh on Pakistan, dismissed or forgotten by many
Indians, but still a hurtful memory for the Pakistan military.
What would be the most important and likely of these scenarios?
Theft is a possibility, as is unauthorized use. Perhaps even more
likely is the possibility of accidental or inadvertent use, followed by
the realization that no war was intended. This use could take place
on the territory of the state that owned the weapon, or across the
border. More frightening and far-reaching would be the detonation
of a device―or the release of significant radioactive material―in an
Indian or Pakistani city. Mumbai and Karachi are not only
vulnerable to a smuggled nuclear weapon, they have prime nuclear
targets in the form of research and power reactors, and an attack
along the lines of the World Trade Center and Pentagon airplane
bombings is now farther from the realm of the inconceivable. The
entire set of Pakistani and Indian nuclear facilities could also be the
site of a significant accidental release of radiation caused by mismanagement or sabotage. In these cases, the governments involved
would have to determine quickly whether the radiation release was
accidental or deliberate. If such an incident took place at a moment
of very high India-Pakistan tension, it could precipitate a chain of
events leading to still more serious steps. Thus, it is possible to
envision a cataclysmic war between India and Pakistan triggered off
by an unrelated event—or such an event might be caused by an
individual or group that sought to precipitate such a war.
Other surprises can be envisaged. Beyond five years from now,
there may be new and inexpensive ways of producing fissile
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material, simpler and more effective weapons designs, and more
sophisticated delivery systems available to India and―with
assistance from others―Pakistan. There is likely to be a deployed
Indian theater missile defense, probably with American, Russian, or
Israeli technical assistance, and this might change the nuclear
calculus between New Delhi and Islamabad in unknown ways.
There might, for all we know, emerge a South Asian Gorbachev
willing to take the kind of risk that will transform strategic relations
dramatically. It is a sobering reminder that many of the most
startling turns in global politics, such as Khomeini’s revolution in
Iran, the end of the Cold War, and the events of September 11, have
caught us napping. Prudence requires us to expect the unexpected.
Implications for U.S. Policy.
This analysis shows the large number of variables that can affect
possible outcomes with regard to the nuclear future of India and its
neighbors. Of these, only some are within the province of the United
States to control. The variables we have considered are of two types:
political and military. While the latter do have some autonomy, it
would be fair to say that politics is the prime mover of strategic
relationships. Ultimately, nuclear postures and interactions are
shaped by perceptions of threat, and these are fundamentally
political in character. That being said, the United States must
distinguish between those variables over which it has little or no
control and those it can hope to influence. It may be said at the
outset that in no case is the United States likely to shape Chinese
behavior or thinking except indirectly through the policies it follows
directly toward China.
The India-Pakistan relationship can be influenced to some degree
if the United States is willing to invest the effort and resources. It
could help rebuild Pakistan’s floundering economy and, with the
judicious use of loan conditionalities, its social and political
structures (through deradicalization and democratization) ; exert
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pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorism as an instrument of state
policy; and persuade India to come to the negotiating table. The
India-China relationship, however, is unlikely to be influenced by
the United States except to the extent that its future is determined by
the altogether different dynamics of U.S.- China relations. The global
environment, as we have seen, can have an important bearing on
South Asia, but given its indeterminate effects, it is unlikely that the
United States will shape its policies toward China and Russia,
among other countries, on the basis of their eventual impact on the
subcontinent. Nor is there much scope for ensuring the domestic
stability of the three countries, with the exception, as noted earlier, of
tied financial aid to Pakistan.
Of the four military variables discussed in this chapter, the
United States will have little or no direct influence over three:
numbers and types of weapons, strategic warning time and
robustness of deterrence, and conceptions of deterrence. Its own
predilections are not in accord with the minimalist postures that it
would prefer India and Pakistan to adopt. At best it can try persuasion, but if their determination to go ahead is sufficiently strong to
override their own history of restraint in the construction of nuclear
capability, then it is unlikely that American efforts will have much
effect. As regards stability of command and control, the United
States can play a significant role, working independently with India
and Pakistan, extending advice and technical assistance to
strengthen nuclear safety and security, and not waiting for them to
reach a joint confidence-building agreement. Safety concerns are
particularly strong in light of the terrorist threat in both countries.
Here, the primary challenge for U.S. policymakers will be to
convince the nonproliferation lobby at home that technical assistance
will not constitute a reversal of constraints imposed on proliferators.
Looking down the road 20 years, the possibilities are so diverse
that it is hard to guess what will happen and harder still to devise
appropriate policies to facilitate desired outcomes. We conclude by
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offering two “golden rules”: the first is that the outside world,
especially the United States, should stand ready to assist India and
Pakistan in managing their inevitable crises and conflicts, and
should not assume that the two states can, on their own, move down
the road of a peace process. Second, the nuclear and strategic
planners of these two states should avoid over-confidence, and not
assume that they, or their successors, will be able to avoid a nuclear
incident or nuclear war. Deterrence usually works, but the perceptual fog that hangs over the leadership of each state, especially
regarding the motives and capabilities of the other, is quite thick.
They must prepare for crisis management, but strive to keep their
own nuclear arsenals as small and as reliable as possible, if only to
reduce the scale of the catastrophe that would be a regional nuclear
war.
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CHAPTER 8
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR FUTURE
Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan
INTRODUCTION
Predicting anything about the future is a monumental challenge.
The South Asian rivalry is unparalleled in both the distinct challenge
and the complex conundrum that it poses to international security.
The region has such a fragile stability that every reasonable expectation can go wrong. Two years ago, President Bill Clinton, based on a
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), described the region as
“the most dangerous place in the world.”1 The NIE itself concluded
that there was a “sharply increased chance of a non-nuclear military
conflict between India and Pakistan, possibly erupting into a nuclear
exchange.”2 The CIA Director again asserted this fear in February of
2001, saying, “the regional situation remains volatile, making the risk of
war between two nuclear-armed adversaries unacceptably high.”3 As the
war on terrorism in Afghanistan rages on, India and Pakistan are
locked eyeball-to-eyeball, having amassed an estimated one million
soldiers on operational alert along their border. South Asia is a
veritable tinderbox that could explode at any moment.
The integrity of Pakistan’s long-term future has been seen as
suspect. Not too long ago, U.S. officials and academics were openly
predicting Pakistan’s inevitable march towards a failed state, citing
internal chaotic breakdown and/or the probability of war with
India. While the former prediction seems to have been outpaced by
events, given the redirection by Pakistan’s leadership and its
renewed status as a pivotal regional actor, the probability of the
latter, i.e., war with India, unfortunately cannot be ruled out.4 Since
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the September 11 crisis and the war on terrorism, the dynamics in
South Asia have not changed for the better, and if anything have
worsened. The hostility between India and Pakistan has been a
cognitive construct with deep roots, and has grown especially strong
during the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India.5
Overt nuclearization and nuclear deterrence have not assured crisis
stability in the region. Despite U.S. engagement and involvement
with both India and Pakistan, the two countries have not developed
a “sense of the region,” nor have they used this as an opportunity to
eschew their zero-sum mentality. Instead, both have exploited each
other’s vulnerability. Finally, for a host of reasons, no serious
attempt has been made to establish the restraint measures that are so
essential between the two nuclear neighbors.
Pakistan’s future will remain in the shadow of crisis instability (a
state of constant tension and intermittent crisis) with India, teetering
at the precipice of conventional war. The specter of nuclear war will
also be ever-present. Security concerns limit Pakistan’s policy
options, but given a choice, it would focus internally on economic
revival and national reintegration, aimed at realizing the vision of
Pakistan as a “liberal, tolerant, progressive, dynamic and strong
Islamic state where theocracy has no place.”6
At the core of President Pervez Musharraf’s agenda is economic
revival, through which he hopes to bring Pakistan back into the
mainstream of regional and international politics. Nuclear weapons
will also play an important role in this endeavor. Given the volatile
neighborhood, and especially a hostile India, conditions in the region
are likely to remain in a state of tension, if not war. Sudden
eruptions, coming in the form of one crisis or another, are likely to
continue as both sides have demonstrated a propensity to engage in
dangerous practices that make the region unstable. Peace and
tranquility will remain ephemeral, and joint security arrangements
or cease-fires will be tenuous at best. Left on their own, India and
Pakistan will likely continue this pattern of crisis instability.
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Paraphrasing Newton’s first law of motion, India and Pakistan will
continue to be propelled by their own state of crisis unless and until
acted upon by some external mitigating force.7
Pakistan’s nuclear future is therefore essentially tied to the
pathway the region might take. Essentially there are two basic paths
the region can now steer towards. The first is a confrontational path
based on cognitive biases that will involve an unconstrained arms
race, leading to dangerous practices and a deployment or “hairtrigger” environment, resulting in increased security requirements.
The second path relies on a cooperative security framework based on
resolving issues, eschewing an arms race for controlled weapons
development under restraints and regimes, creating an environment
that improves the socioeconomic welfare of the citizens, and creating
balance in the region. This model stresses management of nuclear
capability and crisis prevention in the region. Should the region
remain embroiled in the current intransigence towards resolution of
the political conflict, it will likely proceed the way of the first path.
This would mean the continuation of crises in various forms as well
as perpetual tensions; neither country would be able to concentrate
on urgent domestic issues or to invest in their own people’s
development. Moreover, neither would India attain its statusoriented objectives, nor would Pakistan achieve assured security.
Meanwhile, the sufferings of the teeming millions would continue to
multiply. The second path is more desirable but seems unlikely to be
followed unless both states are compelled to seriously commence a
sustained peace process and a formalized restraint arrangement.
This paper proffers the second pathway as the only reasonable way
forward. Following this path of peace and cooperation will entail
frustration, and it will be protracted in nature. The process, however,
must be started and hope must be kept alive.
In the effort to consider Pakistan’s nuclear future circa 2020, this
chapter will be divided into three parts:
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1) Pakistan’s Nuclear Journey: This section will discuss the
backdrop of Pakistan’s initial need for the nuclear program, past
technical and political challenges, and the managerial basis of the
nuclear program.
2) Regional Dynamics: This section will examine the regional
dynamics in South Asia, amplified by outside actors and mutual
threat perceptions, which shape Pakistan’s security policymaking.
3) The Way Forward: This section will suggest a direction in
which the region should go to maintain strategic stability, including
roles that the United States can play. A technical framework for a
restraint regime will be proposed.
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR JOURNEY
Pakistan, the world’s sixth most populous country, has the
world’s seventh largest armed forces and is in possession of an
unspecified number of nuclear arms. It is also currently faced with a
myriad of challenges stemming from economic mismanagement,
competing political institutions, and multiple socioeconomic problems. With an extremely low yearly income of US$470 per capita,
Pakistan’s economy is at one of its lowest ebbs ever. Pakistan is at a
crucial crossroads, needing to carefully balance economic viability
and military security.
Since 1999, following the Kargil crisis, India has increased its
defense expenditures. In contrast, primarily due to its perilous
economic situation, Pakistan has decreased its defense spending in
real terms.8 While India’s steady economic growth allows it to
increase defense spending annually, Pakistan’s focus will likely
remain on improving its economy, ailing from a decade of mismanagement.9 With an “economic revival strategy,”10 Pakistan hopes
to make a turn around within this next decade. The goal of this
strategy will be to return to the economic performance of the 1980s,
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or even the 1960s, a decade that saw the highest Pakistani economic
growth ever, prompting the Harvard Development Advisory Group
to use Pakistan as a model developing country with gross domestic
product (GDP) growth averaging 6 percent.11 This “back to the
future” scenario hinges on the sustainability of a peace resulting
from nuclear deterrence. With all this in mind, Pakistan will be
inwardly focused, seeking to maintain its domestic balance rather
than to confront India. In the process, Pakistan will address its
socioeconomic ills through “poverty alleviation programs and
political reforms that will bring about a ‘silent revolution’.”12
Nuclear capability will be an important factor guaranteeing external
security as Pakistan proceeds toward reviving its economy and
internal stability.
The Pakistani Narrative: Strategic Compulsions and Challenges.
The strategic culture imperatives of Pakistan are derived from its
own historical experiences, primarily two events: the 1971 war with
India and India’s 1974 nuclear test (Pokhran I) . Since it began its
quest for a nuclear deterrent, Pakistan faced and overcame three
major political and technical challenges and four strategic challenges
in the form of crises and threats to its national security. Serious
endeavors to develop a nuclear program began in response to overt
Indian nuclearization of the region in 1974. For Pakistan, the nuclear
dimension changed the strategic balance dramatically. Pakistan’s
basic deterrence rationale revolved around two elements. First was a
belief that a nuclear threat warrants a nuclear response. Unlike some
Middle Eastern countries, Pakistan eschewed the notion of seeking a
“poor man’s equalizer” through chemical and/or biological options.
Second, nuclear weapons were seen as a force multiplier to deter
aggression by conventional force. Nuclear capability would serve as
the core of national security and help to compensate for Pakistan’s
limited resources and the strategic asymmetry with India.
The first political-technical challenge for Pakistan was to develop
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a nuclear weapon. Unfortunately, the timing was not right for
“nuclear late-bloomers.” The early 1970s was the beginning of the
era of nuclear nonproliferation. At the time, attaining a nuclear
deterrent was not a question of a breakthrough in nuclear physics
but of overcoming international political barriers. No other country
faced the kind of difficulties that Pakistan did. India and Israel, the
other two states holding out from the nonproliferation regime, had
passed through the gestation period and surpassed the critical
technology threshold well before proliferation became a serious
question after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into
force.13 The perception in Pakistan was that for every proliferation
act committed by India, Pakistan would be (and was) punished as it
was forced to respond, pursuing what was perceived by Pakistan is
to be their critical national security requirement. Meanwhile, India
would either escape punishment or get away with a slap on the
wrist.
In 1976, Pakistan laid the foundation of its nuclear program,
based on enriching uranium through gas centrifuges after the United
States pressured France not to transfer reprocessing plants to
Pakistan, even though they would be under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. By 1977, U.S. legislation, under
the Symington-Glenn Act, sought to restrict the acquisition and
testing of nuclear weapons—a law that was essentially formulated in
the wake of the 1974 Indian test. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress
passed the Pressler Amendment, a Pakistan-specific law, in 1985; this
made continued military and economic support to Pakistan
contingent upon the U.S. President’s certification that Pakistan did
not possess nuclear weapons. Over a period of time, India realized it
had the advantage over Pakistan. Indian size and potential would
allow it to weather the strictures of the Western-led nonproliferation
regime, which India mitigated with diplomacy (especially using the
“China rivalry” card that resonated well within certain anti-China
and nonproliferation lobbies in the United States) and dependable
Soviet/Russian support. The same was not true for Pakistan, which
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had little room to maneuver diplomatically and economically, and
which was always facing hard choices and political/strategic tradeoffs due to its deleterious economy.
India began to apply this comparative advantage as a calculated
strategy. First, India would challenge the nonproliferation regime by
calling for global disarmament according to article six of the NPT,
and then, after the predictable silence of the United States, use this
lack of response as a pretext to justify its own nuclear program.
Second, India would predict Pakistan’s reaction and provoke it into a
“tit-for-tat” response, simultaneously picking on China and Pakistan
as the “two villains.” Such claims not only provided the propaganda
tool to justify India’s actions, but also engaged Pakistan in an arms
race that would erode Pakistan’s cumulative security. Initially
Islamabad obliged, but it soon realized the trap. It therefore began
calculating what was critical for its national security, and worked on
a strategy to put India on the defensive, with Pakistan responding
only after carefully weighing security, diplomatic and economic
factors.
By the mid-1980s, the U.S. Government believed Pakistan had
developed sufficient capability to “produce enough weapons grade
material to build several nuclear devices per year but was not
believed to have assembled any nuclear explosive devices.”14
Pakistan might have deliberately kept its weaponization capability
on the threshold, or only a “screw driver’s turn away,” primarily to
accommodate U.S. concerns. It was both politically prudent and
made security sense for Pakistan to do so. At the time, Pakistan was
a beneficiary of military and economic support from this superpower ally. But Islamabad could not afford to slow down on this
policy course. By the end of 2000, Pakistan had an unspecified
number of nuclear weapons, primarily highly enriched uranium
(HEU) devices.15
The second challenge for Pakistan after having developed
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nuclear weapons was to acquire and/or develop a means of
delivery. India enjoyed a five-to-one advantage over Pakistan in
aerial delivery means. In 1990, the dreaded Pressler Amendment was
applied to Pakistan, leading to the immediate denial of the delivery
of the already paid for F-16 aircraft. The application of the Pressler
Amendment happened amid important geopolitical changes in the
world and in the region (the end of the Cold War, the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Kuwait/Gulf crisis) that had farreaching political implications: not only did these changes adversely
affect U.S.-Pakistan relations, but they helped to create a security
void in Afghanistan that would prove costly for the region and the
world. In 1990, while Pakistan was denied an aerial means of
delivery, India demonstrated the Agni and Prithvi missiles, the
products of its integrated guided missile program (IGMP)
established in 1983. The serial production of the missiles and their
subsequent induction into the Indian armed forces caused further
imbalance. With the end of the Cold War and visible signs of U.S.
abandonment of the region, followed shortly by the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Pakistan came to feel isolated—that it was being left
on its own to face India as well as the socioeconomic fallout of the
Afghan war, which was in the process of regressing into civil war.
Confronted by such pressures, Pakistan felt compelled to develop a
land-based delivery means for its nuclear weapons, namely, ballistic
missiles. However, as with the NPT and its attendant supply-control
regime,16 Pakistan’s quest for a missile deterrent now faced several
missile-related sanctions under the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), a supply-control cartel established in 1987. Pakistan
turned to its trusted ally, China, and other sources of supply.
Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan and China (as well as North Korea)
were slapped with MTCR sanctions, the latter for alleged supply of
missile technology to the former. This pattern continued until the
Clinton administration departed.17 Despite the sanctions, by 2000,
Pakistan had several land-based solid- and liquid-fuelled missiles,
ranging from 100 kilometers to 3,000 kilometers.18
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The third challenge for Pakistan was to validate the delivery
means and the weapons designs through testing. This challenge had
obvious political costs and unlike the situation of India, Pakistan
could not openly challenge the global nonproliferation regime.
Given the international environment in the wake of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations, Pakistan could not
have contemplated nuclear tests on its own. Indian preparations in
1995 and its intransigence during the CTBT debate made its
intentions clear. In 1998 when India tested again, it was merely a
tactical surprise rather than a strategic one. Pakistan was thus provided with an opportunity to validate its own designs by testing.
Pakistan conducted fission tests that produced the desired results
and thus gained confidence in its designs.
Earlier in April 1998, after much deliberation, Pakistan
conducted its first test of a liquid-fueled missile (the Ghauri), and in
April of the next year, of a solid-fueled missile (the Shaheen). Again,
Pakistan received MTCR sanctions, but protested that India’s 16
Prithvi tests and at least four Agni tests conducted earlier were
ignored under the pretext that India’s missiles were “indigenous”—a
claim Pakistan contested. India’s Prithvi and Agni were the result of a
combination of reverse engineering and off -the-shelf technological
acquisitions of Russian SA-2 missiles, U.S. Scout rockets and French
rocket engines.19 Pakistan believed India never incurred the same
scrutiny, even though both programs contained imported elements.20
Thus, Pakistan overcame significant challenges to achieve
national security. Not only was it under constant threat from India,
but also from the strictures of the West—particularly in the form of
the nonproliferation regimes for nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. By the turn of the century, three generations had paid a
steep price for achieving the nuclear deterrence that would ensure
Pakistan’s national survival and sovereignty.
Strategic Challenges: Major Crises in Nuclearization.
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Throughout this period of nuclearization, Pakistan lived in
dangerous circumstances. In the late 1970s, major political and
regional security changes occurred in the neighborhood. With
respect to India, Pakistan’s principal threat and raison d’être for going
nuclear, four major crises have taken place, and the fifth one is
currently in progress (spring 2002), with the Indian armed forces
fully deployed against Pakistan in a game of brinkmanship in the
wake of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
The 1972 Simla treaty brought peace for over a decade. India and
Pakistan maintained good relations, especially in the late 1970s when
there was a regime change in India for the first time. While major
changes occurred in Iran (the revolution in 1979) and Afghanistan
(the Soviet occupation of December 1979) that directly affected
Pakistan’s western border, India underwent an internal crisis. The
Sikh freedom struggle in the Punjab, adjacent to the Pakistani
border, precipitated a military operation in Amritsar. At approximately the same time (1984), the Soviet-Afghan war was also at its
peak and undergoing a critical phase. Pakistan’s security forces and
intelligence agencies focused on two fronts—on the Punjab border in
the east and in the west towards Afghanistan. India commenced a
surprise occupation of the Siachin Glacier that from Pakistan’s
perspective was a stab in the back.21 The ensuing crisis nearly
brought the two countries to war in 1984. Also at that time, Pakistani
intelligence learned that India had conceived plans to strike at
Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment facility at Kahuta in an apparent
attempt to emulate Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant at
Osirak.22 The crisis diffused after Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984.
Two years later, India planned a major operation code-named
“Brasstacks” under the garb of a military exercise on the border of
the two countries. This event was designed to trigger a conventional
war with Pakistan. Once again, India contemplated executing plans
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to strike at Pakistan’s nuclear installation. The operation would
commence after the Indian air force faked an attack on its own
installation at Trombay, providing the pretext for a “counterattack”
on Pakistan. Again, the underlying notion was to destroy Pakistan’s
nascent nuclear capability before the enrichment process crossed
critical thresholds. Pakistan responded by mobilizing its forces, and
the standoff escalated to the brink of conventional war. This was the
first conventional force assembly of its kind since the war in 1971.23
In 1990, the Kashmir crisis once again brought Pakistan and
India close to war. B y this time, the prospects of nuclear deployment
were perceived to be real, prompting a mission by U.S. Deputy
National Security Advisor Robert Gates to the region. In 1999,
despite a much-trumpeted summit at Lahore, an incursion in the
region of Kargil masterminded by Pakistan once again demonstrated
that the India-Pakistan problems are deep rooted, requiring a
sustained peace and conflict resolution process rather than “flash in
the pan” peace initiatives.
Such a demonstrated pattern of crisis instability naturally leads
observers to express concern about the very real possibility of
escalation into a nuclear exchange. Justas the nuclear threat to
Pakistan calls for the nuclear deterrent, the new and dangerous
capability demands deliberate and responsible management. Mankind’s deadliest device, nuclear weapons, can be a double-edged
sword where mismanagement of arsenals can lead to destruction as
quickly as an incoming attack. Tampering, accidents, and unauthorized launches are all the specters of deterrence in stability. It is for
these reasons that development of a comprehensive command and
control apparatus is extremely important.
Managing Nuclear Arsenals.
During the nuclear age, the experience of the Cold War
protagonists revealed that there was an imbalance in understanding
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nuclear security because the “process of managing nuclear arsenals
[was] less discussed and less familiar than either the weapons themselves or the doctrinal logic used to define it.”24 Strategic affairs have
traditionally been dominated by the military. Until 1998, Pakistan’s
strategic development program was coordinated under the utmost
secrecy by a small circle of the highest-level leaders. After the tests,
the government had an obligation to the nation and the international
community to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various
civilian and military organizations required for the management of
the nuclear capability. In February 2000, Pakistan announced the
creation of its Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) that would
ensure civilian control. The “head of the government” (a civilian) is
the chairman of both the “Employment Committee” and the
“Development Committee.” The former is the apex body responsible
for policy formulation and direction, establishment of the hierarchy
of command and control, and the delegation of authority, as well as
being responsible for safeguards, monitoring, and accounting of the
nuclear material. The latter is essentially a military-scientific
committee that implements the policy guidelines to attain specific
strategic force objectives. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is the
secretariat that plays the pivotal role of planning, coordinating, and
guiding. At the services level, Strategic Force Commands are
responsible for training, maintaining, and ensuring custodial safety
of the as sets under close supervision of the SPD. Figure 1 represents
a skeletal model of Pakistan’s command and control hierarchy.
Through this command and control, Pakistan has been able to set a
strategic direction towards its “minimum deterrent requirement.”
The establishment of this command system in Pakistan
institutionalizes the nuclear capability under a centralized forum
and ensures the future size and shape of the nuclear force. The
control apparatus oversees every aspect of the arsenal in the strategic
and policy context, ensuring that the program remains affordable
and within the constraints of the economy.
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The Always/Never Dilemma.
Peter Feaver has described the central challenge of any strategic
command and control system as an “always/never dilemma.” The
always/never dilemma is one that faces every nuclear-capable state
when it establishes the command systems to manage its nuclear
forces.“ Leaders want a high assurance that the weapons will always
work when directed and a similar assurance that they will never be
used in the absence of authorized direction.”26 This factor is
especially critical in a tense standoff like the one in South Asia.
Normally such a system is based for peacetime operations; however,
the dilemma here illustrates the trade-off between safety in the
storage of nuclear weapons and the need for readiness if the
deterrent threat is to be effective. The transition from peace to war is
fraught with dangers. “Deterrence rests on the credibility of the
command system ability. While deterring aggression, which is
paramount, a second goal is to avoid accidental war.” Military
history and everyday operational experience affirm that the
unexpected is to be expected in complex operations—the more so in
nuclear operations.27 The propensity of South Asia to run into crisis
makes the case for establishing a reliable command and control
system all the more crucial. It stands to reason that centralized
authority should be held exclusively by a commander who prefers
never to actually use nuclear weapons, and who would therefore
provide safeguards against their accidental or unauthorized launch,
thereby making nuclear use exclusively contingent upon the central
command authority. However, the vulnerability of the central
command to a decapitating attack forces it to pre-delegate not the
authority to launch nuclear weapons, but the ability to do so. While
bolstering the deterrent threat, the diffusion of the ability to initiate
nuclear use multiplies the difficulty of preventing three dangers:
accidents, tampering,
and un-authorized use—thus the
always/never dilemma. This dilemma is even more trenchant for
Pakistan, given the lack of strategic depth, technical asymmetry, and
crisis instability vis-à-vis India.
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REGIONAL DYNAMICS: STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES AFFECTING PAKISTAN’S SECURITY POLICYMAKING
Factors Affecting Pakistan’s Security Future.
Pakistan’s future security will be contingent upon four factors:
nuclear deterrence, economic development, stability in Afghanistan,
and relations with India (the Kashmir dispute is central here). The
interplay and policy trade-offs involved in balancing these factors
will determine Pakistan’s security for the foreseeable future.
Assuming that more resources will be consumed by the military
in a state of war than in peace, nuclear deterrence of war therefore
frees more capital for domestic investment. The whole idea of
nuclear weapons development in Pakistan is predicated upon
deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. The resultant peace,
therefore, creates a window that must be used to optimize resources
for economic reforms. Pakistan’s future policy should therefore be to
balance the symbiotic relationship between nuclear deterrence and
economic revival, and handle the implicit trade-off.
Peace and stability in Afghanistan are inextricably linked to
Pakistan’s security, therefore Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan
remain that of a friendly government in Kabul and a peaceful and
settled border (based on the Durand Line). The historical, cultural,
geographical, and demographic linkages are imperative, making the
two states “naturally interdependent.” Afghanistan’s “landlocked
imperative” (her need for access to the Indian Ocean and aid from
Pakistan) and Pakistan’s quest to reintegrate itself into the Central
Asian network (e.g., via oil pipelines) will not only enhance
Pakistan’s security but help to stabilize the entire region.28 Pakistan
may have learned from its mistake that her strategic interest does not
warrant establishing a puppet regime in Kabul but is better served
through a dependent and friendly regime that develops relations
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based on geopolitical and cultural affinity. The dividends for
Pakistan from stability on its Afghani border are many, including the
elimination of a thorn in its relationship with Iran and with other
Central Asian countries.
With India, the relationship is essentially complicated by the
non-resolution of Kashmir and other disputes. In Pakistan, there are
two distinct schools of thought regarding India. The first is the
optimist school that believes that there are essentially no differences
between India and Pakistan except those over specific issues. Once
Kashmir and the other issues are resolved, South Asia will be
ushered into an era of peace, amity, and prosperity. The second is
the deterministic school of thought, which believes that hostility is a
result of cognitive biases. Therefore, even if these issues are resolved,
new issues will be created to keep the animus alive. While both of
these schools of thought developed during the period of mutual
mistrust between India and Pakistan, they lead to contradictory
conclusions regarding the future if the outstanding issues can be
resolved. Perhaps time will reveal which school is correct in its
predictions.
The Myth of a Triangular Security Construct.
The South Asian subcontinent has traditionally consisted only of
India and Pakistan. Given India’s perceptions about China, strategic
analysts have long debated whether the security dynamics of South
Asia can be complete without bringing in the China factor. A recent
study done by the Henry Stimson Center concludes that should
China be taken as part of the regional equation, a treaty-based
triangular restraint arrangement would be “very difficult to
negotiate since neither equality nor formalized inequality is likely to
be acceptable to one or more parties.”29 Economic asymmetries also
exacerbate the instability in the relationships between China and
India and India and Pakistan. According to the World Bank’s 2001
development report, both Pakistan and India have close to 40
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percent of their population under the international poverty level
(one dollar per day), while Chinese poverty is fewer than 5 percent
of their population. Chinese growth rates are also projected to be
higher at 7 percent than Indian rates (5.5 percent), which are in turn
higher than Pakistani growth rates.30 Moreover, the fundamental
military disparity between the regional rivals is not going to change
in the next 20 years. Although India may reach the current Chinese
stockpile of nuclear weapons numbering over four hundred, Chinese
stockpiles will, by that time, have grown greater, especially with no
bright prospects for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and
the expected Chinese response to the U.S. deployment of a ballistic
missile defense (BMD) system. Also, India’s nuclear and conventional advantage over Pakistan will likely remain, especially given
Pakistan’s current prostrate economy.
India’s security perception nevertheless revolves around the
“twin threat” from China and Pakistan.31 At one level, a Sino-Indian
détente seems possible, yet the rhetoric of the “China threat” is a
constant Indian mantra.32 The propagation of the China threat is in
part a deliberate Indian policy calculated for the ulterior motive of
gaining political and security support from the West.33 As for the
other threat, Pakistan’s nuclear program is driven purely by security
concerns specific to India; Pakistan’s nuclear future hinges upon the
perceived threat and ambitions of India.
Pakistan believes Indian ambitions and aspirations are three-f
old: 1)emerge as a global power (at least to be seen as China’s equal);
2) eliminate the influence of outside powers in South Asia; and 3)
develop regional security under Indian patronage and terms. To
realize these objectives, India’s hopes are pinned on three key
assumptions. One is that the United States, in its perceived cold war
with China, would feed Indian ambitions by accepting her as a
strategic partner. Second, China would be kept away from influence
on and cooperation with Pakistan, and possibly be deterred from
deploying a naval presence in the Indian Ocean (seen as India’s
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“lake”) . The third is India’s ability to maintain a weak, subservient,
and semi-sovereign Pakistan (as a “West Bangladesh”) . Indian
designs on China and Pakistan could be construed as the following:
in the short term, engage China to buy time while maintaining the
rivalry in order to receive Western support and to justify an arms
build up—thus narrowing the developmental and technological gap
between India and China. In the long term, force China to accept
India as a peer competitor with global status. With regard to
Pakistan, in the short term, New Delhi seeks to isolate Islamabad and
force it to change its Kashmir policy and/or accept the status quo. In
the long term, India’s objective is to erode Pakistan’s military
capacity and national will to sustain sovereignty in South Asia.
While the China factor in South Asian dynamics cannot be
dismissed, its inclusion in the regional construct skews regional
dynamics and dims the prospect of a secure nuclear future for the
region. China may view an emerging India as a potential rival, but
the disposition of Chinese armed forces does not indicate any
offensive design or capability that is India-specific. Contrary to the
claims to date, it has never been shown conclusively that China has
targeted or deployed strategic forces or missiles anywhere that could
threaten India. China’s security focus is toward the East.34 Posing a
real threat to India would obviously be counterproductive to
Chinese aims, objectives and security interests.35 Indeed, the ChinaPakistan relationship has been very close and is likely to progress
into economic and other fields since Pakistan considers “China’s role
key to South Asian peace.”36 Pakistan will continue to rely on China,
and this factor will affect the larger Asian power balance.37 Finally,
the concept of deterrence is a key factor in each of the three actors’
perceptions of the others. In Kashmir, Pakistan supports a freedom
struggle that India considers a sub-conventional war under the
nuclear umbrella. India believes that asymmetrical assured destruction will provide an opportunity for limited conventional war by
assuming that it possesses escalation control over Pakistan. Pakistan,
therefore, has not foreclosed the use of nuclear weapons as a last
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resort (the Samson option) . India keeps the Chinese threat alive to
justify its arms build-up while China supports Pakistan to maintain
the regional balance.
The Russian and Israeli Factors.
Russian assistance to India’s strategic and nuclear programs is
another cause of potential instability in the region. Soviet S-300
missile sales with the possible transfer of Arrow missile technology
from Israel and other Western countries may be helping India
develop an anti-ballistic missile defense system of sorts.
Furthermore, Russia’s cooperation and transfer of early warning and
surveillance systems to India will boost New Delhi’s space program.
Such cooperation skews the balance in the region and would
obviously affect Pakistan’s response. Israel has also been known to
sell rocket technology, remotely piloted vehicles, and other armaments to the region. The arms flow between Israel and India is
especially troubling and destabilizing because it invites Pakistan to
reciprocate by beginning a similar relationship with Israel’s Arab
neighbors. Although Pakistan has deliberately avoided technology
transfers to Israel’s neighbors, the specter of a two-way “Middle
East-South Asia arms corridor” is a very destabilizing one, increasing the pressure in two already tense regions.
U.S. Influence in South Asian Politics.
Looking ahead, the emerging multipolarity of the international
system and evolving U.S. policy on Asia (that may well engender a
new cold war) will set the direction of the region’s future. In the
wake of the events of fall 2001, the focus on international terrorism
will likely overshadow all other policy choices in the short term. In
the long run, however, the interplay of geopolitics and strategic
policy (notably the issues of proliferation and missile defense) will
resurface. This will have a profound impact in determining the
contours of regional dynamics. For example, the United States has
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been seeking a “strategic partnership” with India, while at the same
time seeking “strategic cooperation” with Pakistan. More
importantly, the war in Afghanistan saw the United States win back
its old ally, and brought Pakistan an “opportunity to come back from
the precipice.”38 In normal times, the United States would want to
steer clear of the India-Pakistan rivalry. However, at the time of this
writing, the United States is passing through a critical point in its
war; the stakes are extremely high and the outcome of the evolving
situation remains to be seen.
Both India and Pakistan are at odds with each other, but not with
the United States. For the first time, Washington finds India allied to
the United States and thus the United States has leverage to bring
both parties to a negotiating table. Moreover, given the dynamics
and dangers involved, the United States cannot afford to take the
low road to South Asia. The apparent U.S. tilt in favor of India and
concomitant abandonment of Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s
led to a vacuum in the region. Since September 11, however, that has
been corrected, although skepticism continues in Pakistan regarding
the longevity of U.S. engagement. Also, the United States has shown
nominal interest in restraining India’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal,39
pulling out of various international treaties and protocols and clearly
signaling to the world its disinterest in international treaties and
regimes not having to do with Islamic terror. If this pattern
continues, the next few years will likely see a continuation of the
nuclear and conventional force build-ups in South Asia.
Lastly, the staying power of the United States will be the driving
force behind the direction of South Asian politics. This may run
contrary to India’s professed policy of opposing the involvement of
outside powers in South Asian affairs, but Pakistan believes that the
United States will maintain a balanced relationship with both the
countries. In the context of the nuclear and conventional balances of
power in the subcontinent, the United States should develop a policy
that appreciates the security concerns of all parties in realistic rather
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than idealistic terms.
THE WAY FORWARD: TOWARDS A RESTRAINT REGIME
In the first two decades after independence, despite two wars (in
1948 and 1965) India and Pakistan took several steps towards peace
and security in the region, including in Kashmir.40 The Karachi
agreement of 1948 was the basis for the conduct of troops on the
Ceasefire Line (CfL) that became the Line of Control (LOC) after the
1971 War. Between 1972 and 1998, there were several bilateral
agreements; most notable among them were three: an agreement not
to attack the other’s nuclear installations; membership in the
chemical weapons convention; and an agreement on the conduct of
military exercises and the demarcation of airspace.
Despite these agreements, tensions between the two countries
continued, thereby eroding confidence in the agreements. India and
Pakistan were discussing multiple issues, such as Jammu and
Kashmir, the Siachin Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, trade,
security, etc. With the arrival of the BJP government in 1998, India
adopted a more belligerent agenda toward Pakistan. The nuclear
tests in 1998 generated heat between the protagonists, and gained
the attention of the global community. The United States engaged
both India and Pakistan separately in strategic dialogues, leading to
bilateral dialogue between the two.41
The talks between India and Pakistan resulted in the exchange of
several restraint ideas. None of them ever resulted in a viable
process for implementation as neither side was prepared to give up
its advantage. For example, in the October 1998 talks between India
and Pakistan on “Peace, Security and Confidence Building Measures,
”India offered an exclusive agreement on the nuclear aspect without
any corresponding agreement on conventional force restraints.
Further, they proposed not to engage in counter-value targeting
(against cities and other civilian dwellings) while attempting to
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neutralize Pakistan’s deterrent by keeping the option of counterforce targeting (against military troops and bases) open. Conversely,
Pakistan proposed a strategic restraint regime that included a
combination of nuclear, missile and conventional force restraint
arrangements.42 Thus Pakistan called for no first use of force—
conventional or nuclear—thereby curtailing India’s options to use its
conventional force advantage. Two years later, Pakistan also
suggested the concept of the non-deployment of missiles at the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in which four specific
proposals were made: not to deploy ballistic missiles, not to
operationally deploy nuclear capable missile systems, to formalize
flight test notification, and to declare a moratorium on the
development, acquisition and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles.43
India dismissed all of the proposals, and the world did not take
interest—especially the Bush administration, whose indifference was
perhaps a result of its quest for support of the unpopular BMD
system, which India had previously backed.
Crafting a Restraint Regime.
Based on these proposals and discussions, three distinct aspects
of a restraint regime need to be considered.
Regional Security Framework. There are two categories of arms
control measures particularly applicable in the regional context. First
are the traditional measures that aim at crisis avoidance and build on
restraints—essentially confidence-building measures (CBMs) and
risk reduction measures. Second is the category of arms control that
imposes limits on numbers and kinds of weapons, and is in the
realm of imposing mutually acceptable developmental constraints
that can be extended to disarmament. Past experience suggests that
South Asia may not yet be amenable to this second category. At the
same time, however, there is a desire for any agreement that could
inspire a cautious rapprochement between India and Pakistan.
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One of the key reasons for the breakdown of negotiations has
been the failure to integrate various factors into a framework that
redresses not just the issues of concern but also the structural
asymmetries in the region. A regional security framework would
involve four major principles: 1) development of some basic rules of
engagement to ameliorate the danger of war; 2) a fundamental
change in the strategic and political climate from zero-sum to
positive-sum; 3) an integrated approach to nuclear and conventional
forces; and 4) involvement of the international community to ensure
that commitments are honored.
Integrated Arms Control Framework. Conventional arms control
and restraint measures form an essential part of the equation,
alongside nuclear missile restraint. The Conventional Forces in
Europe (CfE) principles for asymmetrical and proportionate
conventional arms control and restraint are the direction South Asia
needs to travel. Both sides must mutually identify offensive and
defensive forces. Buffers would be created to prevent the assembly
of offensive forces in threatening areas (which would be designated
as “low force zones”), thereby avoiding another “Brasstacks”-type of
eventuality. Both India and Pakistan would voluntarily submit
reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. In the same spirit,
any increase in strength, equipment, or structure should be
voluntarily and mutually made known as part of a CBM.
Nuclear Missile Constraints. Determining the thresholds for
nuclear restraint is very difficult, as ambiguity is seen as an essential
aspect of effective deterrence. A smokescreen is kept over actual
capabilities, deployment status, and the numbers of delivery means
as well as the weapons in a deliberate strategy to keep the enemy
guessing by mixing ambiguity and transparency. It is difficult to
determine a base line for the current state of weaponization and
deployment. For obvious security reasons, there can be little
transparency in the state of operational preparedness. Letting
specific nuclear thresholds be known invites aggression up until that
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point. Before the present crisis it was widely assumed that existing
nuclear weapons were not fully deployed.44 At least the delivery
vehicles were not mated with the nuclear warheads. However, there
was ambiguity over whether the warheads were being stored with
the nuclear cores placed inside the warheads. From a technical
perspective, restraint measures can range from non-weaponization
up to full deployment. Examples include:
• The nuclear devices (cores) are kept separate from other
warhead components and not co-located.
• The nuclear devices and warheads are not assembled but are
co-located for rapid assembly.
• The nuclear warheads are assembled but not mated with the
missile frames or aircraft.
• The nuclear warheads are mated with the missile frames but
are not co-located with the delivery means (transporter/
erector/launcher, TEL).
• All components are co-located to be rapidly mated.
In the India-Pakistan context, it is extremely difficult to verify the
stage of weaponization and highly unlikely that transparency in the
state of weaponization would be subjected to regime verification.
However, if nuclear weapons are mounted with aircraft or missile
delivery platforms and fully deployed, then it becomes technically
possible to verify through various surveillance and other national
technical means (NTMs).
Nuclear Scenarios.
At present, both armies appear to be in a state of mobilization
and deployment in battlefield locations. Because of ambiguity
176

surrounding nuclear weapons on both sides, if the situation
continues to escalate, it cannot be construed that nuclear weapons
are in the same state of weaponization as they were prior to
December 13, 2001. Three scenarios of nuclear use could be
visualized in South Asia between now and the future: preventive,
accidental, and the escalation of limited war.
Preventive Nuclear Strike. India may conduct a decapitating attack
after careful calculation and consideration of force levels,
redundancy, and vulnerability. Sudden strikes to cripple or
eliminate Pakistan’s assets or nerve center and infrastructure would
certainly start a nuclear exchange.45
Accidental Launch. In the absence of a treaty or formal restraint
arrangement, and under conditions of non-verifiable CBMs and
deliberate ambiguity (by informal consent of both parties), deployed
nuclear forces area recipe for instability and misperceptions. Nuclear
forces dispersed for reasons of survivability and invulnerability pose
the necessity for early warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
The biggest question would be how to address the dilemma of predelegation in the event of a decapitating attack. Further, the onus of
physical security, protection, and reliability (human and technical)
would now increase exponentially. The burden on command
systems would be tremendous. Given the railroad conditions in the
sub-continent, preventing an accident during the transportation of
nuclear weapons, especially the paraphernalia involved with liquidfueled missiles, would be extremely hard. Accidents cannot be ruled
out and therefore the methods of ensuring safety during the move
will be a very important feature in the South Asian environment.
Deception is a part of adversarial relationships, but misperceptions
during crisis can lead to risks of false warnings and possible nuclear
exchange. Creating doubts in the minds of the opponent is a
deliberate act, and in a hostile environment and during a crisis,
confusing the other side could have very dangerous consequences.
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Limited War. The belief of the Indian military that it could
conduct a limited war under the nuclear umbrella has already been
discussed. It is quite possible that the current situation could become
a sequel to those previous crises. The strategic assembly and
movement of conventional forces cannot remain concealed, and
takes time to develop. However, nuclear weapons and forces can be
assembled and deployed far more rapidly and secretly even though
their use may not be contemplated. In such a scenario, nuclear forces
may well be deployed preceding the conventional force build-up.
The determination of redlines, or the nuclear threshold, may be very
difficult to predict as conventional war escalates. The notion that
India will keep escalation dominance may well prove wrong, if for
no other reason than as a result of the sheer confusion generated in
the fog of war.
Elements of a Restraint Regime.
The very real possibility of any one of these aforementioned
contingencies necessitates concrete measures to promote safety and
to lessen the likelihood of misperception leading to tragedy. It is for
this reason that delays in response, early warning systems, and the
establishment of a crisis center is recommended.
Delay in Response. For crisis stability, restraint with respect to
weaponization and deployment is critical, and that is reflected by a
desire on both sides to have “only recessed or latent deterrence.”46
This should not be construed as stymieing either country’s ability to
respond. In fact, a delay in response in normal circumstances makes
security sense and provides assurance that arsenals and delivery
means are not only safe but under the control of the NCA. Delay in
response allows for the prevention of accidental nuclear warfare
while still allowing each country to protect its national security. Key
proposals to implement a viable delay in response program are:
• Critical components are kept removed from the system;
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• Launcher and warhead separation to mutually agreed
geographical limits;
•

Two-source warning system;

• Two or more persons in control; and
• A personnel reliability system.
It is also important to improve the sensor and command
networks of nuclear forces under such a program. When strategic
forces are kept in delayed response modes, alerting systems can fail
in two ways: either by signaling false alarms or by failing to signal
an alarm during an actual attack. Respective national command
authorities must take into account both of these issues when
redundancy checks are added into the system.
Cooperative Warning Arrangement. One of the key areas that need
to be addressed is the surveillance and early warning disparity
problems. Although generally both India and Pakistan lack reliable,
up-to-date surveillance or warning systems, this is a major
disadvantage for Pakistan. In a crisis, both leaderships would be
working under blind spots, and they may well indulge in dangerous
practices that could be misperceived by the other. Third parties, such
as the United States, should help establish a cooperative warning
arrangement between India and Pakistan and assist them in
interpreting data provided by this warning system or provide the
necessary information for the two parties to do so themselves.
America should assist India and Pakistan in developing secure
communications systems and in verifying accidental nuclear
detonations or unannounced missile launches.47 In addition, if both
countries have a restraint agreement that includes a non-deployment
agreement, the United States could verify the absence of deployment
to both parties in case of misperceptions. This cooperative warning
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system “might well be linked to the recently opened U.S.-Russia
joint warning system, and could eventually include China. Indeed, it
might be part of a larger Asian verification system.”48 In the long
run, India and Pakistan must themselves accord a high priority to
achieving a bilateral agreement on aerospace developments for
surveillance and satellite monitoring. Such an agreement is not to
justify spying but to be confident that there is nothing to hide and
that no hidden strikes are being planned. This is a CBM critical to the
nuclear future of both India and Pakistan, and would go a long way
toward relieving tensions on both sides.
Crisis Prevention Center. At this stage, both India and Pakistan are
very sensitive to intrusive verification mechanisms. However, in the
absence of verification, the strength of any arms control agreement is
diluted. They might agree to establish central crisis prevention
centers, patterned after the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC),
in their respective capitals that would deal with crises where shortterm, immediate communications are needed. The basic purpose of
these centers is to support crisis management and crisis avoidance,
and to substantiate implementation of CBMs—basically, to prevent
the crisis from escalating into a war that could lead to the use of
nuclear force. They would also help both countries respond
promptly to any unanticipated developments. Functional arrangements can be worked out if a basic code of engagement, like the one
suggested above in the regional security framework, is already
established.
As an integral part of the crisis prevention centers, “nuclear
accident centers” should also be established. These centers would be
staffed with specialists and observers. When a crisis occurs, they can
confer with each other and report to their respective national
command authority/head of state, providing critical information for
decisions. To prepare a mutually acceptable blueprint of the centers,
both sides should establish a “consultative commission,” comprised
of scientists, technicians, diplomats and experts from the military,
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which could meet periodically to plan and oversee the centers,
exchange concerns and discuss future modalities.
U.S. Cooperation on Crisis Prevention.
The United States is in a unique position with regard to India
and Pakistan. It can play a vital role in encouraging nuclear and
political CBMs. Politically, the United States could support an
interim agreement to de-escalate the current situation by mutually
withdrawing forces from the (unstable) deployed positions. The next
obvious challenge for the United States would be to facilitate a peace
process that includes Kashmir and other issues in which the crisis
threshold could be raised, thereby fostering greater stability and
predictability. Nuclear CBMs could be engendered by “carefully
weighing the merits and pitfalls of sharing [its] expertise and, where
possible, technology.”49 No matter how confident India and Pakistan
are about their nuclear safeguards, the matter of nuclear safety
should never be taken lightly. There are always human and technical
errors, or a combination of the two, that can happen. To help
ameliorate that risk, the United States can:
•

Help establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs).

•

Establish a cooperative warning arrangement that
institutionalizes a method for exchanging information and
that identifies areas where instant cooperation could help
prevent crisis escalation.

•

Help introduce a personnel reliability program (PRP).

•

Co-develop systems akin to the Nuclear Emergency Search
Teams (NEST), with specially trained teams that can react
and take control in case of a hoax or an emergency.50

•

Share experience with accident avoidance techniques to
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reduce technological errors, such as electromagnetic
radiation, computer fallibility, etc., and such areas where the
United States and others have experienced nuclear dangers.
•

Help design software for better electronic locks.

•

Suggest alternative means/measures for developing foolproof communications so as to obviate the possibilities of
misinterpretation, especially in a crisis or war-like environment.

•

Identify factors that can check or recheck verification
measures to prevent premature reactions to a false warning—
especially on radar screen, etc.

•

Provide generic physical protection and material accounting
practices.51

•

Provide sophisticated vaults and access doors.

•

Provide portal command equipment.

•

Provide advanced circuitry to prevent accidental launch.

CONCLUSION
India and Pakistan need to coexist as sovereign neighbors.
Because both are nuclear-capable states, they are required to exercise
restraint and limit their actions. It is incumbent not only upon them
but also the international community to seek early resolutions to
their conflicts. It would be foolhardy to expect that arms control and
restraint measures will work unless meaningful and substantive
moves forward on core issues are pursued concurrently.
Nevertheless, to prevent nuclear accidents and formal nuclear
and/or conventional force deployments, there is an urgent need to
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establish a restraint regime in this region—perhaps more critical
than in any other place in the world.
With an eye towards the next 20 years, two paths can be seen as
possibilities for the region. One of those paths is the status quo,
leading to a future determined by aggressive military policies that
cause their mirror images in the rival state’s reactionary policies.
This would no doubt spell an unrestricted arms race with less and
less communication and fewer safety measures. The alternative to
this path would be characterized by third party intervention leading
to greater cooperation and the construction of a mutually acceptable
framework for a restraint and stability regime, something along the
lines described above.
This chapter has proffered ideas where the West could help by
sharing experience, expertise and technology. Such cooperation is
not for the purpose of rewarding or enhancing capabilities but to
ensure stability and peace and to avoid the risk of a nuclear war.
Toward this end, it is time to take a fresh look at the current policy of
denying technology and experience, and to distinguish between
technologies that contribute toward stability and reducing the risk of
nuclear war, and those that aid proliferation. South Asia stands at
the crossroads—on one hand the precipice of nuclear war and on the
other a redefinition of nuclear history by developing a restraint
regime model based not on mutually assured destruction, but on
mutually assured accommodation. Which road is taken will impact us
all.
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CHAPTER 9
THE PERILS OF PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA1
Scott D. Sagan
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India tested five nuclear weapons in the
Rajasthan desert. By the end of the month, Pakistan had followed
suit, claiming to have detonated six nuclear devices—five to match
New Delhi’s tests and one in response to India’s 1974 peaceful
nuclear explosive test—at an underground facility in the Chagai
Hills. With these tests, the governments in Islamabad and New
Delhiloudly announced to the world community, and especially to
each other, that they both held the capability to retaliate with nuclear
weapons in response to any attack.
What will be the strategic effects of these nuclear weapons
developments? Will the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia
bring stability to the region or lead to nuclear war? There are many
scholars and defense analysts—some in the United States and many
more in India and Pakistan—who argue that the spread of nuclear
weapons to South Asia will significantly reduce, or even eliminate,
the risk of future wars between India and Pakistan.2 Following the
logic of rational deterrence theory, these “proliferation optimists”
argue that statesmen and soldiers in Islamabad and New Delhi know
that a nuclear exchange in South Asia will create devastating
damage and therefore will be deterred from starting any military
conflict in which there is a serious possibility of escalation to the use
of nuclear weapons.
Other scholars and defense analysts—some in India and
Pakistan, and many more in the United States—argue the opposite:
nuclear weapons proliferation in India and Pakistan will increase the
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likelihood of crises, accidents, and nuclear war.3 These proliferation
pessimists do not base their arguments on claims that Indian or
Pakistani statesmen are irrational or that the Indian and Pakistani
governments are weak. Instead, these scholars start their analysis by
noting that nuclear weapons are controlled by military organizations
and civilian bureaucracies, not by states or by statesmen. Organization theory, not just rational deterrence theory, should therefore be
used to understand the problem and predict the future of security in
the region. This organizational perspective leads the proliferation
pessimists to focus on the pathways by which deterrence could fail,
due to common organizational bias and errors, despite the unacceptable costs of any nuclear war.
These two theoretical perspectives thus lead to different
predictions about the consequences of nuclear proliferation in South
Asia. Fortunately, a new history of nuclear India and nuclear
Pakistan is emerging, a history by which scholars and policymakers
alike can judge whether the predictions of the deterrence optimists
or the organizational pessimists have been borne out. Unfortunately,
the emerging evidence strongly supports the pessimistic predictions
of organizational theorists.
There are four requirements for stable nuclear deterrence:
prevention of preventive war during periods of transition when one
side has a temporary advantage; the development of survivable
second-strike forces; the avoidance of accidental nuclear war; and
finally the ability to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
terrorists. Each of these requirements will be examined in turn. I will
first present the pessimistic predictions deduced from organization
theory about difficulties governments will face in attempts to meet
these nuclear stability requirements. I will then illustrate the
resulting problems with historical examples concerning the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In each case, I will
then show how very similar problems have already appeared or are
emerging in India and Pakistan. Finally, the conclusions will then
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briefly outline both the lessons for theory development and the
policy implications of the argument.
It should be acknowledged from the start that there are
important differences between the nuclear relationship emerging
between India and Pakistan and the Cold War system that
developed over time between the United States and the Soviet
Union. While the differences are clear, the significance of these
differences is not. For example, the nuclear arsenals in South Asia
are, and are likely to remain, much smaller and less sophisticated
than was the case with the U.S. and Russian arsenals. This should
make each arsenal both more vulnerable to a counterforce attack and
less capable of mounting counterforce attacks, and thus the net effect
is uncertain.
There are also important differences in civil-military relations in
the two cases, but these differences too are potentially both stabilizing and destabilizing. The Russians and the Americans both eventually developed an assertive command system with tight high-level
civilian control over their nuclear weapons. In contrast, India has an
extreme system of assertive civilian control of the military, with (at
least until recently) little direct military influence on any aspect of
nuclear weapons policy. Pakistan, however, is at the other end of the
spectrum, with the military in complete control of the nuclear
arsenal and only marginal influence from civilian political leaders,
even during the periods when there is a civilian-led government in
Islamabad.
There are, finally, important differences in mutual understanding, proximity, and hostility. India and Pakistan share a common
colonial and pre-colonial history, have some common cultural roots,
and share a common border; they also have engaged in four wars
against each other and are involved in a violent 50-year-long dispute
about the status of Kashmir. In contrast, the Americans and Soviets
were on opposite sides of the globe and viewed each other as
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mysterious, often unpredictable, adversaries. The Cold War
superpowers held a deep-seated ideological rivalry, but held no
disputed territory between them and had no enduring history of
armed violence against each other.
There is also, however, a crucially important similarity between
the nuclear conditions that existed in Cold War and those in South
Asia today. In both cases, the parochial interests and routine
behaviors of the organizations that manage nuclear weapons limit
the stability of nuclear deterrence. In this chapter, I will demonstrate
that serious organizational perils of proliferation, like those
witnessed in the Cold War, are emerging in both India and Pakistan.
The newest nuclear powers will not make exactly the same mistakes
with nuclear weapons as did their superpower predecessors. They
are, however, also not likely to meet with complete success in the
difficult effort to control nuclear weapons and maintain stable
deterrence.
The Problem of Preventive War.
From an organizational perspective, one can deduce three
reasons why military officers have a bias in favor of preventive
war—defined as a deliberate attack initiated during the period when
one has a temporary military advantage over an adversary and
believes that war is better now than later. First, military officers are
more likely than civilians to believe that war is inevitable in the long
term, a belief that stems from both their self -selection into the
profession and their training once they join the armed forces. If war
is deemed inevitable in the long run, it makes sense to strike an
enemy state before it is able to strengthen its retaliatory capabilities.
In addition, military officers have biases in favor of offensive
doctrines. Offenses can bring decisive victories and glory and
military officers often believe that offensive operations can take
advantage of the principle of the initiative, enabling them to
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implement their own complex war plans and forcing adversaries to
improvise and react to these plans, rather than implement their own.
Preventive wars are by definition offensive in character and military
planners have the tactical advantage of deciding when to attack and
how to execute their war plan.
Finally, military officers are less likely than civilians to focus on
domestic or international political disincentives against preventive
war. By their training and their locus of responsibility, military
officers focus primarily on military requirements of victory and not
on allied states’ concerns, post-war reconstruction and recovery in
enemy states, or domestic political constraints on the initiation of the
use of force.
American Preventive War Discussions. Considerable evidence from
U.S. Cold War history supports these theoretical predictions. The
Truman administration discussed the possibility of nuclear preventive war after the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test, but rejected the idea
in April 1950.4 In September 1950, however, Major General Orvil
Anderson, the commandant of the Air University, publicly called for
a preventive war against the USSR, telling a New York Times reporter:
“Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb
nests in a week. . . . And when I went up to Christ—I think I could
explain to Him that I had saved civilization.”5
Anderson was fired for this indiscretion. But when widespread
organizational preferences are rejected, they do not vanish
overnight. Indeed, many senior U.S. military officers continued to
advocate preventive war as a way of coping with the emerging
Soviet threat well into the mid-1950s. Perhaps the most dramatic
example was Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining who
recommended a preventive attack on the Russians in 1954 before
they developed larger nuclear forces. General Twining is quoted as
saying that: “[W]e must recognize this time of decision, or we will
continue blindly down a suicidal path and arrive at a situation in
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which we will have entrusted our survival to the whims of a small
group of proven barbarians.”6
President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected these recommendations in 1954, largely on grounds that even a successful nuclear first
strike would lead to a long and costly conventional conflict with the
Russians. Moreover, Eisenhower questioned whether war with the
Russians was inevitable, given U.S. deterrent capabilities and the
hope that containment would eventually lead to an overthrow of the
Soviet system from within. Finally, although Eisenhower expected
that the United States would win what he called a third world war,
he also believed it would leave the United States with a dictatorial
government and an isolationist public, ill-prepared to occupy the
vast territories of enemy nations.
In short, preventive war was advocated by senior leaders of the
U.S. military for many years after the first Soviet nuclear test, but
was eventually rejected by senior civilian authorities that held strong
views of the broader costs of such an attack and held different beliefs
about the inevitability of war with the Russians.
Brasstacks and Preventive War in South Asia. Pakistan has been
under direct military rule for almost half of its existence and some
analysts have argued that that the organizational biases of its
military leaders had strong effects on strategic decisions concerning
the initiation and conduct of the 1965 and 1971 wars with India.7 In
contrast, India has a sustained tradition of strict civilian control over
the military since independence.
These patterns of civil-military relations are highly influential in
nuclear weapons doctrine and operations. In India, the military has
traditionally not been involved in decisions concerning nuclear
testing, designs, or even command and control. In Pakistan, the
military largely runs the nuclear weapons program; even during the
periods in which civilian prime ministers have held the reins of
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government, they have not been told of the full details of the nuclear
weapons program nor given direct control over the operational
arsenal. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, for example, appears not to
have been given full details of the status of the Pakistani nuclear
weapons program before she visited Washington in June 1989 and
has stated that she was not consulted before the Pakistani military
ordered the assembly of Pakistan’s first nuclear weapon during the
1990 crisis over Kashmir.
This organizational theory lens suggests that it is fortunate that it
was India, not Pakistan, that developed nuclear weapons first in
South Asia. Military rule in Islamabad (and military influence during
periods of civilian rule) certainly has played an important role in
Pakistani decision-making concerning the use of force (see the
discussion of the Kargil conflict below) . But the Pakistani military
did not possess nuclear weapons before India tested in 1974 and thus
was not in a position to argue that preventive war now was better
than war later as India developed a rudimentary arsenal.
The preventive war problem in South Asia is not so simple,
however, for new evidence suggests that military influence in India
produced serious risks of preventive war in the 1980s, despite strong
institutionalized civilian control. The government of Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi considered, but then rejected, plans to attack
Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility in the early 1980s, a preventive
attack plan that was recommended by senior Indian military
leaders.8 Yet as occurred in the United States, the preferences of
senior officers did not suddenly change when civilian leaders ruled
against preventive war. Instead, the beliefs went underground, only
to resurface later in a potentially more dangerous form.
The most important example of preventive war thinking
influencing Indian nuclear policy can be seen in the 1986–87
Brasstacks crisis.9 This serious crisis began in late 1986 when the
Indian military initiated a massive military exercise in Rajasthan
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involving an estimated 250,000 troops and 1, 500 tanks, including the
issuance of live ammunition to troops, and concluding with a
simulated counter-offensive attack, including Indian Air Force
strikes, into Pakistan. The Pakistani military, fearing that the exercise
might turn into a large-scale attack, alerted military forces and
conducted exercises along the border, which led to Indian military
counter-movements closer to the border and an operational Indian
Air Force alert. The resulting crisis produced a flurry of diplomatic
activity and was resolved only after direct intervention by the
highest authorities, including an emergency telephone conversation
between Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo and Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and special diplomatic missions to India by
Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and President Zia ul-Haq.
The traditional explanation for the Brasstacks crisis has been that
it was an accidental crisis, caused by Pakistan’s misinterpretation of
an inadvertently provocative Indian Army exercise. For example,
Devin Hagerty’s detailed examination of “New Delhi’s intentions in
conducting Brasstacks” concludes that “India’s conduct of ‘normal’
exercises rang alarm bells in Pakistan; subsequently, the logic of the
security dilemma structured both sides’ behavior, with each
interpreting the other’s defensive moves as preparations for
offensive action.”10 A stronger explanation, however, unpacks New
Delhi’s intentions to look at what different Indian decision-makers
wanted to do before and during the crisis.
The key to interpreting the crisis correctly is to understand the
preventive war thinking of then-Indian chief of the army staff,
General Krishnaswami Sundarji. Sundarji apparently felt that India’s
security would be greatly eroded by Pakistani development of a
usable nuclear arsenal and thus deliberately designed the Brasstacks
exercise in hopes of provoking a Pakistani military response. This in
turn could then provide India with an excuse to implement existing
contingency plans to go on the offensive against Pakistan and take
out the nuclear program in a preventive strike.11 This argument was
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confirmed in the memoirs of Lt. General P. N. Hoon, the
commander-in-chief of the Western Army during Brasstacks. He
wrote:
What had remained only a suspicion all along is now being
revealed to be true. . . . Brasstacks was no military exercise. It was
a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And
what is even more shocking is that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv
Gandhi, was not aware of these plans for war.12

The preventive war motivation behind Sundarji’s plans helps to
explain why the Indian military did not provide full notification of
the exercise to the Pakistan is and then failed to use the special
hotline to explain their operations when information was requested
by Pakistan during the crisis. A final piece of evidence confirms that
Sundarji advocated a preventive strike against Pakistan during the
crisis. Indeed, as George Perkovich reports, considerations of an
attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities went all the way up to the most
senior decision-makers in New Delhiin January 1987:
[ Prime Minister] Rajiv [ Gandhi] now considered the possibility
that Pakistan might initiate war with India. In a meeting with a
handful of senior bureaucrats and General Sundarji, he
contemplated beating Pakistan to the draw by launching a preemptive attack on the Army Reserve South. This would have
included automatically an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to
remove the potential for a Pakistani nuclear riposte to India’s
attack. Relevant government agencies were not asked to
contribute analysis or views to the discussion. Sundarji argued
that India’s cities could be protected from a Pakistani counterattack (perhaps a nuclear one), but, upon being probed, could not
say how. One important advisor from the Ministry of Defense
argued eloquently that “India and Pakistan have already fought
their last war, and there is too much to lose in contemplating
another one.” This view ultimately prevailed.13

The Kargil Conflict and Future Problems. Optimists could accept
that the Brasstacks crisis may have been a deliberate attempt to spark
a preventive attack, but they might be reassured by the final
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outcome, as senior political leaders stepped in to stop further
escalation. The power of nuclear deterrence to prevent war in South
Asia, optimists insist, has been demonstrated in repeated crises, e.g.,
the Indian preventive attack discussions in 1984, the Brasstacks
crisis, and the 1990 Kashmir crisis. “There is no more ironclad law in
international relations theory than this, ” Devin Hagerty’s detailed
study concludes, “nuclear states do not fight wars with each
other.”14
In the spring and summer of 1999, however, India and Pakistan
did fight a war in the mountains along the Line of Control (LOC),
separating the portions of Kashmir controlled by each country, near
the Indian town of Kargil. The conflict began in May, when the
Indian intelligence services discovered what appeared to be
Pakistani regular forces lodged into mountain redoubts on the
Indian side of the LOC. For almost two months, Indian army units
attacked the Pakistani forces and Indian Air Force jets bombed their
bases in the high Himalayan peaks. Although the Indian forces
carefully stayed on their side of the LOC in Kashmir, Indian Prime
Minister Atal Vajpayee informed the U.S. government that he might
have to order attacks into Pakistan and U.S. spy satellites revealed
that Indian tanks and heavy artillery were being prepared for a
counter-offensive in Rajasthan.
The fighting ended in July, when Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington and, after receiving political cover
in the form of a statement that President Bill Clinton would “take a
personal interest” in resolving the Kashmir problem, pledged to
withdraw the forces to the Pakistani side of the LOC.15 That
Clinton’s statement on Kashmir was merely political cover for the
withdrawal was later made clear when Clinton revealed that he had
told Sharif that he could not come to Washington unless he was
willing to withdraw the troops back across the LOC.16
Over 1,000 Indian and Pakistan soldiers died in the conflict and
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Sharif’s decision to pull out was one of the major causes of the coup
that overthrew his regime in October 1999. The 1999 Kargil conflict is
also disturbing, not only because it demonstrates that nuclear-armed
states can fight wars, but also because the organizational biases of
the Pakistani military were a major cause of the conflict. Moreover,
such biases continued to exist and could play a role in starting crises
in the future. This will increase the dangers of both a preventive and
preemptive strike if war is considered inevitable, as well as the
danger of a deliberate but limited use of nuclear weapons on the
battlefield.
Three puzzling aspects of the Kargil conflict are understandable
from an organizational perspective. First, in late 1998, the Pakistani
military planned the Kargil operation paying much more attention,
as organization theory would predict, to the tactical effects of the
surprise military maneuver than to the broader strategic
consequences. Ignoring the likely international reaction and the
predictable domestic consequences of the military incursion in India,
however, proved to be significant blind spots contributing to the
ultimate failure of the Kargil operation. Second, the Pakistani Army
also started the operation with the apparent belief—following the
logic of what has been called the stability/instability paradox—that
a stable nuclear balance between India and Pakistan permitted more
offensive actions to take place with impunity in Kashmir. It is
important to note that this belief was more strongly held by senior
military officers than by civilian leaders. For example, at the height
of the fighting near Kargil, Pakistani Army leaders stated that “there
is almost a red alert situation, ”but they nevertheless insisted ”there
is no chance of the Kargil conflict leading to a full-fledged war
between the two sides.”17 This leaked statement to the press
apparently reflected what the Pakistani Army was privately advising
the government and helps explain why senior officers opposed the
withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from Kargil.
Although Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif apparently approved of
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the plan to move forces across the LOC, it is not clear that he was
fully briefed on the nature, scope, or potential consequences of the
operation. The prime minister’s statement that he was “trying to
avoid nuclear war” and his suggestion that he feared “that India was
getting ready to launch a full-scale military operation against
Pakistan” provide a clear contrast to the confident military
assessment that there were virtually no risks of an Indian counterattack or escalation to nuclear war.18
Third, the current Pakistani military government’s interpretation
of the Kargil crisis, at least in public, is that Nawaz Sharif lost
courage and backed down unnecessarily. This view is not widely
shared among scholars or Pakistani journalists, but such a stab-inthe-back thesis does serve the parochial self-interests of the Pakistani
army—which does not want to acknowledge its errors—and those of
the current Musharraf regime. The New Delhi government’s
interpretation, however, is that the Indian threats that military
escalation, a counterattack across the international border, would be
ordered if necessary forced Pakistan to retreat. These different
lessons learned could produce ominous outcomes in future crises:
each side believes that the Kargil conflict proved that the other will
exhibit restraint and back away from the brink in the future if their
government exhibits resolve and threatens to escalate to new levels
of violence.
Future military crises in South Asia are likely to be nuclear crises.
Proliferation optimists are not concerned about this likelihood,
however, since they argue that the danger of preventive war, if it
ever existed at all, has been eliminated by the development of
deliverable nuclear weapons in both countries after May 1998. The
problem of preventive war during periods of transition in South Asia
is only of historical interest now, optimists would insist.
I am not convinced by this argument for two basic reasons. First,
the Indian government has given strong support to the Bush
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administration in its plans to develop missile defense technology
and expressed interest in eventually procuring or developing its own
missile defense capability in the future. The development of missile
defenses in India, however, given the relatively small number of
nuclear warheads and missiles in Pakistan, would inevitably reopen
the window of opportunity for preventive war considerations.
Military biases, under the preventive war logic of better now than
later, could encourage precipitous action in either country if their
government was seen to have a fleeting moment of superiority in
this new kind of arms race, facing the dangerous possibility of the
adversary catching up and surpassing it in the future.
The second reason to be pessimistic is that preventive war biases
can have a background influence on considerations of preemptive
war—that is, attacks based on the belief that an enemy’s use of
nuclear weapons is imminent and unavoidable—in serious crises. To
the degree those decision-makers believe (or think that adversary
decision-makers believe) that war is inevitable in the long term, it is
likely to color the perceptions of the other side’s actions and plans at
the brink of war. Here the lessons of Kargil are ominous.
While it is clear that the existence of nuclear weapons in South
Asia made both governments cautious in their use of conventional
military force in 1999, it is also clear that Indian leaders were
preparing to escalate the conflict if necessary. Pakistani political
authorities, moreover, made nuclear threats during the crisis,
suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used precisely under
such conditions: Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, for example,
proclaimed in May that Pakistan “will not hesitate to use any
weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.”19 In
addition, Indian military officials believe that Pakistan took initial
steps to alert its nuclear forces during the conflict.20
In future crises in South Asia, the likelihood of either a
preventive or preemptive attack will be strongly influenced by a
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complex mixture of perceptions of the adversary’s intent, estimates
about its future offensive and defensive capabilities, and estimates of
the vulnerability of its current nuclear arsenal. Organizational biases
could encourage worst-case assumptions about the adversary’s
intent and pessimistic beliefs about the prospects for successful
strategic deterrence over the long term. Unfortunately, as will be
seen below, organizational proclivities could also lead to destabilizing vulnerabilities to an enemy first strike in the immediate term.
Organizational Problems Compromising Survivability.
The fear of retaliation is central to successful deterrence, and the
second requirement for stability with nuclear weapons is therefore
the development of secure, second-strike forces. From an
organizational theory perspective, however, there are many reasons
to predict that military organizations might not deploy nuclear
weapons in survivable basing modes despite the existence of a
strong national security imperative to do so. Military leaders
understandably favor development and deployment of more
weaponry, and with limited budgets these interests often lead them
to spend more on weapons production and skimp on expensive
operational practices that increase survivability. Similarly,
professional military officers have strong proclivities to engage in
traditional operations and their interest in preserving traditions and
organizational morale can lead them to oppose innovative weapons
delivery systems and deployment operations.
Even when their leaders do not consciously reject new military
operations, organizations will tend to follow their past behaviors and
may continue to practice specific deployments that make forces
vulnerable to attacks when adversaries have developed new threats.
To the degree that leaders of military organizations have offensive
biases, they have increased incentives to rely upon first strike,
preemptive, or launch-on-warning options that do not require force
survivability.
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Moreover, organizational learning tends to occur only after
failures: military organizations, like other organizations, have few
incentives to review and adjust operations when they believe they
are successful. This can lead them to follow practices that appear to
be working well, even though in reality they are not. At the same
time, organizational routines often produce signatures to enemy
intelligence agencies that inadvertently reveal secret information and
the location of otherwise hidden military forces.
Cold War Vulnerabilities. The history of the Cold War provides
numerous examples of these kinds of organizational problems
producing inadvertent military vulnerabilities. In the 1980s, for
example, the U.S. Air Force leadership strongly supported the
development of a larger and more powerful intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), but they cared far less about whether the planned
MX missile was deployed in any of the expensive basing modes—
mobile racetrack configurations, railway basing, rotating them
between empty silos—under discussion. In the 1950s, the United
States Navy leadership also opposed the creation of a ballistic missile
submarine fleet, because they preferred traditional and more
exciting attack submarines. By emphasizing tradition over
innovation, this policy delayed the development of what eventually
became the most survivable leg of the U.S. strategic triad.
A dramatic example of how a military organization’s operational
routines can produce serious strategic vulnerabilities is the U.S.
secret penetration of the Soviet Navy’s underwater communications
system. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are widely considered
to be the least vulnerable portion of a nuclear arsenal, providing a
stabilizing, secure second-strike capability. In the early 1970s,
however, the U.S. Navy initiated a secret intelligence operation
against the Soviet SSBN fleet that enabled the United States to know
the timing and locations of Soviet submarine patrols in the Pacific
and maintain a U.S. attack submarine trailing behind each Soviet
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SSBN. The organizational failures of the Russian military that led to
this problem read more like the Keystone Kops than the KGB. First,
the Soviets failed to encrypt many messages sent through an
underwater communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk to the
missile submarine base at Petropavlovsk, figuring that such
protected waters were safe from U.S. spying activities. Second, to
make matters worse, they gave away the location of the secret
communications cable by posting a sign on the beach telling local
fisherman “do not anchor, cable here.” The crew of the U.S.S. Halibut
thus easily located the line, tapped into the Soviet Navy’s secret
underwater communications, and received the operational plans and
tactical patrol orders for the Russian SSBN fleet. It is important to
note that the Soviet General Staff continued use of this vulnerable
communication system, believing that their forces were secure unless
proved otherwise, until an American spy revealed the secret
operation to Moscow.21
Soviet organizational routines also created vulnerabilities to their
land-based nuclear missile forces during the Cold War. For example,
the failure of the Soviet military to keep its 1962 missile deployment
in Cuba secret, despite the strong desire for such secrecy by the
Kremlin, was caused by construction crew routines that produced
signatures leading American intelligence analysts to locate otherwise
secret missiles. The Star of David pattern of air defense missile
battery placements and the easily recognized slash marks on missile
pads, practices developed and seen in the USSR, gave away the
secret Cuban operation to American intelligence officers.22 Similarly,
American photo-interpreters were able to locate the secret ICBM
silos of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces because of the triple
security fences built around the silo buildings and the distinctive
wide radius curves in the entry roads, built to transport long missiles
to the sites.23 These kinds of organizational problems are common in
military history, as intelligence agents figure out how to understand
enemy operations and make them vulnerable to attack.
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Survivability of Nuclear Forces in South Asia. Will such organizational problems exist with nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia?
Before the 1998 nuclear tests, proliferation optimists used to assume
that second-strike survivability would be easily maintained because
India and Pakistan had a form of non-weaponized deterrence and
thus could not target each other. It is by no means certain, however,
that this condition of non-weaponized deterrence will continue as
both India and Pakistan develop advanced missiles in the coming
years.
An organization perspective points to numerous reasons to be
concerned about the ability of the Indian and Pakistani organizations
that control nuclear weapons in South Asia to maintain survivable
forces. Two organizational problems can already be seen to have
reduced (at least temporarily) the survivability of nuclear forces in
Pakistan. First, there is evidence that the Pakistani military, as was
the case in the Cold War examples cited above, deployed its first
missile forces, following standard operating procedures, in ways that
produce signatures giving away their deployment locations. Indian
intelligence officers thus identified the locations of planned Pakistani
deployments of M-11 missiles by spotting the placement of defense
communication terminals nearby.24 A second, and even more
dramatic, example follows a Cold War precedent quite closely. Just
as the road engineers in the Soviet Union inadvertently gave away
the location of their ICBMs because construction crews built roads
with extra wide-radius turns next to the missile silos, Pakistani road
construction crews have inadvertently signaled the location of the
secret M-11 missiles by placing wide-radius roads and roundabouts
outside special garages at Sargodha Missile Base.25
Military biases are also seen in conventional war plans in India.
Indian military officers are clearly planning large-scale conventional
force operations against Pakistani airbases, using U.S. Paveway II
laser guidance bombs. These operations could present Pakistan with
serious “use it or lose it” problems and with serious degradation in
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their command and control of nuclear weapons, yet these are
inadvertent escalation dangers that have not been discussed at all in
the emerging Indian strategic writings on limited war in South Asia.
Instead, these strategists simply assume that limited wars can be
fought and won, without creating a risk of precipitating a desperate
nuclear strike.
Finally, analysts should also not ignore the possibility that Indian
or Pakistani intelligence agencies could intercept messages revealing
the secret locations of otherwise survivable military forces, an
absolutely critical issue with small or opaque nuclear arsenals.
Indeed, the history of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan
demonstrates that both states’ intelligence agencies were able to
intercept critical classified messages sent by and to the other side.
For example, the Pakistan is learned immediately when the Indian
Army commander issued operational orders to prepare for military
intervention against East Pakistan; while before the war, Indian
intelligence agencies acquired a copy of the critical message from
Beijing to Rawalpindi informing the Pakistan is that China would
not intervene militarily in any Pakistani-Indian war.26 Perhaps most
dramatically, on December 12, 1971, the Indians intercepted a radio
message scheduling a meeting of high-level Pakistani officials at
Government House in Dacca, which led to an immediate air attack
on the building in the middle of the meeting.27
The Kargil conflict also provides evidence of the difficulty of
keeping what are intended to be secret operations secret from one’s
adversary. Throughout the conflict, the Pakistani government
insisted that the forces fighting on the Indian side of the LOC were
mujahideen (indigenous Islamic freedom fighters). This cover story
was exposed, however, when some of the mujahideen failed to leave
their Pakistani military identification cards at their base in Pakistan
while others wrote about General Musharraf’s involvement in the
operation’s planning process in a diary that was later captured.28
Finally, Indian intelligence organizations intercepted a critical secret
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telephone conversation between General Musharraf and one of his
senior military officers, which revealed the Pakistani Army’s central
involvement in the Kargil intrusion.29
The Risks of Accidental Nuclear War.
Social science research on efforts to maintain safe operations in
many modern technological systems suggests that serious accidents
are likely over time if the system in question has two structural
characteristics: high interactive complexity and tight-coupling.
Complexity is problematic in hazardous systems because it
decreases the likelihood that anyone can predict all potential failure
modes and thereby fix them ahead of time. Moreover, the most
common engineering strategy to make reliable systems out of
inherently unreliable parts is to utilize redundancy in many forms
such as multiple safety devices, backup systems, and extra personnel
as signed to a problem. Redundancy, however, makes the system
more complex and can therefore create hidden failure modes that no
one wants or anticipates.30
Tight-coupling simply means that there is little time to stop
processes once begun, little slack in the system to permit pause and
reflection. Incidents and individual accidents still occur in looselycoupled systems, but they do not cascade into catastrophic systems
accidents. In tightly-coupled systems, however, one error leads to
another and another and no one can intervene in time to stop the
serious accidents from occurring. Highly complex and tightlycoupled organizational or technological systems may operate
successfully for a while, but they are very accident-prone over the
long term. In short, there are inherent limits to safety with such
systems.
The Limits of Cold War Safety. Two close calls to accidental nuclear
war that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrate the way
in which complex and tightly-coupled systems can create serious
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nuclear dangers that no one can anticipate ahead of time or fix easily
on the spot.31 In October 1962, the U.S. Air Force had ten test missile
silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), in California, which it
used for launching test missiles over the Pacific to Kwajalein Atoll.
When the crisis alert began, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) put
nuclear warheads on nine of the ten test missiles at the base and
aimed them at the Sino-Soviet bloc. On October 26, without further
communication with Washington political authorities, officers at
Vandenberg launched the tenth missile on a previously scheduled
test launch over the Pacific Ocean. No one thought through the
possibility that the nuclear alert might be detected and that the
subsequent missile launch might be misperceived.
Another illustrative case occurred in the special Cuban Missile
Early Warning System set up by the United States during the crisis.
U.S. military personnel set up an emergency radar system facing
Cuba, but no one anticipated that a technician would place a training
tape (showing what an attack would look like) into the online system
and that the radar operators would become confused and report that
a Soviet missile had been launched from Cuba and was about to
detonate near Tampa, Florida. Precisely such a set of unexpected
interactions did occur on October 28 at the height of the crisis. These
incidents are the kind of false warnings and near accidents that a
normal accident theorist would predict are inevitable in a complex
and tightly coupled nuclear command and control system.
Normal Accidents in Nuclear South Asia. Will the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear arsenals be more or less safe than were the U.S.
and Soviet arsenals in the Cold War? It is clear that the emerging
South Asian nuclear deterrence system is both smaller and less
complex today than was the case in the United States or Soviet
Union earlier. It is also clear, however, that the South Asian nuclear
relationship is inherently more tightly coupled because of
geographical proximity.
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With inadequate warning systems in place and with weapons
with short flight times emerging in the region, the timelines for
decision making are highly compressed and the danger that one
accident could lead to another and then lead to a catastrophic
accidental war is high and growing. The proximity of New Delhi and
Islamabad to the potential adversary’s border poses particular
concerns about rapid decapitation attacks on national capitals.
Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about social stability,
especially in Pakistan, that could compromise nuclear weapons
safety and security. These concerns have increased as a result of the
potential for domestic strife in Pakistan that could follow the war
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Proliferation optimists will cite the small sizes of India and
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals as a reason to be less worried about the
problem. Yet the key from a normal accidents perspective is not the
numbers, but rather the structure of the arsenal. Here there is good
and bad news. The good news is that under normal peacetime
conditions, India, and most likely Pakistan as well, do not regularly
deploy nuclear forces mated with delivery systems in the field. The
bad news is that, as noted earlier, the Indian military has stated that
it received intelligence reports that Pakistan had begun initial
nuclear alert operations during the Kargil conflict.
From an organizational perspective, it is not surprising to find
evidence of serious accidents emerging in the Indian nuclear and
missile programs. The first example is disturbing, but predictable.
On January 4, 2001, Indian Defense Secretary, Yogender Narain, led
a special inspection of the Milan missile production facility in
Hyderabad. The Milan missile, a short-range (two kilometer) missile
normally armed with a large conventional warhead, had failed in
test launches and during the Kargil war, and Narain was to discuss
the matter with the plant’s managers and technical personnel. For
reasons that remain unclear, the electrical circuitry was not
disconnected and the live conventional warhead was not capped on

211

the missile displayed for the visiting dignitary from New Delhi
when the plant manager accidentally touched the start button. The
missile launched, flew through the body of one official, killing him
instantly and then nose-dived into the ground, catching on fire and
injuring five other workers. The defense secretary was shocked but
unharmed. The official killed was the quality control officer for the
Milan missile program.32
The false warning incident that occurred just prior to the
Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 is a second case demonstrating
the dangers of accidental war in South Asia. During the crucial days
just prior to Prime Minister Sharif’s decision to order the tests of
Pakistani nuclear weapons, senior military intelligence officers
informed him that the Indian and Israeli air forces were about to
launch a preventive strike on the test site.33 The incident is shrouded
in mystery and neither the cause nor the consequences of this
warning message are clear. Some press reports claim that Pakistani
intelligence officers, fearing an Israeli raid like the attack on Osirak
in 1981, misidentified an F-16 aircraft that strayed into or near
Pakistani territory. Other reports state that an Israeli cargo plane
carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s armored Cadillacs
triggered the warning system. A third possibility is that officials of
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence agency did not believe there
was any threat of an imminent Indian-Israeli attack in 1998, but
deliberately concocted (or exaggerated) the warning of a preventive
strike to force the prime minister, who was wavering under U.S.
pressure, to test the weapons immediately. It is not clear which of
these is the more worrisome interpretation of the incident: false
warnings could be catastrophic in a crisis whether they are
deliberate provocations by rogue intelligence officers, or genuinely
believed, but inaccurate, reports of imminent or actual attack.
It is important to note that the possibility of a false warning
producing an accidental nuclear war is South Asia is reduced, but is
by no means eliminated, by India’s adoption of a nuclear no-first use
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policy. Not only might the Pakistani government respond, following
its stated first-use doctrine, to intelligence (in this case false) that
India was about to attack successfully a large portion of Pakistani
nuclear forces, but either government could misidentify an
accidental nuclear detonation, occurring during transport and alert
activities at one of their own military bases, as the start of a
counterforce attack by the other state.
Pakistani officials should be particularly sensitive to this
possibility because of the memory of the 1988 Ojheri incident, in
which a massive conventional munitions explosion at a secret
ammunition dump near Rawalpindi caused fears among some
decisionmakers that an Indian attack had begun. The cause of the
Ojheri explosion appears to have been a fire caused by an accidental
rocket explosion during loading at the depot. It has also been
claimed, however, that the accident was actually a deliberate act of
sabotage against the munitions dump.34 This kind of accident
producing a false warning of an attack cannot, however, be ruled out
in India as well, as long as the government plans to alert forces or
mate nuclear weapons to delivery vehicles during crises.
In addition, there should be serious concern about whether both
countries can maintain centralized authority over nuclear-use
decisions. Although government policy in this regard is kept
classified, for obvious reasons, serious analysts in both countries
who are worried about decapitation of the government leadership in
a nuclear strike on the capital recognize the need for some form of
predelegation. Some Pakistani observers are aware of this issue and
therefore have advocated predelegation of nuclear authority to lower
level military officers. The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine simply
states that “the authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides
in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated
successor(s), ”yet some Indian analysts also recognize that in crises
or war, as one military officer put it, “by design or default” nuclear
weapons “control may pass to the professional military men and
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women who serve the nation well.”35
The risk of accidental war in South Asia is exacerbated by the
fact that neither government has instituted a Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP), the set of psychological screening tests, safety
training, and drug use and mental health monitoring programs used
in the United States to reduce the risk that an unstable civilian or
military officer would be involved in critical nuclear weapons or
command and control duties. Historically in the United States
between 2.5 percent and 5 percent of previously PRP-certified
individuals were decertified, that is, deemed unsuitable for nuclear
weapons-related duties, each year. Presumably similar low but still
significant percentages of officers, soldiers, and civilians in other
countries would be of questionable reliability as guardians of the
arsenal. This personnel reliability problem is serious in India, where
civilian custodians maintain custody of the nuclear weapons.
However, it is particularly worrisome in Pakistan, where the
weapons are controlled by a professional military organization
facing the difficult challenge of maintaining discipline in the midst a
society facing a failing economy and problems of religious
fundamentalism after the fall of the Taliban government.
Finally, there is evidence that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani
military has focused sufficiently on the danger that a missile test
launch during a crisis could be misperceived as the start of a nuclear
attack. There was an agreement, as part of the Lahore accords in
January 1999, to provide missile test advance notification, but even
such an agreement is not a foolproof solution, as the Russians
discovered in January 199 5 when a bureaucratic snafu in Moscow
led to a failure to pass on advance notification of a Norwegian
weather rocket launch that resulted in a serious false warning of a
missile attack. Moreover, both the Pakistan is and the Indians appear
to be planning to use their missile test facilities for actual nuclear
weapons launches in war. In India, Wheeler Island is reportedly
being used like Vandenberg AFB, a test site in peacetime and crises,
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and a launch site in war.36 During the Kargil crisis, according to the
Indian army chief of staff, alert activities were also detected at “some
of Pakistan’s launch areas—some of the areas where they carried out
tests earlier of one of their missiles.”37
The New Challenge of Terrorism.
Before September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden was quite open in
stating his desire for nuclear weapons. Indeed, when he declared a
jihad (holy war) against the United States in 1998, he was asked
about reports that he wanted nuclear weapons and replied, “to
possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a
religious duty.”38 Bin Laden added in a May 1998 interview, “we do
not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and
civilians.”
We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from
Muslims, Muslim children, and women. American history does
not distinguish between civilian sand military, and not even
women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs
against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants
and military? . . . We believe that the biggest thieves in the world
and the terrorists are the Americans. The only way for us to fend
off these assaults is to use similar means.39

Hatred and shame and a desire to punish Americans motivate
such terrorist visions. But I also fear that there is considerable
method in Osama bin Laden’s madness. Immediately after the
September 11 attacks, many observers wondered how bin Laden
could think that he could get away with killing six thousand
American citizens. How could such an attack serve his political
purpose of overthrowing conservative Muslim regimes in the
Middle East and destroying Israel, given that a massive U.S. military
response was inevitable? The answer is that there is a kind of
strategic logic behind his use of mass murder, a logic that he also
outlined in interviews. Two factors appear to be important: his belief
that the U.S. public lacked the will to support a long war and his
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hope that large-scale U.S. intervention in the Middle East would
destabilize the regimes that he seeks to overthrow.
In May 1998, bin Laden clearly expressed his views about the
lack of U.S. willingness to fight:
We have seen in the last decade the decline of the American
government and the weakness of the American soldier who is
ready to wage Cold Wars and unprepared to fight long wars. This
was proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions.
It also proves they can run in less than 24 hours, and this was also
repeated in Somali a. We are ready for all occasions. We rely on
Allah.40

n addition, he argued that the Saudi government would
eventually fall because of its support for the United States, just as the
Shah’s government fell in the Iranian revolution. U.S. military
activities in the region could increase the likelihood of an uprising
from the streets and mosques. “We predict that the Riyadh leader
and those with him that stood with the Jews and the Christians . . .
will disintegrate. They have left the Muslim nation.” Bin Laden
concluded, “the Muslims are moving toward liberating the Muslim
worlds. Allah willing, we will win.”41
Any terrorist leader with this kind of strategic vision is not likely
to be deterred from using nuclear weapons or radiological weapons
against the United States. U.S. threats to use conventional military
forces to kill or capture such a terrorist may not be believed since
such an effort could require a long and drawn out military
campaign. It is also possible that nuclear weapons could be delivered
in a covert manner (by a commercial airline or ship, by a cruise
missile, or by truck). In such cases, deterrence would fail since the
perpetrator would believe that there was no return address against
which to retaliate. Finally, even if the perpetrator of such an attack
was known, Jihadi terrorists might welcome U.S. threats to retaliate
in kind, since the U.S. use of nuclear weapons could hasten the
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downfall of allied regimes in the Muslim world through protests in
the mosques and riots in the streets.
Because deterrence will not work, the best way, by far, to prevent
Jihadi fundamentalist terrorists from ever using nuclear weapons is
to prevent them from ever possessing such weapons. This antiterrorist imperative adds yet one more compelling reason why the
spread of nuclear weapons to potential proliferate states is to be
feared, not welcomed. For the best way, by far, to prevent Islamic
terrorists from possessing nuclear weapons is to prevent unstable
states, especially unstable Islamic states, from possessing nuclear
weapons.
Pakistan is clearly the most serious concern in the short run.
Pakistani weapons lack the advanced Permissive Actions Link (PA
Ls) locks that make it difficult for a terrorist or other unauthorized
individual to use a stolen nuclear weapon.42 There are no specialized
Pakistani teams trained to seize or dismantle a nuclear weapon if one
was stolen. No dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) is in
place to ensure the psychological stability and reliability of the
officers and guards of Pakistan’s nuclear forces.43 Instead, Pakistani
soldiers and scientists with nuclear responsibilities are reviewed and
approved for duty if they are not suspected of being Indian agents
by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.
It was clear after September 11, however, that this organizational
arrangement was an inadequate answer to the vexing question of
who would guard the guardians. After Pakistani President
Musharraf decided to support the U.S. war against bin Laden and
the Taliban regime, he forced a number of senior and junior officers
of the ISI to leave office because of their ties to the Taliban (and
reportedly al Qaeda as well in some cases) and placed a smaller
number of nuclear scientists from the Pakistani program under
house arrest.44 This was certainly reassuring news, but it remains
unknown how many secret Jihadi supporters still exist inside the
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shadows of Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies. Nor do we
know how close those shadows fall to nuclear weapons storage sites.
Prior to the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government had
maintained that it would not assist new nuclear powers in making
their arsenals safer and secure for fear that this would signal other
potential nuclear powers that the United States was not serious
about its nonproliferation policy. The terrorist attacks forced a
reevaluation of this policy and led to an emergency U.S. government
effort to assist in providing increased security for Pakistani nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials storage sites.45 The fear among some
policymakers in Islamabad also clearly increased. Despite the earlier
assurances by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry that Pakistani
“(nuclear) assets are 100% secure,” Pakistani Foreign Minister Sattar
quickly accepted at least some degree of U.S. technical assistance in
nuclear security improvements in November 2001. When asked
whether Pakistan would accept the new U.S. offer of assistance,
Sattar answered, “Who would refuse?”46
Unfortunately, the Pakistani military government apparently did
refuse to accept the kind of assistance that the United States offered,
and on November 9 President Musharraf told ABC’s Nightline that
after September 11, “I didn’t take any particular precautions . . . We
have strong custodial controls, and a command control system
which is very effective. I did not issue any special orders as such.”
When asked to assess the likelihood, on a scale of one to 100, that
Pakistani nuclear weapons would fall into the hand of terrorists,
Musharraf replied, “I would certainly give it over 90.”47
Hopefully, this emergency nuclear security assistance effort will
be implemented and prove successful in meeting the severe counterterrorism challenge created by the ties between some Pakistanis and
the al Qaeda terrorist group. This challenge will continue, however,
well beyond the initial anti-terrorist military campaigns.
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Kenneth Waltz and other proliferation optimists have assumed
that the weapons of new nuclear states will remain in the hands of
the central governments that built them. That assumption is not
warranted. The risk of terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons or
materials is yet one more reason why we should fear nuclear
proliferation.
Conclusions: Beyond Denial
Nuclear South Asia will be a dangerous place. This will be the
case, not because of ill will or irrationality among government
leaders nor because of any unique cultural inhibitions against
strategic thinking in both countries. India and Pakistan face a
dangerous nuclear future because they have become like other
nuclear powers. Their leaders seek perfect security through nuclear
deterrence, but imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations
control their nuclear weapons. If my theories are right, these
organizations will someday fail to produce secure nuclear
deterrence. Unfortunately, the evidence emerging from these first
years of South Asia’s nuclear history suggests that this theoretical
perspective is powerful and its pessimistic predictions are likely to
come true, even though we cannot predict the precise organizational
pathway by which deterrence will break down.
This perspective on the consequences of nuclear proliferation in
South Asia provides important and related lessons for both theory
and for policy. Most Indian and Pakistani scholars and government
analysts have followed on traditional pathways blazed by American
nuclear strategists: they produce policy recommendations about
arsenal structure and targeting plans based on the seductive and
deductive logic of rational deterrence theory. Less common are
studies focusing on the complex organizational and operational
problems that nuclear weapons create for those who possess them.
There is great need for more work in this area, however, since
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nuclear weapons in South Asia present several new theoretical
puzzles that have not been thoroughly analyzed. There are several
questions that must be asked in future research. What important
behavioral differences are likely to exist between organizations that
manage nuclear weapons that are run primarily by civilians (India)
and similar organizations run entirely by military officers (Pakistan)?
Will organizational biases grow stronger during crises, when there is
insufficient time for detailed civilian or even military leaders’
intervention in detailed operational plans? How do common military
biases change when a military officer assumes a senior political post:
does where he sits determine how he stands on nuclear issues or
does he carry the intellectual baggage of training in military
organizations along with him to the new post? How broad a shadow
do nuclear weapons cast in South Asia? Kargil demonstrated that
they have not prevented all wars between nuclear states. But what
kinds of limited wars are likely in the future? And how can they
remain limited?
The organizational perspective suggests that there are more
similarities than differences between the nuclear powers and the
way they manage, or at least try to manage, nuclear weapons
operations. There is, however, one important structural difference
between the new nuclear powers and their Cold War predecessors.
Just as each new child is born into a different family, each new
nuclear power is born into a different nuclear system since other
nuclear states exist and influence their behavior. This phenomenon,
however, is in theory likely to have contradictory effects on nuclear
crisis behavior. On the one hand, the ability of other nuclear powers
to intervene in future crises may be a major constraint on undesired
escalation. On the other hand, this ability may encourage the
governments of weaker states to engage in risky behavior—initiating
crises or making limited uses of force—precisely because they
anticipate (correctly or incorrectly) that other nuclear powers may
bail them out diplomatically if the going gets rough.
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The possibility that other nuclear states can influence nuclear
behavior in South Asia does lead to one final optimistic note. There
are many potential unilateral steps and bilateral agreements that
could be instituted to reduce the risks of nuclear war between India
and Pakistan, and the U.S. government can play a useful role in
helping to facilitate such agreements. Many, though not all, of the
problems identified in this article can be reduced if nuclear weapons
in both countries are maintained in a de-mated or dealerted state,
with warheads removed from delivery vehicles, either through
unilateral action or bilateral agreement. U.S. assistance could be
helpful in providing the concepts and arms verification technology
that could permit such dealerting (or non-alerting in this case) to
take place within a cooperative framework. The United States could
also be helpful in providing intelligence and warning information,
on a case-by-case basis, in peacetime or in crises to reduce the danger
of false alarms. In addition, safer management of nuclear weapons
operations can be encouraged through discussions of organizational
best practices in the area of nuclear weapons security and safety with
other nuclear states.
There will be no progress on any of these issues, however, unless
Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans alike stop denying that serious
problems exist. A basic awareness of nuclear command and control
problems exists in New Delhi and Islamabad, but unfortunately
Indian and Pakistani leaders too often minimize them. The August
1999 Indian draft doctrine report, for example, claimed that “nuclear
weapons shall be tightly controlled,” that command systems “shall
be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks, ”
and that “safety is an absolute requirement.”48 But it did not explain
how such lofty goals could be confidently achieved. Government
officials in New Delhi sometimes speak as if nuclear safety problems
have been successfully addressed, as when Ministry of Defense
officials told parliamentarians in July 1998 that the nuclear weapons
safety procedures “have been revised and updated in keeping with
requirements in this regard.”49 For their part, senior Pakistani
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authorities have claimed that the problem of accidental nuclear war
has already been solved. A. Q. Khan, for example, has claimed that
“Pakistan has a flawless command and control system” for nuclear
arms, and former Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz insisted that there was
“no chance” of an accidental nuclear war in South Asia.50
The U.S. government refused to assist the Pakistanis in
developing improved safety and security for their nuclear weapons
until the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan
highlighted the danger of al Qaeda members or Taliban supporters
stealing a weapon or nuclear materials from a storage site. Prior to
September 11, Washington officials argued that any assistance in this
area would reward Islamabad for testing and signal other potential
nuclear weapons states that the United States is not serious about its
nonproliferation goals. An even more serious concern is that sharing
specific technological devices and information could be counterproductive if it encourages Pakistan to mate warheads and bombs to
delivery vehicles and to deploy weapons into the field in the belief
that these operations would now be safe. Any future nuclear security
assistance program should therefore focus on encouraging safe and
secure storage, transport, and maintenance of nuclear materials,
components, and warheads. It should not include technical
assistance or studies of organizational best practices regarding
nuclear alert operations such as mating warheads to missiles or
transporting fully assembled weapons. The principle behind U.S.
nuclear assistance should be to focus on organizational practices and
technologies that would encourage Pakistan to maintain its nuclear
components stored separately and not mated to delivery vehicles.
Future programs with India should have the same focus.
A first useful step for the United States is to accept that nuclear
weapons will remain in Pakistan and India for the foreseeable future
and that the problem of Kashmir will not be solved easily or quickly.
The political problems between the two South Asia nuclear powers
may someday be resolved. Until that day comes, the U.S.
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government has a strong interest in doing whatever it can to reduce
the risk that India and Pakistan will use nuclear weapons against
each other.
ENDNOTES
1. Portions of this chapter were previously published in Asian Survey, Vol.
XLI, No. 6, November/December 2001; and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz ,
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (forthcoming 2002).
2. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1998; David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear
Powers,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87-119; Kenneth
N. Waltz, “More May Be Better” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, pp. 1-45;
Brahma Chellaney, “Naiveté and Hypocrisy: Why Antiproliferation Zealotry Does
Not Make Sense,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 1995, pp. 779-786; K.
Subrahmanyam, “Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy” in
Bharat Karnard, ed., Future Imperiled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond, New
Delhi: Viking Press, 1994, pp. 188-193; and Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s
Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D.
Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2000, pp. 158-181.
3. Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed.,
India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, New Delhi: Har-Anand
Publications, 1999, pp. 150-188; Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of NuclearArmed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 781793; Peter D. Feaver, “Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear
Operations,” Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4, Spring/Summer 1993, pp. 159-191;
and Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47-91.
4. NSC-68, in Foreign Relations of the U.S. (hereinafter FRUS followed by year
and volume), 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, pp. 281-282.
5. Austin Stevens, “General Removed over War Speech,” New York Times,
September 2, 1950, p. 8.
6. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “The Coming National Crisis,” August 21, 1953, Twining Papers, series 2,

223

Topical Series, Nuclear Weapons 1952-1961 folder, U.S. Air Force (USAF)
Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
7. See Julian Schofeld, “Militarized Decision-Making for War in Pakistan:
1947-1971, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 27, No. 1, Fall 2000 ; Sagan, “More Will be
Worse,” pp. 62-63; and Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1986.
8. Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and
Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South
Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1995, pp. 9-10; and Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 239-244.
9. This interpretation of Brasstacks was first presented as a speculative
argument based on organization theory predictions in Scott D. Sagan,
“Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,”
International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, p. 195.
10. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 92, 106.
11. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest To Be a
Nuclear Power, New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000, pp. 322-323.
12. P. N. Hoon, Unmasking Secrets of Turbulence, New Delhi: Manas
Publications, 2000, p. 102.
13. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 280.
14. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 184.
15. Bradley Graham and Nathan Abse, “U.S. Says Pakistan Will Withdraw,”
Washington Post, July 5, 1999.
16. See “Pak Troops Withdrew from Kargil at My Insistence,” Times of India,
June 3, 2001, at http://www.timesofindia.com/030601/03worl6.htm.
17. Ihtashamul Haque, “Peace Linked to Kashmir Solution,” Dawn Wire
Service, June 26, 1999.
18. Pamela Constable, “Pakistan Aims to ‘Avoid Nuclear War’, " Washington
Post, July 13, 1999; “U.S. Involvement Essential: PM,” Dawn Wire Service, July 10,
1999.

224

19. “Any Weapon Will Be Used, Threatens Pak,” Hindu, June 1, 1999.
20. Raj Chengappa, “Pakistan Tried Nuclear Blackmail,” The News paper Today,
January 12, 2000.
21. See Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold
Story of American Submarine Espionage, New York: Public Affairs, 1998, pp. 158-230.
22. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, New York:
Longman, 1999, p. 208; and Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Random House, 1990, pp. 277-288.
23. Dino A. Brugioni, “The Art and Science of Photo Reconnaissance,”
Scientific American, Vol. 274, No. 3, March 1996, pp. 78-85.
24. N. Prasannan, “Spark of Hope,” The Week, September 28, 1997.
25. John Diamond, “Satellite Shows Pakistan’s March Toward Nuclear
Capability,” Chicago Tribune, March 16, 2000, p. 10.
26. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the
Creation of Banglades, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 199 and
225.
27. Asoka Raina, Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service, New Delhi :
Vikas Publishing House, 1981, pp. 60-61.
28. Shisher Gupta, “Major’s Diary Exposes Pak’s Involvement,” Hindustan
Times, July 10, 1999, p. 1; and From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review
Committee Report, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000, pp.
21 and 97.
29. The whole transcript is available at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
home page at http://www .ipcs.org/documents /1999/2-apr-jul.htm#Tapes.
30. Scott D. Sagan, “Toward a Political Theory of organizational Reliability,”
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1994, pp.
228-240.
31. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear
Weapons, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 78-80, 130-131.

225

32. “Doubts over BDL Safety Norms,” Hindu, January 9, 2001; and “One Killed
as Missile Misfires During Demonstration,” The Times of India, January 5, 2001.
33. “Pakistan Probably a Stronger Country than Most Pakistanis Think - U.S.
Ambassador,” Dawn Magazine, July 19, 1998; and Shahid-Ur-Rehman, Long Road to
Chagai, Islamabad: Print Wise Publications, 1999, pp. 115-116.
34. Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold
Story at http://www.afghanbooks.com/beartrap/; and Samina Ahmed and David C.
Cortright, “Going Nuclear: The Weaponization Option” in idem, eds., Pakistan and
the Bomb, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998, p. 96.
35. Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons,”
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 10, January 2000, p. 1728.
36. Raj Chengappa, “Missiles: Boom for Boom,” India Today International, April
26, 1999, pp. 28-30.
37. Raj Chengappa, “Pakistan Tried Nuclear Blackmail,” The Newspaper Today,
January 12, 2000.
38. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_bin-laden1_981228.
html.
39. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/miller_ bin-laden_980609.html.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. See “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,”
The Landau Network, at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf.
43. Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, speech at the Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation Center Conference 2001, Washington, DC, June 18,
2001, available at http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conference%202001/
sattar.htm.
44. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “Leader Purges Top Ranks Of Military,
Spy Service, ”Washington Post, October 8, 2001, p. 1; Sanjay Singh, “Indian
Intelligence Inputs Behind ISI Chiefs Exit,” Statesmen, October 9, 2001; John F.

226

Burns, “Pakistan Atom Experts Held Amid Fear Of Leaked Secrets,” New York
Times, November 1, 2001, p. 1.
45. See Greg Myre, “US Wants to Advise Pakistan on Nukes,” Associated
Press, November 3, 2001.
46. Ibid. The earlier quote comes from David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s
Nuclear Weapons Complex,” October 2001, http://www .isis- online.org/publications/
terrorism-/stanleypaper.htm.
47. Musharraf’s interview with Ted Koppel is at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
nightline/DailyNews/musharraf 011109. html.
48. Draft Report of National Security Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,
August 17, 1999, on the Embassy of India in the U.S. home page at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_ doctrine_aug_17_1999.html.
49. Raj Chengappa, “Worrying Over Broken Arrows,” India Today, July 13,
1998.
50. “Pakistan Has Flawless Control for Nuclear Arms: Qadeer,” News
(Islamabad), October 4, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-TAC-98277, October 4, 1998; and “No Chance of Accidental N-War: Pakistan Sets Up
Effective Command System,” Dawn, November 30, 1998.

227

Part IV.

U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES

229

CHAPTER 10
U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON
REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA
Compiled by
Michael R. Chambers
Editor’s Note: This chapter represents a summary compilation of
the views and ideas expressed by the three military officers on this
panel. Most, if not all, of the ideas and views in this chapter were
presented by more than one member of the panel, and so no direct
attribution is intended, nor should it be attempted by the reader.

Regional security and stability in South Asia are important
national security interests of the United States, and of our military
forces. If anyone did not understand this fact prior to September
2001, the events of that month and the succeeding months have
made it abundantly clear. The possession of nuclear weapons by
both India and Pakistan, coupled with their periodic crises, has for
many years worried American military and security analysts. But the
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the
Pentagon in Washington, DC, brought the concerns about regional
security in South Asia to the fore. India, and especially Pakistan, is
playing very important roles in the global war on terrorism, and yet
tensions between these countries could complicate the efforts in that
war.
One of the most important ways for the U.S. military to promote
regional security and stability in South Asia is through military-tomilitary relationships and exchanges. These ties can exist on
numerous different levels, ranging from annual dialogues between
defense secretaries/ministers to junior officers attending staff
colleges in other countries. The United States benefits from these
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relationships by gaining insights into the thinking of other militaries,
by training with these militaries and enhancing interoperability in
case we need to join with them in coalition military operations, and
by gaining access to military facilities in these countries in times of
crises. These kinds of relationships have proven very important in
the war on terrorism, just as they have in the past in other situations.
And the lack of such relations with Pakistan during the 1990s also
showed their consequences in the immediate aftermath of September
11. Into the future, it is imperative that the United States builds and
sustains these military-to-military relationships in South Asia.
South Asia and U.S. National Interests.
One of the most important enduring national interests of the
United States is economic prosperity. The U.S. military plays an
important role in the pursuit of this interest because one of the most
important underlying conditions for economic growth and
prosperity is security. As Secretary of State Colin Powell has noted,
money is one of the biggest cowards in the world, running away
from insecurity, as do investors and businessmen from instability in
a country or region. American armed forces help to ensure global
order and thus to maintain the global economic system.
South Asia, and India in particular, has great potential
economically. Helping South Asia to realize this potential will not
only benefit the people of this region, but also all of us. A dynamic
economy in the South Asian region will provide an impetus for
continued global economic growth. Regional security and stability
are necessary (but not sufficient)conditions for the economies of the
South Asian countries to grow and achieve prosperity. If the United
States hopes to promote regional security and stability in South Asia
so that the region can continue on a path toward economic
prosperity and thereby contribute to the world economy, it must be
involved in the region—politically, economically, and militarily.
Included as part of our military efforts to support regional security
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should be military cooperation programs.
In addition to this economic rationale for supporting regional
stability, the United States has an enduring interest in promoting
regional security because it can affect security and stability beyond
the region. This was made painfully obvious to the United States on
September 11. Regional security and stability in South Asia is also a
precondition for security and stability in Central Asia. Central Asia
is a region of great potential: on the downside, as a continuing
source of terrorism; on the upside, as a source of abundant energy
resources that can help to fuel economic development in many Asian
countries. Which way Central Asia goes will depend to a large extent
on the security situation in South Asia. Instability and insecurity on
the subcontinent will surely spill northward.
A third enduring U.S. national interest, as well as a global
interest, is in seeing the Muslim world move forward with modernization. Much of the Muslim world today is locked in a challenge
where militant fundamentalist elements within their societies are
atavistically pulling these nations back toward the past. Pakistan
could play an important role here, serving as an example to other
Muslim nations on how to advance into the 21st century and join the
modern world. American involvement with Pakistan, including
military cooperation, could facilitate this process.
These national interests in South Asia should guide U.S. policy
toward the region well into 2020 and beyond. The United States also
has some more immediate security interests in the region that are
guiding short- to medium-term policy. The first of these is access to
and through the South Asian region for direct action operations in
the global war on terrorism. In particular, this access was important
for the “theater opening” process of the war. Theater opening refers
to setting the stage for successful operations, and includes opening
up bases for U.S. and coalition armed forces, putting logistics into
place, putting medical support into place, and leveraging off host
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nation resources to achieve these goals. As long as the campaign
against global terrorism continues in Afghanistan, access to and
through India, and especially Pakistan, will remain vital. This access
will also remain vital after the initial phases of the campaign are
over, and we turn to stability operations and nation-building
operations in Afghanistan. These operations will continue for
sometime, and the efforts of Pakistan and India to provide access are
critical.
A second immediate security interest is in eliminating terrorism
within the South Asian region. This is a broader problem than
merely eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This is
a complex issue, and the terrorist networks within the region have
tentacles that extend beyond South Asia. In fact, it needs to be
remembered that some of the terrorists that struck the United States
on September 11 received training in Western Europe and even in
the United States. And in addressing this objective of eliminating
terrorism from South Asia, the United States needs to do some
introspection. To what extent did our policies, particularly the
sanctions placed upon Pakistan since 1990, contribute to or exacerbate the conditions that led to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in
Afghanistan, a Taliban regime that allowed Osama bin Laden’s al
Qaeda terrorist network to operate from its territory? As we move
forward, we need to ensure that any past mistakes are not repeated.
A third immediate security interest in South Asia is to do all that
we can to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction in this
region, particularly nuclear weapons. If a conflict between India and
Pakistan should escalate to the nuclear level, it would have
catastrophic consequences for the people of the region. It would also
have global repercussions. The attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, as well as the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania
in a failed attack, lowered the bar for what could be attempted by
terrorists in their attacks on innocent civilians. If India or Pakistan
were to use nuclear weapons in a South Asian conflict, it would
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similarly lower the threshold for use of these weapons. This could
have a demonstration effect that would be disastrous for the world
and for global security.
Thus, South Asia is an area of important U.S. national interests.
This is true in the immediate period as we try to prosecute the war
on terrorism against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and as
we try to prevent a nuclear catastrophe in the region. Longer term,
we have enduring interests in the region to help it grow
economically and prosper, and to maintain regional security and
stability since instability here could spill over into other regions of
the world. Moreover, we need to encourage Pakistan to serve as an
example to other Muslim countries of how to resist militant
fundamentalism and move into the 21st century as a modern yet
Muslim society.
Military-to-Military Security Cooperation Programs.
In order for the United States to successfully pursue these
interests if it hopes to influence the events and developments in
South Asia, then it needs to be involved in the region. This includes
political, economic, and diplomatic engagement, and also military
cooperation. There is a new paradigm of involvement with South
Asia, and it is one that seeks military-to-military relations with both
India and Pakistan. U.S. military relations with both countries have
been hampered over the last 10-15 years by legislatively mandated
sanctions. These were imposed in 1990 on Pakistan after President
George Bush could no longer certify that Islamabad was not
developing nuclear weapons, with the effect that we lost contact
with a generation of junior and middle-ranking officers. These ties
were only restarted since September 11. Relations were developing
in the 1990s with India but were suspended in 1998 after its nuclear
tests of that year. Fortunately, these relationships were slowly
restarted in 1999-2000, and have been proceeding apace.
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Military cooperation programs are comprised of a broad scope of
activities, ranging from coalition military operations in warfare, to
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, to joint
training exercises, to foreign arms sales and financial military aid,
and to various types of dialogues and exchanges. These include
regularized discussions between senior civilian and military defense
officials, such as the recently revived Defense Planning Group with
India; the exchange of visits by senior officers; and the educational
exchanges under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. IMET programs are possibly the most important of
the security cooperation programs, because they lead to insights and
personal relationships that can be critical in the event of a crisis.
Included under IMET are educational exchanges at the cadet level
where foreign citizens can be educated at our service academies.
Also included are exchanges of officers at intermediate service
schools in which American officers are able to spend time learning
about the military of other countries, and foreign officers are able to
learn what American officers are taught—and to be influenced by
our philosophy and ideas on civilian control over the military.
Cooperation programs serve a number of important objectives,
several of which are relevant to the pursuit of U.S. immediate and
enduring interests in South Asia. First, they can provide access to
decisionmakers. This is more true in a country such as Pakistan
where the military has a very strong role in the government than in
India, but even in India the military leadership has a crucial voice in
many national security issues, particularly regarding tensions with
Pakistan and the potential use of nuclear weapons. Such access can
be gained through senior-level contacts, but it is also possible that a
junior officer who studied in the United States many years ago could
become one of the senior officers today. Having a former classmate
in such a position could prove valuable if a crisis erupts.
Second, such security cooperation activities can provide access to
bases and facilities for U.S. military operations if needed. Since the
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end of the Cold War, the United States no longer has an extensive
global network of bases—nor can it afford to have such a network.
Instead, it must rely on access to bases and facilities of other
countries near a theater of operation. Working with the military of
other countries and building relationships with members of the
military in those countries can assist the United States in gaining
such access when it is needed.
Third, security cooperation activities are intended to foster what
Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the U.S. forces in the
Pacific, has called “security communities, ”to develop “coalition
outlooks” within a specific region. Whether the U.S. military likes it
or not, the political reality today is that we will have to operate in
coalitions with militaries from other countries to pursue many of our
goals. Such operations include not only warfare—such as the global
war on terrorism, or the Gulf War—but also peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance operations, disaster relief operations,
and search-and-rescue operations. If we expect to function well with
other militaries during armed conflict and other types of crises, we
need to learn how to work with them during peacetime, to train and
practice with them. Achieving interoperability and this level of
cooperation requires a large investment in time and effort, and so we
need to be engaging militaries from other countries prior to a crisis
in order to work well with them in a time of crisis. Moreover,
training together and setting patterns of cooperation between militaries can help to reduce mutual suspicions and even to develop
outlooks that see security within a region as being held in common.
Fourth, these activities can increase mutual understanding
between militaries and provide important insights into the thinking
of the security elites of other countries. Mutual understanding is
built by various types of discussions and exchanges within militaryto-military relationships, but in particular by exchanges promoted
under IMET. Having officers spend time learning in a service school
of another military provides those officers with knowledge about the
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thinking and culture of that military. And spending time in that
other country provides exposure to the broader values and cultures
of the society that military is nested within. The insights gained by
such involvement could facilitate the development of common views
and approaches to solving a problem. Or more simply, they could
provide important intelligence insights on other militaries.
Finally, such activities enable the U.S. military to learn in a
direct, functional way from the experiences and expertise of other
militaries. The United States should not assume that it has a
monopoly on knowledge or expertise. For example, there is much we
could learn about high-altitude mountain warfare from the Indians
and Pakistanis, who have more experience in this area than we do.
Security cooperation activities, such as joint training exercises, can
enable our military to draw on such expertise to improve our own
capabilities.
The Value of These Programs: Fall 2001.
The value of these security cooperation activities—the personal
and institutional relationships that are created and sustained, the
insights and understandings that are gained—was made abundantly
clear in September-October 2001 in our efforts to launch the global
war on terrorism and the campaign in Afghanistan. The relationships with the Pakistani military established in the 1980s proved
extremely important for reestablishing these ties last fall. Despite the
lack of involvement over the last decade, these previous relationships smoothed our efforts to gain access to facilities in Pakistan,
facilities necessary for staging some of our operations into
Afghanistan. We also were able to operate across Pakistan to execute
the initial strikes against the Taliban and al Qaeda. And most
importantly, a relationship of many years standing existed between
General Anthony Zinni, then the Commander of U.S. Central
Command, and General Pervez Musharraf, who became leader of
Pakistan. When General Tommy Franks succeeded Zinni, he
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adopted this relationship and persevered in sustaining it. This
relationship probably contributed to Musharraf’s decision to side
with the United States in the war on terrorism and provide us access
to the facilities we needed.
Nevertheless, the decade without security cooperation and the
loss of contact with a generation of Pakistani officers had its costs.
First, we were unsure about the degree to which the junior and
middle officer corps in Pakistan were fundamentalist, and therefore
might side with the Taliban against us. We knew the character and
leanings of the senior officers based on our contacts in the 1980s.
This uncertainty about the affiliations of the lower ranking officers
was one of the big, troubling questions on September 12. Second,
once President Musharraf chose to side with us and allow us access
to Pakistani facilities, we were unsure about whom to call to work
out the details of coordination and access to the facilities. Because of
the years with no military-to-military relationship, we did not have a
good answer to this question at first. Having a military relationship
in place prior to September 11 would have greatly assisted this
process.
Even a relationship that is still in its infancy can prove vital. The
uncertainties experienced by the American military in reopening
dialogue with Pakistan and in arranging the details of access to
facilities there were noticeably absent in our discussions with
Uzbekistan and even Tajikistan. We had an established security
cooperation program with the Uzbek military, which greatly eased
our discussions with them. And even in Tajikistan, where our
relationship was still just getting off the ground, the fact that we had
some level of security cooperation—rather than none—again
facilitated our ability to get access. The story was the same with
Oman, where preexisting relationships with senior officers facilitated
our gaining crucial access to bases there for the campaign in
Afghanistan, even though Oman was at the time hosting a major
joint exercise with the British.
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Military cooperation activities are intended to achieve important
U.S. national interests, particularly security interests, as already
discussed. They also provide important avenues of communication
with senior military officers in other countries. For these reasons,
such activities should not be used in carrot-and-stick fashion by U.S.
political leaders to pursue varying diplomatic goals. The
relationships created by these cooperation activities can have longterm value, if they are sustained. Moreover, we cannot expect that
the relations will be easily restarted once they have been cancelled.
Thus, security cooperation programs, particularly IMET, should be
continued even if tensions or problems arise with a country, and
should only be fully terminated if actual conflict breaks out. We
cannot hope to influence or promote reform in the military of
another country (for example, Indonesia) if we do not have a
relationship with them.
Moving Forward with Military Relations in South Asia: The
Challenges to be Faced.
It is important for the United States to move forward in
developing military relations and security cooperation with India
and Pakistan, for all of the reasons discussed above. This is an
important region for U.S. security, in the present and into the future.
Military cooperation programs can assist our government in
achieving these interests, particularly by promoting mutual
understanding between individuals and institutions, and building
relationships that can someday provide access to important decisionmakers and military facilities. Nevertheless, we will face some
challenges as we move forward.
First of all, the revived relationships in South Asia are heavily
influenced by the war on terrorism. This war involves, for the first
time since World War II, the application of all of the U.S. elements of
national power in a synchronized fashion on a global scale. This will
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require a high level of interagency discussion and coordination on
our part. We are out of practice here, and this could complicate our
efforts.
Second, how should we conceptualize our military-to-military
relationships today, especially in the context of the war on terrorism?
Whereas in the past these relationships have been state-to-state, we
are seeing the increased relevance of nonstate, transnational actors in
al Qaeda, and their ability to operate from within various countries
where the government does not have full authority. How should this
be factored into our relationships? Also, is the war on terrorism truly
a war in the conventional sense of the term, or is it more of a law
enforcement operation?
Third, we need to deal with the history of animosity between
India and Pakistan in our military relations with these two countries.
The U.S. approach has been one of balance, and we need to continue
this. We need to ensure that our cooperation with one country does
not give, or potentially give, it an advantage over the other, and we
need to ensure that our cooperation is not perceived as giving one
side the advantage over the other. Toward this end, we need to
maintain complete transparency in our military relationships with
both the Indian and Pakistani militaries.
Finally, these military relations will remain vulnerable to
manipulation by our political leaders due to the potential for
tensions in the future between the United States and the countries of
South Asia, particularly over the issue of nuclear weapons. Political
leaders have used these relationships in the past in an attempt to
gain political or diplomatic leverage, and the possibility of this will
remain in the future. Hopefully, they will understand the value of
these relationships, understand the possible costs when these are
suspended or cancelled, and understand the difficulties involved
when trying to restart them in a hurry to deal with an emerging
crisis.
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Part V.

STRATEGIC CULTURE
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CHAPTER 11
INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
Kanti Bajpai
The future of South Asia will depend in large part on India. As
the largest country in the region, its choices and actions will
condition the policies of its neighbors and of the nonregional powers
that have a stake in the subcontinent. India’s policies are likely to
affect actors well beyond South Asia as well. India’s choices and
actions will affect the life chances of over one billion Indians and
perhaps another two billion people around its periphery from
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the west, to Nepal and China in the
north, to Bangladesh and Burma in the east, and a number of other
countries in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean littoral. How will
India behave in the years to come? Observers of India claim that
Indian diplomatic rhetoric and moves have changed considerably
since the end of the Cold War, but in what respects exactly? One way
of answering that question is by understanding Indian strategic
culture. What are the basic perceptions and precepts of India’s
strategic community? What do they tell us about how India might
behave over the next decade or so?
This paper attempts to delineate Indian strategic culture in the
post-Cold War period. Indian strategic culture, which was
dominated by the worldview of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, is in ferment. With the end of the Cold War, at least three
different streams of thinking are vying for dominance. These three
schools may be called Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism.
To call them “schools” is to overstate the case. Those who hold to the
views associated with the three perspectives do not call themselves
by the names I have used, although the usage of the term Nehruvian
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is common enough in Indian discourse. I claim, however, that these
three viewpoints exist, and that if one abstracts from Indian security
texts they can be assembled in the way that I have done here.
Such a claim will be controversial even in India. It is a
commonplace of the discourse on Indian security that India does not
have a strategic culture and that Indians have historically not
thought consistently and rigorously about strategy. At the very least,
indians have not recorded their strategic thinking in written texts,
the only exception being the ancient classic, Arthasastra.1 That India
does not have a tradition of strategic thinking is not altogether
incorrect. On the other hand, since the country’s independence in
1947, it has had to deal with a number of security challenges, and the
volume of writings on these issues is enormous. Newspaper and
magazine commentary is probably the largest single source on
Indian thinking. In addition, the strategic community has produced
a corpus of scholarly writings on security. A number of journals
publish regularly on security matters. Finally, there are the texts of
Indian prime ministers and other leaders who have over the years
written and spoken publicly on security policy.
I argue that Indian strategic culture can be understood in terms
of an identifiable set of basic assumptions about the nature of
international relations, some of which are shared between the three
schools and some of which are not. With Alastair Iain Johnston, we
can refer to these assumptions as constituting the central strategic
paradigms of the three perspectives. In addition, the three perspectives can, once again in terms of Johnston’s schema, be described by
their grand strategic prescriptions on the means that should be used to
make India secure.
What is Strategic Culture?
What is strategic culture? Johnston defines strategic culture in
the following terms:

246

Strategic culture is an integrated set of symbols (i.e.
argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.)
that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of
force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic
preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.2

Strategic culture consists of two parts. The first is the central
strategic paradigm—the basic assumptions about orderliness in the
world. Included here are assumptions about the role of war in
human affairs, about the nature of the adversary, and about the
efficacy of the use of force. The second part is grand strategy, or the
secondary assumptions about operational policy that follow from the
prior assumptions.3 These may be gleaned from various texts written
over time by statesmen, soldiers, scholars, commentators, and
diplomats.
Johnston’s conception of strategic culture will inform this inquiry
into Indian strategic culture. For example, we will use his distinction
between the central strategic paradigm and grand strategy to parse
Indian strategic culture. We will also follow his lead in unearthing
strategic culture by interpreting various written texts rather than by
inferring cultural traits or constants from behavior. However, we
will also depart from his schema in various ways. First, while
Johnston could turn to a series of well-known ancient Chinese
military classics for his work on China, this is not possible in the
Indian case where there are no established canonical texts except for
the Arthasastra. Instead, we will turn to the post-Cold War writings
of some of the most important voices in the Indian strategic
community. This is probably more appropriate in any case, given
how difficult it is to establish the influence of ancient texts on
contemporary thinking and choices.
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Second, Johnston’s conception of strategic culture and grand
strategy places great emphasis on the role and deployment of force.
The use of force is clearly the key issue in any conception of strategy,
although it may be less important in grand strategy, which refers to
the coordination of a nation’s military, political, diplomatic, and
even cultural resources for the purposes of security. Grand strategies
vary not just by differences in how force is used but also by the
extent to which other instruments are deployed. Johnston allows for
this to some extent, but the issue of the efficacy and disposition of
force is pervasive in his study.4 Since this paper will examine in
particular Indian grand strategy as a component of its strategic
culture, we will give due weight to economic, cultural and other
nonmilitary instruments of grand strategy.
Third, Johnston’s conception is overly preoccupied with external
security threats whereas in most post-colonial societies, and indeed
in much of the post-Cold War world, it is internal security that is
increasingly at the fore of security concerns. Johnston’s basic grand
strategic typology could be used to describe a state’s posture
towards internal security threats as well—accommodation,
defensiveness, and offensiveness. However, once again, his
emphasis on coercion and force in these grand strategic formulations
becomes problematic in the context of internal security where
governments typically prefer to use other methods and instruments
as far as possible.
Fourth, Johnston’s work, at least implicitly, seems to assume that
a state’s security is dominated by local, regional threats, mostly to
territorial integrity. This is not incorrect. A country’s neighbors and
near-neighbors on the whole are the most salient threats. However,
in the modern world (i.e., the past 4 centuries), major threats to a
society have often come from distant lands. The rise of great powers
with global reach are a fact of life in the inter-national system and
few regional states, particularly rising powers such as India, can
afford to ignore the reach of nonregional powers who do not
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necessarily covet distant territory but can intervene in regional and
domestic politics. How a country deals with distant or nearby great
powers is a vital component of security policy. Grand strategies will
differ on the means of dealing with these powerful states.
We will also need to relax some of Johnston’s methodological
principles in order to deal with the Indian case. Johnston grants that
there may be different streams of strategic thinking, but he suggests
that, in order to establish the existence of a strategic culture, it is
necessary to show that there exists a set of strategic preferences that
are consistently ranked above others in some canonical texts, that the
different streams in effect can be ordered from the most to the least
important. He also insists that the link to actual behavior must be
established, by showing that the preferences of a strategic culture
“anchor” the thinking of decisionmakers and that their thinking then
determines the course of government policy.5 While Johnston is
correct to insist on such rigor, this is not possible at this stage of
research on Indian strategic culture. For one thing, as noted earlier,
in India there are no canonical texts across which one would test for
consistency of preference ranking. The researcher on Indian strategic
culture must therefore take a more college-like approach to
textuality, fashioning a composite text out of scattered writings in
the press, academic journals and volumes, think tank publications,
biographies and autobiographies, and so on. Secondly, our research
method will be to delineate the three dominant approaches culled
out of this collage of materials and then to juxtapose the various
grand strategic recommendations against the actual policies of the
Indian government over the past decade or so. The paper will show
that post-Cold War Indian policy correlates or is congruent with the
neoliberal approach more than either the Nehruvian or hyperrealist
approach. For now, the best that can be done is to show that there is
at least a circumstantial link between strategic culture and strategic
choice/behavior.
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Central Strategic Paradigms.
According to Johnston, a core strategic paradigm provides
answers to the following questions:
•

The role of war in international relations.

•

The nature of the adversaries and the threats they pose.

•

The utility of force.

Indian strategic thought does not address these questions
systematically and explicitly enough for a Johnstonian analysis.
There are no ancient “military” classics as far as we know apart from
Kautilya’s Arthasastra. As for the Arthasastra, it does not have the
status of the Western or Chinese military classics. It would be hard
to show, for instance, that its tenets were widely known historically.
Nor are there any modern classics of strategy and grand strategy,
although Jawaharlal Nehru’s writings on international affairs and
Indian foreign policy do constitute a corpus of influential materials.
More recently, the writings of K. Subrahmanyam and, in nuclear
matters, of General K. Sundarji, have been influential.
Subrahmanyam’s views in particular, because of his extensive news
paper writings, are widely known.
In the Indian case, therefore, the central strategic paradigm
cannot be delineated with the kind of textual richness and
interpretive rigor that Johnston was able to bring to bear in the
Chinese case. What this paper will do therefore in this section is to
sketch out the broad approach to international relations that is
embodied in the three Indian schools of thought. To do this it will be
necessary to reconstruct that thought and then to extrapolate from it
answers to the three questions located at the heart of a central
strategic paradigm.
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Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism. Before we proceed
to reconstruct Nehruvian, neoliberal and hyperrealist approaches to
international relations in terms of their differences, it is important to
note their areas of agreement. For while they disagree in key
respects, they also proceed from a core set of common assumptions
and arguments.
First of all, all three paradigms accept that at the heart of
international relations is the notion of the sovereign state that
recognizes no higher authority. In such a system, each state is
responsible fundamentally for its own security and well-being.
Above all, states strive to protect their territory and autonomy.
Second, all three paradigms recognize that interests, power, and
violence are staples of international relations. States cannot avoid the
responsibility of pursuing the national interest, however that is
defined. Nor can they be indifferent to the cultivation of power—
their own and that of other states. States must in some measure
accrue power in a competitive system. Finally, conflict and war are a
constant shadow over interstate relations. While the three paradigms
differ on the causes of conflict and war and on the ability of states to
control and transcend these forces, all three accept that disputes and
large-scale organized violence are a regular feature of international
relations. Third, all three paradigms accept that power comprises
both military and economic capabilities, at a minimum. States need
both. While they differ on the optimum mix and use of these
capabilities, proponents of the three views are in agreement that
military and economic strength are vital for security. Beyond this
common base, the three paradigms differ.
Fundamental to Nehruvianism is the argument that states and
peoples can come to understand each other better and thereby make
and sustain peace. Nehruvians accept that in the international
system, without a supranational authority, the threat of war to settle
disputes and rivalries is in some measure inescapable. States must
look after themselves in such a world, in which violence is a
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regrettable last resort.6 However, Nehruvians believe that this state
of “anarchy” can be mitigated, if not eventually supervened.
International laws and institutions, military restraint, negotiations
and compromise, cooperation, free intercourse between societies,
and regard for the well-being of peoples everywhere and not just
one’s own citizens, all these can overcome the rigors of the
international system.7 Furthermore, to make preparations for war
and a balance of power the central objectives of security and foreign
policy is, for Nehruvians, both ruinous and futile: ruinous because
arms spending can only impoverish societies materially and create
the very conditions that sustain violence and war; futile because,
ultimately, balances of power are fragile and do not prevent largescale violence (as the two world wars so catastrophically
demonstrated).8
Neoliberals also accept the general characterization of
international relations as a state of war. That coercion plays an
important role in such a world is not denied by neoliberals.
However, the lure of mutual gain in any interaction is also a
powerful conditioning factor among states, particularly as they
become more interdependent. Neoliberals often express their distinct
view of international relations by comparing the role of military and
economic power. According to neoliberals, states pursue not just
military power but also economic well-being. They do so in part
because economic strength is ultimately the basis for military power.
Economic strength can, in addition, substitute for military power:
military domination is one way of achieving one’s ends; economic
domination is another. Economic power can even be more effective
than military power. Thus, in situations of “complex interdependence,” force is unuseable or ineffective.9
Most importantly, though, neoliberals believe that economic
well-being is vital for national security in a broader sense. An
economically deprived people cannot be a satisfied people, and a
dissatisfied people cannot be secure.10 The key question then is:
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where does economic strength and well-being come from? In the
neoliberal view, it can only come from free market policies. Free
market policies at home imply, in addition, free trade abroad. Free
trade is a relationship of mutual gain, even if asymmetric gain, and is
therefore a factor in the relations between states. Indeed, where
Nehruvians see communication and contact as the key to the
transformation of international relations, neoliberals believe that
trade and economic interactions can achieve this.11
Hyperrealists harbor the most pessimistic view of international
relations.12 Where Nehruvians and neoliberals believe that
international relations can be transformed—either by means of
communication and contact or by free market economic reforms and
the logic of comparative advantage—hyperrealists see an endless
cycle of repetition in interstate interactions. The governing metaphor
of hyperrealists is threat and counterthreat.13 In the absence of a
supranational authority that can tell them how to behave and is
capable of enforcing those commands, states are doomed to balance
of power, deterrence and war. Conflict and rivalry between states
cannot be transformed into peace and friendship (except temporarily
as in an alliance against a common foe); they can only be managed
by the threat and use of violence.14
From this, hyperrealists conclude that the surest way of
achieving peace and stability is through the accumulation of military
power and the willingness to use force.15 Hyperrealists reject the
Nehruvian and neoliberal concern over runaway military spending
and preparedness, arguing that there is no good evidence that
defense derogates from development.16 Indeed, defense spending
may, in the Keynesian sense at least, boost economic growth and
development. Hyperrealists are also skeptical about the role of
institutions, laws, treaties, and agreements. For hyperrealists, what
counts in international relations is power in the service of national
interest; all the rest is illusion. The neoliberal faith in the power of
economics is equally one that hyperrealists do not share.
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Hyperrealists invert the relationship between military and economic
power. Historically, they argue, military power is more important
than, and probably prior to, economic power. A state that can build
its military power will safeguard its international interests and will
build an economy and society that is strong.17
War, the Nature of the Adversary, and the Utility of Force. What can
we say from this reconstruction of Nehruvian, neoliberal, and
hyperrealist approaches to international relations in relation to the
role of war, the nature of the adversary, and the utility of force?
For Nehruvians, war is a choice that states can and will make.
While Nehruvians accept that the international system is anarchic
and that states pursue their interests with vigor, violence is not
inevitable.18 Wars, as Nehru affirmed, are made in the minds of men,
and therefore it is in the minds of men that war must be eradicated.
War is not a natural, inherent activity. It can therefore be avoided
and limited even when it occurs. The state of war—the fear,
expectation, and preparation for war—can be overcome by wise,
cooperative policies amongst states.19
The adversary, in the Nehruvian view, therefore is not a
permanent one. War arises from misperceptions and ideological
systems that color the attitudes of states and societies and spread
fear and hatred. The adversary either does not comprehend India or
is misled about Indian goals and methods. Its leadership may be at
fault. Ordinary citizens may support their governments out of
ignorance or illusion created by government propaganda. The
adversary therefore can be made into a friend by communication
and contact with India and Indians, at both the official and
nonofficial levels.20
It is this—communication and contact between governments and
peoples—rather than force that will end conflict and make India
more secure. International organizations and interstate negotiations
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are ways of institutionalizing communication and contact. The threat
or use of force, particularly in a coercive, offensive way, is
counterproductive and will generally be reciprocated by the
adversary, leaving the basic quarrel unchanged. Both parties can
only be weakened and harmed by a relationship built on force. All
issues are negotiable in the end. India must possess enough force to
defend itself, but it should not have so much that it makes others
fearful. Certainly, force must be absolutely the last resort, even if it is
used coercively.21
Neoliberals, too, admit that war is a possibility between
sovereign states. However, it is not the only inherent condition in the
international system. Given that societies have different comparative
advantages and that there is a global division of labor, states cannot
escape the logic of interdependence.22 Interdependence makes for
more pragmatic international policies: states worry not just about
war but also about trade, investment, and technology.23
In the neoliberal conception, adversarial relations are produced
by two factors. First, like Nehruvians, neoliberals believe
misunderstanding and miscalculation are responsible for enmity. If
governments and peoples were more clear-headed and did their
cost-benefit calculations correctly, they would see that rivalry and
violence is irrational and that the benefits of economic relations
untrammeled by quarrels over territory are far greater than anything
that may be gained from conflict. Second, military enmity is
fundamentally an old-fashioned condition which cannot be
sustained as economic globalization goes forward. India itself is
guilty of seeing its relations with various countries in the old
geopolitical way because it has not understood the logic and power
of globalization.24
Therefore, force is an instrument of declining utility. For
neoliberals, force is an outmoded and blunt instrument unsuited to
the new world order. States must have enough force to defend
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themselves, but it is economic power and the capacity to innovate in
a global economy that eventually makes societies secure. Force in the
service of expansionism is irrelevant. Territorial conquest and
control, in a world where capital, in formation, and even skills flow
across national boundaries, is anachronistic. States must be attentive
to defense needs, but on the whole India’s economic growth and
modernization, and its integration into a globalized world economy,
are its greatest sources of strength.25 India would do better to use its
increasing economic power as a way of influencing others than to
use force in such a role.26
Hyperrealists offer quite different perspectives on war,
adversaries and force. War is a constant possibility in an anarchical
system and, while it can be destructive and painful, is also the basis
for a state’s autonomy and security. War is not therefore an
aberration but a natural tendency of international relations.
Preparing for war is not warmongering; it is responsible and wise
statecraft. War comes when rival states calculate that the other side is
either getting too powerful or is weakening.27
In the hyperrealist view, the international system is a lonely
place. States have no permanent friends. Anyone can be an
adversary. The adversary, as much as India, must prepare for war in
the service of its interests and survival. Other things being equal,
neighboring states are more likely to be adversaries: conflicts over
territory, status, and power are ever-present possibilities in intimate
relationships. No amount of communication and contact or
economic interaction will transform the relationship because it is
zero-sum. Only a balance of power can regulate relations with
nearby or distant rivals.28
Force, in the hyperrealist view, is an indispensable instrument in
international relations. It is the only means by which states can truly
achieve their ends against rivals. States must accept that violence
may be necessary in the national interest. Force may be deployed
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purely defensively, but the best defense is often offense. It may even
save lives on both sides. Control of territory is not old fashioned but
rather militarily imperative, especially in conflicts with neighbors. In
the end, force may have to be used to destroy the adversary’s
military formations and to control or wrest contested territory. No
political or military leadership can responsibly avoid planning for
the coercive use of force. Only “idealists” of various stripes—
Nehruvians or neoliberals—could fool themselves into thinking that
a more aggressive posture is always bad.29
Grand Strategy.
Grand strategic thought, as Johnston emphasizes, is focused on
the issue of means rather than ends. How do the three schools of
thought deal with the operational challenges of internal security,
regional security, and relations with the great powers? The strategic
paradigms have indicated the general predispositions of different
streams of Indian thinking. What prescriptions do they offer more
specifically on ethnic diversity and violence and India’s dealings
with Pakistan, China and the United States? In addition, now that
India is a nuclear power, how do the three schools view nuclear
weapons?
Ethnic Diversity. Nehruvians base internal security on a secular,
democratic, and socialist order. The use of force to regulate internal
order is in this view an absolute last resort. In a vast and diverse
nation, peace at home requires enlightened social, political, and
economic policies. Secularism, liberal democracy built along federal
lines, and socialist economics constitute such policies.
The Nehruvian formula for managing a large, heterogeneous
country with religious, linguistic, caste, and regional differences
consists of various elements: constitutionalism and civic nationalism;
the devolution of power in a layered federalism; the granting of
group rights (e.g., a differentiated civil code in practice, linguistically
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based states and the three-language arrangement, and reservations
for backward castes); and the calibrated use of force when necessary.
In addition, Nehruvianism relies on a mixed economy to deliver a
measure of social justice so that disadvantaged social groups have a
stake in being loyal to the Indian state. In sum, the Nehruvian view
is that communitarian democracy and social resilience is the surest
path to internal security.30
Neoliberals agree with Nehruvians in large measure on the issue
of internal security, but have two rather sharp differences. First,
neoliberals think that the mixed economy in India went too far and
became overly regulative. The claims of social justice were sadly not
achieved by the “license and permit raj.” What was achieved was
corruption and stagnation. Without steady and high rates of growth,
the economy did not have enough steam to pull the poor up and
away from their destitution. Deprivation fuelled ethnic hostility and
violence and will continue to do so. Only high rates of economic
growth over several decades can reverse the trend. Secondly,
neoliberals think that reservations for disadvantaged groups are
destructive beyond a point. Reservations, they concede, serve the
cause of social justice, but India has exceeded the sustainable limits
of a quota system. The tensions generated by the new reservations
policy (e.g., the backward classes or Mandal award) are doing more
harm than any good that might have been achieved by the policy.31
On internal security, the hyperrealists differ significantly from
the Nehruvians and neoliberals. While they do not altogether reject
the role of secularism and democracy, they are usually
contemptuous of socialism. Secularism and democracy are necessary
but not sufficient conditions of internal order and stability.
Socialism, on the other hand, positively harms India by sapping its
social and economic vitality.32 For hyperrealists, the hallmark of a
responsible government faced with internal instability is the
willingness to use force against those who are undermining peace
and order. Secularism and democracy can only be kept alive by a
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strong hand. Hard, pre-emptive and dissuasive actions will promote
lawful behavior; any delay in using force and excessive restraint in
the application of violence will only increase the challenges to state
authority and lead to greater disarray.33
Some hyperrealists go further, though. As Hindu cultural
nationalists, they regard secularism, democracy and socialism as part
of the problem and not part of the solution. Secularism, for them, has
become appeasement of India’s minorities at the expense of the
Hindu majority.34 Democracy is often license. And socialism at its
worst is the rejection of age-old virtues and methods, even
godlessness, which can only lead to social decay and disintegration.
What India needs is social and cultural coherence, not revolutionary
socialism. This can only come from relying on the leadership of those
who by tradition and merit lead society and by respecting traditional
cultural norms and practices. Cultural nationalists argue that it is
Hindu society that gives India its fundamental unity. Internal
security is therefore achieved by promoting the idea of a Hindu
realm in which minorities will be treated with tolerance and respect
but in which Hindu leadership is at the political helm and Hindu
preferences come first.35
Pakistan. Nehruvians believe that India and its various neighbors,
including Pakistan, can and will live in peace. With the smaller
states, there is little or no prospect of violence. With Pakistan, on the
other hand, there is a long history of violence. Nehruvians see
Pakistan as an aggressive state, as do the neoliberals and
hyperrealists. In the Nehruvian view, Pakistan is an artificial state,
created on the basis of the erroneous “two-nation theory.”36 A state
based on Islamic precepts and on its difference with India cannot
hold together. Compounding the problem is the absence of
democracy. Feudal overlords and the military together control the
country. They perpetuate their domination by casting India in the
role of a mortal threat.37 Having demonized India, Pakistan must
constantly enlist powerful protectors against its bigger neighbor.

259

During the Cold War, this meant allying with the United States and
China. Pakistan’s alliances with Washington and Beijing gave
Islamabad an inflated sense of its military and diplomatic strength.
Backed by American and Chinese power, Pakistan became obdurate
and aggressive.38
In the Nehruvian view, India’s policy towards Pakistan must
take account of these complexities. While relations with Pakistan are
daunting, they are not hopeless. Given the intricacies of the
relationship, India’s moves must be geared to patient, long-run
diplomacy rather than dramatic breakthroughs. The Nehruvian
diagnosis rests on the view that enmity and hostility towards India
comes from misunderstanding and delusion. The original partition
ideology—the two-nation theory—is a mass delusion that was
propagated by Jinnah and the Muslim League.39 The enemy image of
India sustained and elaborated by the feudals and the military is also
false. The primary aim of Indian policy is of course to defend the
country from military aggression and subversion. In the longer term,
though, it is to undermine the two-nation theory and to break down
the image of India as a hostile state. Communication and contact
between India and Pakistan is the only way of doing this.40
Various lines of policy follow. First of all, an adequate defense
against aggression is vital. India cannot afford to be surprised and
overcome militarily. The accent in the Nehruvian program, though,
is on the word “adequate.” Nehruvians, we should remember, are
skeptical of the use of force and of balance-of-power politics. India,
they believe, should be able to defend itself against its enemies but
should not dispose of so much force that it frightens others.41 In
addition, Nehruvians believe in the efficacy of international
institutions and rules in preventing and limiting violence among
states: there are alternatives to responding to violence with violence.
Thus, a second important line of policy is to use international law
and institutions as well as bilateral treaties and agreements to tie
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Pakistan down. Not surprisingly, it was Jawaharlal Nehru and India
that took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations (UN) in 1948. It is
also India that has repeatedly sought to codify relations with
Pakistan in treaties and agreements—most importantly, the Simla
Accord, and most recently, the Lahore Declaration. While
Nehruvians no longer have much faith in the UN in the matter of
Kashmir and more generally in dealing with Pakistan, they insist
that bilateral agreements have an important place in resolving
conflict. The Simla and other agreements, including the various
cooperative and confidence-building accords, must be the
touchstone of India’s Pakistan policy.42
A third line of Nehruvian policy is to wean Pakistan away from
its external backers and supporters and to discourage those powers
from interfering in the region. Weaning Pakistan away from its
external dependencies will require it to shed its hostile image of
India and restructure its domestic politics. Discouraging external
powers from meddling in regional affairs can be achieved by
pursuing a policy of nonalignment. By adopting a principled stand
on great power behavior and by refusing to permanently ally with
one power or other, India can persuade those powers to leave it and
the region alone.
Finally, the core of the Nehruvian approach is to change
Pakistani attitudes towards India. The only way of accomplishing
this, in the end, is through communication and contact with both the
Pakistani government and people. No matter what the provocation
by Pakistan, Nehruvians argue, New Delhi must hold firmly to a
policy of engagement and negotiation. Summitry is one way of
keeping a conversation going with official Pakistan. Trade and the
benefits from it can be instrumental in showing Pakistanis that
diplomatic normalization with India is profitable. People-to-people
interactions (sports, culture, intellectual exchanges) can serve to
demystify India in the Pakistani imagination. In sum, only a
multifaceted relationship with Pakistan can bring about lasting
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accommodation and a robust peace.
When neoliberals think about India-Pakistan relations, they
approach the issue differently from Nehruvians. Where Nehruvians
emphasize a multifaceted process of communication and contact,
neoliberals look essentially to strike bargains to the advantage of
both sides. In this view, Pakistan is a threat to India’s security but
can be brought around to a more pacific and accommodative view of
the relationship if New Delhi uses an approach built on the promise
of mutual gain, particularly economic gain.43 Neoliberals argue that,
ultimately, Pakistan’s leaders and people are not above the logic of
costs and benefits. Whatever their sense of national identity and their
fear of India, Pakistanis will eventually measure their policies
toward their neighbor in terms of the advantages and disadvantages
of alternative courses of action. In the end, economic well-being is
paramount for any society, and Pakistan will come around to the
view that it must cut a deal with India in order to give its people a
better life.44
Neoliberals do not reject the entire Nehruvian program. The
Nehruvian insistence on an adequate but non-threatening defense
posture and a multifaceted relationship with Pakistan is congenial to
neoliberals who place great emphasis on economic well-being via
free market policies. An overly ambitious defense posture, in their
view, will channel government and private expenditures into nonproductive areas and cramp economic growth.45 In this respect, they
do not differ greatly from the Nehruvians. Neoliberals also support
the Nehruvian view of working toward a broad relationship with
Pakistan and Pakistanis. The core of the neoliberal approach is based
on the primacy of economics, and therefore anything that goes
beyond the traditional focus on military and diplomatic interactions
is helpful. However, neoliberals differ from Nehruvians in two key
respects.
First of all, neoliberals are not great believers in the effectiveness
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of international institutions and laws or bilateral treaties and
agreements.46 The Nehruvian “obsession” with institutions, laws,
treaties and agreements (e.g., in the UN, especially in the early years)
and the various bilateral accords with Pakistan are, in their view, a
negotiatory dead end. The Nehruvian way constitutes a formalistic,
old-fashioned approach to diplomacy and statecraft and has been the
bane of India’s foreign policy. UN resolutions are ineffective, even
against the humblest states. And the bilateral accords with Pakistan
are mere paper commitments, which Islamabad can ignore—even
tear up—at will. New Delhi should be prepared to scrap any or all of
these accords if and when it is necessary to do so; the Nehruvian
insistence on sticking by them in rote fashion is unimaginative and
unhelpful. Neoliberals do not necessarily reject these accords, but
they want India to adopt a more flexible, nondogmatic approach.47
The second difference with the Nehruvians is on the regional
role of the great powers—the United States, Russia, China, Japan and
the Europeans. Neoliberals argue that keeping the great powers out
of the region is futile and, worse still, positively harmful to the
Indian cause. Great powers by definition are hard to keep out of
strategic arenas and, in the case of the United States, virtually
impossible. More importantly, great power involvement could be to
India’s advantage.48 After the Cold War, the great powers perceive
India and Pakistan quite differently. An India that is booming
economically in the wake of economic reforms, that is a
nonexpansionist power, and that is a stable multiethnic democracy is
an asset. Pakistan, with its economic problems, its revisionist
agenda in South Asia and its support of revolutionary Islamic
groups, and its chaotic, Islamic polity, by contrast, is a potential
failed state.49 In this new geopolitical situation, India should
cultivate the great powers and encourage them to lean on Pakistan
as a way of bringing Islamabad around to a deal. From the neoliberal
perspective, what India therefore needs is omni-alignment, not
nonalignment: an engagement and rapprochement with all the great
powers, even China, in the service of a regional order that suits New
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Delhi’s interests and that is not inimical to great power preferences.50
For neoliberals, then, Pakistan policy must be geared to bringing
Islamabad to the negotiating table. Whereas Nehruvians want to
fundamentally change Pakistani thinking, neoliberals are more
“pragmatic” and “worldly,” insisting that an economic logic will
eventually engineer accommodation. Economic development in
Pakistan will do more to transform elite and popular attitudes than
anything India can do by way of political, social, and cultural
engagement. But for Pakistan to come to the table, India must
become an economic powerhouse. The example of India’s economic
growth, the gap in capabilities that will open up as a result, and the
potential opportunities for Pakistanis in an accelerating Indian
economy will give New Delhi the power to make Pakistan an offer it
cannot refuse. When the economic foundation for a new relationship
is built, as it increasingly has been over the past decade of reforms,
flexibility in India’s diplomatic stance will be crucial for encouraging
Pakistan to reciprocate with its own brand of new thinking. Finally,
the pressures exerted by the great powers on India’s behalf will put
Pakistan in a mood to negotiate seriously.
The hyperrealist prescription for dealing with Pakistan is not to
worry overly about the intensity of communication and contact with
that country, nor to rely on the imperatives of economic change, nor
even to turn to others for help. Instead, hyperrealists argue, India
must focus on the “fundamentals” and on policies that have stood
the test of time in the international system. Ultimately, the only
language that Pakistan understands and heeds, like any other
country, is the language of power and violence. The core of India’s
policy therefore is to build its military strength.51 Given that India is
eight times Pakistan’s size, it should be in a position to overawe
Pakistan militarily. From a position of dominance, New Delhi should
dictate terms to Pakistan. With military strength will come an array
of options that can be used to raise the costs of Pakistan’s
intervention in Kashmir. These options should be exercised sooner
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rather than later. Taking the fight to Pakistan rather than reacting to
Pakistani provocations is the essence of a workable, effective
policy.52
What does it mean to take the fight to Pakistan? Hyperrealists
argue that India should repay Pakistan in the same coin militarily,
but, in addition, politically and economically. Militarily, India
should make Pakistan pay a much higher cost for the conflict in
Kashmir. At the very least, Indian forces should be more aggressive
in counterinsurgency operations, as they were in Punjab. Beyond
this, Indian forces could begin to test the Line of Control or even the
international boundary. Artillery fire, air strikes and “hot pursuit”
attacks into Pakistan-held Kashmir would serve notice that India
was no longer willing to fight a purely defensive internal war.
Finally, at the limit, India should be prepared to attack across the
international boundary to threaten Pakistan’s heartland. The fact that
India and Pakistan are nuclear powers does not bother some
hyperrealists who would seriously contemplate the possibility of
“limited war under nuclear conditions,” arguing that India’s nuclear
superiority will give it “escalation dominance,” that is, the ability to
control the pace and direction of military action. Politically,
hyperrealists argue, there is no reason why India cannot do what the
Pakistanis are doing in Kashmir. New Delhi could begin to fund and
arm various dissident groups in Pakistan, including separatists or
ethnic rebels in Baluchistan and Sindh as well as unhappy religious
groups in Punjab. India could increasingly play host to prominent
dissident leaders as well, especially Sindhis, but also those from the
Pakistani side of Kashmir.53 Finally, India could resort to economic
warfare to raise the costs of conflict. New Delhi could meddle with
Pakistan’s currency and stock market. It could increase its own
defense spending, compelling Pakistan to raise its expenditures and
driving its economy into a fiscal meltdown. As the United States
drove the Soviet Union out of business, so India could spend
Pakistan into oblivion.
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Hyperrealists, therefore, in effect imply that the collapse or
destruction of Pakistan is the only truly viable solution. Pakistan is
an implacable foe and, with every setback or defeat, it will only
rebuild itself for the next round of conflict. After 1971, that should
have been clear to India. Pakistanis see compromise and negotiation,
restraint and cooperation assigns of weakness and incoherence in
India. Unless Pakistan is reduced to a state of permanent chaos or
debility, it will, phoenix-like, rise from the ashes to challenge India
again and again.
Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists have quite different
prescriptions for how to deal with Pakistan. Nehruvians trust in
patient, long-term diplomacy that builds on existing treaties and
obligations, defensive defense, society-to-society contact and
communication, and nonalignment. Neoliberals prefer a pragmatic,
flexible approach to Pakistan, a reliance on economic contacts and
India’s growing economic strength to bring Pakistanis around, a
restrained military posture, and alignment with the great powers
(especially the United States) rather than nonalignment.
Hyperrealists want India to rely on power and force rather than
treaties and economic links to take the fight to Pakistan, to subvert it
from within, and eventually to bring about its collapse.
China. The Nehruvian belief that states and peoples can
eventually be brought around to make peace with each other extends
to relations with China. Notwithstanding the war of 1962 with
China, Nehruvians do not see China as an imperial power trying to
intimidate its neighbors. Rather, China is a backward country trying
to improve the lives of its huge population, much like India. It is also
trying to overcome the trauma of a semi-colonial occupation in the
19th century. Its communist regime is repressive but has also played
a progressive role for its people. The communists liberated and
united China and incurred the wrath of the Western powers, and
much of the ire against China in the international system continues
to be Western inspired. China’s desire to reintegrate Hong Kong,
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Macao, and Taiwan is justified because these areas belonged to
China historically. China’s claim to Tibet is more controversial, but
there is little that can be done about the Tibetan situation except
hope that eventually China will realize the folly of forcible
occupation. While Chinese communism is distasteful, to mount a
crusade
against
it
internationally
is
counterproductive.
Communication and dialogue with China, and giving China its due
in the international order, will modify Chinese policies more than
confrontation.
India’s own difficulties with China, in the Nehruvian
perspective, arose from Beijing’s obduracy and its involvement in
the Cold War—and New Delhi’s own mistakes. While China was
ultimately responsible for the war of 1962, its aggressiveness was
momentary and limited. China and India have historically never
been enemies, in the Nehruvian view.54 They represent two ancient
civilizations with a fair degree of contact with each other over two
millennia and no record of hostilities. In the modern period, they
generally have been friends and are, even now, central to the
prospects of peace and security in Asia.55 India was supportive of
China’s national liberation struggle and, after 1949, of its
membership in international society. The war was an aberration and
was due to a series of misunderstandings. A settlement over the
border issue and long-term peace and friendship with China is made
easier by these facts.
Nehruvians broadly endorse the kinds of policies that the Indian
government has pursued with China since 1962 in bringing Beijing
around to a settlement. An adequate defense against China is vital.
New Delhi must be able to defend its borders and cannot be caught
napping if India-China relations should suddenly decay as they did
in 1961-62. However, India’s posture along the border should not be
provocative.56 Beyond this, India has to pursue a steady, patient
course of diplomacy with China. Nehruvians are supportive of the
general thrust of India’s diplomacy with China over the past decade.
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Before 1988, India insisted that there could be no real improvement
in relations until the Chinese reverted to the military situation before
1962 and handed back any territories taken from 1949 onwards. New
Delhi insisted that a border settlement must be based on an
acknowledged principle of demarcation rather than mere give-andtake. Since 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian prime
minister to visit China after the 1962 war, India has changed its
approach. The basic shift has been to broaden the relationship and to
refuse to hold other areas of interaction hostage to a settlement of the
border. Thus, in the 1990s, India signed a number of confidencebuilding agreements with China. Over a decade, the presidents,
prime ministers, and foreign ministers of the two countries met over
a dozen times, more than at any time since 1949. Before 1998, Indian
and Chinese military leaders were meeting more frequently as well.
In 2000, India and China began an official security dialogue which
goes beyond border issues. Finally, India-China trade blossomed,
from a mere $200 million to well over $2 billion in the course of a
decade. India has also agreed to develop closer social links between
the two societies in terms of cultural, scientific and sporting
exchanges.57
Beyond this bilateral engagement, Nehruvians believe that India
and China have a broad geopolitical interest in common, namely, to
ensure that Asia does not become either an arena of conflict between
Asian countries themselves or an object of Western influence once
again.58 As rising powers, India and China could come into conflict
as they grow in capabilities and influence. A number of other Asian
conflicts and rivalries exist. And without the Soviet Union to hold
them in check, the Western states, particularly the United States,
could begin to interfere in the affairs of Asia and exert pressures on
Asian countries in the name of humanitarian concerns such as
human rights. Nehruvians therefore see a future concert with China
and other Asian powers—including Russia—as a long-term goal.
India, China, and the major Asian powers should come together to
build confidence and cooperation amongst themselves in order to
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avoid mutual conflict and to keep the U.S. and other Westerners at
bay. 59
Neoliberals view China differently. India-China relations in the
ancient past or even more recent past are largely irrelevant. It is the
present and future of India and China that must be determinative. In
a globalized world, where the barriers to trade, investment, and
technology have loosened as never before, the past holds few
lessons. Older quarrels, such as the border dispute, are anachronisms
that have little bearing on contemporary choices; above all, these
choices must be concerned with how states can manage the
opportunities and threats of globalization.60 Solving the border
quarrel is a relatively insignificant issue, though it will not be easy to
dispose of. Looking at China through the lens of the border dispute
is the wrong way to assess the relationship. It is China’s economic
revolution and the effects of economic change on its foreign and
security policies that are crucial. China is rapidly becoming a great
power. Its economic power is giving it enormous leverage, even with
rivals such as the United States. In the pursuit of great power status
via rapid economic change, China is now committed to pragmatic
policies toward Taiwan, Japan, and India, as well as toward the
United States.
For India, this has at least two implications. First, the primary
goal of grand strategy in a globalizing world is economic strength.
Economic strength is good in itself in terms of better living standards
and a more resilient society, but it is also a source of influence in
international affairs. India must emulate China to be secure against
its neighbor in the decades to come, and more importantly, to
manage its relations with other great powers as Beijing does.61
Second, with its eye on economic progress, China is likely to be a
restrained power interested in managing and resolving conflict.62
Neoliberals support the Nehruvians on an adequate rather than
extravagant defense and on a multifaceted engagement with China.
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From the point of view of neoliberals, though, it is economics that
should lead the way. China is interested in economic advancement
through trade, investment, and technology transfers, as is India.
Trade with China could be much larger than it is at present. India
and China could in addition invest in each other’s economies. There
are areas of technology where they could cooperate, especially in
formation technology.63 Neoliberals argue that India will benefit
from an economic relationship with China and in addition will gain
diplomatic leverage: New Delhi should aim to “do a China” on
China. With a steadily deepening economic engagement, differences
over the border and Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad will be
easier to resolve, and on terms that suit India. The problem, in the
neoliberal view, is India, not China. India has not learned to be
coldly calculative, to put economics center stage in its external
relations, to shed its prejudices about market-driven economics and
globalization, to marginalize old-fashioned disputes over territory,
and to forsake old methods, policies, and agreements. Neoliberals
are impatient with both Nehruvians and hyperrealists who they see
as being old-fashioned about economics, security, and the conduct of
diplomacy.
Thus, in the neoliberal view, the Nehruvian interest in a concert
with China and Russia and other Asian powers is unrealistic, even
counterproductive.64 Older security problems and rivalries will
gradually dissipate as economics comes center stage. A concert of
Asians to regulate intra-Asian conflicts is an idea whose time has
probably come and gone. An economic league in Asia would be
more to the point. As for even a loose alliance against the United
States and the West, this is highly improbable. China, Russia, and
India individually have much greater stakes in a relationship with
the United States and the West than with each other, for the most
part. In any case, India, as a secular, modern democracy has much
more in common with the Western countries than with China or
even the new Russia. Flirting with China and Russia is tactically
understandable: it is a signal to the United States not to take India
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for granted. But an Asian concert of powers that excludes the United
States in particular is virtually impossible.
While Nehruvians think that India and China can be friends and
allies and while neoliberals argue that India and China can cut a
strategic deal if they develop their economic relations, hyperrealists
see China as the greatest military threat to India, far more so than
Pakistan.65 The Nehruvians, in the hyperrealist view, failed in the
1950s and 1960s to comprehend Chinese goals and methods, and to
prepare to meet force with force. They are no wiser about China 40
years later: communication and contacts with China will do little to
change the basic expansionist and aggressive tenets of the
authoritarian Chinese leadership, and it is absurd to think that the
two countries can combine to manage Asian security.66 The
neoliberals also are misguided about China. Their faith in the power
of economics is exaggerated. For China, pragmatism in foreign and
security policy and economic modernization is merely tactical and
will be dispensed with when Beijing feels strong enough to use
unilateral means. India must therefore prepare itself militarily to
deal with China. Nuclear deterrence is vital if India is to be secure
against China.67 In addition, India’s conventional military power
must be augmented to defend Indian territory against the largest
army in the world.
Beyond military preparedness on India’s part, New Delhi must
knit together an alliance of Asian countries that will contain China. It
must do to China what China has done to India, namely,
encirclement.68 In the 1950s, China took over Tibet. In the 1960s and
1970s, it carefully cultivated Pakistan, diplomatically and militarily.
Whenever possible, it has sought to increase its influence in South
Asia among the smaller states, especially Bangladesh and Nepal. In
the 1990s, it began to penetrate Burma. Hyperrealists argue that it is
time for India to break out of this encirclement with its own counterencirclement of China. New Delhi must put together an alliance in
Southeast and East Asia all along the Chinese periphery. This would
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involve strengthening relations with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
and the ASEAN states including Vietnam and Burma, all of whom in
the end must fear China more than anyone else.69 Hyperrealists
favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea as much as
the Chinese navy is a presence in the Indian Ocean. Some
hyperrealists would go so far as to insist that India must reopen the
Tibet question and help counter China’s rule.70 A counterencirclement will assume even greater importance as the U.S.
position in Asia diminishes. Hyperrealists argue that the United
States will eventually have to pull out of Asia, leaving the field open
to China. At that point, Asians will have to face up to the
responsibilities of containing China by themselves.
In sum, as with Pakistan, hyperrealists envisage India taking the
fight to China. They see India as being too complacent about China
and merely reactive to Chinese diplomatic and strategic moves. The
Chinese, in their view, only respect power. India’s own military
strength, combined with an alliance system in Asia, would in the
aggregate be powerful enough to replace the United States as the
main check on Chinese ambitions. Hyperrealists see India as a
potential pole of attraction in the international system, particularly
so in Asia. India should be the linchpin of a system of alliances, from
Israel at one end to Taiwan at the other, that combats both Islamic
fundamentalism and Chinese expansionism.
Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists have quite different
perspectives on China. China at one level is like Pakistan—a
neighbor with whom India has a territorial dispute and with whom
hostilities are possible. At another level, with its astonishing
economic growth and size, China represents a rising power, a great
power in the making at the very least. Nehruvians in the end believe
that India can create the conditions for peace and cooperation with
the giant to the north, much as it can with Pakistan. Neoliberals
argue that economics can lead the way even with China, and that a
pragmatic approach to the border can bring about a stable
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relationship. Hyperrealists see a rising China as aggressive and
expansionist, and therefore argue that only Indian military power
and a containment of China by a ring of Asian powers will hold
Beijing in check.
The United States. For most countries in the world, dealing with
the great powers, whether they are nearby or distant, is a special
challenge of grand strategy. Nehruvians, neoliberals, and
hyperrealists differ as much on this issue as on internal security,
relations with Pakistan and China, and nuclear weapons. All three
groups recognize that the only great power of any significance for
India is the United States, and that the United States is not a military
threat in any foreseeable future. However, it is a diplomatic threat.
Often, U.S. policies hurt Indian interests collaterally rather than
intentionally. American regional and global policies run counter to
Indian preferences in various ways, and managing both the intended
and unintended effects of U.S. policies pose a special challenge given
the American superiority over all other powers.
The Nehruvian prescription for dealing with great powers is
nonalignment. Nonalignment is not neutrality, and it is not
amoralism. It is a policy built around three elements: first, a refusal
to be permanently attached to any great power, and to judge
international issues in the light of India’s interests and general
principles of international security; second, the fashioning of a
coalition of Third World countries against great power dominance;
and third, mediating between rival great powers and the fostering of
international institutions and law so that the international system as
a whole is made safer and, in particular, weak Third World powers
are afforded more protection. In short, autonomy, balancing,
mediation, and institutionalism are at the heart of the Nehruvian
system for managing relations with the great powers. These points
deserve some elaboration.
First of all, according to Nehruvians, nonalignment served to
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keep India outside the East-West fray for the most part. India was
able to avoid being entangled in other people’s quarrels and to
preserve its freedom to choose one side or the other, or not to choose
sides as it saw fit. Nonalignment served India’s domestic stability as
well. If India had chosen one side in the Cold War, this may have
encouraged the other side to meddle in its domestic politics to
punish it. Also, given the ideological divide between left and right
within India, alignment with either superpower would have been
disruptive.
Second, nonalignment helped to construct a Third World
coalition. Nehru himself scorned the “trade unionism” of the Third
World, but Nehruvians generally saw nonalignment as a form of
collective resistance against the imperial powers. Over the years, in
classical balance of power fashion, the nonaligned countries adopted
a perceptible tilt towards the weaker superpower, the Soviet Union,
in order to gain leverage with the more dominant superpower.
Third, in the Nehruvian view, nonalignment is more than a
rejection of alliance politics and resistance to the great powers. It is
an insistence that the smaller powers can help to mediate the
differences between the great powers. It is also an insistence that
international institutions, organizations and law matter, and are
particularly important for the protection of weaker powers. For
Nehruvians, this is a vital and ultimately the most positive aspect of
nonalignment. Nonaligned states, free from the constraints of
alliance responsibilities, enjoy a vantage point from which they can
not only judge the actions of the great powers but also from which
they can help bridge differences. New Delhi might be in a position to
offer in formation, i deas, and interpretations of events that would
bring the two sides closer together. The mediatory function of nonalignment, Nehruvians argue, is vital for international peace and
stability, especially for the security of the smaller countries because
in any global confrontation their survival, independence, and
development will be at risk.71
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Finally, Nehruvians argue that international institutions can play
a role in checking the great powers. International organizations,
international law, and international norms and conventions are ways
of tethering the great powers. By promoting procedures, rules, and
debate in international relations, the smaller powers might be able to
slow down the great powers or, better still, get them to reconsider
their goals and policies. The great powers may manipulate
international procedures, rules, and debate to their advantage, but
this is not certain. In any case, an international system with
procedures, rules, and forums for debate must be better than one
without.
Nehruvians argue that nonalignment in this larger sense is
relevant in the post Cold War world. With the United States
rampant, preserving India’s autonomy is an even more challenging
task. Nonalignment and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
continue to be a refuge for countries that do not want to bandwagon
with Washington.72 So also is balancing against U.S. power a vital
interest. Strictly speaking, balancing against the U.S. is impossible.
However, a coalition of Southern states could resist U.S. pressures on
selected issues. The possibility of Indian leadership of a Southern
coalition could well enlarge India’s bargaining power with
Washington.
Nehruvians in the post-Cold War period also regard an IndiaChina-Russia partnership as a response to U.S. hegemony. In the
longer term, a concert of Asian powers could hold the United States
at bay.73 Since Nehruvians worry about the polarizing effects of
balance-of -power politics, they also support the view that India
should continue to act as a mediator with the United States. Thus,
some Nehruvians propose that India can represent Southern
interests to the United States and act as a moderate go-between.74
Finally, in the post-Cold War period, a nonaligned posture that
attempts to rally Southern countries around international
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institutions, rules, and norms can in some measure hope to subvert
the U.S. hold on power. Since the United States is using international
institutions, laws, and conventions for its own purposes, Indian
diplomacy must be geared both to sustaining international
organizations and to preventing their manipulation by the United
States and its allies.
It is on the issue of how India deals with the great powers that
neoliberalism most clearly defines its differences with both the
Nehruvians and hyperrealists. For the neoliberals, relations with the
great powers represent opportunities as much as threats. India will
become a full-fledged great power, in the neoliberal view. This is
more or less inevitable. While Nehruvians do not disagree with the
neoliberals on India’s destiny as a great power, for them India’s
great power aspirations must be built on autarky, that is, on self reliance. Neoliberals argue by contrast that in the contemporary
world this is not possible. India can only become a great power by
raising its economic growth rates, and this is feasible if India works
with rather than against the great powers as a way of increasing
trade, technology transfers, and investment.75
Nonalignment and everything it represents therefore seems
dreadfully old-fashioned to neoliberals. In the neoliberal view, the
great powers are no longer in fundamental conflict.76 With the end of
the Cold War, there is no Manichean conflict animating international
relations. One side won the Cold War, namely, the United States and
the Western nations, and the other side lost. The victors are not in
conflict: the United States and its Western partners and Japan remain
allies. Those who lost the Cold War, moreover, have accepted the
fundamental tenets of the victors. There are, therefore, no rival
alliance blocs vying for India’s or anyone else’s membership.
Choosing between two great blocs and two ideological systems is no
longer a factor.77 Given that there are no great powers locked in
conflict, the mediatory role of nonaligned states is also no longer a
factor of any significance.
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Most importantly for neoliberals, the idea of resisting the great
powers is anachronistic. For one thing, there is only one truly great
power, the United States, and its power is so overwhelming that to
conceive of resistance in any real sense is impractical. Since the
United States leads a coalition of great powers, its preponderance is
only magnified. Besides, resistance to the great powers implies that
these powers are attempting to force countries to do something that
they do not wish to do. Neoliberals argue that this is not the case. A
liberal global economic order and even global nonproliferation, the
two areas where the great powers do twist arms, are in the interest of
most states. Even India, with some qualifications, gains from both. It
is in India’s interest to promote an open trading and financial system
worldwide. It is also in India’s interest to curb the spread of weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs). Neoliberals want India to be a nuclear
weapons power, albeit a restrained one, but they also want India to
join the nonproliferation order as a way of curbing the spread of
WMDs.78
Neoliberals argue that after the Cold War, the United States, by
and large, is no longer interested in the vast majority of smaller
powers. The problem for most of the smaller powers is not pressures
applied against them by the big powers, but rather their own
economic backwardness, malgovernance, regional hostilities, and
vulnerability to fundamentalism and various other nontraditional
security threats (small arms, drugs, criminal mafias, etc.). The United
States in particular is a potential resource in dealing with these
challenges. For countries like India, the real problem posed by
Washington is therefore not so much its desire to dominate as its
unwillingness to help the weaker states deal with these challenges.
From this vantage point, resistance to the United States is
tantamount to cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The
challenge before the weaker powers, including India, is not how to
resist the United States but rather how to cut a deal with it
pragmatically and with dignity.79
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Whereas the Nehruvians want to stay aloof from great power
entanglements, to mediate between the great powers, and to resist
the domination of these powers, and the neoliberals want to cut a
deal with the great powers, hyperrealists want India to break into
the club of the great powers, to bust into the inner circle of the
international order. Their view of India’s relations with the great
powers does not completely reject the Nehruvian and neoliberal
approaches. It does not reject the Nehruvian nonaligned view of
India’s role vis–à-vis the great powers—aloofness, mediation, and
resistance—nor does it turn its back on cutting deals with other great
powers, as advocated by the neoliberals. These are acceptable lines
of policy when India is weak but they should not become the ends of
policy per se. The hyperrealist view is that India has all the
appurtenances of a great power and can, through an act of will,
transform its potential into actuality. Ultimately, India must sit at the
high table of international affairs as a complete and assertive equal,
whether the other great powers like it or not. Sitting at the table,
India will help shape the world order commensurate with its
preferences.
Hyperrealists regard the international system as an anarchical
arena where power is the ultimate arbiter. In such a system, the only
way of restraining the great powers is to make India strong enough
to defend its interests. Hyperrealists argue that neither Nehruvians
nor neoliberals understand the necessities of power. Nehruvians are
idealistic in their view that nonalignment is a means of achieving
autonomy. Nonalignment is the refuge of weak powers. It works as
long as it suits the great powers. In the end, India itself was forced to
play a balance of power game during the Cold War in order to
safeguard its interests. As for the rest of the Nehruvian policy—of
mediation and resistance to the great powers—this also holds little
appeal. Mediation does nothing for India, and a policy of resistance
built on a coalition of weak Southern powers is futile. Nor do
hyperrealists set much store by international organizations, law and
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regimes in restraining the great powers, arguing, like all realists, that
these are creatures of states and exist at the pleasure of the greatest
powers.80 Thus, procedures, rules, and debates are likely to be used
by the strong against the weak and not the other way round.
In the hyperrealist view, neoliberals are just as guilty of woollyheaded thinking. The neoliberal argument that economics is the key
to power in the post-Cold War international system is, in the
hyperrealist view, based on a very limited if not altogether false
reading of international history. The post-Cold War period is not
different from any other period of history: military power remains
the sine qua non of international security and status just as it always
has. Hyperrealists maintain that the neoliberal belief in “economics
over politics” is profoundly mistaken: politics comes before
economics. In international relations, this means that military power
comes before economic power. States that are front-rank military
powers become front-rank economic powers, not the other way
round.81 A state that resolves to make itself into a major military
power will solve the economic and technological problems that
confront it. A state that goes around the world trying to beg and
borrow economically and technologically cannot gird itself up for
the challenges of social transformation and is therefore doomed to
remain a secondary power.
Relations with the United States must therefore be conducted in
a quite different way. New Delhi must be assertive in its relations
with Washington. This means, amongst other things, being clear and
firm about vital Indian interests.82 On these, India must refuse to
compromise. Thus, the nuclear program is non-negotiable with the
United States. American decisionmakers must be told that India is a
great-power-in-the-making and that nuclear weapons are essential in
solidifying India’s status and security. Thus also, U.S. intervention in
regional affairs is tolerable as long as it is supportive of Indian goals,
but on the whole Washington is not welcome in South Asia and
particularly not as a mediator on Kashmir.83 Beyond assertiveness,
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India should signal its desire for a partnership with the United
States. When the United States begins to withdraw from Asia, it will
be in its interest to see India become a confident and versatile
military power. An India-U.S. alliance is possible, particularly
against the common enemy, China.84 India and the United States also
have a common interest in combating Islamic fundamentalism and
terrorism.85 In the long term, however, given the logic of
international politics, the United States will resist India’s rise to
power as it will China’s. Indians must be prepared to tough it out
against U.S. intimidation. The only way of dealing with the United
States is for India to build its military power. India must be in a
position eventually to deter the United States from intervening
militarily in and around India’s sphere of influence in South Asia,
the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and nearby Southeast Asia—and
of course in Indian domestic politics. While India can take the fight
to Pakistan and China, it is not in a position to do so against the
United States in any foreseeable future. India must therefore rely
primarily on dissuasive power vis-à-vis the United States.
To summarize: every country in the world has to worry about
how to deal with the United States. Nehruvians, neoliberals and
hyperrealists propose three quite different ways of dealing with the
United States. Nehruvians see the United States as an imperial
power that cannot countenance any rivals, and that wants to
preserve its preeminence at the expense of powers like India. The
only way to deal with the United States is to resist American policies
and power by building a coalition of Third World states and others
who worry about Washington’s dominance. Out of resistance may
come “conversion” of the United States to points of view that are
more favorable to India and eventually to cooperation. Neoliberals
take the opposite view. For them, the United States is the dominant
power, one that can be supportive of Indian goals, and there is little
option but to bandwagon with Washington. Hyperrealists differ
from both Nehruvians and neoliberals in arguing that the only way
of dealing with the United States is to build India into a military
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power of the first rank.
Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Policy and the Nature of the Deterrent.
Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists differ on the broad
outlines of India’s nuclear policy as well as the nature of the
deterrent. They differ, first, on three basic issues: the utility of
nuclear weapons; India’s relationship to the nonproliferation regime;
and the feasibility and desirability of disarmament. They also differ
on the nature of the deterrent: Nehruvians and neoliberals are
nuclear moderates, while hyperrealists are nuclear maximalists.
Nehruvians hold that nuclear weapons are necessary for India’s
security as long as they cannot be abolished. Nuclear weapons are an
abomination, but if others have them, particularly India’s rivals, then
India must also have them for deterrence.86 Nuclear weapons are
also necessary in a diplomatic sense. In a world of great and growing
inequalities, nuclear weapons are not just a military but also a
political equalizer. India’s capacity to resist great power pressures in
particular will be enhanced by nuclear weapons.
With respect to the nonproliferation regime, and in particular the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a putative fissile
material cutoff treaty (FMCT), Nehruvians argue that India should
not sign either accord, even if joining the nonproliferation regime
does not adversely affect the Indian deterrent. For Nehruvians, the
nonproliferation regime is a leading part of the “new world order”
which is fundamentally unequal and hegemonistic and which must
therefore be resisted.87
Finally, Nehruvians insist that nuclear disarmament is both
desirable and feasible. It is desirable because nuclear weapons could
someday be used, which would be catastrophic not just for the
countries involved but also for the rest of the international
community.88 In addition, disarmament is desirable because nuclear
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weapons are ethically repugnant, if they are not illegal under
international law.89 Finally, disarmament is desirable because
nuclear weapons in the hands of a few is discriminatory, and
discrimination fosters instability and violence.90
According to Nehruvians, a multilateral, verifiable abolition of
nuclear weapons, as proposed by India, is not only desirable, it is
also feasible. Thus, they argue that if the international community
could abolish biological and chemical weapons, then there is no
reason that it cannot get rid of nuclear weapons as well.91 Abolition
requires, in the first place, that the present nuclear weapons states
commit themselves to its achievement in a time-bound and phased
manner. Once they do so and take real steps to eliminate nuclear
weapons, Nehruvians propose that India should join the process of
abolition.
Neoliberals are pragmatists in nuclear affairs.92 Like the
Nehruvians, they also believe that nuclear weapons are vital for
India’s security in a world which shows no signs of moving towards
abolition and which is inhabited by regional nuclear powers—China
and Pakistan—that threaten India’s security. Neoliberals, like
Nehruvians and hyperrealists, note that the nuclear weapons states
(NWSs) continue to reaffirm the fundamental importance of nuclear
weapons in their security postures.93
Where neoliberals part company with Nehruvians and
hyperrealists is in respect to the nonproliferation regime. According
to neoliberals, New Delhi should pragmatically reconsider its
opposition to key elements of that regime in the wake of the May
1998 tests. India’s scientists have certified the tests as being sufficient
for the construction of a credible deterrent and a test ban could be in
India’s interest.94 Neoliberals would cut a deal with the international
community. The deal would have India join the CTBT, a possible
FMCT, and the other nonproliferation regimes (such as the Missile
Technology Control Regime or MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
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etc.). In return, it would get de facto if not de jure recognition of its
new nuclear status, and most importantly, the ban on dual-use and
advanced conventional weapons technologies would be lifted.95
While neoliberals urge India to strike a nuclear deal with the
nuclear powers, they exclude from this compact the traditional
Indian idea of phased disarmament. They insist that India should be
“realistic” rather than “normative” and “moralistic” about nuclear
weapons. Thus, C. Raja Mohan argues that India should set aside its
traditional posture of “disarmament” and focus instead on “arms
control.”96 He even argues that India should positively oppose
abolition on two grounds. First, the incipient “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA) will give the United States and its Western allies an
insurmountable lead in conventional weaponry which can only be
“balanced” by nuclear weapons.97 Second, the terms of global power
more broadly are shifting against India, and only nuclear weapons
will serve to keep India in the great game of global politics. Thus,
even if the United States and other nuclear weapons states agree to
abolish nuclear weapons, India should keep them, at least until it can
catch up in the conventional military and global power race.98
It is worth noting that not all neoliberals are so skeptical about
disarmament. Some strongly support the traditional Indian agenda
on disarmament and are closer to the Nehruvians in this regard.99
This softer, pro-disarmament variant of nuclear pragmatism has
substantial following and should not be discounted. Indian elite
opinion has traditionally supported both nuclearization and an
active stance on disarmament.100 Having said that, it is not clear
whether support for a disarmament agenda is a “tactical” one
intended to counter international criticism of India’s nuclearization,
whether it is an article of faith which Indians find difficult to discard,
or whether it is seen as a genuine, realizable, and practical policy
option. On the whole, it is much more an article of faith for
Nehruvians and much more tactical for neoliberals.
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For hyperrealists, nuclear weapons are principally for deterrence.
Some hyperrealists also believe that India must be prepared to fight
and not just deter nuclear war.101 Nuclear weapons have a political
role as well. Where Nehruvians see nuclearization as a part of a
strategy of resistance to a hegemonic world order and where
neoliberals see it as a way of striking a bargain with the great
powers, hyperrealists perceive the acquisition of nuclear weapons as
fundamental to India’s status as a great power. Without nuclear
weapons, India cannot be counted as a separate pole in the
international system around which other states could cluster for
protection and leadership.
Hyperrealists, like Nehruvians, urge that India should refuse to
join the nonproliferation regime, so that the CTBT and a future
FMCT do not constrain the achievement of a credible nuclear
force.102 India needs to continue testing in order to produce the full
array of nuclear weapons, increase the reliability of warhead design,
and miniaturize the device. It also needs to produce more fissile
material in order to test and to build a sufficiently large arsenal.103
Finally, for hyperrealists, nuclear disarmament is both
undesirable and infeasible, on strategic and technical grounds,
respectively.104 The abolition of nuclear weapons would create the
conditions for great power conflict once again and could lead to
world war. In addition, hyperrealists argues that nuclear
disarmament is unattainable: “There is no empirical record that
suggests that disarmament ever succeeded any time in history. . . .
There is no record. It hasn’t succeeded. . . . [ Therefore] what is the
historical empirical basis on which disarmament is still conceived of
as a foreign policy goal for India?”105 States are loath to give up any
weapon system until a more fearsome instrument comes along. They
must also worry that others will cheat and that those who disarm
could become vulnerable to a “break out.”
On the nature of the deterrent, Nehruvians and neoliberals stand
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for a moderate posture whereas hyperrealists are maximalists.
Nuclear moderates and maximalists differ on six issues: the nature of
the nuclear threat; force size and force structure; negative security
assurances; nuclear readiness; command and control; and the logic
of deterrence. These are summarized in the following table.
Nuclear Moderates
(Nehruvians and
Nuclear Maximalists
neoliberals)
(hyperrealists)
Nature of Nuclear Threat Pakistan, China, or both Pakistan, China, and the
U.S.: “tous azimuth”
Force Size and Force
• 60-140 “Hiroshima
• 300 warheads minimum
Structure
type
including thermonuclear
• No tactical weapons
• Tactical weapons
• Triad
• Triad
Negative Security
• “No first use” is cred- • “No first use” is not
Assurances
ible and operationally
credible and viable
viable
• Nonuse against non• Categorical nonuse
nuclear states is not
against non-nuclear
sacrosanct
Nuclear Readiness
• De-mated, de-alerted • Full deployment of
nuclear posture is
nuclear weapons;
stable
de-mated/de-alert is
• Retaliation can be
vulnerable
delayed
• Retaliation should be
prompt
Command and Control
Small, modest C3I-Extensive, “classical” C31-consistent with a small, even small, restrained prorestrained nuclear
grams need complex
program
command and control
Logic of Deterrence
Uncertainty of retaliaCertainty of retaliation
tion deters
deters

Nuclear moderates see Pakistan and/or China as nuclear threats:
some moderates rank Pakistan as the more serious nuclear threat,
others rank China ahead, and some regard them as more or less
coeval threats. Deterring either or both Pakistan and China is in their
view achievable with no more than 60-140 simple, low-yield nuclear
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weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, in the sense of battlefield
devices, are unnecessary when a purely defensive deterrence is the
objective. To enhance the survivability of India’s nuclear force, a
triad of ground, air, and sea launched nuclear capabilities is vital.
Negative security assurances are both credible and viable if India
maintains a de-mated/de-alerted nuclear posture, that is, if the
warheads and delivery vehicles are kept separate and under
different jurisdictions (e.g. between scientists and armed forces) and
retaliation is assured but at a time of India’s choosing rather than
instantaneous. With a small arsenal and a de-mated/de-alerted
posture, command and control can be a relatively simple, modest,
and affordable undertaking. Nuclear moderation is possible, finally,
because what suffices for deterrence is not the certainty of retaliation
but rather the mere possibility of a second strike.106
Maximalists estimate the nuclear threats to India to be more
challenging, arguing that even the United States constitutes a
concern and that India must therefore, over the long term, constitute
a tous azimuth (all horizons) capability. Deterrence in such an
environment requires a much larger arsenal—at least as large as that
of the second-tier nuclear states, especially China—and a more
sophisticated array of devices including thermonuclear and tactical,
with a triad to increase survivability. Negative security assurances,
according to maximalists, are neither viable nor credible. No
operational deployment of nuclear weapons can guarantee that a
state will not use nuclear weapons first. De-mating and de-alerting
and a slow-to-respond posture is inconsistent with deterrence
stability, which requires the opponent to be sure that retaliation will
be swift and deadly. Command and control must be extensive and
sophisticated so as to ensure the safety and reliability of the arsenal,
whether from unauthorized or accidental use, or during a nuclear
war that may involve a “salvo” of exchanges. Underlying the
contentions of the maximalists is their view that what deters is not
the mere possibility of retaliation, but rather as close to the absolute
certainty of retaliation as it is possible to engineer.107
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In sum, Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists agree that
India needs nuclear weapons for deterrence but they disagree on the
nonproliferation regime and on disarmament: only the neoliberals
would sign the CTBT and an eventual FMCT; and only Nehruvians
regard the elimination of nuclear weapons as both desirable and
feasible. In addition, Nehruvians and neoliberals favor a moderate
nuclear posture whereas hyperrealists argue for a more maximalist
position.
Strategic Culture and Security Policy.
Indian strategic thought for the most part is described by
Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism. How close are these
streams of thought to the conduct of Indian security policy over the
past decade? We must necessarily be schematic here, but our review
of India’s internal ethnic management policies, its policies towards
Pakistan and China, and its behavior towards the United States will
show that actual policy is closest to the preferences of the
neoliberals, notwithstanding the fact that since 1990 India has had
three different kinds of governments in power in New Delhi—a
Congress government under Narasimha Rao (1991-96), a left-of center coalition government under Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral
(1996-98), and a right-of -center coalition led by Atal Behari Vajpayee
(since 1998).
Internally, official policy is consonant with the Nehruvian and
neoliberal consensus on constitutionalism, devolution of power,
group rights, and the calibrated use of force against ethnic rebels. No
changes have been made in government policies. The Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), which leads the present National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) coalition, has challenged parts of this consensus. For
instance, it has suggested that the present constitution requires
modification, and it has appointed a commission to recommend
changes. There is concern that the party wants to bring in rather
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fundamental changes to the present order. The BJP has insisted that
it will repeal Article 370 of the Constitution which gives Kashmir a
special deal within the Union. It has also suggested that it will seek
to produce a uniform civil code for India. While a common civil code
for all religions is enshrined in the Constitution as a goal of policy,
the position of successive governments has been to leave the matter
alone until the minority communities are ready to engage the issue.
From time to time, BJPs pokesmen or ministers have argued that
India should be more “proactive” rather than “reactive” in situations
such as Kashmir. Some have interpreted this to signal greater
interest in the use of force. Having said that, the BJP has thus far not
overturned the consensus in any of these areas.
India’s Pakistan policy over the past decade has varied
somewhat. However, the core of that policy is once again close to the
Nehruvian/neoliberal view. The basics of the Nehruvian approach,
which sees the need for a multifaceted engagement with Pakistan
that tries to change Pakistani attitudes, is clearly visible: official
policy continues to be that existing treaties and agreements must be
honored and that trade, travel, people-to-people and cultural
exchanges should be encouraged as a way of achieving peace and
security. However, the neoliberal view that India needs to remain
alert to new possibilities and that existing treaties and agreements
are dispensable if a deal can be struck is gaining ground. For
instance, since 1995, every Indian government has indicated that it
will discuss Kashmir, among other issues.108 The summit between
India and Pakistan at Agra in July 2001 showed that the Indian
government is willing to break with the past if necessary. The
Vajpayee government indicated that it would open the Kashmir
issue for discussion, as no government has done in the previous 30
years. During the summit and after, references to earlier
agreements—including the Vajpayee government’s own Lahore
agreement—were noticeably few and far between.
Official policy toward China also is closer to the preferences of
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the Nehruvians and neoliberals. New Delhi continues to stress
adequacy in defense along the border. It is careful not to be
provocative militarily. The only exception to India’s general policy of
restraint occurred after the nuclear tests of May 1998, when New
Delhi sought to justify the tests in terms of the Chinese threat. While
this caused a public diplomatic spat between the two countries,
relations were carefully mended thereafter. Since 1988, Indian policy
has been to widen the scope of relations with China and not to make
everything hostage to a settlement of the border dispute. This is a
hearkening back to the original Nehruvian policy prior to the 1962
war. It is also consonant with neoliberal preferences.
It is in respect to relations with the United States that Indian
official policy is most neoliberal. Under three governments, New
Delhi has drifted closer to the United States than at any time since
1947. Nehruvian pronouncements about the need for nonalignment
and a Third World coalition against the United States are gone from
the official vocabulary. India’s involvement in the Non-Aligned
Movement is a mere shadow of its earlier level of engagement. While
Indian diplomats still tend to be the most opposed to U.S. policies in
multilateral forums, actual Indian choices, particularly in the
security realm, are far more pragmatic. Defense cooperation with the
United States, support for American missile defense plans,
unprecedented intelligence sharing between the two countries in the
wake of 9/11, India’s prompt offer of cooperation in the fight against
terrorism, and high-level political interactions with Washington (the
two summits of 2000, the summit of 2001, the spate of Cabinet-level
visits before the 1998 tests, the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh
dialogue, and the high-visibility diplomatic contacts after 9/11)—all
these are signs of the Indian interest in a closer and more pragmatic
relationship with the United States That the Indian Prime Minister
can publicly call the United States “a natural ally” is revealing.
Flourishes such as these are of course not unknown in international
politics, but for the leader of India to say this and to do so on several
occasions is fairly momentous.
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Nuclear policy, too, is suggestive of neoliberal preferences. The
Talbott-Singh dialogue was indicative of the Indian government’s
pragmatism even on this most contentious India-U.S. issue. Its public
pronouncements since May 1998 also are suggestive of a neoliberal
course. The government has emphasized that it wants a minimum
credible deterrent, that it does not seek an arms race, and that it is
not interested in matching the Chinese arsenal. Since May 1998, it
has announced a moratorium on testing and, apart from two missile
tests, it has apparently not moved forward on weaponization or
deployment. On the CTBT, it has committed itself to developing a
consensus on signing the Treaty. That this is no longer particularly
relevant, given the U.S. rejection of the test ban, is another matter.
New Delhi has also indicated that it would participate fully and
seriously in the fissile material ban talks in Geneva. More
importantly, it has engaged the United States and others on
reviewing and tightening (where necessary) India’s nuclear export
controls. Finally, it has shed the old Nehruvian preoccupation with
disarmament as opposed to arms control. While the draft Indian
nuclear doctrine does refer to the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is
clear enough that New Delhi sees this as a utopian goal. Much more
attractive to India are limits and controls on nuclear weapons and on
military activities more generally: in sum, arms control and
confidence building rather than abolition.
Conclusion.
Have the events of September 11, 2001, the war in Afghanistan,
and the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001,
affected any of the assumptions and prescriptions of the Indian
strategic community? Basic strategic assumptions about war, the
adversary, and force change slowly. We will see fundamental
changes at this level only over time, but there may well be the
beginnings of change even here. At the level of grand strategic
prescriptions, we should expect to see changes more quickly and
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perceptibly. Whether or not these changes will be lasting is unclear.
Indian thinking has evolved in a more hyperrealist direction
since September 11 and particularly after December 13. The biggest
changes are in respect to the utility of force and relations with
Pakistan and the United States. The strikes on the United States
might have led Indians to conclude that the use of force was
ultimately rather futile. If the most powerful country on earth, with
its reputation for using force when necessary and its ability to
defend and deter, can be struck such a terrible blow, then one might
conclude that force is of limited value in protecting a society. This is
at best a minority position in the strategic community. The U.S.
response in Afghanistan and the unexpected speed with which the
United States and the Northern Alliance dispatched the Taliban has
suggested instead that overwhelming force can be efficacious. Many
Indians are drawing parallels between the U.S. use of force in
Afghanistan and the Israeli attacks on the Palestinians, and are
asking why India cannot do the same against Pakistan. That Pakistan
has nuclear weapons and that therefore there is a difference with the
U.S. and Israeli situations is acknowledged to some extent, but it is
being argued that there is still room for the coercive use of force by
India. Limited war under nuclear conditions, in this view, is not an
impossibility. Even if India does not eventually use force against
Pakistan for its support of cross-border terrorism, the threat of force
and of military escalation, so the argument goes, should be used to
exert diplomatic pressures against Islamabad.
Indian views of relations with Pakistan are also hardening,
especially after the attack on Parliament on December 13. There is
considerable support for the government’s decision to take a series
of diplomatic steps to indicate its anger with Pakistan, and its
demand for action by Pakistan against terrorist groups across the
border. The government has already withdrawn its High
Commissioner from Islamabad, stopped bus and rail traffic between
the two countries, ordered Pakistan to cut its embassy staff by 50
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percent, and banned overflights by Pakistani airlines. In the next
phase, if Indian demands are not met, the government is threatening
to go further, up to and including abrogating the Indus Rivers Treaty
and revoking most favored nation (MFN) trade status for Pakistani
goods. It has not ruled out the use of force, although it has repeated
that it does not want to go to war. As of spring 2002, Indian troops
have been mobilized and moved up to the front, the air force has
been readied, and the navy has been put on high alert. The
government insists that these are defensive measures but all these
preparations are commensurate with gearing up for a military strike
as well. Many argue that Pakistan is unregenerate and cannot be
coaxed into better behavior either by summitry and agreements or
by playing the economic card. Only diplomatic pressures, the threat
of war or intermittent military strikes against militant camps and
Pakistani facilities, and promoting internal subversion in Pakistan
can exact the kinds of costs that will make Islamabad change its
behavior. If it does not change its behavior, then India will have to
work for the destruction of the Pakistani state. A growing view is
that military escalation will be controllable and that, at the limit, an
eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation may be avoidable. Two
assumptions govern this view. The first is that that India’s escalation
dominance at both the conventional and nuclear levels will hold
Pakistan in check. The second is that in such a confrontation, the
nuclear weapons states and particularly the United States will not
allow Pakistan or India to unleash nuclear weapons.
India’s relationship with the United States is a third area of
grand strategy that has been affected by 9/11 and subsequent events.
In the immediate aftermath of the strikes on New York and
Washington, Indians were angry and alarmed over the recovery of
Pakistan as a strategic partner for the United States. India’s offer of
help seemingly was of little moment, whereas Pakistan overnight
had regained all the ground it had lost over the past 5 years. The
government’s grand strategic plan of allying with the United States
was in danger of collapse. India has recovered from that initial scare
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and has come around to seeing the U.S. fight in Afghanistan as more
important for its own fight against terrorism than the new U.S.Pakistan relationship. The flurry of visits to and from India by highlevel U.S. and Indian decisionmakers has helped sustain the
government’s policy of linking up with the United States
strategically. The strategic community also has come to see the
United States more positively than at any time since 1947. There is
awareness that there is no alternative to cooperating with the United
States and allowing it to play an unprecedented role in South Asia.
The next few weeks (spring 2002) will be pivotal, however. Secretary
of State Colin Powell’s December 2001 statements on President
Pervez Musharraf, relations with Pakistan, and the need for restraint
in South Asia did not please India.109 While the relationship with the
United States is at an all-time high, Indians are watching the United
States carefully for signs of a tilt toward Pakistan in the ongoing
crisis. The United States is still thought to be somewhat hypocritical
and equivocal on terrorism, seemingly more concerned with “its”
terrorist struggle and less concerned about the terrorist challenges
facing other countries. In short, India-U.S. relations have deepened
since September 11. Whether that will be enough in the days and
weeks to come is the question.
In the end it may be worth essaying a thought on nuclear policy.
If the crisis with Pakistan ends in a way that is judged to have been
inconclusive for India or if it appears that the United States and the
international community did not help India sufficiently, then we
may well see a change from a moderate to a more maximalist
nuclear position. India may well conclude that there can be no
strategic autonomy and, ultimately, security in a post-9/11 world
without formidable military power, a willingness to stare down
one’s opponent, and the ability to go to war. A big, versatile nuclear
force will be necessary, in this view, to back up usable conventional
power and to hold at bay any great powers that may seek to
intervene. Should such a view gain ground, it would probably mean
the resumption of nuclear testing, the quicker development of long-
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range missiles and nuclear weapons-capable submarines, and the
full deployment of nuclear weapons—all the things that the
hyperrealists have been urging on India.
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CHAPTER 12
PAKISTAN’s STRATEGIC CULTURE
Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Strategic culture is a collectivity of the beliefs, norms, values, and
historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences
their understanding and interpretation of security issues and
environment, and shapes their responses to these. It is a perceptual
framework of orientations, values, and beliefs that serves as a screen
through which the policymakers observe the dynamics of the
external security environment, interpret the available in formation
and decide about the policy options in a given situation.
Strategic culture establishes “pervasive and long-lasting strategic
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of
military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of actuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”1 It comprises certain
assumptions about the strategic environment, especially the nature
of the adversary and the threat it poses. It also offers definite ideas
about the ways to deal with an adversary or to cope with an adverse
environment.2
The advocates of strategic culture argue that security
management decisions are shaped by “different cultural influences
on the decisionmakers and not by the rational pursuit of similar
national security or functional organizational interests.”3 The
historical narratives created by the dominant elite, their notions of
war and peace, the dynamics of power politics in a polity and the
decisionmaking patterns have a profound impact on the defense and
security-related disposition of a state. These norms, beliefs, and
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perceptions of history are often self -justifying and do not easily
change. The information relating to security issues and problems is
interpreted against the backdrop of strategic culture, which in turn
influences the selection of options to cope with a situation. In other
words, as Jack Snyder puts it, strategic culture represents “the sum
total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of
habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community
have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each
other.”4 It offers a better understanding of a state’s military and
security strategies. Another perspective finds an analogy between
the concept of political culture and strategic culture. The former is a
“short-hand expression of a mind-set which has the effect of limiting
attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems and solutions which are logically possible.” The latter has the
same characteristics but it applies to security and defense policymakers. It includes “the beliefs and assumptions that frame their
choices about international military behavior, particularly those
concerning decisions to go war, preference for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and the levels of wartime
casualties that would be acceptable.”5
The underlying assumption is that the political-military
policymakers do not always respond to reality. They do not make a
dispassionate and realistic assessment of the options and are not
invariably restrained by organizational dynamics. Their security
disposition is shaped by “their image of the situation.” Their
behavior is determined by what they “think the world is like, not
what it is really like.”6
Historical narratives, perceptions of the adversary’s intentions
and capabilities, and the beliefs, values, and norms of the policymakers are useful to understand the strategic disposition of a state
and the choices the security managers make. However, it may be
difficult to explain each and every decision only with reference to
strategic culture. The role of careful analysis of the situation based
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on realism and the impact of organizational imperatives cannot be
totally excluded.
Historical experiences, perceptions of the adversary and a
conception of self—the determinants of strategic culture—are
relatively permanent, but each crisis situation may be totally or
partly different; this calls for a thorough review of the “facts” of a
situation. Such a review is no doubt done against the backdrop of the
relatively permanent strategic culture, but the new or unique
features of a situation may compel the policymakers to look
elsewhere—to the dynamics of international politics, the role of
technology, and the constraints of diplomacy. At times, the strategic
cultural perspective and the dictates of realism may lead to the same
or similar policy measures. Pakistan’s decision to seek U.S. military
assistance in the mid-1950s and the early 1980s can be explained
with reference to Pakistan’s strategic culture as well as realism
(keeping in view the regional power imbalance to the advantage of
India’s and Pakistan’s resource constraints).
A professional and disciplined military supported by sufficiently
advanced technology and trained human power (e.g., the Indian and
Pakistani militaries) can override the impact of strategic culture in
favor of other considerations—technological, scientific and power
political—in a given situation. There may be a debate among the
policymakers as to the weight to be given to different factors impinging on a security issue. Furthermore, if a military maintains distance
from the society, its top brass have a greater probability of acting
professionally, that is, going for a comprehensive review of a situation. Who makes the major input to security policy is also important
in determining the role of societal factors and the ability of the
policymakers to balance the impact of strategic culture and other
considerations. Civilian leaders who are always concerned about
popular support in order to sustain themselves in power may be
motivated more by considerations of political gains than by professional defense imperatives. If the top brass make the major input,
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there is a greater probability of the professional and organizational
considerations playing an important role in security-related decisions.
Notwithstanding these comments, strategic culture is an
important concept to understand the disposition, responses, and
decisions of the security policymakers. It offers a better understanding of how the leaders are likely to react to a security situation
and what type of options they are likely to go for. Knowledge of
strategic culture helps us to understand the sensitivities of a state
and how to meaningfully engage in a dialogue with its leaders in a
given situation. Many of the policy options or behavior patterns can
be understood with reference to strategic culture. For example, the
role of mujahideen or jihadis in Afghanistan, Kashmir or Palestine cannot be fully understood without reference to their historical narratives, orientations, beliefs , and values. Similarly, reaction to killings
in a war, insurgency, or the capacity to face hardships for a cause
may not be appreciated by a rational choice approach. Ideological
factors, historical narratives, and perception of the self as well as
identification with the cause have better explanatory potential.
The study of strategic culture focuses on the historical experiences and narratives of the policymakers, their perceptions of the
adversary’s intentions and capabilities, and the challenges they
encounter in their interaction with the rest of the world, especially
the immediate neighbors. It takes into account the beliefs , values,
and orientations of the policymakers concerning these security
issues.
The Prism of the Policymakers and Strategic Culture.
The fact that Pakistan was a new state, carved out of India on the
basis of Muslim separatism, has contributed to its insecurity. Most
Indians, especially the policymakers, viewed the establishment of
Pakistan as a negation of the principles they stood for during the
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struggle for independence. Their disposition towards Pakistan
ranged from reluctant acceptance to a hope that the new state might
collapse, making it possible for the separated territories to return to
India. Pakistani leaders overemphasized their “separateness” and
“distinct identity,” reacting sharply to what they perceived as India’s
attempts to strangle the new state in its infancy. Their greatest fear
was the collapse of the state due to either internal disorder caused by
the process of partition, killings, and mass migrations, or India’s
noncooperative, if not hostile, attitude toward Pakistan in the early
years of independence.
It is interesting to note that the top leaders of the Muslim League
who played a decisive role in the movement for the establishment of
Pakistan expected cordial relations between independent India and
independent Pakistan. As early as 1930, while proposing the idea of
a Muslim state in India during his presidential address to the
Muslim League session, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal said that the establishment of a “consolidated Muslim state” meant peace and security
for India “resulting from an internal balance of power.”7 In the early
1940s, Mohammed Ali Jinnah argued that a separate Muslim state
would ensure security in the northwestern zone, and India would
guard the southern and western India. He continued, “We join
together as good friends and neighbors and say to the world, ‘Hands
off India’.” In October 1944 and November 1946, Jinnah said that
India and Pakistan would “proclaim a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ of their
own for the defense of the subcontinent against all outsiders.”8 The
leaders of India and Pakistan toyed with the idea of common defense
immediately before and after independence in August 1947.9
However, the situation changed rapidly soon after independence,
although the echo of joint defense or shared security was heard
occasionally thereafter.
In security and a Hostile India. Three major developments changed
the perspective of Pakistani leaders towards India and caused
serious security problems for them. First, the communal riots that
accompanied the partition of India and the massive influx of
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refugees shocked them. Hardly any part of Pakistan escaped the
adverse impact of the refugee problem or the killings. A large
number of civil servants and military personnel found their family
members trapped in communal riots and mass migrations. Second,
the disputes over the distribution of assets of the government of
British India (civil and military) also caused much bitterness.
Pakistan was more in need of resources for establishing the administrative and military structures of the new state, but it did not receive
its due share, especially of military stores, weapons, and equipment.
Pakistan had to set up a new federal government in Karachi and a
new provincial administration in Dhaka. Both cities, especially
Dhaka, lacked physical resources and other requirements for
creating the infrastructure of the administration, not to speak of the
shortage of experienced civil servants and military officers. Third,
the dispute on the accession of the princely states of Junagadh and
especially Jammu and Kashmir caused much bitterness. On top of all
this was the first Kashmir war, in 1947-48, that brought the two
armies face to face with each other at a time when the Pakistani military, the smaller of the two armies, was in the process of reorganization. These three factors shaped Pakistan’s perception of India as
an adversary.
It was not difficult to evolve a historical narrative to justify what
Pakistan’s policymakers perceived as India’s “hostile” attitude. They
viewed the antagonism between India and Pakistan as an extension
of the distrust and conflict of goals between the Congress Party and
the Muslim League in the pre-independence period as the latter
demanded the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims.
Pakistan’s official and unofficial circles argued that having failed to
stop the creation of Pakistan, the Indian leaders (the Congress Party)
were creating maximum problems for Pakistan. The major disputes
that spoiled their relations in the early years of independence
included, inter alia, the problems of religious minorities, the river
water dispute, the evacuee property issue, the concentration of
Indian troops on the Punjab border in 1950, and the unilateral
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suspension of trade by India in 1950. It was generally believed in
Pakistan that India did not want to solve these problems amicably in
order to purposefully jeopardize the survival of the new state of
Pakistan. The negative statements of Indian leaders strengthened
these perceptions. Pakistan’s policymakers were thus convinced that
Pakistan was externally vulnerable and the search for security
loomed large in their strategic considerations.
Afghanistan’s irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory
intensified the latter’s insecurity. When the Afghan government
came to know in 1947 that the British had finally decided to wind up
their rule over India and that the state of Pakistan would come into
existence, it laid claims on North Western Frontier Province and
parts of Balochistan. The Afghan government adopted divergent
positions on its irredentist claim ranging from independence for the
claimed territory or maximum autonomy within Pakistan to their
absorption into Afghanistan.10 On the pretext of this territorial claim,
Afghanistan opposed Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations
(UN) in September 1947. Intermittent border clashes between the
two countries in the 1950s and the 1960s caused much concern to
Pakistan, and their diplomatic relations were severed twice, in 1955
and 1962.11 Afghanistan was a weaker military power, but what
perturbed Pakistan most was India’s support of Afghanistan’s claims
on Pakistani territory. In 1955, the Soviet Union endorsed
Afghanistan’s demands on Pakistan.12 A large section of public
opinion and the government in Pakistan feared a two-front war:
armed clashes erupting simultaneously on the Pakistan-India and
Pakistan-Afghanistan borders.
A host of security handicaps accentuated Pakistan’s insecurity.
Pakistan’s territory lacks depth and the main railroad link from
south to north (Karachi to Peshawar) runs parallel to the IndiaPakistan border; at several points it is within 60 miles of the Indian
border or the Line of Control in Kashmir. Three Pakistani cities
(Lahore, Sialkot, Kasur) are situated very close to the border, and
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there are hardly any natural barriers like rivers and mountains on
the India-Pakistan border, especially in the Punjab area. No Pakistani
military airfield with the exception of Quetta is more than 150 miles
from the Indian border. Such A situation creates serious handicaps
for the security managers because an adequate defense of these
population centers and communication lines calls for confronting the
troops of the adversary right on the border or in the adversary’s
territory. This requires a well-equipped, highly mobile and hardhitting army. Pakistan lacked such a defensive capability in the early
years of independence.
Opposition to India’s Regional Ambitions. Pakistan’s civilian and
military leaders have often expressed strong reservations about
India’s efforts to assume a leadership and commanding role in South
Asia because of its size, population, industrial and technological
advancement, and military power. This is a long-cherished and often
unstated goal whose roots go back to the days of Nehru. Indian
leaders emphasized India’s commanding role in a more forceful
manner after Pakistan’s military debacle in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani
war.
India’s leadership model asserts that a strong and powerful India
capable of projecting its power in the region and outside is a
guarantee of security and stability of the whole of South Asia.13
India’s policymakers argue that India’s growing military power is no
threat to any state in South Asia because it has nothing against them.
They should coordinate their foreign and security policies with New
Delhi so that India plays its role as the guarantor of regional security
and stability in an effective manner. This strategy has two “core
perceptions.” First, the neighboring states must coordinate their
foreign policy with the imperatives of India’s centrality and security.
Second, India does not favor any outside power supplying
weaponry to or establishing a military presence in any neighboring
state.14 Regional states should establish ties with other states within
the parameters acceptable to New Delhi. In case a South Asian state
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is confronted with some internal problem, it must first approach
India before seeking support from elsewhere. In addition to
insulating the region from external penetration, India insists that the
bilateral problems between it and any other South Asian state should
be dealt with strictly at the bilateral level without involving any
other state or international organization. India has always raised
serious objections to the efforts of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal
to raise their problems with India (i.e., Kashmir, river water, and
trade and transit respectively) at the international level. Indian
government circles and some scholars periodically argue that India
reserves the right to intervene in the domestic problems of the
bordering states if these have implications for India’s security,
including internal consolidation.15 These policy orientations indicate
that India’s security boundaries extend beyond its territorial
boundaries; these coincide with the outer territorial boundaries of
the adjacent states of South Asia.16
Search for Security.
The search for security emerged as the cardinal concern of
Pakistan’s policymakers that not only shaped their worldview and
disposition towards regional and international politics but also
served as an instrument of policy. It manifested itself in four major
policy options: 1) opposition to India’s regional dominance agenda,
2) augmentation of security by assigning the highest priority to
defense needs, 3) weapons procurements from abroad, and 4)
reliance on diplomacy, including military alignment, to overcome its
military weakness vis-à-vis militarily powerful India.
Pakistan’s policymakers and security managers strongly believe
that a New Delhi-managed security model cannot serve as a basis for
durable peace in South Asia. Such a power arrangement comes in
conflict with the national aspirations of other states of South Asia. It
also lacks flexibility to accommodate the divergent perceptions of
peace and security held by the smaller states of the region. Pakistan
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advocates a pluralist power model, which emphasizes the principle
of sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other’s national
sensitivities and recognition of the right of each state to freely
conduct its foreign and domestic affairs. Regional security
parameters should evolve through dialogue and mutual accommodation rather than one state imposing its national priorities.17
Indian leaders dismiss the fears of the neighboring states as
baseless. They argue that the major cause of the problems between
India and its neighbors, especially Pakistan, is their unwillingness to
acknowledge India’s status. If they, especially Pakistan, abandon
their efforts to mobilize support from the states situated outside of
South Asia, the security situation in South Asia will improve.
Pakistan’s abhorrence to India’s commanding role in view of its
historical experiences and the distrust of the latter is deeply
ingrained into Pakistan’s strategic culture. Pakistan’s determination
to protect its national identity and policy autonomy did not decline
after the 1971 military debacle at the hands of India. If anything, its
disposition stiffened.
Defense requirements have enjoyed the top priority in Pakistan.
No matter whether the government was being run by civilians or
generals, defense was allocated the major share of the national
budget. Pakistan’s defense expenditure has ranged from about 73
percent in 1949-50 to 24-25 percent of the total federal expenditure in
2000-01. Its current ratio to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranges
between 5 and 6 percent. This does not include covert expenditure
on defense-related projects as well as weapons and equipment
Pakistan obtained as grants from the United States in the mid-1950s.
Pakistan can be described as a country where poverty of resources
for human needs contrasts with the affluence under which military
programs operate.
Pakistan began weapons procurement from abroad soon after
independence because of the acute sense of insecurity and a lack of
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indigenous defense industry. Pakistan purchased small weapons
and equipment from Great Britain and other Commonwealth
countries in the early years of independence. It was not until
Pakistan joined U.S.- sponsored alliances in 1954-55 that Pakistan
began to obtain weapons and military equipment for the three
services in large quantity. Pakistan and the United States signed the
Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty in May 1954, which facilitated
U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan and military training of its personnel
by U.S. experts. Pakistan was admitted to the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact
(later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) in
September 1955. The fourth security-related arrangement with the
United States was signed in March 1959; called the Bilateral
Agreement of Cooperation, this was an executive arrangement not
confirmed by the U.S. Senate. A separate agreement was signed in
July 1959 allowing the United States to set up a communication
facility, i.e., an air base, near Peshawar.18
Pakistan’s policymakers decided to join the American alliance
system to overcome its security problems. As early as 1951,
Pakistan’s military authorities realized that Pakistan lacked the
resources to upgrade its defense and obtain modern weapons from
abroad. Therefore they were convinced that Pakistan must have “a
strong and reliable friend” who was willing to contribute to
Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen its defense.19 By joining the alliance
system they were able to get the weapons, military equipment, and
training facilities which they could not obtain otherwise. As they
perceived an acute security problem for Pakistan, realism dictated a
policy of alignment to cope with the immediate security problems,
disregarding the diplomatic cost of aligning with the United States.
Pakistan’s policymakers were clear in their mind that they were
working towards strengthening their security vis-à-vis India and
Afghanistan, rather than the Soviet Union, which was the American
concern.
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Pakistan again leaned towards the West, especially the United
States, in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979. The United States pledged to
underwrite Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, although
no new defense treaty was signed. Despite the differences over
Pakistan’s nuclear program, the two countries developed a close
security and diplomatic relationship with reference to the Afghan
conflict. The first 6-year economic assistance and military sales
package (1981-87) offered by the United States to Pakistan amounted
to $3.2 billion. It was equally divided between economic assistance
and a military sales credit facility. About 55 percent of economic
assistance was provided as grants while the rest was in the form of
soft-term loans. Military assistance was in the form of a credit
facility, repayable at a 10-14 percent rate of interest. Pakistan also
obtained 40 F-16 aircraft during 1983-86 through cash payments
outside of the credit facility. The second assistance package (1987-93)
amounted to $4.02 billion at concessional rates of interest. Out of
this, $2.28 billion was allocated for economic assistance and $1.74
billion was in the form of military sale credits. (The United States
terminated this assistance package in October 1990.) 20 The United
States and Pakistan contributed significantly to building and
strengthening resistance to the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan spearheaded by militant Islamic-Afghan groups. This
relationship began to lose its momentum after Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan in 1989 and came to an end in October 1990 when
the Bush administration invoked the Pressler Amendment (1985)
against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and halted all military
sales and economic assistance.
In the early 1970s, Pakistan adopted a different strategy to
strengthen its security. It avoided alignment with the West and
pursued nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy. The civilian
leadership that assumed power after Pakistan lost the Bangladesh
war to India (December 1971) had enough popular support to
pursue a nonaligned foreign policy.
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Pakistan always attached importance to diplomacy for building
international support for its policies, especially the Kashmir issue
and other problems with India. It has traditionally given much
attention to cultivating active ties with the Muslim countries. This
relationship, especially with the oil-rich Arab states like Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Libya, and Iran,
contributed significantly to rehabilitating Pakistan economically and
diplomatically after the 1971 breakup of Pakistan.
Strategic Doctrine.
While mobilizing internal resources, procuring weapons from
abroad and relying on astute diplomacy in order to ensure security,
Pakistan’s policymakers never aimed at military parity with India,
which was neither possible nor desirable. They wanted to develop
enough military capability to let India know that Pakistan could not
only withstand India’s military pressures but also increase the cost of
an armed conflict for that country.
A conventional war with India in Kashmir or on the international
border was considered a strong possibility. The strategy was to
confront the opposing troops right on the borders or to take the war
into the adversary’s territory because some of the Pakistani cities
were situated close to the border. However, Pakistan could not carry
on war for a long period of time due to the paucity of economic
resources and a weak industrial base, especially the limited capacity
of its weapons industry.
Pakistan’s policymakers believe that Pakistan must have the
capability to raise the cost of the war to unacceptable limits for the
adversary so as to deter the latter from engaging in military
adventurism. A prerequisite for such a strategy is the maintenance of
a highly professional, trained, and well-equipped military with
strong fire-power and mobility. An effective air cover is much
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needed for such operations. Similarly, effective communication and
transport systems are needed to quickly transfer troops from one
sector to another sector. Pakistan’s preferred option is to build
pressure on India in Kashmir by engaging in limited military
operations there or by extending clandestine military support to
Kashmiri activists fighting against India. The latter strategy is less
costly for Pakistan and ties a large number of Indian troops in
Kashmir.
Pakistan cannot pursue its strategic doctrine without external
cooperation as it lacks sufficient domestic resources to develop the
required capability. Therefore, it is not surprising that the military
planners attached such importance to Pakistan’s security relations
with the United States. Pakistan’s relations with the People’s
Republic of China are no less significant because China is an important source for building Pakistan’s defense capability. Pakistan began
to obtain weapons and military equipment from China towards the
end of 1965 (after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war) or in early 1966. Since
then this relationship has expanded. China has supplied weapons
and equipment for the three services and contributes significantly to
building Pakistan’s defense industry. It has also extended technical
support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs.
The deterrence approach developed for conventional defense
applies equally to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Had India
not gone for nuclear explosions in May 1998, Pakistan would have
continued with the policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” i.e., admitting to
having a nuclear weapons capability but not going so far as to
explode or make a bomb. Nuclear ambiguity served Pakistan’s
security goals as both India and Pakistan knew that each could make
nuclear weapons and that if one country went ahead with weaponization, the other would do the same. This policy lost its operational
relevance after India resorted to nuclear explosions in May 1998.
Pakistan conducted nuclear explosions after 17 days to rectify the
strategic imbalance in South Asia.21 Pakistan’s nuclear explosions
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were neither meant to strengthen its claims for a global role nor to
produce an “Islamic bomb.” These nuclear explosions were reactive
and were meant to counter what the policymakers described as
India’s nuclear blackmail and its potential to engage in military
action across the Line of Control in Kashmir. As a matter of fact,
Pakistan’s nuclear explosions have neutralized India’s superiority in
conventional defense. Pakistan is not expected to accept any nuclear
weapons restraint regime unless it takes into account its security
concerns and offers a restraint framework that applies equally to
conventional security arrangements. Pakistan does not accept India’s
“no first use” offer. Such a restraint is a disadvantage to the weaker
power, i.e., Pakistan in South Asia. Therefore, Pakistan will welcome
a comprehensive restraint regime that applies to conventional and
nonconventional armaments.
Islam and Strategic Culture.
Islam is integral to Pakistan’s strategic culture because it
contributes to shaping societal dispositions and the orientations of
the policymakers. Islam is closely associated with the establishment
of the state and the constitution designates the state as an “Islamic
Republic,” with an emphasis on the Islamic character of Pakistani
identity and a stipulation that no law can be enacted that violates the
basic principles and teachings of Islam. Islam figures prominently in
political and military discourse. All political parties with some
popular standing recognize the centrality of Islam to the political
process and highlight their commitment to Islam in their election
manifestos and policy statements. Education at the primary, secondary, and college levels (the first 14 years of education) includes
Islamic studies (principles and teachings of Islam) as a compulsory
course of study at all levels for Muslim students. The historical
narratives highlight the advent of Islam in India, glorify Muslim rule
there, and define Pakistani identity with reference to Islam and the
Muslim rule. These narratives also maintain that the Muslim
interests and rights were threatened by an unsympathetic Hindu
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majority during the British rule, forcing the Muslims to first seek
constitutional safeguards and then a separate state. If Islamic
orientations and values are so deeply rooted in the society and the
state, these are bound to influence the strategic culture of Pakistan.
The Pakistani military emphasizes Islam in conjunction with
professionalism, hierarchy, discipline, and service-pride as the
cardinal principles of military organization. Islamic principles and
teachings and Islamic history, especially Islamic battles and the
Muslim generals, are included in the courses of study and training of
military personnel. The Islamic notions shaheed (martyr), ghazi
(victorious), and Jihad-e-fi-sibilallah (holy war in the name of God) are
emphasized as the major sources of inspiration for the Pakistani
military in war and peace. As Islam is closely associated with the
establishment of Pakistan, its defense, especially vis-à-vis India, is
projected by civilian and military leaders as the defense of Islam.
These notions and Islamic symbols were repeatedly invoked during
the wars in 1965 and 1971 to galvanize the military personnel and to
mobilize popular support for the war efforts.
Islamic conservatism has increased in the military since the 1970s
as the number of officers from the middle and lower-middle classes
has risen. Invariably, they have come from conservative religious
backgrounds. A number of other factors reinforced this trend in the
1980s.
First, the emphasis on Islam increased in the military during the
period of General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-88) . Facing a crisis of
legitimacy, General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime invoked orthodox
Islamic injunctions and mobilized orthodox Islamic groups in order
to build support for his rule. This fit well with the changes in the
orientation of the officers recruited in the 1970s and 1980s. The Zia
regime encouraged the public display of religious orientation in the
Army and allowed some of the orthodox religious groups to
penetrate the Army.
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Second, the experience of the Afghanistan conflict (1979-89)
reinforced Islamic conservatism among Army personnel. A good
number of them worked in collaboration with the Islamic parties and
Afghan resistance groups that were fighting against Soviet troops in
Afghanistan. Some of the Pakistani Army personnel, especially those
serving with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), were convinced that
the Afghanistan experience could be replicated elsewhere, and that it
offered an option to bring an end to non-Muslim domination of the
Muslims.
However, the top commanders draw a line between religious
conservatism and activism in the name of Islam. The latter is
disallowed because the top brass think that it undermines
professional excellence, discipline, and the service ethos. They
emphasize the age-old tradition of keeping Islam and military
professionalism together, treating the former as a component of the
latter.
The Afghanistan experience created a nexus between Islamic
militancy and Pakistan’s foreign policy. An Islam-oriented Afghan
resistance movement, often labeled as Afghan Mujahideen, cropped
up as the Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan in December 1979,
although its roots could be traced to an earlier period. They were
ideologically inspired and viewed their resistance activities as a holy
war against the occupying forces of a Godless Communist country
(i.e., the Soviet Union). Pakistan’s ISI and the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) transferred weapons to Afghan resistance
groups and advised them on strategy against Soviet troops in
Afghanistan. The West, the conservative Arab rulers in the Middle
East, and Pakistan glorified these Afghan “holy” warriors as the
heroes of the cause of freedom. Two other developments strengthened their position. First, most Muslim states and movements
supported their cause. Some oil-rich Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia,
the UAE) as well as some wealthy Arab individuals extended
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financial assistance to Afghan resistance groups. Egypt transferred
an undisclosed quantity of Soviet weapons to these groups. Second,
within a short span of time, the Afghan resistance movement turned
transnational. A large number of Arabs and other Muslims joined
them to fight the “holy war” in Afghanistan. Some of these Arabs
engaged in welfare activities for Afghan refugees in Pakistan while
others got military training from different Afghan groups and fought
against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. By the time Soviet troops
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, several thousand Muslim
volunteers from Arab and non-Arab countries were attached to
Afghan resistance groups.
The courage and valor shown by Islam-inspired volunteers
(Afghans and others) in Afghanistan impressed Pakistan’s foreign
policymakers. As already noted, some of the military and
intelligence personnel associated with the Afghan resistance were so
captivated by the Afghanistan experience that they felt this could be
replicated elsewhere for advancing Muslims causes. The resistance
groups were also elated by their success in Afghanistan and felt that
they must carry forward the spirit of the Afghan Jihad (holy war) and
help Muslims fight anti-Muslim forces anywhere in the world. They
found a new cause in Indian-administered Kashmir where an
insurgency had erupted in 1989. The initial links with the Kashmir
insurgency were established in 1990 but their active involvement
began after the collapse of the pro-Moscow Najib government in
Kabul in April 1992. Their Pakistani counterparts joined them in this
struggle.
These developments were in line with the Islamic content of
Pakistan’s strategic culture and, therefore, Pakistan’s policymakers
were happy to find ideologically motivated Muslim volunteers who
were prepared to facilitate the achievement of Pakistan’s goals in
Kashmir—the building of military pressure on India—without incurring heavy material and manpower losses for the military. Recognizing the instrumental relevance of militant Islamic groups, the
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Pakistan military patronized them through its intelligence agency,
the ISI. The ISI provided them funding and weapons and facilitated
their induction into Indian-administered Kashmir. These militant
groups engaged a large number of Indian military and paramilitary
personnel as well as police and intelligence agencies. Pakistan’s
decision to support the operations of the Islamic militants in Indianadministered Kashmir reflects a combination of beliefs , values, and
historical experience as well as expediency and a down-to-earth
assessment of military disparity between India and Pakistan.
The stepped up activities of militant Islamic groups created a
host of problems for Pakistan’s management of foreign policy and
domestic affairs. These activities caused strains in Pakistan’s
relations with the West, especially the United States, because these
Islamic groups were extremely anti-West, and often demanded that
Pakistan delink itself from the United States. Domestically, the rise of
militant Islamic groups increased religious and cultural intolerance,
resulting in religious-sectarian killings and law and order problems.
These developments undermined Pakistan’s image abroad, discouraged foreign investment, and marred the prospects for Pakistan’s
early economic recovery, raising doubts about the capacity of the
Pakistani state to continue performing its basic duties towards the
citizenry.
Pakistan found itself in an extremely difficult situation. It
supported the militants’ role in Indian-administered Kashmir but
wanted to control the adverse effects of their activities on Pakistan’s
domestic political scene and on its interactions with the United
States and other Western countries. This dilemma was accentuated
after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, on
September 11, 2001. U.S. President George W. Bush delivered a
virtual ultimatum to Pakistan to join hands with the international
community for containing the transnational terrorism spearheaded
by Afghanistan-based al Qaeda. A realistic assessment of the situation led the government of Pakistan to cooperate with the United
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States for military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistan also took action against some of the
Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups.
However, the military government allowed the militant Islamic
groups active in Kashmir to carry on their activities in a low-keyed
manner. These groups overplayed their hand by launching terrorist
attacks on high-profile targets, such as the Indian parliament and an
Indian military camp in Kashmir, placing Pakistan in an embarrassing situation in view of the assertion by its leaders that they had
contained the activities of these groups.
Availing itself of the post-9/11 global consensus for controlling
terrorism, India moved its troops to the Line of Control in Kashmir
and to the Pakistan borders in order to put an end to “cross-border
terrorism” from Pakistani territory. Pakistan responded by mobilizing its troops and threatened war if Indian troops entered Pakistanadministered Kashmir or Pakistani territory under the pretext of
destroying the alleged terrorist camps. The United States and other
Western countries advised restraint by both countries and applied
strong diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to control the infiltration of
Islamic groups into Indian-administered Kashmir. In another
manifestation of realism, Pakistan agreed to take measures to cut off
the infiltration, at least for the time being.
Concluding Observations.
Strategic culture is a useful concept for explaining the profile and
behavior of the security policymakers of a state. It conditions their
worldview, interpretation of political and military developments,
perception of the adversary, and selection of policy options. The
disposition of Pakistan’s security managers is influenced by
historical experiences, especially in the early years of independence,
their perception of the regional security environment and Pakistan’s
security handicaps, and their threat perceptions. The major features
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of Pakistan’s strategic culture can be summed up as follows: (a) An
acute insecurity developed in the early years of independence due to
troubled relations with India and problems with Afghanistan. (b) A
strong distrust of India and a history of acrimonious Indo-Pakistani
relations reinforced by the historical narratives of the preindependence period and the troubled bilateral interaction in the
post-independence period. (c) Aversion to an India-dominated
regional power arrangement for South Asia. (d) An active search for
security to maintain its independence in deciding about foreign
policy options and domestic policies. (e) A close nexus between
Islam and strategic thinking, leading to connections between Islamic
militancy and foreign policy.
These attributes of Pakistan’s strategic culture shaped Pakistan’s
security and foreign policy options. These included an advocacy of a
pluralist power arrangement for South Asia, greater attention to
external security, acquisition of military capacity to raise the cost of
war for the adversary, liberal allocation of resources to defense,
weapons procurement from abroad, and the use of diplomacy and
alliance-building with other states, especially with the United States,
for strengthening its position in the region. Other important
strategies were the acquisition of an overt nuclear status in response
to India’s nuclear explosions and the use of Islamic militancy to
pursue foreign policy goals.
However, the emphasis on strategic culture does not totally
exclude the role of other considerations, such as realism, professionalism, and organizational imperatives. Many of Pakistan’s securityrelated decisions involve the elements of more than one approach.
As a professional and disciplined institution, the Pakistani military
cannot be oblivious to realities on the ground. Realism and organizational imperatives have influenced their outlook and decisions on
many occasions. At times, the dictates of different approaches
conflict with each other and the policymakers may be unwilling or
unable to make a clear-cut choice. This is the case with the approach
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of Pakistan’s security managers towards the militant Islamic groups
in the post-9/11 period.
The strategic culture approach helps us understand the historical
and psychological dynamics of decisionmaking. It highlights the
impact of ideological and other societal variables on policymaking
and offers a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political
context within which the policymakers function. Any study of a
state’s strategic profile and the possible reaction to security pressures
requires, inter alia, a good appreciation of the strategic culture of the
country concerned. This facilitates communication between the
security policymakers and the outside actors, i.e., individuals, states,
and organizations, on security-related issues and helps to identify
ways and means to change their policy outputs. This is quite
important for promoting arms control in conventional and nonconventional fields.
ENDNOTES
1. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, p. 46.
2. Ibid.
3. Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and
Control systems,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2000, p. 30.
4. For Jack Snyder’s narration of strategic culture, see Michael C. Desch,
“Culture Clash,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 141-170.
5. Stephen P. Rosen, “Military Effectiveness,” International Security, Vol. 19,
No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 5-31.
6. Kenneth Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” in
Worlfram F. Hannrieder, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, New
York: David McKay Co., 1971, p. 91.
7. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal’s presidential address to the Muslim League at

326

Allahabad in December 1930. See Waheeduzzaman, Towards Pakistan, Lahore:
Publishers United, 1969, p. 132.
8. S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1973, p. 55.
9. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political
Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 38; see also
Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 19.
10. For Afghanistan’s official claim on Pakistani territory, see, Rehman
Pazwak, Pakhtunistan, London: Afghan Information Bureau, n.d.
11. Shirin Tahir-kheli, “Pakhtoonistan and its International Implications,”
World affairs, Winter 1974-75, pp. 233-245; Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan,
Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971, pp. 145-163.
12. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, New York: Praeger,
1972, p. 124.
13. Douglas C. Makeig, “War, No-War and the Indo-Pakistan Negotiation
Process,” Pacific affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 271-294.
14. George Tanham, “Indian Strategic Culture,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15,
No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 129-142.
15. See Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 11-22.
16. See Tanham, “Indian Strategic Culture,” p. 133.
17. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of
Foreign Policy, New York: St. Martins, 1993, p. 21; see also idem, “Pakistan’s Threat
Perception and Weapons Procurement,” in W. Thomas Wander, Eric H. Arnett,
and Paul J. Bracken, eds., The Diffusion of Advanced Weaponry: Technologies, Regional
Implications, and Responses, Washington, DC: American Association for Advancement of Science, 1994, p. 197.
18. The American U-2 aircraft that was shot down over Soviet territory in May
1960, causing a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, took off from this air base. This air
base was closed down in 1969 on the expiration of the 1959 agreement.

327

19. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1963, p. 154.
20. On the U.S.-Pakistan aid relationship, see the chapters by Herbert G.
Hagerty and Arshad Zaman in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds., Pakistan-U.S.
Relations: Social, Political, and Economic Factors, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian
Studies, University of California, 1988, pp. 237-265; Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Security
and Foreign Policy, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988, pp. 217-219, 231-234.
21. For a review of Pakistan’s nuclear program, see Zafar Iqbal Cheema,
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control,” in Lavoy, Sagan,
and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 158-181; Munir Ahmad Khan, “Nuclearization of South Asia and its Regional and Global Implications,” Regional Studies
(Islamabad), Vol. XVI, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 3-38 (the author is former
Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission); and Hasan-Askari Rizvi,
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6, November-December
2001, pp. 943-955. 328.

328

CHAPTER 13
“CULT OF DEFENSE” AND “GREAT POWER DREAMS”:
THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE ON
CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA
Andrew Scobell
INTRODUCTION
Strategic culture should be considered a significant dimension in
analyses of China’s security policy for two reasons. First, the subject
of national cultures has become widely recognized as a key
dimension in strategy, including in the impact of culture on a
country’s tendency to use force.1 Indeed, the impact of culture is
vital to understanding China’s military and security affairs.
Particularly prevalent is the contention that contemporary Chinese
international relations have been heavily influenced by an ancient
and enduring civilization.2
Second, scholars, analysts, and policymakers in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) frequently assert that past and present
policy and behavior is conditioned by a unique traditional Chinese
philosophy of international relations. One influential military
thinker, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, former vice president of the
Academy of Military Sciences, reasons that:
Culture is the root and foundation of strategy.
Strategic thinking, in the process of its evolutionary history, flows
into the mainstream of a country or a nation’s culture. Each
country or nation’s strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of
cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way,
prescribes and defines strategy making.3
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Indeed, the author of the above words and many others in the
same Chinese elite community also perceive culture to exert a
substantial impact on the strategic behavior of other countries.4
Furthermore, contemporary Chinese perceptions of other states are
strongly colored by China’s interpretations of their assumed cultural
proclivities. These cultural images of other countries, particularly the
images of the strategic cultures of other countries, influence China’s
assessment of threats and potential threats in the international
environment.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explains the
two main interpretations of Chinese strategic culture and the nature
and impact of strategic culture on China’s use of force. The second
analyzes the Chinese image of Indian strategic culture. The third
analyzes the implications of Chinese strategic culture and the
Chinese image of India’s strategic culture.
Definitions and Parameters.
I define strategic culture as the fundamental and enduring
assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in
human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and
military elites in a country.5 These assumptions will vary from
country to country.
Also important are the perceptions prevalent among the elite
within one country regarding the nature of another country’s
strategic culture. The sum total of these assumptions tends to result,
for example, in a composite image held by China of India. Borrowing
from Allen Whiting, I define the strategic cultural image to be “the
preconceived stereotype of the strategic disposition of another
nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation
of history, traditions, and self -image.”6
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Chinese elites are not of one mind on either the nature of their
own strategic culture or on the images of these cultures in other
countries. China’s self-image of its own strategic culture is
essentially a Confucian one comprising a widely held and
hegemonic set of assumptions—although certainly not universal.
However, China’s actual strategic culture is the result of
interplay between Confucian and realpolitik strands. The outcome is
what I call a “Cult of Defense,” where by Chinese elites believe
strongly that their country’s strategic tradition is pacifist, nonexpansionist, and purely defensive but at the same time able to
justify virtually any use of force—including offensive and
preemptive strikes—as defensive in nature.7
Chinese perceptions of the strategic cultures of other states tend
to be formed by military strategists and thus are skewed towards a
negative image—as in the case of India.
Contrasting Depictions of China’s Use of Force.
Culture has long been considered a critical dimension in China’s
approach to strategy and warfare. While the term “strategic culture”
was not used until 1988,8 conventional thinking was that China’s
Confucian tradition was a key determining factor in Chinese
strategic thinking. Because of Confucianism, in this interpretation,
China tends to favor harmony over conflict, and defense over
offense.9 Other analysts, usually focusing on Sun Zi’s Art of War,
have stressed a Chinese predisposition for stratagem over combat
and psychological and symbolic warfare over head-to-head combat
on the battlefield.10 At the very least these interpretations of
Confucius and Sun Zi created the image of a China whose use of
force is cautious and restrained.11 More recently, analysts have
argued that China’s leaders are actually influenced by a realpolitik
(or parabellum) strand of strategic culture.12 According this
interpretation, the elite has and continues to be quite willing to use
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force.
Both of the two major interpretations of China’s strategic
tradition (Confucius/Sun Zi and realpolitik) tend to assume its
strategic culture is monistic and make no attempt to link it to
domestic policy. It is a mistake to assume that a country’s strategic
culture can be subsumed within a single tradition and to focus
exclusively on interstate violence. Indeed, it is likely that there are
multiple strands of strategic culture. And ignoring trends in
intrastate and societal violence risks overlooking diverse and
important values and beliefs about the use of force and violence.13
A CHINESE CULT OF DEFENSE
Two dominant strands of Chinese strategic culture—a
Confucius/Sun Zi one and a realpolitik one—exist side by side. Both
of these are operative and the interaction between the two strands
produces a distinctive strategic culture: what I have dubbed the
“Chinese Cult of Defense.”14 Most Chinese strategic thinkers believe
that Chinese strategic culture is pacifistic, defensive-minded, and
non-expansionist. However, at least in the contemporary era, these
sincerely held beliefs are essentially negated, or twisted, by its
assumptions that any war China fights is just and any military action
is defensive, even when it is offensive in nature. Two further
assumptions reinforce this: that threats to China’s national security
are very real and domestic threats are as dangerous as foreign
threats, and that national unification is a traditional Chinese core
strategic cultural value. The combined effect of these beliefs and
assumptions is paradoxical: while most of China’s leaders, analysts,
and researchers believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese
civilization is fundamentally pacifist, they are nevertheless
predisposed to deploy force when confronting crises.
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The “Confucian” Elements.
The Chinese are particularly smitten with what they view as
China’s special gifts to the theory and practice of statecraft and
international relations.15 While the leaders of most countries tend to
believe they use military power in a strictly defensive manner,16 this
cluster of beliefs seems to be particularly inviolable among the
Chinese.17 Such beliefs are so prevalent among Chinese elites that it
is rare to find civilian and military leaders who do not hold some or
all of them.18 Each of the three “Confucian” elements of Chinese
strategic culture can be highlighted with reference to a phrase or
saying.
“Peace is Precious.” A deeply held belief in elite circles is that
China possesses a pacifist strategic culture. Certainly majorities of
people in most countries, including the United States, say they love
peace—indeed it seems a near universal human desire. What is
striking in the case of China, however, is the extreme degree to
which this is stressed—to the extent that Chinese civilization is
viewed as being uniquely pacifist, totally distinct from other
strategic traditions in the world. One of the most recent official
articulations of this appears in China’s 1998 Defense White Paper:
The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy . . . springs from
the country’s historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with
5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese
thinkers advocated
“associating with benevolent gentlemen and
befriending good neighbors,” which shows that throughout history the
Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of
friendship with the people of other countries.19

Numerous Chinese leaders and researchers in the People’s
Republic of China contend that the Chinese people value peace. In
1995, Admiral Liu Huaqing, then a Vice Chair of the Central Military
Commission, told a pro-Communist Hong Kong news paper:
China has consistently pursued a foreign policy of peace and insists that
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various countries should, in line with the charter of the United Nations
and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence . . . maintain a peaceful
international environment and that disputes between countries should
be settled through negotiations.20

Military researchers trace this preference for peace and harmony
back in history. According to the General Xing Shizhong,
Commandant of the National Defense University:
The Chinese people have always dearly loved peace. … This historical
tradition and national psychology have a profound influence on national
defense objectives and strategic policies of the new socialist China.21

According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, Deputy Director of the Academy of
Military Sciences:
China’s ancient strategic culture is rooted in the philosophical idea of
“unity between man and nature” (tian ren he yi), which pursues overall
harmony between man and nature and harmony among men.22

Researchers also frequently mention the Confucian saying “peace is
precious” (he wei gui).23
Leaders and researchers stress that China pursues peaceful
solutions rather than violent ones. Chinese civilian and military
leaders repeatedly stress China’s adherence to the “Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence” as Liu Huaqing does in the above quote.24
According to one civilian scholar, the ancient principle of “trying
peaceful means before resorting to force” (xianli houbing) has been a
major influence on post-1949 China. Thus, while the “leaders of
Mao’s generation were willing to use force to serve China’s security,
and more broadly, foreign policy goals whenever necessary . . . in
most cases China sent strong warnings or protests or engaged in
negotiations” prior to employing armed force.25 In a discussion of
the military thought of Deng Xiaoping, two scholars observed:
For many years we employed the thinking that, in whatever method we
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adopt to solve a problem, we should not use the means of war [ but
rather] peaceful means.26

And Deng felt it important to stress that one of China’s three main
missions for the 1980s was supporting world peace.27 Regularly cited
to bolster this assertion is Beijing’s policy on reunification with
Taiwan. China’s preferred means of unifying China since 1979 is by
non-military means.28 It is true that under Deng, China’s policy
altered dramatically from liberation by force to peaceful unification.
But it is also important to note that the change is more tactical than
strategic. Indeed, Beijing has refused to renounce the use of force.29
“Never Seek Hegemony.” A second deeply held belief is that China
has never been an aggressive or expansionist state. According to
many leaders and researchers, China has never fought an aggressive
war throughout its long history. And China has not threatened other
countries. In post-1949 China this has taken the form of constant
pronouncements of the fact that “China will never seek
hegemony.”30 Senior soldier Liu Huaqing told a Hong Kong
interviewer in 1995:
China is opposed to the use of force and to threatening with force.
. . . China is against hegemonism and power politics in any form . .
. China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it ever do so in the
future.31

And Deng Xiaoping asserted in 1980 that one of the main tasks for
the decade of supporting peace was intimately linked to “opposing
hegemony” (fanduibaquanzhuyi).32 Of course, at the time hegemony
was code word for the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War,
it has come to mean U.S. domination. But the term hegemony (ba)
has a deeper meaning in Chinese political thought. Badao or “rule by
force” has extremely negative connotations in contrast to wangdao or
“kingly way” or “benevolent rule.”33
According to many Chinese analysts, when China goes to war, it
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does so only in “self-defense.” These analysts assert that virtually all
of the wars China has fought have been waged to protect itself from
external threats or to unify the country. One prominent Chinese
military scholar insists that virtually all of the approximately 3,700 to
4,000 wars China has fought in more than 4,000 years of dynasties
(ending with the collapse of the Qing in 1911) have been civil wars or
wars to unify the country. And all of the eight “military actions”
since 1949, the scholar asserts, have been waged in “self-defense.”34
When Chinese forces have ventured abroad, they have done so for a
limited time and for non-expansionist purposes. According to one
analyst:
the facts are: There are no records showing China’s invasion of other
countries or that China stations any soldiers abroad.35

Researchers regularly cite Mao’s statement: “We [China] do not
desire one inch of foreign soil.”36
Examples often cited to support this interpretation include the
famous voyages of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He. Chinese
researchers emphasize these expeditions were non-military in
nature, and no attempt was made by the Chinese armada to conquer
or colonize the lands it visited. The imperial eunuch’s travels to East
Africa and South Asia seem to have been purely voyages of
exploration. According to several scholars, unlike Western
adventurers such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama,
Zheng did not attempt to establish colonies or use force against
peoples with whom he came in contact.37
“If Someone Doesn't Attack Us, We Won t Attack Them.” The third
central tenet of this cult is that China possesses a purely defensive
strategic culture. According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun: “The Chinese are a
defensive-minded people.”38 The classic illustration of this tendency
regularly cited by Chinese scholars is, not surprisingly, the Great
Wall. As noted by Li, “China’s Great Wall has always been a symbol
of a defense, not the symbol of a national boundary.”39 In the 1990s
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some Chinese researchers have sought to validate this point by citing
Western scholarship, notably the work of John Fairbank and Mark
Mancall.40 They also seek to make their case by drawing a direct
comparison between Western and Chinese strategic traditions.
According to Major General Yao Youzhi, Director of the Department
of Strategic Studies at the Academy of Military Sciences, China’s
military tradition places “complete stress on a defensive stance”
whereas, in contrast, Western military tradition “emphasizes
offense.”41
Another example of the defensive nature of China’s strategic
posture is the “no first use” pledge regarding nuclear weapons.42
Chinese officials also point to the military reforms China has
undertaken over the past two decades as proof of China’s purely
defensive stance. Liu Huaqing said in 1995:
As is known to all, China possesses a strategy of active defense, and cut
its troops by 1 million several years ago, something no other country has
thus far achieved. Our present military strength is of a defensive nature
and the Chinese Government strictly limits defensive expenditure to the
minimum level necessary to ensure national security.43

Perhaps the most commonly touted evidence is Mao’s admonition:
“If someone doesn’t attack us, we won’t attack them; however, if
someone does attack us, we will definitely [counter] attack” (Ren bu
fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren fan wo, wo bi fan ren).44 This quote appears in
China’s 1998 Defense White Paper. The late Marshal Xu Xiangqian
also mentioned it in practically the same breath as he discussed
Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia during a 1980
interview.45 Significantly, China’s largest military conflict in the postMao era—the attack against Vietnam in February 1979—was
triggered by Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Although it was
China that invaded Vietnam, Beijing officially labeled this war a
“self-defensive counterattack” (ziwei huanji). According to two
military thinkers: “. . . [A] strategic counterattack implies a strategic
offensive.” The strategists continued:
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. . . [In] the February 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam,
from the military operational standpoint, offensive actions were
employed. Nevertheless, the essence of this kind of offense was a selfdefense counterattack.46

The same logic applied to China’s brief but bloody border wars with
India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969. Both conflicts are
labeled “self-defense counterattacks” (ziwei fanji).47
Guiding Principles for External Security.
Counteracting these three core elements are four key strategic
constants that justify the external use of military force. The concepts
of just war, the value placed on national unification, the principle of
active defense, and high threat sensitivity in practice negate the
pacifying effects of the above core elements.
Contemporary Chinese Just War Theory. There is considerable
attention by Chinese strategic analysts to the concept of just war.
Authors tend to stress that Chinese thinking about just or righteous
war (yizhan) dates back thousands of years.48 The principle of just
war seems to be a crucial element of China’s traditional approach to
war in the view of many contemporary military researchers.49
Indeed it is ancient: Confucius adopted the concept and Mao later
absorbed it.50
The distinction is simple: just wars are good wars and unjust
wars are bad ones. Just wars are those fought by oppressed groups
against oppressors; unjust wars are ones waged by oppressors
against the oppressed. In contemporary Chinese thinking, China has
long been a weak, oppressed country fighting against powerful
imperialist oppressors. Thus for many Chinese any war fought by
their country is by definition a just conflict—even a war in which
China strikes first.51 This might include any war fought to “restore or
protect national territory or to maintain national prestige.”52 The
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1979 border war China fought with Vietnam is viewed as a just
conflict.53 Needless to say, virtually any war fought by a hegemonic
power such as India is an unjust war.
National Unification. National unification is a core value in
China’s national security calculus on which no compromise is
possible. It is an immutable principle in part because of China’s
history of division and inability to stop exploitation and oppression
by foreign powers. But it is also an emotional and unwavering public
stand precisely because the leadership of the PRC seems to lack any
other inviolable principles.54 According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun,
The most important strategic legacy of the Chinese nation is the
awareness of identification and the concept of unification, and this is
where lies the secret for the immortality of . . . Chinese civilization . . . [
s]eeking unification … [ is] the soul of … Chinese military strategy
endowed by . . . Chinese civilization.55

According to another analyst, “hoping for unification, defending
unification is a dimension of the Chinese people’s . . . thought
culture and is a special feature of its strategic thought.”56
Threat Perceptions. China’s political and military leaders see
threats everywhere. the full extent of the siege mentality of China’s
leaders is not always appreciated. This paranoia results in elites
viewing the foreign as well as domestic environments as treacherous
landscapes filled with threats and conspiracies.57 The current
campaign against corruption in China and the crackdown on the
Falungong Sect suggest the depth of the regime’s fear of domestic
threats.58
This mindset may explain the need of the Chinese authorities
during the Maoist era to come up with the seemingly innocuous
phrase “China has friends all over the world.”59 By the same token,
one would expect that China also had at least some enemies in the
world. Indeed one is tempted to conclude that the slogan itself was
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prompted by Chinese insecurities. If a country indeed has many
friendly states around the world, why is it necessary to recite this ad
nauseum? And the reality was that in the late Maoist era China
actually had few staunch friends: the handful that come to mind are
Albania, North Korea, and (most significant for this chapter)
Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Maoist China believed itself
surrounded by enemies. This was true of Deng’s China, and also
holds true for Jiang Zemin’s China.
Active Defense. The strategic principle of active defense is key to
Chinese strategic thinkers. Most thinkers believe this is of central
importance to Chinese strategy. According to the People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) officer handbook, “All military experts, ancient and
contemporary, Chinese and foreign, recognize the importance of
active defense.”60 The tendency is for researchers and policymakers
to broadly define defense as virtually anything, including a
preemptive strike. Successive conflicts, including the 1962 border
war with India, are labeled “self-defense wars” or “self-defense
counter-attacks” (ziwei zhanzheng, ziwei fanjizhan or ziwei
huanjizhan).61
The idea of “active defense” (jijifangyu) is a relatively recent
concept in Chinese strategic thought. It is an idea that crops up
frequently in spoken and written material by Chinese strategic
thinkers—it is mentioned in the 1995 interview with Liu Huaqing
quoted above, for example. While at least one scholar dismisses
active defense as mere propaganda,62 the strategy appears to have
real significance. Indeed it has been a key guiding principle in Mao’s
day, in Deng’s time, and remains important at the dawn of the 21st
century. Indeed, it figures prominently in China’s 1998 Defense
White Paper. According to Deng Xiaoping:
. . . [ A]ctive defense is not merely defense per se, but includes defensive
offensives. Active defense includes our going out, so that if we are
attacked we will certainly counter attack.63
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Senior Colonel Wang Naiming explains:
[Active defense] . . . emphasizes that the nature of our military strategy is
defensive, but also active in requirements. It requires the organic
integration of offense and defense, and achieving the strategic goal of
defense by active offense; when the conditions are ripe, the strategic
defense should be led[ sic] to counterattack and offense.64

The “organic integration” between offense and defense is very
much a part of the concept of “absolute flexibility” (quanbian)
highlighted by Iain Johnston.65 In a real sense then, the line between
offense and defense is blurred. In the final analysis, “Active defense
strategy does not acknowledge the difference . . . between defense and
offense.”66 In fact, according to a researcher at the Academy of
Military Sciences, active defense does not rule out a first strike:
Our strategic principle of “striking only after the enemy has struck”
certainly does not exclude sudden “first strikes” in campaign battles or
counterattacks in self-defense into enemy territory.67

In sum, the impact of the Cult of Defense is a predisposition by
Chinese elites to opt for force because they perceive its use by China
as always defensive in nature.
But the impact of strategic culture does not end here. The impact
on China’s elites in this particular case is two-fold. First, the strategic
culture of their own country (articulated above) affects how they
think and act. What is also influential is the way in which these same
elites perceive the strategic culture of a major rival power—in this
case India.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE IMAGE OF INDIA
India, in the view of many Chinese analysts, is one of the world’s
four great civilizations.68 Possessing one of the world’s largest
conventional militaries, New Delhi also has a small but growing
arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Once a glorious
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empire, India now seeks to reclaim its rightful place in Asia and the
world after being exploited by imperialism for hundreds of years
and then being held back by wrong-headed economic policies for
decades. At the dawn of a new century the economy has been
unleashed and its citizens are eager to achieve their country’s full
potential. India also represents a looming strategic threat to China,
albeit not one that provokes the high level of concern that the United
States or Japan does. India is, in the words of John Garver, a “midlevel [ priority] ranking” for China.69 China sees itself as the rightful
preeminent power in Asia and India as its major medium- to longterm competitor for this position. India’s long-term goal, according
to a strategist at the National Defense University in Beijing
interviewed in a November 2000 Guangming Ribao article, is to
become a world power. According to this analyst, the goal may
constitute an overreaching of India’s ambitions but it still remains
cause for Chinese concern.70
An article in the influential Chinese news paper Zhongguo
Qingnian Bao quoted Indian Home Affairs Minister L. K. Advani as
telling a domestic audience: “The 20th Century belonged to the west,
China wants to become the world leader in the 21st Century, but the
years at the end of the century will belong to our India.”71
Furthermore, in the view of many Chinese strategists, India
possesses an ambitious, belligerent, and expansionist strategic
culture. Of course there are less extreme views of India, but few if
any of China’s strategic thinkers seem to hold warm or positive
views of India for China’s future. Moreover, Chinese analysts tend to
hold realpolitik views of the world and view China’s neighbors with
wariness if not outright suspicion as the above articulation of
China’s own strategic culture indicates.
“Big Country Dreams.”
First of all, in Beijing’s eyes New Delhi is extremely ambitious.
India, Chinese analysts frequently insist, has “daguomeng.”72 Literally
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this means “big country dreams” or in the lexicon of international
relations “great power aspirations.” According to one article
appearing in a prominent official weekly primarily for foreign
consumption, India had taken advantage of the “power vacuum” in
South Asia since the end of the Cold War, and New Delhi’s dream
“which had been held in check for many years, began to manifest
itself .”73 China believes India wants to be the hegemon of South
Asia and eventually a world power. Toward this end India aspires to
become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council, and to further develop its “comprehensive national power.”
China is distinctly unenthusiastic about India raising its stature in
the UN.74
For India, this entails a more technologically sophisticated
military with even greater power projection capability. According to
one writer, India’s army is “extremely strong,” its navy ranks 10th in
the world, its air force ranks 12th, and its defense budget continues
to grow.75 Chinese analysts note that India is buying hundreds of
tanks from Russia, preparing to jointly produce Sukhoi fighters,
indigenously build submarines capable of launching missiles, and
build ballistic missiles capable of reaching “most targets in China.”76
India also is expanding its nuclear arsenal. According to one
estimate, between 1986 and 2000 India was the world’s largest
importer of weaponry, taking in an estimated US$18 billion.77 All of
this leads a writer in the Beijing Review to ask: “Why is India
expanding its military strength in such an urgent way?”78
In addition to significant military power, India also is an
economic power with tremendous growth potential. Although
publicly Chinese analyses tend to stress the weaknesses of India,
notably the abject poverty and significant ethnic and religious
cleavages, they also recognize India’s considerable strengths.79 It
possesses a large population, and a bright, well-educated,
cosmopolitan elite. Moreover, its sizeable and growing hightechnology sector is China’s envy.80 The concluding sentence of the
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entry on “Indian Military Thought” in the 1997 military
encyclopedia compiled by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences
states: “At the turn of the century, at the same time that India strives
to attain its goal of becoming a major economic power, it is working
all-out on military modernization in order to achieve its goal of
becoming a powerful country. . . .”81 All this, of course, leads
Chinese analysts to the inevitable conclusion that India is China’s
natural rival on the Asian mainland.
Naturally, remarks such as those by India’s Defense Minister
George Fernandes in early May 1998 that China is India’s “potential
threat number one” got considerable attention in Beijing. The phrase
was translated by at least one PL A analyst as simply “number one
enemy” (touhao diren).82 Another version omits the prefix “potential”
and quotes Jawaharlal Nehru as saying “The conflict between India
and China is fundamental whether or not it is expressed in war.”83
Furthermore, the U.S.-India rapprochement that occurred in the
1990s had a military component that reinforced China’s suspicions
about New Delhi’s intentions vis-à-vis Beijing.84 The visits to India of
President Clinton in 2000 and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hugh Shelton in 2001 merely heightened the concern.85
The Bully of South Asia.
Second, in the minds of many Chinese strategists, India
possesses an extremely belligerent strategic culture. According to
one PLA analyst: “India has resorted to arms against neighboring
countries more than 10 times” since 1947.86 The Chinese observe that
India has fought three wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971.
This is not to mention the border war India fought with China in
1962 in which New Delhi is seen as the aggressor. Moreover, India
has used strong arm tactics to intimidate its Lilliputian neighbors
into following India’s desires.87 Beijing perceives a record of “war
adventures” by New Delhi:88 intervention in the 1971 Pakistani civil
war, which led to the creation of the independent state of
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Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) ; and military intervention
during the 1980s in the Maldive Islands as well as the extended
military presence in Sri Lanka (although at the invitation of the
Columbo government).89 Perhaps the most recent manifestations of
this belligerency, in China’s eyes, were the nuclear tests of May 1998
and accompanying “China threat” rhetoric of Indian officials.90
Expansionist India.
Third, India’s strategic culture is seen as expansionist—dating
from Jawarharlal Nehru’s desire to create a “Greater Indian empire”
according to several analyses. Not only has a recent Beijing Review
story noted this desire,91 but the Jiefangjun Bao has similarly claimed
that, “since independence, India has pursued a military expansionist
line.”92 The term “hegemonism” has also been used by China to label
India’s efforts in South Asia. Widely used in the 1960s and 1970s, the
word reappeared briefly in 1998 in the wake of the May nuclear
tests.93 For example, a commentary in the May 19, 1998, Jief angjun
Bao was titled: “The Ambition of Seeking Hegemony is Completely
Exposed.”94
China seems to have concluded that the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) government desires all of Kashmir and has made this a
priority.95 Some analysts believe the BJP dreams of absorbing
Bangladesh and Pakistan into a “greater India.”96 In addition, India
gobbled up the former Portuguese colony of Goa and annexed the
independent kingdom of Sikkim in the mid-1970s. One analysis by
two PLA Air Force colonels likened India’s 1975 absorption of the
Himalayan kingdom to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.97 Of course
territorial disputes along the Sino-Indian border underscore New
Delhi’s expansionist ambitions in Beijing’s eyes. According to one
strategist, from the date of India’s official recognition of the People’s
Republic of China (December 30, 1949), it “began to quietly nibble
away at the Chinese territory along the Sino-Indian border.”98
During the 1980s and 1990s, according to the Chinese military
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encyclopedia, Indian strategic thought became more ambitious and
shifted from a continental focus toward the Indian Ocean.99 China
has also noted India’s increasing strategic interest in Southeast Asia,
especially in the South China Sea.100
But China’s primary alarm concerns New Delhi’s perceived
designs on Tibet. A 1998 article quotes a Lieutenant General Singh,
identified as a former deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, as
saying: “The Indian Army cannot fundamentally guarantee India’s
security unless it has the capacity to march into Tibet when
required.”101 Many Chinese strategists seem to fear that India covets
Tibet or at least covertly supports Tibetan splittists.102 New Delhi, in
Beijing’s view, supported the Tibetan insurrectionists in 1959.103 The
official history of the 1962 Sino-Indian War published by the PLA’s
Academy of Military Sciences and another authoritative account
both identify Indian designs on Tibet as the prime cause of the
conflict.104 Chinese suspicions are raised by the continuing presence
of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala. In addition to
playing host to the Dalai Lama, an estimated 110,000 Tibetan exiles
call India their home away from home. And the Indian army also
maintains a military force of mountain troops that is composed
almost exclusively of ethnic Tibetans.105 What is the purpose of this
military formation? Chinese analysts wonder.
Mao reportedly told a visiting Nepalese delegation in 1964: “In
the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.”106 At the very
least, according to one Chinese strategist writing in the late 1990s,
India’s strategic objective is to “split Tibet from China” and create a
buffer between the two powers.107 China’s extreme sensitivity
regarding Tibet is suggested by the concern expressed over the
possibility of an “Asian Kosovo” emerging (i.e., an ethnic separatist
region receiving external military protection). Even prior to Kosovo,
some Chinese analysts voiced concern that an outside power could
impose a “no fly zone” over Tibet in the event of widespread ethnic
unrest there.108
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ANALYSIS
Given the negative image of India held by many strategic
thinkers in China, the warming in relations between Beijing and
New Delhi that has occurred since May 1998 may strike the reader as
remarkable. Indeed, the improvement in ties is quite surprising.109
But beneath the diplomatic niceties and apparent desire for cordial
interaction lurks the strong negative images Chinese hold of India
(and vice versa).110
Perhaps the issue where the two strategic cultures collide headon in China’s view is Tibet. From China’s perspective, the region is
an inalienable part of the Chinese motherland. The deeply held
Chinese belief in the importance of national unity comes to a head
with the view of Chinese strategists that India covets Tibet, or at the
very least seeks to turn the roof of the world into a buffer between
the two Asian giants. In the rivalry or competition between China
and India, John Garver concludes that Beijing has the stronger
position, but, significantly, he notes that China is most vulnerable on
the question of Tibet.111
Geography tends to be conducive to peace since the terrain is so
inhospitable and the border regions so remote that it is very difficult
for opposing forces to find each other, let alone engage. From
China’s perspective, “The mountains are high and India is far away.”
Yet, as Paul Bracken notes, the facts of geography have been altered
considerably by “disruptive technologies” of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, most notably ballistic
missiles.112 As a result, it is far easier for countries like China and
India to wage war than it was in 1962. The ease with which such a
war can be fought is only likely to increase over time.
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps the wariness with which many Chinese view India can
be summed up in two poignant quotes. Decades ago, the Chinese
writer and philosopher Hu Shi reportedly made the tongue-in-cheek
observation that “India conquered and dominated China culturally
for 20 centuries [via Buddhism] without ever having to send a single
soldier across her border.”113 More recently, Australian sinologist
Gary Klintworth opined: “China perceives India to be an ambitious,
overconfident yet militarily powerful neighbor with whom it may
eventually have to have a day of reckoning.”114
To conclude, if one combines China’s strongly negative image of
India’s strategic culture with China’s own “Cult of Defense,” there is
good reason to be concerned about the future of relations between
New Delhi and Beijing. While open conflict between Asia’s two
largest states is not preordained and indeed it is in their mutual
interest to avoid a military contest, the analysis here is a sobering
reminder of the simmering tensions present in their relations.
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CHAPTER 14
INDIA’S ALLIANCES 2020
Sumit Ganguly
INTRODUCTION
India’s foreign and security policies are in flux, their familiar
moorings having been cast aside at Cold War’s end.1 For a significant
portion of the Cold War the architects of India’s foreign policy
professed a belief in nonalignment, Third World solidarity, state-led
economic growth, and secularism.2 In practice, however, these
professed commitments were only partially realized. The structural
constraints of the international system, the exigencies of domestic
politics, and the idiosyncratic roles of particular individuals made
the pursuit, as well as the achievement, of these goals fitful at best. In
terms of manifest behavior, most Indian foreign policy decisionmakers sought authoritative global regimes, especially in such
sensitive areas as trade, foreign multilateral assistance, and the use
of the global commons.3 In the realm of security policy, India
pursued an ideational strategy for almost two decades. When this
policy culminated in a significant military debacle at the hands of its
principal adversary, China, however, India initially resorted to selfhelp and then sought American assistance, but without any strings
attached. Subsequently, it forged a security alignment with the
Soviet Union.4 This security relationship provided India with
important dividends. Among other matters the Soviets proved to be
a reliable supplier of high-technology weaponry at highly concessional rates. They also acted as a counterweight to the People’s
Republic of China, a state with which India had an on-going border
dispute. Finally, they also guaranteed India a veto on the United
Nations Security Council on any adverse discussion of the Kashmir
question.
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The end of the Cold War shattered the many comforting
elements that had constituted India’s grand strategy. With the Soviet
collapse, India’s foreign-policy decisionmakers have had to reassess
the precepts on which the country’s policies had been based and
recalculate their nation’s goals, options, and strategies. The relationship with Russia, the principal successor state to the Soviet Union,
was quickly transformed into little more than a weapons-supplier
nexus. Indian foreign policy decisionmakers were also quick to
realize that, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, an
enfeebled and debilitated Russia in the post-Cold War era could not
serve India’s foreign and security policy interests. Most importantly,
the Russians, unlike the Soviets, could not be relied upon to tie down
China.5 Nor could they be counted on to use their veto in the United
Nations Security Council to protect India from censure on the
sensitive Kashmir issue. Finally, the adoption of a rough-and-tumble
free-market economy in Russia also meant that the lucrative trade
and barter relationship that had thrived for many years was now at
an end.
The Soviet collapse thus necessitated a fundamental shift in
Indian grand strategy. All the central components of this strategy
came under increasing attack from both external and internal
sources. Nonalignment, as one astute Indian prime minister, I. K.
Gujral, accurately stated, had ceased to have much meaning.6
Notions of Third World solidarity also withered along with the
death of the ideological consensus that underlay it. At a domestic
level, the Indian preference for a state-dominated economy also took
a major battering: the Soviet failure had destroyed any idea that
state-led economic growth could be a viable strategy for promoting
economic development.7 The rise of chiliastic religious movements
across the globe, and in India’s immediate neighborhood, also found
some resonance within the country as disenchantment with Indian
secularism grew apace.8
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Mostly freed from the straitjacket of these nostrums,
governments of varying ideological persuasions started to craft a
new set of Indian foreign and security policy alignments. Though
much of the hoary rhetoric of the Cold War years continued to
characterize Indian pronouncements, the Nehruvian idealism that
had undergirded Indian foreign policy became an artifact of the
past.9 Indian foreign policy slowly, but most assuredly, embraced
realist precepts. This became evident from India’s pursuit of a
limited but significant nuclear weapons program,10 its increasing
willingness to use substantial force along (and within) its borders,11
and its commitment to devote substantial resources to national
security.
HAZARDOUS PREDICTIONS
What will India’s alliances look like in 2020? The predictive
power of social science leaves much to be desired, so any attempts to
generate robust propositions about India’s likely alignments two
decades from now are necessarily fraught with significant pitfalls.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to make some informed conjectures.
These conjectures, if they are to have any validity, must be based
upon inferences drawn from past behavior, the existence of domestic
ideational forces, and the structural constraints and opportunities
that exist at regional and international levels.
Resorting to Self-Help.
Despite the dramatic shifts in the configuration of global power
since 1989 and India’s fitful attempts to adjust to these new realities,
one constant seems to undergird Indian foreign policy pronouncements and practices: the quest for decisionmaking autonomy in the
sphere of foreign affairs. Often expressed in neuralgic terms during
the Cold War, this desire for strategic autonomy is deeply embedded
in nationalist assessments of India’s colonial heritage.12 Two
generations of colonial and post-colonial nationalists in India have
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construed India’s history in a particular light. Both liberal and
conservative analysts (in the pristine sense of both terms) have
forcefully argued that India was repeatedly subjected to external
domination. Liberals argue that such domination was possible
because of India’s internal disunity. More conservative commentators contend that such domestic disarray, combined with a lack of
military preparedness, led to foreign domination.13 As a consequence, both camps have insisted on preserving India’s ability to
chart an independent course in world affairs, free from external
influences and pressures.
For much of the post-independence era the liberal camp was
ascendent. Accordingly, in the realm of economic policymaking it
adopted a singularly autarkic set of economic policies and cut India
off from the global economy.14 In the arena of foreign policy the fear
of external pressures coupled with a recognition of India’s material
weaknesses led to the pursuit of nonalignment. And in the realm of
defense policy, these imperatives manifested themselves in the oftenquixotic efforts to promote “self-reliance” in the development and
production of military hardware.15
This drive to maintain autonomy will persist in Indian
decisionmaking circles, despite the emergence of an increasingly
“globalized” world where a variety of social, economic, and political
forces are increasingly buffeting state authority. The attempt to
preserve some freedom of maneuver in the conduct of foreign policy
will necessarily militate against alignment with a major power. The
latter-day adherents of some variant of nonalignment will express
unease about any inordinate reliance on a powerful external actor to
guarantee India’s security.
Yet the power and influence of liberal policymakers could well
wane with generational change. At least two post-colonial
generations have sought to tutor and socialize an emergent
generation of policymakers about the wisdom of this quest for
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autonomy, but it is by no means clear that the emergent generation
in India shares these received beliefs. They may well develop a
markedly different “operational code” as they confront the future.16
Alliances.
International forces may also reinforce these tendencies away
from self-reliance. Russia has already made clear that it will not
assist India as the Soviet Union did in the past. Consequently, India
will need to court other major powers to ensure that its security
interests are adequately safeguarded.
However, the contours of the regional and global environments
that India is likely to face in the year 2020 remain uncertain. What
will be the principal sources of threat to India’s security? Which
other powers will be the likely partners to help India cope with those
threats? While much has changed in the global and regional
international environments over the last decade and even the last
several months, not everything has changed. In all likelihood India’s
principal threats will stem from the same sources as those of the
Cold War period though in markedly different forms.
An Indo-Russian Alliance? The primary threat to India’s security
will still emanate from the People’s Republic of China. Such a
prediction is hardly unreasonable if one assumes that China will not
implode as a consequence of the variety of social and economic
pressures it faces nor will its internal political arrangements be
fundamentally transformed in a democratic direction.17 Consequently, India will seek the assistance of other major powers with
global reach to counter the threat posed by Chinese power.
One possible alliance partner could be Russia. Apart from the
Chinese threat, India could have other seemingly compelling reasons
for aligning with Russia. India might align with Russia to oppose a
number of U.S. initiatives and positions about which the two sides
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have important reservations. After all, both India and Russia have
drawn censure from the United States on charges of human rights
violations in the conduct of their military operations in Kashmir and
Chechnya, respectively, both remain somewhat at odds with U.S.
attempts to quarantine Iraq, and both share misgivings about the
recent U.S. propensity to intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts.
Additionally, there has been significant Indo-Russian military
cooperation, despite the end of the Cold War. Of course, in large part
this cooperation amounts to making a virtue out of necessity: the
cash-strapped Russians need hard currency for their military
hardware, and India, despite its long quest for “self-reliance,”
remains acutely dependent on external suppliers for a plethora of
weapons systems.18
Despite this apparent convergence of interests, it is unlikely that
the two states can forge an effective alliance to balance American
power. The post-Cold War Indo-Russian relationship lacks political
and strategic symbiosis. Russia no longer needs India as a possible
counterweight to China. India cannot count on Russian support on
the vital Kashmir issue.
Moreover, and perhaps most important, a marked shift has taken
place in the past several years in Indo-American relations. The most
dramatic demonstration thereof came in May 2001, when New Delhi
provided a cautious and carefully worded endorsement of the
George W. Bush administration’s plans for deploying a national
missile defense (NMD) system, even though Russia had expressed
grave reservations about its strategic implications.19 In years past
New Delhi, far from endorsing the decision, would have
unequivocally condemned it. Additionally, even with India’s fitful
embrace of the market since 1991 and the emergence of a form of
rough-and-tumble capitalism in Russia, the economic complementarities that had characterized the halcyon days of the Indo-Soviet
relationship will not return. The Russians will no longer accept
barter trade and have little or no interest in Indian consumer
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durables. Nor do they possess the ability to provide India with longterm, highly concessional credits for purchasing petroleum products
and weaponry.20 The lack of convergence on vital issues of security
and strategy and the declining complementarities of the two
economies ensure that a realignment of Indo-Russian relations along
the lines of the erstwhile Indo-Soviet relationship is most unlikely.
A Sino-Indian-Russian Alliance? Could a Sino-Indian-Russian
alliance form against the United States?21 In 1998, Russian Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov suggested that the three countries might
well form such a partnership. These three states appear to have a
number of common grievances against the United States. All of them
seem to resent overweening U.S. military power (and Washington’s
willingness to use it); the American propensity to compromise the
sovereignty of weaker states, as evidenced in Iraq and the Balkans;
America’s selective application of human rights standards; and U.S.
dominance of the emergent rules of the global trading order. Surely a
broad convergence on such a range of issues could form the basis of
an alliance designed to balance American power and prerogatives.
Despite the seeming symmetry of views on these subjects, other
differences will preclude the formation of such an alliance. India,
despite its closeness to the Soviet Union during a significant portion
of the Cold War, consistently rebuffed the Soviet suggestion that a
system of “collective security” be forged in Asia. The Indians
correctly surmised that any such system would be directed against
China and the United States. Despite differences with both states,
Indian decisionmakers felt that participation in a Soviet-led “collective security” system would further exacerbate strained relations
with both China and the United States. Today, when relations with
the United States are steadily improving despite differences on the
nonproliferation front, India cannot afford to forge an anti-American
coalition with China and Russia. More to the point, despite the
apparent commonalities at the global level, India has profound
differences with China. Briefly stated, they include the long-standing
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border dispute, China’s propensity to encourage India’s smaller
neighbors to adopt foreign policy positions inimical or at least at
odds with India’s interests, and its support for Pakistan’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs.
China, in turn, may loudly proclaim its hostility to “American
hegemony” in Asia and elsewhere but would not seek an alliance
with two neighbors of varying strengths and disparate interests.
Furthermore, despite their publicly professed sentiments about
Third World solidarity, China’s decisionmakers are unwilling to
accord India the status of a great power.22 Any alliance with India
directed against the United States would, in the Chinese world-view,
enhance India’s status.
An Indo-American Alliance? India-U.S. relations, on the other
hand, may change dramatically in the years and decades ahead.
Such improvements, of course, would have to be predicated on a
decline of India’s historical avoidance of close alliances. This
intransigence has already begun to disappear in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and in the years
to come growing economic complementarities and strategic necessities may well drive India closer to the United States.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks the United States
dramatically altered its policy toward Pakistan. Prior to these attacks
Pakistan had all but been consigned to the status of a rogue state.
The exigencies of prosecuting a war against Osama bin Laden’s al
Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, led
American policymakers to reestablish a more cordial and robust
diplomatic and strategic relationship with Pakistan. U.S.
policymakers, however, appeared cognizant that forging these new
bonds with Pakistan could easily rent asunder their recent and
tenuous efforts to build firmer ties to India.
Toward this end the Bush administration appeared at pains to
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emphasize the common interest of India and Pakistan to combat
terrorism. Accordingly, when on December 26 Secretary of State
Colin Powell placed the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed
on the list of foreign terrorist organizations, he was at pains to
emphasize that these two entities were threatening the peace
between India and Pakistan. Such a formulation, of course, stemmed
from the exigencies of maintaining a working relationship with
Pakistan. Even as Powell carefully sought to distance America’s ally
of convenience from these two noxious groups, reliable reports in the
American media showed that they were still operating with
impunity from within Pakistan.23 In large measure, the future of the
American strategic relationship will be shaped by the U.S. ability to
address Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir while simultaneously
tackling India’s misgivings about Pakistan’s ties to the most vicious
insurgents operating within Indian-controlled Kashmir.
The economic complementarities between India and the U.S. are
obvious. India’s ability to promote economic development depends
critically on its ability to attract foreign direct investment, not only in
consumer durables and manufacturing but also in critical
infrastructural sectors such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications. American firms can play a vital role in all three sectors,
the still-unfolding energy-development debacle involving Houstonbased Enron notwithstanding.24 Even at its present rate of economic
growth, which is hovering around 6 percent per annum, India’s
energy needs are burgeoning. If the paucity of energy is not to
remain a bottleneck for growth, India will have to seek investment in
a range of new energy-efficient technologies, reform existing
distribution mechanisms, and develop new sources of power.25
The United States is already the principal source of foreign
investment in India. Additionally, a number of prominent American
manufacturing and service companies, ranging from General Electric
to American Express, have a significant presence in India. Between
April 1991 and May 2000, India approved a total sum of $60.3 billion

371

in foreign direct investment, out of which $22 billion was of
American origin.26 Despite this seemingly positive outlook, from the
American standpoint, the India-U.S. economic relationship has yet to
realize much of its potential. American investment in India as a
percentage of global U.S. investment remains miniscule.
Of course, if India can continue on the path to economic
liberalization that it undertook in 1991, its potential can be realized
in large measure. Such a prospect is hardly chimerical, but it will
entail the reinvigoration of India’s mostly stalled economic reform
program with a focus on labor laws, regulatory practices, and
investment in the social sectors.27 Here, India must capitalize on its
comparative advantages. Unlike China, India has three distinct
advantages that can be effectively tapped if the present and future
regimes can formulate and implement a more coherent economic
policy environment. First, despite the legacies of the Nehruvian
variant of Fabian socialism, popularly referred to as the “license,
permit, quota raj,” capitalist enterprise is hardly alien to India.
Second, India does not lack in managerial and entrepreneurial talent.
And finally, despite its glacial pace and corruption at lower levels,
India does have a working judiciary; the rule of law in India, while
imperfect, is a far cry from what prevails in China.28
The other area in which U.S. and Indian interests converge
relates to the future role of China in Asia.29 Contrary to a popular
belief held in certain American academic and policymaking circles,
China, not Pakistan, remains the principal bête noire of Indian
security. India’s stated anxieties about China do not constitute mere
boilerplate; any dispassionate assessment of the evidence inexorably
leads to the conclusion that India harbors legitimate security
concerns from a resurgent China. To begin with, the memories of the
1962 border war still haunt the psyche of Indian elites, nor has the
blatant Chinese support for the Naga and Mizo insurgents
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s been forgotten. More recently,
India’s leaders remain understandably concerned about China’s
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willingness to provide nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
technologies to Pakistan.30 Finally, they also remain unsettled not
simply by China’s refusal to settle the Himalayan border dispute but
by China’s expanding claims in the eastern sector of the disputed
border.31
For a stretch of the Cold War both the United States and India
saw China as a potential adversary. Their views diverged significantly after the U.S. decision to normalize relations with China in the
1970s, when Washington made common cause with China to contain
the Soviet Union. India, fearing a continued Chinese threat, aligned
with the Soviets. The two sides found themselves particularly at
odds during the Afghan war years, when both the United States and
China, to varying degrees, assisted the Afghan mujahideen while
India resorted to considerable semantic contortions to avoid a public
condemnation of the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan.32
U.S. relations with China, despite differences on a number of
political and strategic issues including nonproliferation, global
environmental change, trade, and human rights, remain mostly
robust.33 On the other hand, despite two carefully calibrated agreements between India and China to maintain “peace and tranquility”
along their disputed border, the Sino-Indian relationship remains
fundamentally adversarial. The divergence in India’s and the United
States’ respective relationships with China, however, may change in
the future.
Perceived strategic vulnerabilities and opportunities may also
drive India and the United States closer despite the ideological
baggage of the past. A debate is currently raging within the United
States about how best to deal with a rising China. One school of
thought suggests that conflict between China and the United States
is all but inevitable.34 Another group suggests that planning for
conflict with China may create a security dilemma for China and
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result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This second group suggests that
to avoid a clash with China it is necessary to enmesh it in a thick web
of multilateral agreements, treaties, and normative frameworks.35
The current administration in Washington appears to have adherents
of both camps in its midst.
Those policymakers who fear a revanchist China would like to
use India as a possible counterweight in Asia, even though they are
extremely careful in stating as much for fear of arousing Indian
anxieties.36 Apart from this concern about keeping watch on expanding Chinese power and the surrounding uncertainty about China’s
long-term strategic goals, India and the United States share other
strategic and material interests, including combating terrorism,
reducing piracy on the high seas, and ensuring access to the sealanes
to and from the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf . Simultaneously, although India could benefit from U.S. assistance and
cooperation in these areas, it could offer the U.S. military invaluable
assistance derived from its extensive experience in global peacekeeping operations, jungle counterinsurgency, and high-altitude warfare.37 Cognizant of these possible areas of cooperation, the Bush
administration has taken some steps to court India and has chosen to
overlook the vexed issue of India’s pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs. This shift stands in marked contrast to the Clinton
administration, for which the nonproliferation issue was virtually an
idée fixe.38
Yet the United States must proceed with a degree of
circumspection in its attempts to court India. Few, if any, Indian
decisionmakers would wish to serve as a strategic surrogate for the
United States in Asia and participate in an overt attempt to contain
Chinese power. The atavistic desire for autonomy at all costs will
ensure that such an alignment does not materialize. These
misgivings should not preclude the United States from playing the
role of a reliable, “off shore balancer,” keeping Chinese threats at
bay. Such a posture would be in keeping with the U.S. role as a
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powerful hegemon determined to prevent a new rival from
dominating a significant portion of the Asian landmass.39
This posture may well be acceptable to Indian elites. It is also
consistent with the emerging military-to-military cooperation
between India and the United States.40 Among other matters, in July
2001, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton
visited India to discuss the scope of increased military cooperation
with India. He was the highest-ranking American defense official to
visit India since the Pokhran nuclear tests of May 1998. During his
visit, Shelton informed his Indian counterparts that the Bush
administration was about to reinstate the Defense Policy Group
(DPG), a forum for regular, senior military-to-military discussions
that had been suspended after May 1998.
The events of September 11 and its aftermath held the potential
for unraveling the incipient military relationship with India.
However, the Bush administration appeared determined to broaden
military-to-military contacts with India despite its new relationship
with Pakistan. Accordingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
visited India on November 5 and met with his Indian counterpart,
George Fernandes.41 During this visit it is believed that Rumsfeld
expressed a willingness to provide India with the long-embargoed
GE-404 engines which India needs for its long-delayed Light Combat
Aircraft project. On November 28, Admiral Dennis Blair,
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, traveled to India.
During his visit he discussed the conduct of joint military exercises,
cooperation on combating terrorism and increasing military contacts.
Subsequent to his visit the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group met for
the first time in 3 years in New Delhi. The DPG discussed such
matters as the transfer of American weapons technology to India, the
initiation of joint military exercises and nuclear proliferation.42
Theoretical work in the field of international relations also
provides modest support for an India-U.S. alignment in the future,
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especially as India contemplates an increasingly hostile China on the
horizon. For India, China poses the greatest long-term threat along a
variety of dimensions. More to the point, China’s increasing
aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its growing offensive
power, and its aggressive intentions all conspire to drive India
toward aligning with the United States.43 In terms of aggregate
power, India is considerably weaker than China. In 1999, its gross
domestic product (GDP) was $440 billion and its per capita GDP in
purchasing power parity terms was $1,800. The comparable figures
for China were $732 billion and $4,000, respectively.
In terms of military prowess, China also fares far better than
India. The total manpower of the Indian army, for instance, is 1.1
million as of 2001, whereas China fields an army of 1.7 million.44
Additionally, it should be underscored that the Indian army, unlike
that of the Chinese, deploys a significant portion of its troops in
counterinsurgency and border control operations in Kashmir
(estimates run as high as 250,000), thereby degrading India’s
defensive capabilities vis-à-vis China. Other military indicators also
favor China. India has no known deployed nuclear-missile delivery
capabilities, although they are in the process of developing such
capabilities.45 China, on the other hand, has at least 20 operational
intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 100 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, and a growing number of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.46 The program of military modernization that
China has undertaken will steadily contribute to its offensive
capabilities; this program may well be boosted in response to India’s
modest but expanding nuclear capabilities, especially in the
aftermath of the Pokhran tests.47
It is not just China’s potential that Indians fear. China’s hostile
actions and intractable negotiating posture send disturbing signals to
its southern neighbor. In Indian calculations China stands in
occupation of some 14,500 square miles of Indian territory that
Chinese troops seized during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.
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Additionally, China still claims a stretch of territory along the
Tawang Tract in the eastern sector. And China’s aggressive
intentions are hardly difficult to fathom from the Indian point of
view. Given the tenacity with which China has pursued its other
irredentist claims, ranging from Taiwan to the Spratly Islands, only
the most sanguine Indian decisionmaker would be inclined to think
that the day of reckoning on the disputed Himalayan territories can
be indefinitely postponed. Indeed powerful fears of nuclear
blackmail from China over the territorial disputes contributed to
India’s decision to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998.48
Potential Pitfalls. Apart from the residual misgivings of Indian
elites, two other issues hang over a potentially closer Indo-American
military-strategic relationship. The first, in a way the obverse of the
Indian obsession with strategic and political autonomy, is somewhat
amorphous but nevertheless significant. Key members of the U.S.
strategic and diplomatic communities still deeply resent the Indian
moral posturing and hypocrisy during the Cold War years. These
individuals are still rankled by India’s unwillingness to support the
U.S. anti-communist crusade during the Cold War. Yet these
residual and atavistic misgivings can be dissipated if India shows a
continuing dexterity in side-stepping contentious new bilateral
issues. The Indian willingness to avoid needless acrimony over
Washington’s planned national missile defense system suggests that
Indian diplomacy, long ham-handed, may finally have come of age.
The other issue that still divides the two states is the question of
nuclear nonproliferation. There is little question that the Bush
administration has taken a markedly different view than its
predecessor held of the nonproliferation issue in its quest to improve
relations with India. In late August 2001 it signaled its willingness to
lift a variety of sanctions that were imposed on India by the Clinton
administration in the aftermath of the Pokhran tests.49 Nevertheless,
this issue cannot be dismissed; powerful bureaucratic and political
constituencies on both sides hold markedly different views on this

377

subject and remain fairly intractable in their positions.
Again, adroit diplomacy on both sides can bridge the
nonproliferation divide. This may be especially possible during the
Bush administration, which has shown little regard for strict
compliance with a variety of multilateral arms-control treaties. If
India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles does not
fundamentally threaten American interests, it may not be necessary
to compel India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which
has long been a bugaboo in U.S.-India relations. Indeed, India’s longdecried policies now may even be seen as in concert with longerterm American interests.50
CONCLUSION
Given the external threats that India is likely to face in 2020 an
alignment with the United States may well be the most attractive
option to balance against such threats.51 Structural conditions, in all
likelihood, will direct India toward an alignment with the United
States. Nevertheless, other, domestic-level factors may vitiate the
possibilities of the formation of such a relationship. From the
standpoint of 2002 the positive trends in India-U.S. relations may
appear obvious. Nevertheless, such trends may, for a variety of
factors, not be sustained.
Neorealist premises suggest that in the absence of adequate
domestic resources states frequently seek to address threats through
the creation of alliances. Nevertheless, Indian elites may decide,
given their predilection for decisionmaking autonomy, that they
would rather rely on self-help than court American support. They
may also find the United States to be overly hasty, demanding, and
overbearing. The United States, with its proclivity for quick results
and rapid movement, may also find Indian decisionmaking to be too
hesitant, slothful, dilatory, and ultimately tiresome.52
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Certain domestic groups within India, many of which are still
moved by professions of Third World solidarity and remain
slavishly pro-Chinese, may also seek to prevent a closer IndoAmerican relationship, especially in the military sphere.53 Ironically,
the ideological left wing in India may make common cause with
Hindu zealots in opposing an alignment with the United States. The
Hindu fanatics are hostile toward an Indo-American alliance on the
grounds of cultural nationalism. An Indian embrace of America, in
their view, would corrode the pristine quality of India’s unique
cultural ethos.54 All these caveats notwithstanding, the two sides
remain poised for a possible dramatic breakthrough in relations that
could lead them to an out-and-out alliance by 2020.
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CHAPTER 15
THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-PAKISTANI
ENTENTE CORDIALE
John W. Garver
Introduction
The strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and Pakistan has been a remarkably enduring relationship. It
was founded on an understanding reached by Chinese and Pakistani
leaders at the Bandung conference of African and Asian nations in
1955—a time when Pakistan was closely allied with the United States
and China with the Soviet Union. The partnership solidified in the
early 1960s as China and India moved toward war. It was first
“tested by adversity” during the India-Pakistan war of 1965. It was
tested again, in a different fashion, during the 1971 partition of
Pakistan by India during which China remained virtually inactive
militarily. Nonetheless, the partnership not only survived, but was
strengthened by large-scale Chinese assistance which helped
Pakistan recover from the calamity of partition. The Sino-Pakistani
entente emerged when China saw the U.S. as its major enemy, yet
remained vital after the U.S. became China’s quasi-ally and the USSR
became China’s global nemesis. Within Pakistan, both military juntas
and elected civilian governments remained committed to the
partnership with China and saw it as a key element of Pakistan’s
international policy. Within China, the partnership with Pakistan
emerged during a period of ultra-radical Maoism, was carefully
protected by Mao from the zeal of his Red Guard minions, and yet
continued under the across-the-board retreat from revolutionary
causes carried out under Deng Xiaoping. Pragmatic and
development-oriented, Deng continued China’s covert support for
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development efforts begun by
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revolutionary and upheaval-loving Mao Zedong.
The questions addressed by this chapter are these. How has the
Sino-Pakistani partnership changed as Sino-Indian rapprochement
gained steam after 1988? Has the improvement of Sino-Indian
relations meant evisceration of the Sino-Pakistani strategic
partnership, or is it likely to? Similarly, has the emergence of Islamic
terrorism, both before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001, led
to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistani partnership? Finally, this
chapter will speculate about whether the Sino-Pakistani entente will
persist into the second decade of the 21st century, i.e., to the period
circa 2020.
To answer these questions, it is first necessary to specify exactly
what is meant by the terms strategic partnership, entente cordiale, and
entente—terms that are used synonymously and interchangeably in
the following discussion. The phenomenon that these terms refer to
is the Sino-Pakistani relationship that developed between about 1964
and at least 1988. There were three aspects of that relationship: 1)
Chinese support for Pakistan in the latter’s various conflicts with
India; 2) Chinese support for Pakistani efforts to develop national
strength—including economic and military components—adequate
to resist Indian domination; and 3) frequent high-level consultations
essential to reaching and maintaining understanding between
leadership elites. Understood in this fashion, the Sino-Pakistani
entente can be operationalized to include the following elements:
● Chinese political support for Pakistani initiatives directed
against India, including those regarding Kashmir;
● frequent military-to-military exchanges between China and
Pakistan;
● frequent high-level exchanges of civilian leaders;
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● Chinese transfer of critical military technologies to Pakistan;
● Chinese support for development of Pakistan’s militaryindustrial base;
● Chinese support for expansion of Pakistan’s regional links;
● Chinese transfers of conventional arms to Pakistan;
● deterrent support for Pakistan during confrontations with
India.
The question thus becomes: will relations between the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan in these areas continue over
the next two decades? This chapter approaches the problem in three
ways.
First, it will consider the impact of the U.S.-led war against
terrorism on the Chinese-Pakistan relationship. Did the campaign
against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism launched after the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States foster trends that
could either stabilize or destabilize the Sino-Pakistani entente?
Assuming that trends set in motion by the events following
September 11 will continue for some time, this chapter asks: will
those trends work to undermine, or to reinforce, the Sino-Pakistani
entente? For simplicity’s sake, the complex of events beginning on
September 11, 2001, will be referred to in this chapter simply as
“9/11.”
Second, this chapter will analyze whether changes in world
politics that unfolded after the end of the Cold War circa 1989 have
undermined or are likely to undermine the strategic partnership
between China and Pakistan. The premise underlying this approach
is that the key political trends that have influenced Sino-Pakistani
ties since the end of the Cold War will continue to do so into the
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period circa 2020. Two major post-Cold War trends are posited as
relevant: 1) Sino-Indian rapprochement and, 2) increasing Islamic
transnational militancy in Central Asia (a region defined here to
include Afghanistan, the five post-Soviet republics of Central Asia,
and China’s Xinjiang). Under the impact of these two trends, are we
now witnessing, or will we soon witness, the withering away of the
Sino-Pakistani entente?
Third, this chapter will speculate about the Sino-Pakistani
relationship circa 2020, and about how various factors might
influence that relationship. The key assumption underlying this
section is that it is China’s interests, and not those of Pakistan, that
will be decisive. As the weaker partner in the Sino-Pakistani entente,
and one locked in confrontation with a far more powerful India,
Pakistan’s interest in securing the greatest possible level of Chinese
support is assumed to remain constant. China’s interests, however,
will be assumed to be potentially far more variable.
Finally, let me preview for the reader the hypothesis structuring
the following analysis. My argument is that, while the Sino-Pakistani
entente has been modified in important ways by post-Cold War
developments, it remains stable at its core. Conceivably the
conclusions of analysis along the three approaches outlined above
could point in different directions. Happily this is not the case.
Analysis along the three different approaches all point toward the
same conclusion: the continuing durability of the Sino-Pakistani
entente. The broad structure of the argument developed in the
following pages can be schematically outlined as shown in Figure 1.
Arrows represent inferred causation.
This chapter argues against the proposition that the SinoPakistani entente cordiale has been fundamentally weakened by postCold War developments. It will argue that under a surface of everchanging political events there still remains an ineluctable
congruence of Chinese and Pakistani geostrategic interests vis-à-vis
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Figure 1.
India, that leaders in both Beijing and Islamabad recognize this, and
that there continues to be considerable stability in the Sino-Pakistani
strategic partnership. Beijing’s desire for rapprochement with New
Delhi has indeed introduced new elements into the delicate relations
of Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad. There have been some
significant modifications in the Sino-Pakistani entente as Sino-Indian
rapprochement has developed during the post-Cold War period. But
the core of the old Sino-Pakistani partnership, convergent interests
vis-à-vis India’s position in South Asia, remains unchanged—and is
likely to remain unchanged through 2020.
The Sino-Pakistani Entente and the South Asian Balance of Power.
The foundation of the enduring Sino-Pakistani entente is China’s
interest in maintaining the existing balance of power in South Asia,
that is, in maintaining a balance between Pakistan and India.
Beijing’s interests are best served by maintaining a fragmented
structure of power in South Asia, by ensuring, in other words, that
India remains confronted by an independent-minded Pakistan with
aggregate national capabilities sufficient to defy India and pose
significant security challenges to it. It is in China’s interest to keep
Pakistan strong enough to remain independent of Indian
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domination, and independent-minded enough to challenge India’s
domination of South Asia. This fundamental geostrategic interest has
not changed with the end of the Cold War. Nor is it likely to change
for the foreseeable future.
Chinese analysts tend to frame this problem, and Chinese
interests, in terms of India’s desire for regional hegemony over South
Asia. According to this world view, India desires to establish its
hegemony across the South Asian region, and therefore insists that
the various countries of South Asia respect what India defines as its
security interests in that region. China’s support for the antihegemony aspirations and struggles of Pakistan and other South
Asian countries conforms to the highest principles of national
sovereignty and independence, China’s leaders believe. It also
conforms to China’s own national interests. Indian subordination of
Pakistan would free Indian leaders from fears of, and the consequent
need to plan for, a two-front war with China and Pakistan. Since
1962 Indian military planners have had to operate on the basis of an
assumption that Pakistan might decide to enter a major India-China
war, or that China might similarly decide to come to Pakistan’s aid
in the event of a major India-Pakistan war. Effective Indian
subordination of Pakistan would end this two-front concern,
allowing India to concentrate its forces and attentions against China.
The difficulties confronted by the PLA with the prospect of fighting
a war across the Tibetan plateau are already quite substantial.
Eliminating strong Pakistani forces from the order of battle facing
India would further increase the PLA’s difficulties.
This proposition is not merely one inferred by this American
analyst. It is one that appears repeatedly, in one fashion or another,
in Chinese analyses. An article in the prominent Chinese neoconservative journal Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) in
2001, for example, argued that although India aspired to become a
great, global power, its circumstances were such that it would
probably not achieve that goal. Fundamental conditions accepted by
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India’s own leaders at the time of Indian independence worked
against India’s achievement of global stature. One of two fundamental mistakes made by India’s leaders in 1947 was acceptance “of
the division between India and Pakistan arranged by the English.”
This partition had “led to a state of long-term division and mutual
exhaustion between India and Pakistan.” This, along with India’s
other “mistake,” acceptance of the British parliamentary style of
democracy, constituted an “almost insurmountable obstacle” to
realization of India’s dream.1
Another article published in a PRC provincial paper at about the
same time repeated the same idea. India viewed China as a latent
strategic opponent and was locked into a stalemated territorial
dispute with China, the paper argued. Yet it was unlikely that India
would become aggressive toward China because, “To India’s west is
the hated enemy Pakistan and India’s aggregate strength is not
sufficient for a contest with China” (songti guoli you wufa tong
Zhongguo xiang kangheng). This, combined with India’s memory of its
defeat in 1962, meant that India’s “strategic policy” toward China
would probably continue to be a defensive one of “protecting
present interests.” India wanted to delay the “final contest” with
China until its western problem of Pakistan had been solved.2
Addressing the issue of Chinese support for Pakistan’s military
development efforts, Beijing University South Asian specialist Han
Hua commented that “China sees a weak Pakistan as destabilizing
for the [South Asian] region.”3
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraff the issue similarly during
Premier Zhu Rongji’s May 2001 visit to Pakistan. In an exclusive
interview with Xinhua News Agency on the eve of Zhu’s visit,
Musharraf said that by sending “a strong signal of the continuing
strength and durability” of Sino-Pakistan cooperation, the upcoming
visit would have a positive impact on peace and stability in South
Asia. Pakistan, and China worked together to contribute to regional
peace and stability, Musharraf said.4 At a joint press conference after
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three hours discussion with Zhu, Musharraf said that despite
whatever geostrategic and global political changes might occur,
Sino-Pakistani friendship would remain strong and unbreakable.
Responding to a question about India’s increasing defenses pending,
Zhu Rongji replied “very forcefully” that Sino-Pakistani cooperation
in a number of fields, “including military,” would continue.5
Musharraf framed the issue a bit more directly in a seminar on SinoPakistani friendship in the 21st century organized by Pakistan’s
Institute of Strategic Studies during Zhu’s visit. To that seminar,
Musharraf argued that Pakistan’s interest lay in maintaining regional
balance, and that it desired China to play an active role in this
regard. “Regional imbalance” could threaten peace by encouraging
regional hegemonistic tendencies. China’s ambassador to Pakistan,
Lu Shulin, said that strengthening Pakistan was China’s established
policy, and that this would not change.6
Impact of the Post-9/11 War against Terrorism on the SinoPakistani Relationship.
Post-9/11 events constituted a windfall for China’s interests in
South Asia. First and foremost, Pakistan was brought out of
deepening international isolation and back under the wing of U.S.
patronage. By 2000, Pakistan’s links with and support from the
United States and its key allies had collapsed under the cumulative
weight of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons programs, its links with the
Taliban, and the 1999 military overthrow of Nawaz Sharif’s elected
civilian government. The end to U.S. support combined with
deepening economic and social problems within Pakistan to create a
dangerous situation for China. Pakistan’s comprehensive national
strength might decline so precipitously that it would succumb to
Indian domination. Were Pakistan to collapse economically,
fragment along ethnic and regional lines, disintegrate into pervasive
crime and/or religious extremism, or become unable to sustain
defenses pending adequate to keep up with India, Pakistan might
become unable to resist Indian pressure. Pakistan might be
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compelled to resign itself to living under India’s sway. The existing
balance of power in South Asia between India and Pakistan would
thus be overturned.
Under pre-9/11 conditions, the burden of preventing this from
happening by sustaining Pakistani capabilities to resist Indian
domination fell largely on China. In the event of an India-Pakistan
confrontation in which India seemed bent on a definitive
subordination of Pakistan, Beijing would probably have given
Pakistan all support short of belligerency—supply of munitions,
support in the United Nations and other world political fora,
threatening words combined with ominous actions along the border,
and so on. Were such moves inadequate to sustain Pakistan, Beijing
would have faced a major dilemma: war with India, or overthrow of
the existing South Asian balance of power favorable to China. Either
course would have been costly and risky for China. A revolution in
the South Asian balance via Pakistan’s acceptance of Indian
preeminence would have seriously adverse consequences for China.
It would enhance Indian military capabilities and Indian strategic
confidence regarding Tibet. It would strengthen India’s ability to
compete with China on the global scene. And it would stunt the
future development of Chinese ties with the other small countries of
South Asia. The political lesson of Indian subordination of Pakistan
would be: if even the most powerful South Asian nation other than
India, Pakistan, could not resist New Delhi, what chance did smaller
countries have? On the other hand, a war with India could easily
become protracted, disrupt China’s economic development drive,
and rouse apprehensions about China among all its neighbors.
The renewal of U.S. patronage to Pakistan after September 11
ended the previous period of dangerous Pakistani exclusive
dependence on China and consequent Chinese vulnerability. Once
again Pakistan became an important ally of the United States: it
began receiving U.S. economic support and could call on a degree of
U.S. political support. China was no longer Pakistan’s only
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supporter among the major powers. This was an important if fortuitous gain for Beijing. It removed a lot of pressure which might
otherwise have destabilized the Sino-Pakistani entente.
U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan after September 11 also served
China’s interest in keeping India away from alignment with the
United States. By the end of 1999 Chinese analysts had perceived a
major shift in U.S. South Asian policy, viewing the United States as
tilting toward India as a way of containing China. President Bill
Clinton’s visit to India and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s
visit to the United States, in March and October 2000 respectively,
were seen as reinforcing this development.7 U.S. re-engagement with
Pakistan after 9/11 countered this dangerous trend of U.S. alignment
with India. Moreover, renewal of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance angered
India and created new problems for India-U.S. relations by putting
the United States in the middle of India-Pakistan relations. It also
made it more difficult for the U.S. to deny Pakistan support in the
face of Indian pressure. In addition, the renewal of U.S. support for
Pakistan eased the onus Beijing bore in New Delhi because of
China’s support for Pakistan. China’s support for Pakistan was no
longer an anomaly, but, Beijing could argue, part of a broad trend in
the international community. How could New Delhi object to strong
Chinese support for Pakistan when even the United States provided
such support? Indian anger and pressure would thus be less focused
on China and seem less reasonable. India would also have less
incentive to move toward the United States as a way of punishing
China for its support to Pakistan. Indeed, it might work the other
way. U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan could create incentives for
India to tilt toward China in retaliation for U.S. support for Pakistan.
U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan also served China’s interest in
checking the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in that country.
More radical Islamicist elements within the Pakistan Army and
Inter-Services Intelligence were ousted after 9/11, and some radical
Islamicist organizations were also limited. Secular forces within
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Pakistan’s elite may also be encouraged to roll back the rising tide of
Islamicism. Moreover, the United States will do the dirty work in
this regard; it was the United States that pushed Pakistan in these
directions and thus bore the onus for “interfering in the internal
affairs of a developing country” by pushing Pakistan in a less
Islamicist direction. This will further tarnish the image of the United
States among the developing countries that China courts as a
constituency able to constrain perceived hegemonist tendencies of
the United States.
The consequences of September 11 for China were not all
positive. Most of the negative consequences for China had to do with
Central Asia. Chinese analysts and leaders were deeply
apprehensive of a possible long-term U.S. military presence in
Central Asia as a result of 9/11.8 The new U.S. involvement in
Central Asia also disrupted a carefully constructed structure of SinoRussian cooperation with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Instituted as the “Shanghai Five” in April 1996, this structure of
Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian cooperation was premised on
common opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and cross-border
terrorism. In June 2001 it was transformed into the Shanghai
Cooperative Organization when Uzbekistan joined.9 After 9/11,
however, the whole structure of the Shanghai Five-Shanghai
Cooperative Organization seemed obsolete. The United States was
now the major anti-terrorist partner of Russia, Uzbekistan, and
perhaps even of China itself . The logical next step would be for the
United States to join the “Shanghai” forum, making it the “Shanghai
Seven.” Beijing, of course, would see that as bringing another region
of China’s periphery dangerously within the U.S. global imperium,
raising the specter of U.S. encirclement—particularly as Russia is
again moving closer to the West after 9/11. This Chinese fear will
reenter our discussion later when we consider India’s tilt toward the
United States as a way of pressuring Beijing over its close links to
Pakistan.
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Impact of Sino-Indian Rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani
Entente.
The gist of the argument that the Sino-Indian rapprochement has
undermined, or will undermine, the Sino-Pakistani entente is this:
since the Sino-Pakistani entente was predicated on common hostility
toward India, the improvement of Indian-Chinese relations during
the 1990s along with the steady reduction of tension between India
and China has made partnership with Pakistan far less important to
Beijing. Moreover, since Beijing increasingly recognizes that close
strategic cooperation with Pakistan is an obstacle to further
improvements in China’s relations with India, in order to further
promote Sino-Indian amity and cooperation, Beijing will continue to
gradually distance itself from Islamabad. The hypothesis that SinoIndian rapprochement has led, is leading, or is likely to lead, to the
atrophy of the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale is schematically stated
in Figure 2.
It is indisputable that there has been substantial improvement in
Chinese-Indian relations since the confrontations of the 1960s and
1970s. As with most historical processes, one can trace the roots of
Sino-Indian rapprochement back as far as one cares to go. Arguably
the restoration of ambassadorial relations in 1976, or the visit by
then-foreign minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in 1979 (the first
visit in either direction by a high-level official since Zhou Enlai’s
1960 visit to India), are appropriate starting points.10 But probably
the best starting point for the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement is
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s December 1988 visit to Beijing. In
terms of its political-symbolic significance, Gandhi’s 1988 visit was
equivalent to Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit or Mikhail Gorbachev’s May
1989 visit to China. Gandhi’s visit was the first by a top-level leader
between China and India since Zhou Enlai’s 1960 visit. Gandhi’s visit
was also based on an Indian decision to accept Beijing’s
longstanding proposition that the two sides should set aside the
border dispute where the two sides continued to disagree, and
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Figure 2.
move forward with relations in other areas where agreement was
possible. In the decade after Gandhi’s visit, exchanges between the
two sides at all levels increased and became routine. Important
agreements were signed in areas from economics, to cultural
exchanges, to military-to-military relations, to cooperation on
important interna-tional issues, to measures regulating the border
dispute. In the years following Gandhi’s visit, the symbolism of
amity gradually replaced the symbolism of enmity in Sino-Indian
relations. Taking, then, 1988 as the starting point for Sino-Indian
rapprochement, our question thus becomes: has China in fact backed
away from strategic partnership with Pakistan as Sino-Indian
rapprochement gained steam after December 1988? If so, to what
extent has this been the case?
A simple but effective way of gauging the impact of Sino-Indian
rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani entente is to select several
different time points, one before the onset of Sino-Indian
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rapprochement and two well into that process, and determine the
degree of change in Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation between
those time points. While any change cannot necessarily be attributed
to Sino-Indian rapprochement (since many other factors may be
operating and have caused that change), the absence of significant
variation between the two time points would at least invalidate the
hypothesis that Sino-Indian rapprochement has produced a weakening
of the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale.
1982, 1994, and 2000 provide appropriate time points for
comparison. 1982 was 6 years prior to the onset of Sino-Indian
rapprochement with Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit, while 1994 was 6 years
into the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement. For both years the
annual indexes for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS],
Daily Report China published by NewsBank, Inc., up to mid-1996
provide a convenient database for comparison. The addition of 2000
lengthens the period of Sino-Indian rapprochement, thus addressing
the possibility that 1994 was “too soon” to show any influence of
Sino-Indian rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani entente. Unfortunately, the shift of FBIS to an on-line-only format in mid-1996 led to
the discontinuation of a printed index—or, indeed, of any index, for
FBIS. Data for 2000 must therefore come from a search of FBIS‘s online database via its various “search engines.” On the other hand,
there is no on-line database for 1982. Data for the three time-points
is, thus, not strictly comparable, since different methods were used
for 1982 and 1994 on the one hand and 2000 on the other.
Nonetheless, the comparisons still all come from the same database,
and are probably generally accurate. Comparisons of the operational
dimensions listed at the outset of this chapter for these three time
points are presented below.
1) Chinese support for Pakistani initiatives directed against India.
Regarding Chinese support for Pakistan’s anti-Indian initiatives,
including Kashmir, Beijing has clearly distanced itself from Pakistan as
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Sino-Indian rapprochement progressed. Beijing has attempted to
disentangle itself from the India-Pakistan conflict. Beijing apparently
concluded that close alignment with Pakistan against India would
severely constrain the development of Chinese-Indian ties. Consequently, Beijing moved toward neutrality in important areas of the
India-Pakistan conflict. Beijing’s objective became development of
cooperative, friendly ties with both India and Pakistan, and this
precluded supporting one side against the other on several issues.
This shift was manifested first and foremost in a shift in Beijing’s
position on the litmus-test issue of Kashmir. During the 1990 crisis
over Kashmir and “Kalistan”/Punjab, Beijing responded to strong
Indian pressure by dropping its long-time endorsement of a
plebiscite in the Kashmir region in accord with United Nations
resolutions of 1948-1949. Demand for such a plebiscite had long been
and continued to be Pakistan’s position regarding Kashmir. Between
1964 and 1990 it was also China’s position. In 1990, however, Beijing
shifted course: it stopped referring to the United Nations and its
resolutions in the context of Kashmir (except when Beijing wanted to
needle New Delhi, as, for example, in the aftermath of India’s “China
threat” justification of its May 1998 nuclear tests) . Beijing instead
began extolling peaceful settlement of the issue via talks between
India and Pakistan.11
With the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, Beijing also began
expressing private disapproval and public non-endorsement of some
of Islamabad’s more assertive efforts to challenge India. During the
1990 crisis, militants in Pakistan attempted to force their way across
the border into India, and Indian forces responded by firing on them.
Tension spiraled rapidly. In this situation, China urged moderation
and abstention from violence on all sides. Beijing also declined to
support Pakistani efforts to bring the Kashmir issue before the
United Nations. Nine years later, in 1999, during the crisis created by
Pakistan’s seizure of mountain peaks on the Indian side of the
Kashmir Line of Control and overlooking vital Indian road links
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with Leh in Ladakh, Beijing once again rejected Pakistan’s efforts to
bring the Kashmir issue before international fora. And again Beijing
urged both Pakistan and India to abstain from using force, to deescalate the confrontation, and to resolve their disputes peacefully
via discussions.12
During roughly the same time—between 1997 and 2001—Beijing
also refused to support Islamabad’s effort to create “strategic depth”
in Afghanistan by supporting Taliban rule over that country. Beijing
refused endorsement of and maintained a discrete distance from
Pakistani actions in Afghanistan. While Beijing discretely explored
the possibility of relations with the Pakistan-supported Taliban
regime in Afghanistan in 2000 and early 2001, it declined to move
forward with those relations. When September 11 came, Beijing still
hosted an embassy of the Islamic State of Afghanistan headed by
Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Northern Alliance.
These post-Cold War shifts in Chinese policy came in the context
of the continuation of several pre-existing Chinese steps toward
disengagement from the Indo-Pakistani conflict. As Deng Xiaoping
consolidated control over Chinese foreign policy in 1979, Beijing
began urging improvement of India-Pakistan ties. Rather than taking
Pakistan’s side in that country’s disputes with India, as Beijing had
done under Mao Zedong, Beijing began urging moderation on both
sides. The rationale for this shift in 1979 was fear of Soviet
encirclement via closer Indian association with Moscow, plus Deng’s
desire to create a stable environment for economic development by
reducing tensions with all of China’s neighbors. But the policy of
neutrality in Indo-Pakistani disputes continued with new meaning
as Sino-Indian rapprochement gained steam after 1988. Yet another of
Deng Xiaoping’s post-1978 changes was to end the polemical war
against India that Mao Zedong had ordered. Under Deng, Chinese
references to Indian “regional hegemony” became far scarcer—
although, again, Beijing still trundled out these rhetorical blasts
when it was particularly unhappy with New Delhi.
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In sum, in terms of Chinese support for Pakistani political efforts
against India in the South Asian region—whether Kashmir, the
achievement of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, or the struggle
against Indian “hegemonism”—China did, in fact, back away from
Pakistan as Chinese-Indian rapprochement unfolded.
2) Frequency of high-level military-to-military exchanges.
Exchanges among high- and mid-level leaders have been far less
affected by Sino-Indian rapprochement. Such exchanges have
remained relatively frequent as Sino-Indian rapprochement has
advanced. In 1982 there were five high-level military exchanges
between China and Pakistan. In 1994 there were three high-level
military exchanges. In 2000 there were again three exchanges. These
are listed in Table 1.
The diminution of high-level military interchanges from five in
1982 to three in 1994 and 2000 may have been partially a function of
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. With Soviet
withdrawal, China concluded that the fighting in Afghanistan had
shifted from a war of national resistance against foreign occupation
to an internal, civil war. Chinese support for the Afghan mujahadeen
groups rapidly dried up. Consequently there was less need for
Chinese and Pakistani militaries to coordinate activities in support of
the Afghan mujahadeen. Nor was it any longer necessary in 1994
and 2000, as it had been necessary in 1982, for China to extend
deterrence support to Pakistan to counter Soviet pressure on frontline state Pakistan.
3) Frequent high-level exchanges of civilian leaders.
Offsetting the reduction of military exchanges between and
1994/2000 was a slight increase in visits by high- level civilian
officials: two in 1982 compared to three in 1994. In 2000 there were
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1982
Mar.: PRC Vice Premier Ji Pengfei with delegation including
Deputy PLA Chief of Staff Zhang Zhen to Pakistan.
Apr.: Pakistan National Defense College delegation to PRC.
May: Pakistan deputy chief of army staff to PRC.
Sep.: Pakistan chairman of Joint Chiefs Staff Committee to PRC.
Dec.: PLA military colleges and schools delegation to Pakistan.
1994
Feb.: Pakistan chief of army staff to PRC.
Jul.: PRC minister of defense to Pakistan.
Nov.: PLA military college delegation to Pakistan.
2000
May: Pakistan National Defense College delegation to PRC.
May: Pakistan chief of naval staff to PRC.
Nov.: PLA delegation to Pakistan for International Defense
Exhibition.
Table 1. PRC-Pakistan Military Exchanges in 1982, 1994, and 2000.
again two direct exchanges, plus a summit meeting in a third
country. In 1982 Vice Premier Ji Pengfei and Vice Foreign Minister
Han Nianlong visited Pakistan in March, while Pakistani President
Zia ul Haq visited China in October. In 1994 Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto visited China in January, Vice Premier Qian Qichen visited
Pakistan in February, and Pakistani President Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari visited China in December. During these exchanges, Chinese
leaders continued to state China’s support for Pakistan’s efforts to
uphold its sovereignty, independence, and territorial unity, while
Pakistani leaders expressed their gratitude for and continuing
confidence in China’s support. Both sides continued to affirm during
the 1994 visits that the Sino-Pakistani relationship was an “allweather one, tested by adversity.” That partnership would continue,
Chinese officials insisted, “regardless of changes in the international
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situation.” In plain speech that meant regardless of Sino-Indian
rapprochement. In 2000, President Pervez Musharraf visited Beijing in
January, and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pakistan in July.
Presidents Jiang Zemin and Musharraf also held discussions in New
York City in September during a United Nations session.
4) Chinese transfer of critical military technologies to Pakistan.
Chinese transfer of critical technologies to Pakistan also
continued unimpaired by Sino-Indian rapprochement. Arguably, they
have even increased. China’s support for Pakistan’s missile and
nuclear energy program, and even for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program, continued in spite of strong U.S. and Indian objections. In
both areas these transfers were cloaked in secrecy. The persistence of
Chinese assistance in spite of strong international pressure probably
contributed to sentiments of trust and reliability between China and
Pakistan.13
China gave very significant assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program circa 1982. Chinese personnel during that year
reportedly helped Pakistan overcome technical difficulties at the
uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta—Chinese moves that created
difficulties in U.S.-China relations.14 About the same time China
reportedly gave Pakistan the design for a 25-kiloton nuclear weapon
comparable to the successful design tried in China’s fourth nuclear
test in October 1966.15 Still other reports asserted that China sold
Pakistan tritium via a private German company.16 Tritium is an
isotope of hydrogen used for enriching fission explosions to form a
fusion reaction. The veracity of these reports was later broadly
confirmed by U.S. officials testifying before the U.S. Congress.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert
Einhorn later told the U.S. Senate that there was “very strong
evidence “that China had assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program prior to China’s entry into the nonproliferation regime in
1992.17

403

Even after China’s entry into the NPT regime in 1993, it
continued to openly assist Pakistan’s civilian nuclear energy
program. Chinese construction work on a 300-megawatt nuclear
power plant at Chasma in western Pakistan continued throughout
the 1990s. Begun in 1992, the plant finally began operation in August
2000.18 The plant will produce a large amount of radioactive waste
which could potentially be processed into plutonium. The United
States urged Beijing to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Pakistan
on the grounds that diversion of assistance from the civilian to the
military sector was likely. Beijing rejected U.S. urging in this
regard—while accepting similar U.S. prompting regarding Iran.
Regarding Pakistan, Beijing insisted that its assistance to that
country’s civilian nuclear energy program was purely non-military
and in accord with China’s obligations under the NPT. Direct
Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program
apparently continued covertly for at least a year after 1993. In June
1994, a Chinese company sold to Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets used in
the production of highly enriched uranium. Acquisition of these
magnets reportedly allowed Pakistan to double its production of this
uranium.19 Ultimately, Beijing convinced the U.S. government that
the Chinese government had not known about the sale.20 This
analyst suspects, however, that these transfers were in line with
Chinese policy, if not directly approved by Chinese leaders. In any
case, by the time Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programs ceased around 1994, Pakistan already had a self-sufficient
indigenous nuclear capability.
While direct Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program apparently ceased circa 1994, Chinese assistance to
Pakistan’s missile development efforts continued unimpeded during
the 1990s. In 1988 China reportedly agreed to help Pakistan develop
an equivalent of China’s M-11 missile—a solid-fueled rocket with a
185-mile range carrying a 1,100-pound warhead. (It is significant that
this agreement came in the same year as Gandhi’s visit and the onset
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of Sino-Indian rapprochement.) Under the agreement China was to
train Pakistani personnel, transfer essential technology, and provide
parts and equipment to assist Pakistan’s effort. Over the next several
years and continuing in our target year of 1994, cooperation under
this agreement progressed—all under highly secret conditions, of
course.21 In August 1994 Pakistan reportedly made a payment of $15
million under the cooperation agreement to pay for missile
components. China also reportedly agreed to send specialists to
Pakistan to train personnel there in the operation of the new
missile.22 China’s foreign ministry damned Western press reports
about these activities as “fictitious and irresponsible”—although
denials were carefully couched to specify that China’s activities had
not violated the letter of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). Later that same year, in November 1994, China promised
the United States that it would abide by the major provisions of the
MCTR—an agreement that the U.S. believed would end Chinese
assistance to Pakistan’s M-11 program. In fact such assistance
continued.23 During his visit to Beijing in December 1994, Pakistani
President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari addressed the missile
cooperation issue. The missiles and missile technology Pakistan had
obtained from China, Leghari said, were within the MTCR. Pakistan
had not acquired “M-11 missiles” from China, Leghari said.24 It
seems that both Beijing and Islamabad were using fine verbal
distinctions and legalistic loopholes to continue their missile
cooperation in spite of U.S., and probably Indian, objections.
The November 1994 U.S.-PRC agreement did not end China’s
assistance to Pakistan’s missile development programs. In late 1995
U.S. intelligence satellites detected construction north of Rawalpindi
of a new facility very similar in layout to an existing M-11 factory in
Hubei province, China. Intercepts of telephone transmissions from
the facility indicated to U.S. intelligence that approximately twelve
Chinese engineers from the China Precision Machine Import-Export
Corporation had visited the site. The U.S. intelligence community
concluded that the plant was designed to manufacture M-11
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missiles, that China was assisting in that effort, and that the plant
would be operational by 1997.25 Still later, according to U.S.
intelligence reports to the White House and Congress, China
increased shipments of specialty steel, guidance systems, and
technical assistance used for missiles following India’s nuclear tests
in May 1998.26 The next year the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
stated openly and unequivocally, for the first time, that China had
transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. This determination triggered
the application of sanctions mandated by U.S. laws and thus led to a
crisis in U.S.-PRC relations.27 Although the reported transfers had
taken place several years earlier, the leaking of this information in
1999 was probably linked to on going Chinese transfers to Pakistan.
After a series of U.S. sanctions over cases of missile technology
transfers to Pakistan by Chinese companies in 2000, in November of
that year the United States and China reached a new agreement on
the issue. According to that agreement, or at least the United States
understanding of it (the text of the agreement has never been made
public), China would cease export of all “equipment, material and
technology that can be directly used in missiles, as well as missilerelated dual use items.”28 Once again Chinese assistance to
Pakistan’s missile program continued in spite of whatever
agreement was reached with the United States. Throughout the first
half of 2001, U.S. spy satellites ascertained Chinese delivery of
missile components to Pakistan by over-land truck and by ship. The
Chinese materials were being used, again according to U.S.
intelligence reports, for the production of a 465-mile range missile
and develop-ment of a new missile with a 1,240-mile range. Both
missiles could carry nuclear warheads.29
It is clear that China’s transfer of critical missile technology to
Pakistan continued into the early 2000s, unimpaired by the advance
of Sino-Indian rapprochement.
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5) Chinese support for development of Pakistan’s military-industrial base.
Chinese support for the development of Pakistan’s military
industrial base increased substantially between 1982 and 1994, and
again between 1994 and circa 2001. Activity in this regard in 1982 (as
indicated by the NewsBank FBIS indexes) included the May opening
of a representative office in Beijing by the National Bank of Pakistan.
This was the first such Beijing office by a Third World country
bank—a significant symbolic gesture. When the office was opened,
the head of Pakistan’s National Bank lauded the very close and
cordial relations between his bank and the Bank of China, and
expressed confidence that the new office would further promote
friendship between China and Pakistan. Then in July 1982 an
agreement on border trade provided for an increase of 5 percent over
the previous year. (Such border trade had been under way since
1969.) In October the two countries signed an agreement establishing
a joint committee to promote economic, trade, and science and
technology cooperation. These were rather modest measures of
Chinese support.
Chinese support in 1994 for Pakistan’s efforts to develop its
military-industrial base was far more extensive. China agreed to
build and supply heavy equipment for two 25-megawatt turn-key
electric generating plants at Haripur, 60 kilometers from Islamabad.
A Chinese-built heavy electrical equipment complex was
inaugurated at Hattar in November of that year. Chinese engineers
were supervising the construction of a copper, silver, and gold
mining complex at Saindak on Pakistan’s border with Iran. The
projected output was to be sold to China and other countries to
generate foreign currency. The China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC) was also building a 300,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant at
Cashma near Islamabad. This was the first nuclear power plant
exported by China. In 1994 a group of 60 future Pakistani operators
of the Cashma facility arrived in Beijing for training at the
postgraduate school of CNNC. A China-Pakistan science and
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technology commission also held a 2-day session in January—under
the protocol signed in 1982—and concluded an agreement on
increasing science and technology cooperation.
The increase in Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s development
efforts between 1982 and 1994 is best explained in terms of China’s
far greater economic capabilities and openness at the latter point.
China was much richer in 1994 and its more-marketized economy
created incentives for firms to seek out foreign opportunities for
profit making. Be that as it may, it is clear that Chinese support for
Pakistan’s efforts to develop its industrial base increased rather than
declined as Sino-Indian rapprochement advanced. Even more
ambitious Chinese support for Pakistan’s national development
efforts in 2001—centered around Gwadar in western Baluchistan—
will be discussed separately below.
6) Chinese support for expansion of Pakistan’s regional links.
Regarding Chinese support for expansion of Pakistan’s regional
links, during both 1982 and 1994 China worked to expand Pakistan’s
trans port links with Central Asia. In August 1982 the Khunjerab
pass in the Karakorum Mountains was officially opened. India
protested, and both Pakistan and China rejected these protests. In
1994 China agreed to the initiation of weekly flights between Urumqi
and Islamabad. It also agreed that Xinjiang could be used as a transit
route for trade between Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan. This arrangement
enabled Pakistani commerce and travelers to avoid unstable conditions in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and expand various sorts of
contacts with post-Soviet Central Asia.30 Once again, these were
modest manifestations of Chinese support for Pakistan. Far more
ambitious support would come in 2001 when Beijing signed on to
support a large-scale and long-term Pakistani effort to expand its
regional links via Gwadar. Again, the Gwadar project will be
discussed below.
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7) Chinese transfer of conventional weapons to Pakistan.
China’s transfer of conventional weapons to Pakistan has been a
mainstay of the strategic partnership between those two countries.
One study found that during the period from 1966 to 1979 Pakistan
was by far the major recipient of Chinese arms, with transfers to
Pakistan considerably exceeding those to even North Vietnam.31 In
order to capture a somewhat larger set of data, for this investigation
I have expanded the time frame by 1 year on either side of our target
years, thus encompassing the years 1981-1983, 1993-l995, 19982000—2000 being the most recent SIPRI Yearbook available at the time
of writing. Reference to the listings of arms transfers published in the
annual yearbooks of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute indicates only slight variation between our three target
periods. I have also both contracts signed and munitions delivered in
those years. The results are presented in Table 2.
While the data presented in this table are not strictly comparable,
they do seem to show that there has not been a major reduction of
Chinese conventional weapons transfers to Pakistan after the onset
of Sino-Indian rapprochement.32 Changes in the composition Chinese
weapons sales to Pakistan seem to have more to do with Pakistan’s
defense modernization needs than with placating India.
8) Chinese deterrent support for Pakistan.
A final dimension of the Sino-Pakistani entente has been Chinese
support for Pakistan in the face of a threatened Indian attack in order
to prevent such an attack, i.e., Chinese “deterrent support” for
Pakistan. Here I believe our time points must, once again, be a bit
more flexible since international confrontations do not occur every
year. Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, there are four
confrontations we can use to gauge Chinese deterrent support: 1) a
Soviet campaign of 1983 to pressure India to take action against
Pakistan in order to compel Pakistan to desist from providing
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1981-1983
150 T-59 main battle tanks
60 Q-5 FANTAN-A fighters, contracted
60 F-7 fighters, contracted
17 fast attack craft,contracted
1993-1995
20 trainer versions of F-7M AIRGUARD fighters
1992-96: 202 T-85-IIAP main battle tanks**
1994-96: 30 K-8 Karakorum-8 jet trainer aircraft
1989-93: 450 portable Anza anti-aircraft missiles
1990-93: 200 Red Arrow-8 anti-tank missiles
1998-2000
4 fire control radars for 37-mm guns on fast attack craft
34 C-Son/CSS-N-8 ship-to-ship missiles for fast attack craft
6 K-8 Karakoram-8 jet trainer aircraft
1994-2000: 550 portable surf ace-to-air QW-1 missiles
1990-2000: 7,600 Red Arrow-8 anti-tank missiles
* Unless indicated as contracted, all entries refer to deliveries.
** The inclusive time period given for this and several other deliveries over-lap
with the three periods of our investigation. Entries without years fall squarely
within our 3-year time perods, according to the SIPRI registers.
Source: Registers of tranfer and licensed production of major conventional
weapons: from SIPRI Yearbooks, 1982-84, 1994-96, 1999-2001. The last 3-year
sequence is shifted earlier because later SIPRI Yearbooks were not available at time
of publication of this article.

Table 2. PRC Transfer of Conventional Weapons to Pakistan
before and after the Onset of Sino-Indian Rapprochement.
sanctuary for the Afghan mujahadeen; 2) the Indo-Pakistani
confrontation of 1990 over “Kalistan” and Kashmir; 3) the IndoPakistan confrontation of 1998 over mutual overt nuclearization; and
4) the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 1999 over Kargil. For the sake
of brevity and ease of comparison, I will present data from these four
case studies in tabular form in Table 3.
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Two points emerge from comparison of these four episodes. First,
the precise verbiage used by Chinese representatives became more
vague and less pointed during the 1990s, as compared with the 1983
episode. In 1983 Wu Xueqian spoke directly of “war” and possible
“foreign armed attack” on Pakistan. China’s choice of words in 1990
and 1999 was far more elliptical, even though war was a very real
possibility in both latter years. In 1990 Defense Minister Qin Qiwei
spoke merely of continuing China’s traditional policy of “supporting
the Pakistan . . . armed forces in safeguarding . . . state sovereignty
and territorial integrity.” During the Kargil confrontation of 1999,
PLA chief of general staff General Fu Quanyou merely stated that
military cooperation between China and Pakistan was “vital” and
would continue “no matter how the world . . . situation might
change,” i.e., even if war broke out between India and Pakistan. In
1998 General Zhang Wannian’s words were even more vague,
though we should also recognize that the situation in post-nuclear
test Indo-Pakistani relations was considerably less tense than in
either 1990 or in 1999 during the Kargil confrontation.
The change in verbiage between 1983 and 1990, 1998 and 1999 is
significant. As Sino-Indian rapprochement advanced, Beijing began
using less abrasive, more oblique words to express deterrent support
for Pakistan. This analyst believes, however, that the words used in
1990 and 1999, after the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, still
effectively conveyed the same point: if India attacked Pakistan,
China would support Pakistan. This is not to say that Beijing was
extending open-ended support or a blank check to Islamabad. It
clearly was not. But just as clearly, Beijing intended by these
carefully chosen words to extend some degree of Chinese support to
Pakistan if that country was attacked by India. Beijing was saying it
would “support” and “stand with” Pakistan. It left unspoken exactly
how and to what extent it would provide such support. Most
probably, such “support” would entail all means short of outright
belligerency. Discussions by this author with Pakistani officials in
Islamabad in 1990 conveyed the distinct impression that, at that
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juncture at least, those officials were quite understanding of Beijing’s
need to mince words for the sake of improved relations with New
Delhi, while remaining confident that the underlying Sino-Pakistani
strategic link remained strong.
It must, of course, be noted that in 1983 it was ultimately the
USSR that was being deterred, while in 1990, 1998, and 1999, India
alone was the object of Chinese persuasive efforts. Nonetheless, the
point still stands: Chinese verbiage became more elliptical. The
second point to be made, however, is that China continued to render
deterrent support to Pakistan even during the period of Sino-Indian
rapprochement. In all three Indo-Pakistani confrontations of the 1990s,
Beijing’s comments effectively made the point that, if worse came to
worst, Pakistan would have China’s support in the military security
areas—at least materially and politically.
The Balance of Change versus Continuity in the Sino-Pakistani Entente.
What general conclusions are we then to draw from this survey
of the several operational dimensions of the Sino-Pakistani entente
listed at the beginning of this chapter? In terms of China’s support
for Pakistani initiatives against India, Chinese policy shifted
fundamentally, and Beijing adopted a neutral position toward such
efforts. Military-to-military exchanges were somewhat reduced after
the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, but were still robust. Highlevel exchanges of civilian leaders continued unreduced. Transfers of
critical, strategic technologies—nuclear and missile—continued
unimpeded, and perhaps at an even higher level and with an even
greater level of trust deriving from the increasingly long record of
cooperation in covering up these covert transfers. Chinese support
for Pakistan’s efforts to develop its military industrial base did not
diminish, but increased. Chinese support for Pakistani efforts to
expand its regional links increased (as the thrice-promised
discussion of Gwadar will soon show). Sales of conventional
weapons continued—and probably increased as the United States
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bowed out of arms sales to Pakistan after 1990. Chinese deterrent
support for Pakistan against foreign threats became more subtle, but
continued in essence. Only in the areas of Chinese support for
Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and support for other Pakistani
political-diplomatic initiatives against India does there seem to have
been fundamental change. The conclusions drawn from these facts
by analysts may vary. The conclusion drawn by this analyst is that
China attempted to adopt a more neutral position in Indo-Pakistani
conflicts, but remained solid in its support of Pakistan’s efforts to
defend its national security and sovereignty. In other words, the
evidence, on balance, leads to a rejection of the hypothesis that SinoIndian rapprochement has led to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistani
entente.
The Gwadar Project: Strong Chinese Support for Pakistan in the
21st Century.
In 2001 China agreed to underwrite a massive development
project in Pakistan’s western Baluchistan province. China’s support
was announced during Zhu Rongji’s May 2001 visit to Pakistan and
ceremonially associated with the 50th anniversary of the
establishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in May 1951. Chinese
support for the first phase of the project was finalized in August
2001 (just before 9/11) at nearly $400 million. Chinese leaders also
promised similarly robust support for subsequent phases of the
project. China’s support for the Gwadar project was a powerful
manifestation of the continuing vitality of the Sino-Pakistani entente
cordiale.
Named after the small city on the Arabian Sea where the project
was based, the Gwadar Development Project entails construction of
a new, major deep-water port. The harbor is to be dredged, and
eventually 23 deep-sea ship berths will be built, along with new
wharves, warehouses, and other critical harbor facilities. The port
will also have container and petroleum loading and unloading
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facilities. A new rail line is to be built northward from Gwadar,
connecting with the main east-west rail line to Iran at Dalbandin. A
modern highway will also be built east from Gwadar along the
Mekran coast to Liari in the east. Both the Mekran highway and the
rail line to Dalbandin will tie the Gwadar harbor into the existing
road and rail networks of Pakistan. A new high-voltage electrical
transmission line will also be built from Turbat to Gwadar. Through
these efforts, a small fishing village will be transformed into a
modern harbor with the capacity eventually expected to equal
Karachi, which in 2001 carried 90 percent of Pakistan’s seaborne
trade.33 The contours of the Gwadar project are illustrated by Figure
3.
Gwadar had been the projected sea terminus of pipelines
proposed by Pakistan during the mid- and late-1990s. During that
period, Pakistani government agencies lobbied vigorously for new
pipeline routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan to bring the vast
but unexploited energy resources of the Caspian Sea region to world
markets.34
The implications of the Gwadar project—should it be completed
substantially as projected—are great. Establishment of Gwadar and
Pakistan as key transit routes for Central Asian energy to reach
world markets would have immense spillover effects for the fiscal
resources of the Pakistani government and for Pakistani economic
development. The resources available to Pakistan’s government for
its discretionary use would be far greater. Strengthening Pakistan’s
defense capabilities would certainly be one choice. Pakistan’s
involvement in the world economy, and consequent economic
growth, would also be greatly facilitated by the doubling of
Pakistan’s harbor capacity.
From a military standpoint, the creation of a second major
seaport 450 kilometers further from the border of India than Karachi
would substantially enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth in the event
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of a war with India. This consideration seems to have been decisive
in Pakistan’s decision to move forward with the Gwadar project.
During the end game of the Kargil incident of spring 1999, the Indian
Navy had swiftly concentrated forces off the Karachi harbor. The
swiftness of the Indian move had succeeded in trapping Pakistani
naval forces inside the harbor, as well as threatening to close
Pakistan’s sole major seaport should the incident at Kargil continue
unresolved. In the Indian view, the threatened blockade of Karachi
played an important role in compelling the Pakistani military to call
its infiltrators back behind the Line of Control at Kargil. Within two
years of the Kargil mini-war, Pakistan’s government decided to
move forward with the Gwadar project in spite of objections from
Pakistan’s Planning Commission that the large cost of the project
made it nonviable on economic grounds. Pakistan’s government
decided to move forward with the project on “strategic grounds.”
The construction of new pipelines and rail links to a large harbor
at Gwadar will also greatly boost Pakistan’s influence throughout
the Central Asian region. With Pakistan—and an Afghanistan
friendly to Pakistan—serving as the conduit for the flow of Central
Asian energy resources to the world as well as of the world’s
manufactured goods to Central Asia, Pakistan would become a
pivotal link in the emerging world order. A probable follow-on to
the projected Chardzhou, Uzbekistan-Gwadar pipeline would be a
spur eastward to deliver a portion of that oil to energy-hungry India.
This would mean that Pakistan would control the spigot for this
potentially substantial portion of India’s energy supply. It would
also probably doom Indian-promoted projects for undersea pipelines
between India and Iran, skirting Pakistani territorial control. In sum,
Gwadar is an extremely ambitious project with wide-ranging
regional implications. Chinese rhetoric at the time of the August
2001 agreements likened the Gwadar project to construction of the
highway over the Karakorum Mountains that linked China and
Pakistan in the late 1960s. Given the wide-ranging implications of
the Gwadar project, this comparison does not seem inappropriate.
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The Gwadar project is a powerful demonstration of China’s
continuing interest in keeping Pakistan strong even as Sino-Indian
rapprochement progresses. It is noteworthy that China undertook
support of Gwadar shortly after the process of Sino-Indian
rapprochement resumed following the chill in Sino-Indian relations,
which was caused by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests with their
explicit anti-China justification. Once again there is the pattern of
Sino-Indian rapprochement advancing in tandem with continuing
Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation.
Limited Success of India’s Efforts to Pry China away from
Pakistan.
The current state of play in the India-China-Pakistan relationship
is not China distancing itself from Pakistan for the sake of SinoIndian rapprochement. It is, rather, India mobilizing increasing
pressure on China to distance itself from Pakistan, while Beijing has,
thus far at least, tenaciously refused. This Indian campaign to
pressure China began in 1998 with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP)
assumption of power in New Delhi. Prior to that point, India’s China
policy seems to have been dominated by residual Nehruvianism
with its romantic vision of Sino-Indian cooperation on behalf of the
Third World as at least the desirable goal of the Sino-Indian
relationship. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his foreign affairs
advisors Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra (the Prime Minister’s
Principal Secretary), along with coalition partner George Fernandes,
gave a distinctly more pragmatic, realistic cast to India’s China
policy.35 Whereas previous Indian governments had delinked SinoIndian rapprochement from Sino-Pakistani relations, the new
government linked them, although only implicitly. Under the
guidance of Vajpayee, Singh, Mishra, and Fernandes, India also
began developing pressure points to make Beijing see the wisdom of
winding down its entente cordiale with Pakistan.
There were several elements to New Delhi’s effort to pry Beijing
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away from Islamabad: explicit identification of China—and
especially the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale—as the reason for
Indian nuclearization in mid-1998; raising the issue of Sino-Pakistani
relations in the newly initiated security dialogue; using India’s
“Look East” policy to expand Indian security ties with China’s
neighbors; and establishing a strategic partnership with the United
States as a way of repaying China in kind for its links to Pakistan.
Pressuring China was not the only objective in any of these policy
thrusts, but in each case it was one important objective.
Explicitly and publicly associating the Sino-Pakistani entente
cordiale with India’s need to openly acquire nuclear weapons in 1998
was one way in which India’s new foreign policy team attempted to
pressure Beijing. A letter sent by Prime Minister Vajpayee to world
leaders at the time of India’s test, for example, explained that India’s
“deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear
environment,” was linked to the combined threat of “an overt
nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed
armed aggression against India in 1962,” and a “covert nuclear
weapons state” that “had attacked India three times in the last fifty
years.”36 It was the conjuncture between these two states—not
named in Vajpayee’s letter but clearly identifiable as China and
Pakistan—that required India’s explicit and overt acquisition of a
nuclear deterrent. While Vajpayee’s letter was intended to remain
private, high-profile public comments by other Indian officials at
about that time made the same point.37 Although Indian leaders in
effect apologized a few months later for openly calling China a
threat to India,38 the Indian promulgation of those criticisms stands
as one mechanism of Indian pressure on China over its strategic
partnership with Pakistan.
New Delhi also used its new security dialogue with China to lay
out its demand for a winding down of the Sino-Pakistani entente.
The first session of the dialogue met in March 2000. During that
meeting, the Indian side made clear its view that continuation of the
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Sino-Pakistani security partnership constituted a threat to Indian
security. In India’s view, development of genuine Indian-Chinese
amity and cooperation required the end, or at least the very
substantial limitation, of the Sino-Pakistani military partnership.
India pressed China to end its assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and
missile programs. Such assistance adversely affected regional
stability, the Indian side said, and prompted an Indian response in a
“responsible and restrained manner.” India asserted that sensitivity
to each other’s security concerns was essential to a productive
dialogue.39 Again at the second dialogue session in February 2002,
New Delhi raised the issue of Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s
missile programs.40
India’s “Look East” policy was another mechanism of Indian
pressure. Started in 1995 under the leadership of Prime Minister
Narasima Rao, this policy had a largely economic rationale and was
part of the deepening push to open the Indian economy. In 1998, the
BJP government began giving the Look East policy a new strategic
cast. By 2000 and 2001, the two years reviewed in Table 4, the
expansion of Indian security links with countries all around China
under the Look East policy was in high gear.41
The expansion of India’s security relations with Japan, Taiwan, and
Vietnam under the Look East policy is especially worthy of note,
since they are of special concern to Beijing. Japan is, of course,
China’s historic rival for pre-eminence in Asia and a Chinese foreign
policy concern ranking only behind the States as of 2002. A JapanIndia defense dialogue at the defense minister level was initiated
during Foreign Minister Yukihiki Ikeda’s July 1997 visit to India.
That dialogue was interrupted by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. It
was resumed, however, following the visit to India by Prime
Minister Yoshiro Mori in August 2000 when the two countries
proclaimed a “global partnership.”42 The evolving India-Japan
security relationship was manifested by an agreement for increased
naval cooperation to counter piracy that was concluded during
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2000
Jan.
Jan.
Feb.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
Jun.

Jul.
Jul.
Aug.

Sep.Oct.
Nov.

Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visits Japan.
Indian Army Chief of Staff V.P. Malik visits Myanmar.
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visits India.
Myanmar’s SPDC Vice-Chair Maung Aye visits Shillong for
talks with senior Indian officials.
Defense Minister Fernandes visits Vietnam.
Vietnamese naval delegation visits India.
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits Singapore to
participate in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and PostMinisterial Conference (PMC).
Thai foreign minister visits India. Agreement to increase bilateral ties, including security links.
Indian Army Chief of Staff Malik makes follow-up visit to
Myanmar.
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visits India. First such
visit in 10 years. Japan and India proclaim “global partnership.”
Indian Navy (IN) ships visit Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,
Philippines, and China.
Foreign Minister Singh visits Vietnam. High-level Myanmar
government delegation visits India. India extends US $15
million credit. Foreign Minister Singh visits Vientianne, Laos.
Presides over founding of Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
involving Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and India―but
not China.

2001
Jan. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visits Vietnam and
Indonesia. In Vietnam, agreement signed on cooperation in
nuclear energy. First such visit to Indonesia in 14 years.
Agreement signed to increase Indonesia-India military
exchanges.
Table 4. Implementation of the Look East Policy.
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Feb.

Foreign Minister Singh to Myanmar. First such visit since
1987.
Mar. IN and Singapore Navy conduct joint exercises (eighth such
exercise since 1993).
May Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Malaysia, calls for
“institutionalized dialogue” between India and ASEAN.
Chinese Navy destroyer and supply ship visit Mumbai. IN
warship visits Singapore. IN and Japanese Navy conduct joint
exercises off coast of both countries.
May- Indian Coast Guard ship visits Philippines and Vietnam.
Jun.
Jun. Foreign Minister Singh visits Australia for inaugural session of
“framework dialogue.”
Jul. Planning Commission deputy head K. C. Pant visits Vietnam
for ARF and PMC. First ever defense talks between Japan and
India. India proposes expanded defense cooperation.
Aug. Indian Navy “observes” watch Taiwan naval exercises.
Foreign Minister Singh visits Australia. Indian Army Chief of
Staff S. Padmanabhan visits Japan to initiate enhanced
military exchanges.
Sep. India and Indonesia sign further agreement to increase
military exchanges. IN warships participate in Australian
Fleet Review. Indian defense secretary to Australia to
conclude agreement on intensifying defense cooperation and
military contacts.
Oct. Japan’s ex-Prime Minister Mori to India for diplomatic talks.
IN destroyer calls at Wellington, New Zealand.
Nov. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visits India.
Commander of Myanmar Navy visits India.
Dec. IN and South Korean Navy conduct joint exercises in Arabian
Sea.
Dec. Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Japan.
Table 4. Implementation of the Look East Policy (concluded).
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Defense Minister Fernandes’ visit in January 2000, and by joint naval
exercises carried out in October 2000 and again in May 2001.43
Indian links with Taiwan are also extremely sensitive. In this
context, in January 2002 one of Taiwan’s most reliable papers, Lianhe
Bao, reported that Indian air force officials had secretly visited
Taiwan, and that Taiwan and India had begun the exchange of
military information. Taiwan has also reportedly begun posting a
military liaison officer to New Delhi.44
Finally, Vietnam also is a recent nemesis of China, and one still
deeply apprehensive of China’s growing power. A strategic
understanding between India and Vietnam regarding China is not
new, having existed in the early 1980s.45 Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
government moved to revive this long-dormant partnership. During
the 2 years of the Look East policy surveyed here, the March 2000
visit to Vietnam by Defense Minister Fernandes led to an agreement
on expanded security cooperation in countering piracy in the South
China Sea. The next month a Vietnamese naval delegation visited
India to discuss implementation of that agreement. Joint naval
exercises in the South China Sea followed in September. Then in
January 2001, New Delhi added a nuclear coloration to the
developing India-Vietnam relationship by agreeing to assist
Vietnam’s efforts in the peaceful uses nuclear energy. It is
understood, of course, that skills, technologies, and perhaps
materials developed in civilian applications of nuclear power are
intrinsically fungible into military areas, at least in the absence of
very strict international monitoring.
Through its accumulation of strategic links with China’s
neighbors, New Delhi has begun doing in East and Southeast Asia
the same thing that China had been doing in South Asia: New Delhi
is using counter-encirclement to deal with Chinese encirclement.
Implicit in this is a proposed bargain: if China will respect India’s
security concerns in South Asia, India is prepared to respect similar
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Chinese concerns in East and Southeast Asia.
Forging a strategic partnership with the United States was one of
New Delhi’s main instruments of pressure on Beijing. Indeed, it is
probably fair to say that the emergence of the new India-U.S.
partnership has placed great pressure on Beijing. An India-U.S.
military-security relationship began to develop in January 1995
when a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry resulted in
an agreement to expand military contact and cooperation. The latter
included joint naval exercises and a high level consultative group on
defense issues.46 The slowly developing India-U.S. military relation
was aborted in the aftermath of the May 1998 tests. The substantial
understandings reached through the talks between Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh and the U.S. State Department’s Strobe Talbott in the
second half of 1998 revived forward movement in the relationship.
President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 and Prime Minister
Vajpayee’s reciprocal visit in September were further steps forward.
The joint statement on “A Vision for the 21st Century” issued during
Clinton’s visit resolved “to create a closer and qualitatively new
relationship between the United States and India.” It also provided
that, “In the new century, India and the United States will be
partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary
responsibility for ensuring regional and international security.” The
two sides also “agreed on a number of steps to intensify and
institutionalize the dialogue between India and the United States.”
Among these were dialogues on foreign policy and Asian security.47
The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Vajpayee’s visit
agreed to further “broaden . . . cooperation in peacekeeping and
other areas of UN activity, including shaping the future international
security system.”48
The Bush administration that took office in January 2001 sought
to dramatically upgrade the partnership between the United States
and India. New Delhi responded positively. In May Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited India to present to
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India’s leaders the new administration’s thinking about a “new
strategic framework” for India-U.S. ties. According to this “new
framework,” the United States would view and treat India as a major
strategic partner for dealing with global issues. Also in May 2001,
India responded relatively positively to the Bush administration’s
missile defense proposals, a sign that Washington noted
approvingly. Then in November, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld visited India to ask for a list of weapons and military
equipment India wished to procure from the United States. That
same month, Vajpayee visited the U.S. again for talks. A visit by
India’s Defense Minister Fernandes to the United States in January
2002 followed, and culminated in the signing of an agreement
regarding the security of military information. This agreement paved
the way for the transfer to India of sensitive military-related U.S.
technology. By February 2002, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Richard Myers made a visit to India to finalize terms
for the first major Indian purchase of U.S. military equipment since
the 1998 tests. It was anticipated that India’s purchase of military
equipment would shift substantially from Russia, France, and Israel
to the United States with the lifting of U.S sanctions.49 One seasoned
Indian analyst commented that “Few could . . . have imagined that
we would so soon see the day when there is an ever-expanding
exchange of information and experiences between India and the
United States in security-related matters.”50
By developing a military-security relationship with the United
States, New Delhi presented Beijing with the specter of Indian
participation in a U.S. effort to contain China. New Delhi’s message
to Beijing clearly implied that unless China wanted this to happen,
China should become more sensitive to Indian concerns about
Chinese activities in South Asia, starting with China’s ties to
Pakistan.
As indicated by the evidence presented earlier regarding the
continuing robust nature of the Sino-Pakistani entente, China has
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thus far resisted Indian pressure. Indian efforts have had limited
success in weakening the Sino-Pakistani partnership. Beijing’s
refusal to disengage militarily from Pakistan was forcefully stated by
PRC Minister of Defense Chi Haotian during a 5-day visit to
Pakistan in February 1999. Chi’s visit came in the midst of a Chinese
pressure campaign on New Delhi to retract its recent words about a
“China threat” made at the time of India’s May 1998 nuclear tests.
Such a retraction would “untie the knot” India had created in IndiaChina relations by using the China threat to justify Indian
nuclearization, and restart the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement.
“Pakistan and China sit in the same boat and have a common
mission,” Chi said. “They have an all-weather friendship and have
remained each other’s most trusted friends and will continue this
friendship in the future. This friendship is a guarantee of peace not
only in this region, but also the whole world, including South
Asia.”51 Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar pointed out that Chi’s visit,
coinciding as it did with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s historic
visit to Pakistan, contained the important message that Pakistan and
China would continue their cooperation in spite of changes
occurring at the international and regional levels.
Beijing also rejected Indian assertions in the bilateral security
dialogue that China’s links with Pakistan were in some way
unacceptable or constituted a threat to India. The Chinese side
assured India that China’s military cooperation with Pakistan was
part of normal state-to-state relations and in accord with the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.52 Further talks over this issue
came during Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s July 2000 visit to New
Delhi. On that occasion, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh
stressed concerns about China’s transfer of missile technology to
Pakistan.53 Tang responded that China-Pakistan cooperation was
part of normal state-to-state interaction, which was not directed
against India or any other country. “It has been re-emphasized by
the Chinese side that their relationship with Pakistan is a normal,
bilateral and sovereign one and not directed toward any country,
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especially India,” Singh told the press following his talks with
Tang.54 In other words, Chinese-Pakistani relations were a bilateral
issue that were not the proper concern of New Delhi, and for India to
presume to regulate those relations was an infringement on the
sovereignty of Pakistan and China. Tang’s visit to India was the first
by a high-ranking Chinese official to India following the post-May
1998 chill in Sino-Indian relations, and provided an opportunity for
both sides to place key issues on the table. To underline the point
that improvements in Sino-Indian relations would not lead to
deterioration of Sino-Pakistani relations, following his one-day official
visit to India, Tang paid a three-day official visit to Pakistan in July
2000. Upon his arrival, Tang told reporters that China’s relationship
with Pakistan was an “all-weather relationship” and that it was “not
possible at all for the development and improvement of China-India
relations to affect further development of China-Pakistan relations.”
“Sino-Indian relations are Sino-Indian relations, and Sino-Pakistani
relations are Sino-Pakistani relations,” Tang said.55
Beijing rejects the Indian proposition that China’s cooperation
with Pakistan in various areas constitutes in any way a threat to
India. For India to object to such cooperation between Pakistan and
China is a manifestation of Indian hostility toward China, an
expression of Indian aspirations of “regional hegemony,” based on
the erroneous premise of “the China threat,” inspired by sinister
Western forces intent on creating problems in China’s relations with
its neighbors, and a violation of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence to which India has professed agreement. Indian leaders
should purge all such thoughts from their minds and proceed to
sincerely develop Sino-Indian cooperation independently of SinoPakistani links, Beijing argues. Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Indian ties
should proceed on completely separate tracks. There was, and could
be, no linkage between them. China’s objective is to develop allround, friendly, cooperative relations with both India and Pakistan. If
India is unhappy with Sino-Pakistani military cooperation, Beijing is
quite prepared to increase such cooperation with India.
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Although Chinese analysts do not, as far as I know, use the term
in regard to Sino-Pakistani-Indian relations, the concept of proper
“handling” or “management of contradictions” very aptly describes
China’s approach to that relationship. Beijing is pursuing
substantially contradictory or incompatible objectives: maintaining a
solid strategic partnership with Pakistan while developing a multidimensional cooperative relationship with India. Beijing’s objective
is to prevent these two policy strands from becoming an either/or
choice, to prevent pursuit of one from becoming an obstacle to
pursuit of the other.
In the first direct clash between Beijing and New Delhi over this
issue—during the 24 months after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests—
China won hands-down. Confronted by intense domestic, international, and Chinese pressure, New Delhi was forced to retract its
direct and high-profile statements about China posing various
threats to India, and resume the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement
under conditions that made clear Beijing’s determination to continue
its strategic, security partnership with Pakistan.56 New Delhi, in
other words, was compelled to accede to Beijing’s terms for the
conduct of Sino-Indian-Pakistani relations. Sino-Indian rapprochement
would continue parallel to the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale. Will
Beijing be able to adhere to this position over the next 18 years (to
2020) in the face of continuing Indian pressure? As my introductory
comments indicated, this analyst’s guess is that Beijing will continue
to resist Indian pressure. Before engaging in that bit of futurology,
however, it is necessary to assess the impact of transnational Islamic
militancy on the Sino-Pakistani entente.
Islamic Militancy/Separatism as a Factor Undermining the SinoPakistani Entente.
Prior to September 11, the hypothesis that growing Chinese
concern for Islamic separatism in the Xinjiang autonomous region
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was leading, or would lead, to Chinese disengagement from
Pakistan had some currency. Though this idea has been considerably
mooted by 9/11 and the subsequent (at least partial) disengagement
of Pakistan from Islamic extremism, it is still worth considering for
two reasons. First, it informs us about the dynamics of Sino-Pakistani
relations for the decade of the 1990s. Second, the issue of
transnational Islamic radicalism is by no means passé, and in looking
to the future, it is well to consider whether that radicalism might
undermine the Sino-Pakistani entente. The hypothesis that
transnational Islamic radicalism will lead to Chinese disengagement
from Pakistan is schematically shown in Figure 4.
The first point to be made here is that the empirical test
conducted in the previous section is relevant here. There was not, on
balance, a fundamental Chinese disengagement from Pakistan
between 1982 and 2001. This being the case, as with the hypothesis
regarding Sino-Indian rapprochement, we seem to have here a case of
imputed causation without demonstrated change in the stipulated
dependent variable. A second preliminary point regarding the
syllogism offered above is that there is a crucial logical gap between
the second and third elements, between mounting Chinese concern
for Islamic separatism in Xinjiang and disengagement from Pakistan.
Why would Chinese disengagement from Pakistan address Beijing’s
mounting concerns over ethnic separatism in Xinjiang? Why would
Chinese disengagement from Pakistan improve rather than diminish
Beijing’s ability to deal with transnational Islamicist support for
separatism in Xinjiang? Why would not having good, grateful
Muslim friends in Islamabad—a very important Islamic country and
the best friend of the Taliban regime in Kabul—not be more useful to
Beijing’s efforts to check foreign subversion in Xinjiang? The implicit
argument here seems to be either: 1) Pakistan refuses to comply with
Chinese wishes on this issue and Beijing responds by drawing away
from Pakistan, or 2) Beijing concludes that a more isolated and
weaker Pakistan will act more cautiously and/or be more responsive
to Chinese concerns. We will return to these points below.
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Figure 4.
It is beyond dispute that the breakup of the USSR had a profound
impact in China.57 The fate of the USSR became a negative lesson of
what the PRC had to avoid at all costs. Although there were several
other aspects of “the lesson of the USSR” of greater importance
within China than that of ethnic separatism, it is that aspect which is
of concern to our discussion here. According to China’s 1998
statistical yearbook, 61.6 percent of Xinjiang’s population were
ethnic groups other than Han: Kazak, Uygur, Kirgiz, Tajik, and
Mongol.58 Most of these non-Han people were of Islamic religious
faith. China has long faced threats of ethnic separatism from the
Islamic, largely Turkic peoples of Xinjiang province.59 These
challenges increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s as the
mujahadeen struggle in Afghanistan raged and then Soviet authority
in Central Asia unraveled. China responded with increased domestic
repression and controls, including especially increased supervision
of religious institutions and activity in Xinjiang.60
As Islamicist separatist activity increased further in the mid- and
late-1990s, Beijing responded with a three-pronged approach.61 First,
Beijing intensified cooperation with Russia and the newly
independent states of Central Asia. As noted earlier, by 1996 this
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cooperation was embodied in the Shanghai Cooperative
Organization of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tadjikistan. Second, Beijing began insisting that Pakistan take
measures to end the training of Chinese citizens from Xinjiang in
camps of Islamic schools in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Third,
Beijing began using carrots and sticks in an effort to persuade the
Taliban regime to cease and desist all training for Muslims from
Xinjiang.
It is the Pakistan component of this approach which most
concerns us here. Pakistan’s leverage with the Taliban was very
important to Beijing. Indeed, M. E. Ahrari has concluded that this
borrowed leverage gave China greater influence with the Taliban
than either the United States or Russia.62 It seems clear that Pakistan
acted in compliance with Beijing’s demands for assistance. But it is
equally clear that Islamabad’s activity did not have the result Beijing
desired.
During 1993 the U.S. had come very close to declaring Pakistan a
terrorist state because of its activities in Kashmir.63 According to
Ahmed Rashid, Islamabad averted this possibility by shifting
responsibility for processing of Kashmir-bound terrorists to
Pakistan’s Islamic parties, and by moving the relevant training
camps into eastern Afghanistan where the Jura tribal authorities
were induced to take these camps under their protection. Then as the
Taliban emerged on the scene, Pakistani entities gave that movement
ever-greater support for a combination of strategic, economic,
religious, and political reasons. Pakistani support for the Taliban was
deep and broad. As Afghanistan became a center of transnational
Jihadist terrorism, smuggling, and narcotics production under the
Taliban, virtually all the countries of the region, from Iran through
Russia and the new Central Asian states, became increasingly
alarmed. China shared these concerns.
To what extent did China’s leaders know about Pakistan’s
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support for transnational Islamic radicalism? A definitive answer to
this question is currently unavailable, but Chinese intelligence
almost certainly had at least a general understanding of what was
going on between Pakistan, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden. If
Pakistani officials tried to mislead Chinese representatives, Beijing
could have easily concluded that Pakistan was playing a dangerous
two-faced game. If this were the case, Beijing might have concluded
that China would be better served by joining the regional antiTaliban, anti-Pakistan coalition that was emerging by 2000 than by
continuing to support Pakistan in the face of growing hostility by
that regional coalition. On the other hand, if Pakistani leaders were
forthright with Chinese leaders about Islamabad’s policies and
objectives, while assuring them that Pakistan would see to it that the
emerging Islamicist forces would not target China, that could well
point in another direction. Terrorist attacks against the United States,
the West, and India were not necessarily contrary to China’s
interests. From Beijing’s perspective, the crucial question was this:
How likely were the Islamicist forces being created by the Taliban
and bin Laden to turn against China?
In late 1998 the PRC embassy in Islamabad complained to the
Pakistani foreign ministry that PRC nationals from Xinjiang were
being trained in guerrilla warfare in both Pakistan’s northwest tribal
area and in Afghanistan. The basis for the Chinese complaint was
intelligence obtained from the interrogation of 37 PRC nationals
from Xinjiang apprehended following their return to China after
receiving such training. Pakistan’s foreign ministry took China’s
complaint as a very serious matter, and on October 3 asked the
Interior Ministry to undertake intense efforts to determine whether
this was in fact the case. Available news reports do not say whether
the investigation by Pakistani security services turned up
confirmatory evidence, or whether PRC nationals studying at Jihadoriented madras sahs in Pakistan were expelled or deported to China.
Pakistani officials were quoted, however, as saying that such
training was “unthinkable” and incompatible with Pakistan’s long
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and time-tested relationship with China. The Taliban, for its part,
categorically denied that any foreign nationals were undergoing
training in Afghanistan.64
Toward the end of 1999 China received intelligence that Osama
bin Laden had convened a meeting in Kabul attended by
representatives from Xinjiang separatist groups, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, and senior members of the Taliban
leadership. At that meeting bin Laden reportedly proposed that
China-based groups cooperate with the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and proceed in an “organized fashion” in Xinjiang. Ties
among various Xinjiang separatist groups were upgraded and
intensified as a result of the meeting. Chinese intelligence also
determined that Xinjiang groups were sending their “backbone
members” for training at bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan. Many of
these core cadres received actual combat experience in Afghanistan,
Kashmir, Uzbekistan, or Chechnya.65
Again Beijing turned to Islamabad for help. Foreign Minister
Tang Jiaxuan discussed the Afghanistan issue with Chief Executive
Pervez Musharraf and President Rafiq Tarar during his 3-day visit to
Pakistan in July 2000. As noted earlier, this visit came just after
Tang’s one-day visit to New Delhi signifying the restoration of SinoIndian comity—and the continuation of Sino-Pakistani military
cooperation in that context. Tang discussed in Islamabad issues
related to cooperation in missile development and Afghanistan.
There is no evidence that there was an explicit link between these
two issues (i.e., of Chinese support for Pakistan’s missile
development efforts being contingent on Pakistan’s help with
Xinjiang’s internal security problems), but everyone engaged in
those talks would have well understood the existence of an implicit
linkage. Diplomatic sources in Islamabad reported tension in SinoPakistani relations over the Afghanistan issue and noted that Beijing
would again ask Pakistan to moderate Taliban activities. Pakistan
ought to keep a wary eye on developments in Afghanistan and
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“must not, in any way, be associated with something the Chinese
perceive to be inimical to their interests,” Islamabad’s The News
warned.66 Tang Jiaxuan was apparently frank about China’s
concerns over Islamicist subversion in Xinjiang. “Beijing has been
increasingly concerned about the negative impact of the violence in
Afghanistan on its restive Moslem population in Xinjiang,” another
Pakistani news paper reported.67 Tang Jiaxuan’s Pakistani hosts
responded to his concerns over Xinjiang by arranging a meeting
between him and Taliban representatives in Islamabad. Those
representatives assured Tang that Kabul “will not allow anyone to
operate against China from Afghanistan.” In talks with the deputy
director general of the Asian Department of China’s foreign
ministry, Sun Guoxiang, who had accompanied Tang to Islamabad,
the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan categorically rejected all charges
that Chinese citizens were being trained in Afghanistan. “Some
foreign enemies of the people of Afghanistan and vested interests are
bent upon creating misunderstandings and differences between the
two friendly countries [China and Afghanistan] by leveling false and
baseless allegations.” The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would
never allow anyone to operate against China from Afghanistan, the
ambassador said.68
While using its Pakistan links to influence the Taliban, Beijing
also worked with other powers to pressure Kabul to conform to
international norms. In December 2000 China voted in favor of U.S.and Russian-sponsored United Nations Security Council sanctions
against Afghanistan. Shortly before the U.N. vote, a three-man PRC
team headed by China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Lin Shulin, flew to
Kandahar for talks with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammud Omar.
Omar again denied that any people from Xinjiang were being
trained in Afghanistan, and called for increased cooperation between
China and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders also
pleaded for a Chinese veto of the imminent U.N. sanctions. Lin
Shulin explained why such a Chinese veto would not be
forthcoming.69
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It is clear from these events that China’s link with Pakistan was
an important instrument for pressuring the Taliban, that is, for
dealing with China’s internal security problems in Xinjiang. Using
Pakistan’s good offices did not bring satisfactory results for China,
but Beijing did utilize those good offices. Indeed, it was one of
Beijing’s most important policy tools. What might have happened if
the September 11 attacks on the U.S. had not occurred and the
Taliban and bin Laden otherwise continued on their chosen course?
It is conceivable that this might have led to Chinese actions designed
to punish Pakistan. This did not occur, however, and the likelihood
of such a development occurring in the future seems to have been
substantially diminished by 9/11.
The logic of Pakistan’s situation suggests that Pakistan’s military
leaders have been, and will continue to be, solicitous of China’s
concerns about Xinjiang. If the guiding strategic concern of
Pakistan’s military leaders is securing “strategic depth,” that
objective could not be achieved by alienating Pakistan’s most
important, most powerful backer. With the dissolution of the U.S.Pakistan alliance circa 1990, China became Pakistan’s only backer
among the major powers. As we have seen, China has given
Pakistan, and continues to give, important strategic support. It
would be extremely reckless for Pakistan’s military leaders to
alienate China by failing to respond to Chinese concerns about
Xinjiang. Accomplishing Pakistani “strategic depth” requires
retaining Chinese support while forging a solid Islamic alliance
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Meeting Beijing’s requirements
in Afghanistan without sacrificing Islamabad’s objectives there was
certainly a major political problem for Pakistan’s military rulers. But
finding ways of dealing with this tension, rather than resolving it in
favor of forging a Pakistan-Afghanistan Islamic union, is probably
the better problem for Islamabad to face. For China’s part,
continuing warm relations and strategic partnership with Pakistan
gave Islamabad incentive to respond to Beijing’s concerns over
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Xinjiang. If Beijing disengaged from its strategic partnership with
Islamabad, leaders in that capital would have fewer incentives to
comply with Beijing’s wishes regarding Xinjiang.
Speculations about the Period to 2020.
Today, in 2002, the Sino-Pakistani entente retains its vital force,
and it remains substantial. While China has disengaged from IndiaPakistan conflicts to a significant degree for the sake of IndianChinese rapprochement, Beijing remains deeply committed to and
supportive of Pakistan’s efforts to sustain national power adequate
to resist Indian domination. The high level of elite understanding
between Islamabad and Beijing also remains unimpaired. China’s
“all-weather” and “adversity-tested” friendship still means that
China’s support for Pakistan will continue in spite of Indian
objections, and independent of whatever happens in India-Pakistan
relations. This arrangement is unacceptable to India, and New Delhi
is mobilizing various pressures to pry Beijing further away from
Islamabad. Expanded Indian partnership with the United States
raises for Beijing the specter of Indian participation in a U.S.sponsored containment of China—unless Beijing becomes more
sensitive to India’s concerns regarding Pakistan. The expansion of
Indian security ties with China’s East Asian neighbors further raises
the stakes for Beijing. Thus far Indian pressure has worked only at
the margins of the Sino-Pakistani entente. The core, China’s support
for Pakistan’s national development efforts, remains vital. Assuming
that Indian efforts to pry Beijing away from Pakistan will continue,
will Beijing become more responsive to Indian demands and
disengage from Pakistan over the next two decades?
Two considerations involving the United States will play an
important role in determining the amount of pressure China will be
subject to because of its continuing ties with Pakistan. One is the
level of tension in U.S.-PRC relations. The second is the level of U.S.
support for Pakistan.

436

Regarding the level of Sino-American tension, were U.S.-PRC
relations to deteriorate badly, Beijing would, ceterius paribus, become
more desirous of uncoupling India from the United States. The more
fearful Beijing is of U.S. containment, or even of outright U.S. attack
against China, the more willing it would be to meet Indian demands
regarding Pakistan in order to disassociate India from a U.S.-led
anti-China bloc. Yet disengaging from Pakistan to appease India
would be a very risky move for Beijing. It would expose China to a
possible Indian double-cross, leaving Beijing in an even worse
situation. We will return to this matter below.
Regarding U.S.-Pakistan ties, greater levels of U.S. support for
and engagement with Pakistan would diminish, or at least offset,
Indian pressure on China generated by continuation of the SinoPakistani entente. Beijing would be able to argue that its support for
Pakistan is in line with trends of the international community, and
not some sort of unacceptable anomaly. Indian anger at U.S.Pakistan ties would also work against Indian alignment with the
United States, and even make cooperation with China more
attractive to New Delhi as a way of punishing Washington for its
support for Pakistan.
Finally, the trajectory of Indian development over the next 18 or
so years, especially relative to that of China, will be important. If—
and this is a very big if—India’s economic reforms deepen
substantially and succeed in attracting large volumes of foreign
direct investment and in generating large export growth, and if this
were juxtaposed with instability within China due to the insolvency
of its banking system and/or the collapse of the loss-earning state
enterprises, China’s incentives to appease India by sacrificing
Pakistan would increase.
Several scenarios can be envisioned which could conceivably lead
to Chinese disengagement from Pakistan. The most likely of these
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would entail deterioration of U.S.-China or perhaps ChineseJapanese relations, combined with Indian gestures effectively
suggesting to Beijing the real possibility of Indian strategic
alignment with the U.S. and/or Japan unless Beijing met New
Delhi’s demands. New Delhi might unequivocally demand Chinese
disengagement from Pakistan as the price for Indian nonalignment
with China’s American and/or Japanese foes to the east. Beijing
might judge as too great the risks of noncompliance with New
Delhi’s demands, and draw away from Pakistan. This syllogism is
outlined in Figure 5.
How likely are these situations to materialize in the period to
2020? Regarding increased levels of Chinese tension with the United
States and/or Japan, short of a Chinese decision to attack Taiwan, it
is difficult to envision a major deterioration of relations and
escalation of tensions. The trials and tribulations of the 1990s seem to
have persuaded leaders in both Washington and Beijing that
confrontation is too costly, of uncertain outcome, and does not serve
national interests well. Estranged relations punctuated by periodic
crises seem to be the likely course of U.S.-PRC relations for the
foreseeable future, probably out to 2020. It is unlikely that there will
be a major deterioration of Sino-American relations such as might
require drastic Chinese action to uncouple India and the United
States—once again short of a Chinese decision to attack Taiwan.
Were a Sino-American war over Taiwan to occur, Indian
neutrality secured at the cost to China of disengagement from
Pakistan would not be adverse to U.S. interests. Indian involvement
in the Sino-American war would probably not be decisive or even
desirable from the U.S. point of view (if the strategy of limited war
was again adopted). A post-war China that confronted and was
constrained by an India with a far more powerful position in South
Asia would, on the other hand, comport with U.S. interests.
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Figure 5.
Regarding Japan, while new tensions and conflicts have emerged
in Sino-Japanese relations since about 1996, it is difficult to imagine
those tensions escalating to a level which would make Chinese
leaders genuinely fear Japanese-Indian strategic cooperation. The
exception to this might be Japanese acquisition of long-range air
attack and/or power projection capabilities. This too seems unlikely
to occur over the next 18 years.
The quality of Indian diplomacy will also count for a lot. Indian
diplomacy would have to be very skillful. New Delhi would have to
make Beijing genuinely apprehensive of possible Indian alignment
with the United States, without going so far as to convince Beijing
that it was unwise for China to sacrifice its most effective instrument
for countering India. There are still strong institutional barriers to
effective diplomatic maneuver in India. Very strong sectors of the
Indian academic and media elite believe that India cannot, and
should not, align with the United States. Reasons given for this
include: India’s tradition of non-alignment; the exploitative,
capitalistic, aggressive, or hegemonistic nature of the United States;
and China’s anticipated negative reaction to Indian alignment with
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the United States. Regarding the final reason, the line of argument is
that Indian alignment with the United States would anger Beijing,
thereby thwarting development of more friendly Sino-Indian
relations. This was demonstrated, so the argument runs, by China’s
strongly negative reaction to the BJP government’s solicitation of
U.S. “understanding” for Indian nuclearization in May 1998.
Improvement of Sino-Indian relations thus requires that India not
get too close to Washington. This is a widespread view in India, one
that Beijing encourages and courts with friendship diplomacy.
At least as common in India as suggestions that closer India-U.S.
strategic cooperation would pressure China to disengage from
Pakistan, is the argument that such cooperation is reckless and
would backfire to India’s disadvantage. Chinese analysts are well
aware of these strong trends in Indian thinking, and China’s
diplomacy has become fairly adept at exploiting this line of Indian
thought. Given the depth of divisions within Indian opinion, plus
the effectiveness of Chinese diplomacy in courting Indian proChina/anti-Western sentiment, resolute and decisive Indian action
that might actually scare Beijing into seeing some need to disengage
from Pakistan seems unlikely. It seems more likely that Beijing
would conclude that Indian threats to align with the United States
and/or Japan are bluffs from which Indian leaders can be compelled
to back away by the application of appropriate Chinese
countermeasures.
If Chinese leaders were persuaded that India would actually
align with the United States and/or Japan, the importance of
Pakistan as a means for countering India would become even more
vital to Beijing. This is a major conundrum for India’s efforts to
pressure China away from Pakistan. To genuinely rouse Chinese
concerns, to persuade Beijing that Indian threats of alignment with
the United States are credible, New Delhi must move toward
genuine cooperation with the United States. Yet by doing this, it
makes Pakistan even more valuable to Beijing as a counter to India.
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Under conditions in which actual Indian alignment with the U.S.
seemed possible, Chinese disengagement from Pakistan would
require firm Indian guarantees that New Delhi would not align with,
or continue its alignment with, the United States subsequent to
Chinese disengagement from Pakistan. Beijing would also require
solid Indian guarantees that New Delhi would not seize the
opportunity of Chinese disengagement from Pakistan to decisively
subordinate Pakistan. Lacking either of these, Beijing would face the
possibility of an Indian double-cross. New Delhi might move against
a now-isolated Pakistan, a Pakistan without Chinese support.
Decisive Indian subordination of an isolated Pakistan might then be
followed by Indian alignment with the anti-China U.S.-Japan bloc.
All of this seems exceedingly unlikely. It seems far more likely that
Beijing would not risk the extremely powerful check on India
constituted by a strong Pakistan able and willing to counter India.
China will probably prefer to found its security in South Asia on an
advantageous balance of power, rather than endanger that structure
for the sake of Indian good will.
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CHAPTER 16
THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA1
Aaron L. Friedberg
Over the course of the next several decades, there is a good
chance that the United States will find itself engaged in an open and
intense geopolitical rivalry with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Such an outcome is not inevitable; few things in international
politics are. But there are strong reasons to believe that it is at the
very least plausible, and even quite likely. Indeed, there are reasons
to believe it is already under way.
In what follows, my aim is to consider what such a SinoAmerican rivalry might look like, and how it could unfold. In doing
so, I make three basic assumptions. The first is that, as a nation-state,
China will continue to hang together—that, however dramatically its
economy and political system may change over the next several
decades, they will not collapse. My second assumption is that, in the
words of a recent U.S. Defense Department report, China “wants to
become the preeminent Asian power,” which necessarily means that
it will seek ultimately to displace the U.S. as the preponderant power
in the region. Third, I assume that the U.S., while seeking to satisfy
China’s ambitions by at least to some degree acceding to its wishes,
will not be willing to abandon its own present position of preponderance in Asia or to surrender pride of place to China. To permit a
potentially hostile power to dominate East Asia would not only be
out of line with current U.S. policy, it would also mark a deviation
from the fundamental pattern of American grand strategy since at
least the latter part of the 19th century.
The combination of growing Chinese power, China’s effort to
expand its influence, and the unwillingness of the U.S. entirely to
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give way before it are the necessary preconditions of a “struggle for
mastery” in Asia (to adopt a phrase from the British historian A. J. P.
Taylor). How, then, might that struggle arise?
The Sino-American relationship today contains a mix of
cooperative and competitive elements. The two countries trade with
each other, American businesses invest considerable sums in China,
and many Chinese students come to study in the United States.
Beijing and Washington engage in sporadic military-to-military dialogues and ongoing discussions of various regional and global
issues, including the future of the Korean peninsula and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. At the
same time, however, the U.S. and China have strong disagreements
on a variety of matters, human rights and the Taiwan question being
foremost among them. And in recent years the two sides have begun
to regard each other as potential military rivals, although both are
reluctant to acknowledge this openly.
It is precisely this mix of cooperative and competitive elements
that may shift sharply in the competitive direction. In the new
configuration of things, China and the U.S. would most likely
continue some form of economic relationship, they would not be
openly at war with one another, and they would maintain diplomatic ties. But flows of trade and investment would increasingly be
distorted by strategic considerations, the two powers would be
engaged in a much more open military competition—designing,
deploying, and training their forces with an eye toward possible
conflict—and this military rivalry would be accompanied by a
political contest waged throughout the Asia-Pacific region and
perhaps beyond.
Any number of pathways could lead from the present to this
imagined future. Thus, a single catalytic event, such as a showdown
over Taiwan, especially if it entailed a significant loss of life on either
side, could transform the U.S.-China relationship virtually overnight.
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Whichever side prevailed, the loser would look for ways to exact
revenge, and each power would likely redouble its efforts to
strengthen its military and diplomatic postures in Asia and undermine those of its rival. Or there could be a gradual deterioration in
relations, an accumulation of lesser disputes and failed efforts to
resolve them that would lead the U.S. and China to become
increasingly suspicious and hostile. Or there might be some
combination of these trends—say, a period of gradual deterioration
punctuated by one or a series of crises (like the one that followed the
accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia
in the spring of 1999), no one of which might seem in itself to be of
overwhelming importance but which, taken together, could culminate in a much more contentious relationship.
Regardless of how it arose, an intensified Sino-American rivalry
would likely manifest itself in different spheres and along different
dimensions. Let me take these in order, beginning with the
economic.
ECONOMIC RIVALRY
Ever since it began market reforms in the late 1970s, the PRC has
become heavily dependent for its continued well-being on the
outside world, and, in particular, on the U.S. Without heavy inflows
of American capital and technology, and without access to the huge
U.S. market, China would not have been able to progress as far and
as fast as it has. Whether or not the U.S. could have used its position
of relative economic advantage for strategic purposes during this
period, the fact is that, for the most part, it did not try. Despite some
efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to punish China for violations of human rights and arms proliferation, U.S. economic pressure
was half-hearted and largely ineffectual. By the mid-1990s, the U.S.
was lifting most sanctions, loosening or abandoning most controls
on dual-use technology exports to China, and moving to grant it
status as a normal trading partner.
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It did so based largely on the belief that trade leads to peace.
Mutual economic exchange is assumed to forge a shared interest in
good relations, and a powerful disincentive to conflict. According to
advocates of “engagement” with the PRC, international trade and
investment will fuel economic growth, economic growth will speed
democratization, and a democratic China will be far less likely to use
force or threats against other democracies, including the U.S.
It is certainly possible that, if it continues to grow richer, China
will also become, from the American perspective, more benign. But it
is also conceivable that this may not happen. If it does not, the U.S.
will be faced with a challenge with which it has not had to cope in
over a century: a strategic rival that is economically and technologically dynamic, deeply engaged in the world economy, and whose
total output may come eventually to approach America’s own.
Will an era of more openly competitive relations be marked by
renewed U.S. efforts to exert economic leverage on China? The
answer will depend a great deal on how such an era begins. A
sudden, severe crisis could galvanize American domestic opinion,
overwhelm the objections of business groups and others with a
strong vested interest in continued commercial contacts, and lead to
the imposition of near-total restrictions on imports, exports, and
capital and technology flows. But if the deterioration is gradual, a
sufficient political consensus may not exist in the U.S. to support
even limited sanctions. To the contrary, it is precisely when relations
falter that arguments for keeping trade on an even keel will be
advanced most strenuously.
As time passes, China will probably become even less susceptible
to American economic pressure than it is today. Chinese exports to
the U.S. may be large, but even now they are greatly overshadowed
by China’s exports to its Asian neighbors. And as important as the
U.S. is as a source of capital, it now comes in only third among the
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five largest providers of direct foreign investment to China; the other
four (Hong Kong, which serves as a conduit for Taiwanese investment on the mainland, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) are all
Asian players. In the future, the Chinese government will have a
strong strategic incentive to encourage and expand such diversification, above all in order to lessen excessive dependence on the U.S.
In the long run, China will become relatively less reliant not only
on the U.S. but on the outside world generally. Rising incomes will
mean a growing pool of domestic savings and a declining reliance on
foreign investment. In time, the technological advance of Chinese
industry will be fueled more by indigenous developments and less
by ideas, techniques, and machinery imported from abroad. The
maturing of its vast domestic market will probably also mean that
trade will diminish as a share of gross national product (GNP) and
that China will become less dependent on exports and imports than
it is today (though at least in the medium term it is likely to depend
more heavily on certain critical imports, especially of food and fuel).
As China develops and becomes more deeply integrated into the
global economy, it will not only be less susceptible to economic pressure from others but more capable of exerting economic pressure of
its own. This pressure need not even be deliberate to be felt: as the
experience of the U.S. in the Western hemisphere suggests, a big,
dynamic economy can exert an almost gravitational pull on the
smaller units that surround it. The analyst Ross Munro has noted in
Orbis that the rapid growth of China’s economy has produced a
significant expansion in its influence all along its interior land frontier, as its mostly poor neighbors in South, Southeast, and Central
Asia have begun to look to it increasingly as a source of markets, aid,
and business deals.
Beyond its immediate neighborhood, the sheer size of the potential Chinese market has also helped to create powerful business
lobbies favoring good relations with the PRC. In the major industrial
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powers, these groups can be expected to pressure their own governments in favor of policies that happen also to be in Beijing’s interest:
easing restrictions on exports of capital and technology, avoiding
sanctions, tariffs, or other market-closing measures that might provoke Chinese retaliation, and, in general, doing whatever is possible
to maintain good bilateral relations and a “positive business
climate.”
The activities of pro-PRC lobbying groups may be perfectly
legitimate and predictable; but in democratic societies they have
nevertheless had the effect of dulling the reactions and limiting the
strategic repertory of governments. These effects have been especially pronounced in the U.S. Barring some truly severe crisis, trade
with China will continue to exercise its muffling influ-ence on
American strategy.
Even if the U.S. should, at some point, adopt a more openly
competitive stance, it would have great difficulty getting others to go
along. This is not only because of genuine differences of perspective
over how best to cope with China’s increasing power and
assertiveness, but also because each of the members of a potential
coalition will be subject to its own domestic pressures. To get some
sense of this, imagine, during the Cold War, the debates on strategic
policy that would have gone on within NATO if the members of the
alliance had also been, to varying degrees, deeply engaged in
economic exchange with the Soviet Union. As Andrew J. Nathan and
Robert S. Ross conclude in their book, The Great Wall and the Empty
Fortress (1997), “It is almost unthinkable that the rest of the world
would unite to isolate China as the West did in the era of
containment.”
In addition to what it gains passively, as it were, simply by
engaging with the rest of the world, China has also been actively
deploying its growing economic weight to shape the strategic
behavior of others. First, and most obviously, Beijing uses access to
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the Chinese market as a means of rewarding or punishing foreign
firms and, through them, influencing their home governments. Ross
Munro and Richard Bernstein relate in The Coming Conflict with China
(1997) that PRC officials promoted an unusual array of business
deals with American companies in the spring of 1994, just as the
Clinton administration was considering revoking China’s mostfavored-nation status over human rights violations. Two years later,
having headed off this threat, Prime Minister Li Peng announced
that China would buy $1.5 billion worth of aircraft from Airbus
Industrie rather than Boeing because, in his words, the Europeans
did not “attach political strings to cooperation with China, unlike the
Americans who arbitrarily resort to the threat of sanctions or the use
of sanctions.”
China has been especially assertive in attempting to exert direct
economic influence over Taiwan. Following the election of Chen
Shui-bian in the spring of 2000, the Beijing government began to
warn Taiwanese companies with investments on the mainland that
(according to a report in the New York Times) “they would be subject
to unspecified sanctions if they advocated independence for
Taiwan.” To drive home the point, the PRC has evidently begun to
make examples of companies whose chief executives are associated
with the cause of independence. (In one case, a large petrochemical
concern whose chairman supported Chen found its facilities on the
mainland subjected to numerous inspections.) Even more visible is
the case of Ah-mei, a Taiwanese singer popular on the mainland
who performed the national anthem at Chen’s inauguration. Her
music and videos have since been banned from Chinese statecontrolled media; in response to official pressure, Coca-Cola
withdrew TV, radio, and billboard advertisements featuring her
image.
Beijing clearly hopes to use economic threats and inducements,
then, to discourage the U.S. from ever pursuing a more
confrontational policy toward it. The same economic instruments
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could also prove extremely important in efforts to affect American
interests in Asia, discouraging Japan and Korea from participating in
the development of theater missile-defense systems, for example, or
persuading Singapore to abandon its present policy of permitting
U.S. naval vessels to dock at its ports. The PRC could also do more
than in the past to separate the U.S. from its European allies by
shifting business from American firms to their EU competitors.
The PRC has begun to get into the financial-diplomacy game as
well, if so far on a rather modest scale. In 1994, China stole a march
on India by financing, building, and equipping a $200 million coal
mine in Bangladesh. And during the summer of 1997, as the Asian
financial crisis was reaching its depths, China joined the IMF and a
group of much wealthier Asian countries in extending a financial
bailout package to Thailand—the first time that it had ever participated in such an effort. Eighteen months later, at the beginning of
1999, Thailand surprised the U.S., its nominal ally, by signing a
“Plan of Action for the 21st Century” with China—an agreement
described by one Thai observer as “a strategic move by China to seek
an alliance to counter the influence of the U.S.” If the Thai example is
any indication, economic assistance in various forms will probably
become an increasingly significant means for China of winning
friends and influencing people.
There are also other, more subtle financial instruments at its
disposal. During the Asian crisis, China extracted the maximum
diplomatic benefit from its (self-interested) decision not to devalue
its currency despite sharp drops in the currencies of many of its
smaller neighbors. It thereby earned plaudits as a responsible
regional “citizen,” an upholder of stability, and, in contrast to Japan,
a country able to take tough economic decisions. But China’s muchvaunted restraint may also have carried with it an implicit and more
menacing message: the PRC is now, as one senior official of the
People’s Bank put it at the time, “a big player,” and what it does or
fails to do in the economic realm can have large and potentially
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devastating effects on the well-being of other, lesser players.
One final possibility: because China promotes exports while
restricting imports, it has run substantial trade surpluses in recent
years and accumulated large foreign-exchange reserves. In 1998, for
example, the PRC’s reserves stood at over $140 billion, second only
to Japan’s. If China continues to amass large reserves and if, as seems
likely, the bulk of these are held in dollar-denominated assets, they
could provide Beijing with an economic weapon against the U.S. By
dumping its reserves at the right moment, China might hope to
trigger a run on the dollar, an increase in U.S. interest rates, and
perhaps a stock-market crash. It is true that such an attack, if it
produced the intended immediate results, could also do serious
damage to China’s economy; the mutually destructive effects of
attempts at currency manipulation and financial coercion have
caused some analysts to compare them with nuclear weapons. But
the prospect of mutual devastation does not necessarily provide an
ironclad guarantee that a weapon will never be used.
The bottom line is simple: one way or another, China’s economic
growth will provide it with an increasing array of instruments with
which to try to exert influence on other countries and, if it chooses, to
carry forward a strategic competition with the U.S.
MILITARY RIVALRY
The second dimension of a possible struggle for mastery in Asia
will be military. From the early 1970s until (at the latest) the early
1990s, the U.S. and the PRC pursued what might be described as
parallel rather than convergent military programs. While both
countries were augmenting their capabilities and planning for future
warfare, neither was explicitly or overtly focusing its activities on the
other. Rather, for almost two decades, American and Chinese
defense planners shared a common adversary: the Soviet Union. The
weakening and subsequent collapse of the USSR removed the basis
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for this tacit Sino-American alliance, and also freed the two countries
to devote more of their military resources to other potential rivals.
Over the course of the 1990s, they came increasingly to regard each
other in just this light.
Starting in 1985, China’s armed forces, at the direction of their top
political leaders, downgraded preparations for an “early, major, and
nuclear war” with the Soviet Union and began to focus on the possibility of local, limited wars on China’s periphery. This change had
the general effect of directing the attention of the Chinese military
outward—away from the need to absorb a massive enemy nuclear
attack and subsequent invasion and toward the problem of projecting power at least some distance from China’s frontiers. Then the
1991 Gulf War heightened Chinese awareness of the military impact
of new technologies and, partly as a result, caused Chinese planners
to concentrate with new intensity on the possibility of a future
conflict with the U.S. According to Allen Whiting, writing in the
China Quarterly, “war games played against the American ‘enemy’
have been standard since 1991.”
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. has been slower to focus similar
attention on China. During the early post-Cold War years, American
armed forces were preoccupied first with fighting the Gulf War, then
with managing reductions in their size and budget, and finally with
carrying out a variety of operations, from peacekeeping missions of
varying scale to a sizable air war in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s
and down to the present, there was also a strong political inhibition
against considering China a future military rival.
The turning point probably came in 1995-96, when China fired
ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, as the Washington
Post correspondent Thomas Ricks has reported, U.S. military
planners have been devoting greater energy to potential Asian
contingencies and, however reluctantly, thinking about a possible
confrontation with China. If present trends continue, over the next
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several years the U.S. and China will move toward an increasingly
obvious military competition, with several facets.
Offense vs. Defense.
China has placed heavy emphasis on the development and
deployment of missiles: short-, intermediate-, and long-range,
nuclear and conventional, cruise and ballistic.
Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has added substantially to its
arsenal of short-range conventional ballistic missiles (the DF-11s and
DF-15 s), and by 2005 it is expected to have roughly 600 of these
weapons within range of Taiwan.2 Older, liquid-fueled, intermediate-range missiles capable of striking targets throughout East
and South Asia with nuclear weapons (DF-3As) are being
supplemented with newer, more accurate, solid-fueled missiles (DF21As). Finally, China’s small force of fixed, liquid-fueled intercontinental-range rockets (DF-5s and DF-5As) is expected to be
upgraded over the course of the next decade to include two new
types of land-based mobile missiles (the DF-31 and DF-41, both of
which may be capable of carrying multiple warheads) and one
submarine-launched ballistic missile (the JL-2). If, as is widely
assumed, some of these weapons are equipped with multiple
warheads, the number of weapons deliverable against the U.S. will
rise into the low hundreds. If the number of new launchers deployed
is larger than expected, that total could grow to as many as 1,000.
China’s interest in missiles may be due in part to the fact that, as
opposed to manned long-range aircraft, submarines, or surface naval
vessels, they are relatively cheap, comparatively simple, and potentially very effective. While the Chinese air force and navy continue to
work at acquiring and improving more traditional kinds of military
systems, missiles, as the analyst Mark Stokes observes, “are rapidly
becoming the sole credible long-range firepower projection asset
which the [military] has in its inventory, and this will remain likely
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true for the foreseeable future."
At the same time that China has been augmenting its missile
forces, the U.S. has been developing and moving toward the
deployment of both national and theater ballistic-missile defense
systems. Our intensified interest in defense was not driven initially
by concern over China, but rather by the threat from “rogue” states
like North Korea and Iran. Nevertheless, at least since the 1995-96
Taiwan Strait crisis, the question of the possible utility of defenses
against Chinese missiles has inevitably arisen. For their part, and
whatever American decisionmakers may say or believe, Chinese
strategists probably assume that our missile-defense programs are
directed in large measure at blunting their offensive forces. For the
moment, PRC planners have reason to hope that American defensive
deployments will be delayed by some combination of technical
problems, budgetary concerns, domestic political developments, and
diplomatic pressure. But they are unlikely to be so imprudent as to
ignore the possibility that, sooner or later, some kinds of defenses
will be deployed. Even a limited national missile-defense system
could well be capable of intercepting all of the PRC’s present ICBM
force. If they cannot derail the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD)
program through diplomatic means, the Chinese will therefore want
to be in a position to defeat it militarily, probably by deploying
larger numbers of missiles, at least some of which will be capable of
carrying either decoys or multiple warheads. (Another form of insurance might be submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles, or
ballistic missiles that could be fired at depressed trajectories.)
Then there is the prospect that the U.S. may deploy theater missile
defenses (TMD), either alone or in conjunction with its regional
friends and allies. A working TMD system would decrease China’s
confidence in its ability to intimidate other Asian countries by
threatening to attack them with nuclear weapons; it might also
seriously complicate Chinese hopes of disrupting American military
operations in the western Pacific by quickly disabling a handful of
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fixed bases and facilities. A Japan able to shelter behind a defensive
shield might also feel freer to develop its own offensive capabilities,
perhaps even including nuclear weapons. Last but not least, a TMD
system deployed on or around Taiwan could blunt what is now
China’s most potent threat against the island, perhaps opening the
way for moves toward formal independence.
China’s options for responding to these possibilities are similar to
those it has in dealing with NMD, although, because of the shorter
distances involved, some countermeasures may be easier and less
expensive to implement. Preventing deployment in the first place
through diplomacy and intimidation would be an obvious first
choice. Preparing to swamp a TMD system with ever-larger numbers
of warheads would be another. Circumventing defenses by developing long-range cruise missiles or other means of attack would be a
third. Finally, if the U.S. and its allies seemed to be developing
defenses sufficiently capable to blunt a conventional missile attack,
the Chinese might seek to up the ante by adding to their force of
short- and intermediate-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. A defensive system able to shoot down 75 percent of the
missiles fired against it might look very impressive against an allconventional attack, but much less so against one that could contain
a mix of more and less destructive warheads.
Projecting Power.
The U.S. is today able to project conventional air and naval power
virtually unimpeded anywhere in the western Pacific, including all
along China’s eastern seaboard and, conceivably, hundreds of miles
inland. American forces, brought to bear at long distances, and with
the help of a handful of local friends and allies, pose the single
greatest obstacle to any Chinese effort to establish itself as the
dominant power in East Asia. Chinese planners must fear that, in a
crisis or future conflict, the U.S. could close China’s ports, unleash
precision conventional attacks with cruise missiles and stealthy
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manned aircraft against targets on the Chinese mainland, and, by
sinking Chinese submarines and surface ships, break an attempted
blockade of Taiwan. If they are to displace the U.S. as East Asia’s
dominant military power, Chinese strategists must come up with
ways of countering American forces.
I have already mentioned one such way: the possible use of
missiles against U.S. regional bases. At present and for the foreseeable future, the ability of the U.S. to sustain air and naval operations
in the western Pacific depends heavily on access to a small number
of facilities in Japan and South Korea. If these (plus a handful of
others in Singapore, Australia, and perhaps in the Philippines and
Guam) can be destroyed or rendered unusable, America’s ability to
project power will fall precipitously.
Next in order of technical difficulty for China would be acquiring
weapons with which to sink American surface ships, and especially
the aircraft carriers on which the U.S. now relies so heavily. In most
conflicts involving U.S. and Chinese forces, these vessels would have
to operate at the far western edge of the Pacific and might therefore
be especially vulnerable to attacks by cruise missiles, torpedoes, and
intelligent mines.
Such weapons could be unleashed in large numbers from swarms
of relatively inexpensive platforms, including small submarines and
surface ships, and remotely piloted aerial vehicles. Anticarrier
attacks by land-based ballistic missiles are another possibility.
More challenging than sinking carriers but of potentially even
greater benefit would be the capacity to disable American
intelligence, communications, and navigation satellites and to
disrupt U.S. information systems, both in the region and beyond. In
contrast to China, which in conflicts close to home would enjoy the
benefits of interior lines of communication, the U.S. would have to
control its forces at great distances from home and across a vast
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theater of operations. Even temporary disruptions could have
devastating and potentially disastrous consequences. This is
something that has not escaped the attention of Chinese observers.
According to Mark Stokes, “Chinese strategists and engineers perceive U.S. reliance on communications, reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a potential ‘Achilles’ heel,’" and they are looking for
ways to attack it, including by means of ground-based lasers,
jammers, and kinetic kill vehicles.
Defeating American power projection will also require defending
Chinese territory against airborne attack. Toward this end China has
apparently been devoting considerable resources to developing a
nationwide air-defense system capable of locating, tracking, and
intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles, including those with
stealthy characteristics. Improved coastal defenses, perhaps including antisubmarine-warfare ships, attack submarines, and aircraft,
could also force U.S. cruise-missile-launching submarines to operate
at greater distances from China’s shores, thereby reducing the array
of targets they could cover.
In this regard, and more generally, the thrust of Chinese programs will be to push American forces back and, at the very least,
seriously complicate their efforts to operate in the western Pacific.
Deterrence.
For decades we have promised, explicitly or otherwise, to defend
our Asian allies if they were attacked by China. Until very recently
we have done so from a position of virtual immunity to direct
Chinese attack on our own soil. The development of Chinese longrange strike capabilities and, in particular, a visible and substantial
increase in China’s ability to hit the continental U.S. with nuclear
weapons could raise profound questions in Asia about the continuing utility of the American nuclear “umbrella.”
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Assuming for the moment that the U.S. does not go forward with
a national missile defense system, the deployment by China of a
fairly limited number of sea- and land-based mobile missiles will
effectively guarantee it a secure second-strike capability. As things
now stand, the small Chinese ICBM force would take hours to make
ready for launch, and it could conceivably be destroyed in a
preemptive American attack, perhaps one involving only the use of
precision conventional weapons. A larger, more diverse, and more
mobile force of solid-fueled rockets will be far less vulnerable. Such a
force could conceivably also be used to conduct limited attacks on
U.S. military targets rather than simply lobbing a few large and
inaccurate warheads at a handful of American cities.
In certain respects, the next 10 to 15 years may thus come to
resemble the early stages of the Cold War. In the late 1940s and well
into the 1950s, the U.S. enjoyed a huge advantage in its nuclear
competition with the Soviet Union. American forces operat-ing from
bases around the Eurasian periphery (and, with the introduction of
the B-52 bomber, from American soil) were poised to deliver nuclear
weapons virtually anywhere in the USSR; for a long time, the Soviets
had no comparable capability. Yet even the anticipated Soviet
development of intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles
triggered major worries within the Western alliance. American
policymakers were long preoccupied with convincing their NATO
allies, the Soviets, and perhaps themselves that the U.S. would,
indeed, intervene in a European war even if in doing so it risked
nuclear attack on its own soil.
Much of what the U.S. did in Europe—maintaining and
augmenting ground forces, deploying large numbers of tactical
nuclear weapons, tolerating (and even encouraging) the acquisition
of national nuclear forces by at least two key allies, and increasing
the flexibility of American strategic nuclear forces—was motivated
by the desire to strengthen deterrence in the face of increasing Soviet
intercontinental-strike capabilities. Until nearly the final moments of
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the Cold War, the Soviets, for their part, tried to raise doubts about
American resolve as a way of weakening the Western alliance. There
is already some evidence that China may try to use similar tactics to
undermine the U.S. position in Asia.
In 1995, a high-ranking Chinese official was widely quoted as
having told a visitor that the U.S. would not come to Taiwan’s rescue
because, in the end, Americans cared more about Los Angeles than
Taipei. More recently, during the run-up to the March 2000
Taiwanese presidential election, China’s official armed-forces
newspaper warned that, unlike Iraq or Yugoslavia, China is “a
country that has certain abilities of launching strategic counterattack
and the capacity of launching a long-distance strike. . . . It is not a
wise move to be at war with a country such as China, a point which
the U.S. policymakers know fairly well also.”
These threats were evidently intended to give pause to anyone
contemplating possible conventional strikes on Chinese forces or
territory in the context of a fight over Taiwan. In the future, Chinese
strategists may issue more generalized warnings, perhaps suggesting that the growth in their striking power means that the U.S. will
have to contemplate sacrificing Washington to save Tokyo, or Seoul,
or Sidney, or Manila, or Singapore. Such comments would be
directed more at Asian than at American audiences, and their aim
would be not so much to deter the U.S. as to raise questions about
the ability of the U.S. to deter China. The ultimate aim would be to
raise doubts in the minds of Asian observers as to the continuing
value of American security commit-ments.
POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY
Any intensified military rivalry between the U.S. and China will
be accompanied by a stepped-up competition in the political or
diplomatic realm, which is the third dimension of a possible future
struggle in Asia. The central issue of this particular contest would be
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the making and breaking of alliances.
As in the military arena, the U.S. starts with a number of very
considerable advantages: it enjoys good relations with most
countries in East Asia and has alliance ties or other security
connections with many of them, including most of the wealthiest
and most powerful. China, on the other hand, has problematic
relationships with a number of major players in both East and South
Asia and its closest collaborators (North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan,
and Russia) suffer from profound domestic liabilities.
The U.S. also benefits from what is, for the moment at least, a
major geopolitical advantage: the possible threat posed by the sheer
magnitude of its material power is offset to a degree by its
remoteness from the heart of Asia. Because it is far away, the U.S. is
less menacing than China, which is nearby and thus potentially
overwhelming. Indeed, as China’s capabilities grow, there may be a
strong tendency on the part of the other Asian states to draw closer
to one another, and to the U.S., in order to counterbalance Chinese
power and preserve their own independ-ence.
If power-balancing were automatic and inevitable, the U.S. could
afford to sit back and let nature take its course. But the societies of
Northeast and Southeast Asia also have long historical experience
with Chinese preponderance, and they could choose to live with it
again in the future, especially if the only alternative appeared to be a
period of protracted and dangerous rivalry between China and the
U.S. Moreover, if the U.S. appears weak and vacillating, or if its
withdrawal from the region begins to seem inevitable, these
countries may conclude that they have little choice but to cut the best
deal they can.
The aim of Chinese diplomatic strategy, therefore, will be to turn
America’s geographical remoteness from an advantage to a disadvantage, weakening existing American relationships and prevent-
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ing the formation of new ones, feeding doubts about U.S. resolve
and staying power, and making China’s rise seem both as inevitable,
and as unthreatening, as possible.
How might this be done? First, Chinese leaders could transform
their country’s longstanding but largely rhetorical opposition to
bilateral military alliances into a central feature of their foreign
policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese were willing to accept
that America’s Asian alliances served the useful purpose of countering Soviet “hegemonism.” During the 1990s, China preferred that
Japan continue under American tutelage rather than being left free to
expand its power and pursue its own objectives. But, as has already
begun to happen, deteriorating U.S.-PRC relations and stepped-up
efforts at U.S.-Japan security cooperation will cause Chinese strategists to reexamine their permissive position and ultimately to take a
much tougher, anti-alliance stance.
Accompanying this shift could be the amplification of another
persistent theme in Chinese diplomacy. As it works to displace the
U.S. from Asia, China will intensify its campaign against “hegemony” by criticizing America’s cultural and economic “imperialism”
and attacking its arrogance and intrusiveness. China will seek
friends among those in Asia (and beyond) who feel they have
suffered at the hands of U.S. corporations, American-led international institutions, and/or American efforts to enforce conformity
with U.S. views on political liberties and human rights. At the same
time that it seeks to gain the benefits of greater integration into the
world economy, China could also emerge as a leading critic of the
ills of globalization and a leading proponent of various kinds of
regional (as opposed to global and hence American-dominated)
institutions. Chinese policy may even take on a racial aspect, perhaps
appealing to those who share ethnic and cultural characteristics
across East Asia or, more generally, making the case against “the
West” and for “Asia for the Asians.”
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As it has done in recent years, China will no doubt become an
even more enthusiastic participant in multilateral security dialogues
and other forums in Asia, using them to convey the image of a good
international citizen and an open, unthreatening power. Active
Chinese participation will also ensure that multilateral mechanisms
cannot be used against the PRC’s interests. As relations with the U.S.
degenerate, China may also begin to advocate new institutions that
will exclude “non-Asian” powers and seek “local” solutions to
regional economic, environmental, and security problems.
Its strictures against bilateral alliances notwithstanding, China
will also attempt to develop its own “strategic partnerships,” both in
Asia and beyond. In some cases (as in its current dealings with
Russia, Israel, and a number of European countries), China’s goal
will be to obtain military hardware and advanced technology. In
others (as, most likely, with Pakistan) the PRC will be supporting the
enemy of an enemy (India).
Next, in order to circumvent U.S. efforts to apply economic
sanctions or technology controls, China may hope to cultivate a
much closer relationship with a more independent and perhaps
openly anti-American European Union. In the Persian Gulf region, it
may align itself more openly with Iran as a way of deflecting
American attention and scarce military resources from East Asia,
and in order to ensure its own access to oil. In continental Southeast
Asia (especially Myanmar and Thailand), it may use threats and
inducements to gain access to facilities for its own military forces or
to deny access to the forces of its rivals. In Central Asia, it may work
to establish client regimes that will protect oil pipelines and control
Islamist groups that might otherwise foment discontent among
China’s own non-Han minorities.
Finally, while China will probably continue to shun any
pretension to global power, it may provide assistance to states or
nonstate actors around the world that see themselves as being
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opposed to the U.S. Like the Soviet Union before it, albeit more for
geopolitical than for ideological reasons, China could become a lowkey but important supporter of rebel movements, “rogue states,”
and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and
Central and Latin America.
But it is in East Asia, their main sphere of activity, that Chinese
strategists will most want to focus attention. In order to do this, they
will probably aim first to secure their continental “rear areas.”
Toward this end, China will work hard to maintain a good relationship with Russia and to avoid being drawn into debilitating conflicts
in Central Asia. In South Asia, although China will probably opt to
continue its present policy of supporting Pakistan to distract India, it
could also try to take India out of the larger strategic equation by
offering a spheres-of-influence arrangement that would leave India
dominant on the subcontinent in exchange for its continued nonalignment.
In East Asia itself, China may seek to execute the diplomatic
equivalent of a pincer movement, applying pressure from the north
(the Korean peninsula) and the south (the South China Sea) in order
to gain its primary objectives at the center: the acquisition of Taiwan
and the neutralization of Japan.
Following the success of an initial gambit this past spring (2000),
the Chinese will probably continue to press North Korea to negotiate
with the South, while at the same time attempting to build themselves up as the indispensable intermediary. In return for its
continued help in delivering North Korea, China may hope to gain
some assurances from South Korea about the role of the U.S. on the
peninsula. Even if Chinese strategists cannot extract much in the
way of concrete promises, they may nevertheless come to believe
that progress toward reunification will unleash popular forces in the
South that will lead irresistibly to an American withdrawal. Continued improvement in North-South relations would also help to lull
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Japan and undermine U.S. efforts to build support for theater missile
defenses.
While these events are unfolding, the PRC will use a variety of
tactics to aid the further extension of its influence in Southeast Asia.
Here, in contrast to its role as peacemaker in Korea, it may show a
harder, tougher face. An increase in piracy (perhaps supported
covertly by China) could provide the justification for an expansion of
naval activities in the South China Sea, enabling the PRC to assert its
territorial claims in the area. China may also seek to encourage the
activities of ethnic and religious separatist movements in Indonesia
and the Philippines in the hope that, if these countries become
wracked by civil unrest, they will be much less capable of acting to
oppose the growth in Chinese power. After years of tolerating
Singapore’s military cooperation with the U.S., China may also begin
to press that country to choose sides or, at the very least, abandon its
tilt towards the U.S. And if Chinese leaders feel the need to flex their
muscles, and perhaps also to demonstrate the limits of American
power and commitment, they may pick a fight they think they can
win, most likely by provoking and then pummeling Vietnam in what
their military planners have called a quick “local war with high-tech
characteristics.”
The consolidation of China’s position to its north and south will
set the stage for the final resolution of the core strategic issues of
Japan and Taiwan. With regard to the former, China’s goal must be
to detach it from the U.S. without at the same time stimulating a
resurgence of Japanese assertiveness and militarism. Despite their
oft-expressed fears, Chinese strategies may become less worried
about Japan as the country’s population ages, its political system
continues to founder, and its economy fails to regain its former
luster. A Korean settlement that results in a greatly reduced U.S. role
on the peninsula could yield a corresponding increase in Japanese
discomfort at being the last major remaining outpost of American
military power in Asia. If so, the moment may have arrived for
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China to offer Japan some kind of “grand bargain,” perhaps involving a mutual non-aggression pact and a pledge to maintain freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea in exchange for a sharp
curtailment or outright abrogation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. At this
point, if not before, Taiwan would have little choice but to accept the
PRC’s terms for reunification.
CONCLUSION
These, then, are the main elements of the possible struggle to
come in Asia. Of course, it is one thing for Chinese strategies to
fantasize about easing the U.S. out of East Asia without firing a shot;
actually doing so is another matter altogether. For one thing, if the
PRC is impatient, if it underestimates the impact of its action on its
opponents, if it is excessively high-handed or overly brutal, it could
well wind up stimulating precisely the kind of determined, unified
response that could foil its plans and block its ambitions. For another
thing, it is conceivable that China will mellow with the passage of
time, or suffer from domestic weaknesses that will prevent it from
pursuing its objectives in a consistent and effective way. And most
important of all, the U.S. could either adjust its current policies so as
to make an open Sino-American confrontation less likely or, if
conflict cannot be avoided, prepare for its eventuality while
simultaneously preserving America’s own position in Asia.
If I have purposely refrained from dwelling on American
strategic options in the coming decades, it is hardly because we are
without them—whether economic, military, or political. Rather, it is
because the first order of business is to see the situation plain—
namely, that in several important respects a U.S.-PRC strategic
competition is already under way, and there is a good chance that it
is only going to become more intense and open. In recognizing these
realities, the Chinese are well ahead of the U.S.
Militarily, the PRC will continue to do what it is already doing:
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working to offset or neutralize current U.S. advantages, increasing
its ability to target U.S. forces, facilities, and command-andcommunications systems in, around, and over the western Pacific
while improving its capacity to deter or defend against American
attacks on its own forces and territory. These military activities will
likely be accompanied by an effort to break up the American-led
alliance system in Asia and ultimately to detach the U.S. from most
of its present partners and to push it as far back across the Pacific as
possible. To this end, the PRC will use every instrument at its
disposal, including especially its growing economic clout.
In this respect, what one needs to bear in mind is that China will
be a very different kind of strategic competitor from the Soviet
Union. The PRC’s size, dynamism, and relative openness confer a
much greater ability to shape the behavior of other countries, thus
helping to dissuade the U.S. from confrontation, diminish-ing the
effectiveness of any unilateral American attempt to use economic
instruments against it, driving a wedge between the U.S. and the
other advanced industrial nations, and enhancing China’s own
capacity to exert influence over the countries in its region. The threat
all this holds out to American interests can be countered, but first it
must be acknowledged.
ENDNOTES
1. This chapter previously appeared in Commentary, Vol. 110, No. 4, November
2000, pp. 17-26.
2. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Chinese military also reportedly intensified
its efforts to develop long-range land-attack cruise missiles.
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CHAPTER 17
CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC BALANCES AND
ALLIANCES IN SOUTH ASIA IN 2020
Michael R. Chambers
As this volume is being compiled in July 2002, South Asia
remains in a precarious state. The intense crisis which seemed to
have the region on the brink of nuclear war this spring has subsided.
Through U.S. mediation, President Pervez Musharraf promised to
“permanently” end the infiltration of Islamic militants from Pakistan
into Indian Kashmir. A skeptical India has given Pakistan until
October to make good on this pledge. Yet just one month after
Musharraf’s promise, India is claiming that terrorist infiltration is on
the rise again after a brief lull.1
Despite President George W. Bush’s announcement that
“everything has changed” after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
it is clear that in South Asia much has stayed the same. In particular,
India and Pakistan continue their periodic crises with Kashmir as the
focus of the conflict. However, some things have also changed,
including the high-level U.S. involvement to reduce tensions in the
region.
Many changes have buffeted South Asia in the last 10-15 years.
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union altered
the global security environment and the relations India and Pakistan
had with external actors, especially the superpowers. The rise of
militant Islamic conservatism—and terrorism—and the 1998
decisions by New Delhi and Islamabad to cross the nuclear threshold
have also affected the regional dynamics. The purpose of this
volume is to assess where South Asia is headed in the year 2020 so
that the United States can devise forward-looking policies. In
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particular, we have focused on the expected future strategic balances
and alliances.
This chapter is intended to pull together the insights, analyses,
and forecasts of the previous chapters in an attempt to project these
anticipated balances and alliances. Before turning to this task, it is
important to remind the reader of all the caveats and cautions in the
preceding chapters. Many variables are at play in the region, and the
expected future balances and alliances depicted here represent a slice
of all the possible scenarios. Despite the uncertainties underlying this
prediction, it is an effort worth attempting.
This chapter will proceed by drawing on alliance theory to
provide a framework for the consideration of the anticipated
patterns of security conflict and cooperation. It will then review the
sources of security threats expected to face India and Pakistan in
2020, and lay out the alliance patterns predicted to result. Finally,
this chapter will draw out a number of policy recommendations for
the United States as well as India and Pakistan.
Balances, Alignments and Alliances.
In trying to forecast the likely patterns of strategic balances and
alliances in South Asia in 2020, this volume seeks to anticipate the
patterns of cooperation and conflict that will exist among the
regional states (and the extraregional states involved in South Asia),
the patterns of amity and enmity that shape these relationships.
Understanding the axes of enmity as well as the axes of amity is
crucial, because balances and alliances are dual-natured concepts. As
George Liska wrote, “[C]onflicts are the primary determinants of
alignments. Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone
or something.”2 In order to explain or predict which countries will
form a relationship of security cooperation, we need to comprehend
and envision what security threats will provoke this cooperation.
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These patterns of security cooperation we are considering all fit
within the general concept of “alignment.” As Glenn Snyder has
written, alignments amount to “a set of mutual expectations between
two or more states that they will have each other’s support in
disputes or wars with particular other states.”3 When these mutual
expectations are formalized and concretized in a written agreement,
they become an alliance. In between the formalized alliance and the
informal alignment based merely on mutual expectations are other
types of relationships, one of which is an entente, or a specific
understanding reached between two (or more) countries on how
they will cooperate but without the formalization of a treaty of
alliance.
As has been noted by many scholars, alignments and alliances are
an integral part of the functioning of the balance of power.4 As one
country feels threatened by another country, it has three basic
options: to build up its own domestic capabilities to deal with the
threat, to seek security cooperation with a third country similarly
threatened by the second, or some combination of the two.5 Security
cooperation with a third country takes the form of an informal
alignment, a quasi-formal entente, or a formal alliance—or possibly
some other point in between these three. What is important to keep
in mind is that this security cooperation is triggered by a threat, and
the cooperation is intended to help the aligned/allied countries
counterbalance the common threat.
What causes one country to feel a threat from another that would
lead it to seek an alignment with a third country? Stephen Walt has
suggested that four factors contribute to the perception of a security
threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and
aggressive intentions.6 While not mimicking Walt’s categories, this
volume (and the original conference panels) similarly disaggregated
key factors leading to the threats that can trigger counterbalancing
alignments: the economic, political, and demographic factors that
underlie fundamental power capabilities; nuclear weapons and their
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role in the national power of the regional states; and the perception
of threats and hostile intentions from other countries through the
lens of strategic culture. Based on these factors, what are the likely
patterns of enmity and threat in South Asia in the year 2020?
South Asian Threat Patterns Circa 2020.
The Distribution of Power Capabilities. Currently, India is the most
powerful country in South Asia, with Pakistan in the second
position. If we look at military capabilities, the Indian military is
more than twice the size of Pakistan’s armed forces, with 1.26 million
troops compared to 620,000. India also out spends Pakistan, with
defense expenditures of $14.7 billion in 2000 by New Delhi, $3.6 5
billion by Islamabad. In terms of military equipment, India similarly
outweighs Pakistan; for example, India has approximately 3,400
main battle tanks compared to Pakistan’s 2,300, 27 principal surface
combat ships to 9, 16 submarines to 10, 1 aircraft carrier to 0 for
Pakistan, and 738 combat aircraft compared to 353.7 India also
possesses more nuclear weapons: India has produced enough
weapons-grade plutonium to produce 50-90 nuclear weapons, and is
believed to have approximately 30-35 nuclear warheads; Pakistan
has enough weapons-grade material for 30-55 weapons, but it is
unclear how many warheads have been assembled.8 The one
capability in which Pakistan outpaces India is ballistic missiles.
While there is some uncertainty in the numbers, Pakistan is believed
to have 80 Hatf-1 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs),30-84 Hatf-3
SRBMs (including 30 M-11 missiles acquired from China),
approximately 12 medium-range Ghauri-1 missiles, and perhaps 5-10
Ghauri-2 missiles. India is believed to have 20-50 Prithvi-1 SRBMs
(but probably only 12 deployed, with 3-5 launchers), 25 Prithvi-2
SRBMs, and perhaps 5 intermediate-range Agni-1 missiles, with 20
Agni-2 intermediate-range missiles ordered.9
Economically, India also dominates the region. As noted by Vijay
Kelkar in this volume, India’s economy comprises over three-
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quarters of the regional economy, and in 2000 India had a gross
domestic product (GDP) of $479 billion, compared to Pakistan’s
$61.7 billion. In per capita terms, Pakistan’s $470 barely outranked
India’s $460, primarily because India’s population is more than
seven times that of Pakistan.10 During the 1990s, India’s GDP grew at
an annual rate of 5.62 percent, compared to Pakistan’s 4.01 percent.11
And while India’s growth had slowed in 1999-2001, it picked up to
5.4 percent in fiscal year 2001-02 (ended March 2002).12 Finally, India
has a vibrant information technology sector to help lead its economy,
while Pakistan does not.
Population is often seen as a power resource, and here also India
has the upper hand. As noted by Kelkar and by Shripad Tuljapurkar,
India has a much larger population than Pakistan, a more literate
population, and a more highly educated population. However, India
has a larger absolute number of poor than Pakistan. Still, as Kelkar
notes, India was the only country in the region that improved its
poverty ratio from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, and it also made
tremendous strides in this area in the 1990s, dropping its poverty
rate from 36 percent in 1993-94 to 26 percent in 1999-2000.
While military capabilities, economic prowess, and population
are relatively easy power resources to measure, domestic politics and
political stability are harder to get one’s hands on. Nevertheless,
these are also considered important factors in calculating relative
power between countries. Again, these factors favor India. Pakistan
has not seen stability in its political system over the last 10-15 years.
The 1990s saw much shifting between governments led by Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, with each capitalizing on the scandals and
alleged corruption of the other to regain office. Finally, General
Pervez Musharraf took power in a coup in 1999, ousting Sharif.
Musharraf has been engaged in a number of steps to try to
stabilize—and centralize—political power. There is also the
uncertain role of Islamic militancy in Pakistan of late, with militant
Islamic conservatism (supportive of the former Taliban regime in

477

Afghanistan) challenging the more traditional secular and modernist
version of Islam. Meanwhile in India, despite the communal violence
that erupted in Gujarat state in spring 2002, the continuing
challenges of shifting from a quasi-statist to a more liberal economy,
and the imperatives of operating a coalition government, India
remains a relatively stable democracy. However, India does have
one political liability that Pakistan can exploit: Kashmir. Islamabad’s
support for the Kashmiri separatist movement provides it a resource
with which it can threaten India’s territorial integrity and the symbol
of tolerance and inclusiveness of Muslims that many Indians hold
dear.
How might these capabilities shift by 2020, with consequent
impact on the threats that will shape alignments in the region? In
terms of domestic politics and political stability, Teresita Schaffer
notes that India will face a number of challenges between now and
2020, including generational leadership changes in both the
Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the impact of
the increasing power of regional political parties, and improving the
effectiveness of governance generally. Indian leaders will also have
to deal with communal tensions. Nevertheless, it is not expected that
India will be plagued by widespread political instability. Pakistan,
on the other hand, is more of a question mark. Its political future was
not addressed in detail by conference participants because many felt
that it remains too volatile, and it is not possible to make reliable
predictions about it circa 2020. As this is written, President
Musharraf has been taking steps to bring stability to Pakistan’s
political system, including a recent proposal to radically reform
Pakistani politics from a parliamentary system to a presidential one,
with a consequent centralization of power. These reform proposals
are being met with criticism.13 How long might the popular political
parties put up with military dictatorship, and what might be the
result of such tensions? In addition, there is the tension over
Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Thomas Simons suggests that we will
likely see the more traditional—and secular and modernist—vision
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of Islamic identity win out, but this is not assured. What is assured,
then, is that Pakistan has a greater likelihood for political instability
circa 2020 than India.
Economically, India should maintain its dominance in the region.
If India undertakes second-generation reforms along the lines
spelled out by Kelkar, it is estimated to achieve a GDP of $3 trillion
by 2020, with a South Asian regional GDP of possibly $4 trillion.
Moreover, India would increase its share of global trade, its share of
the global service sector, and of the IT sector in particular. It would
also reduce its poverty levels further. Based on these developments,
we should expect India to increase its economic role and influence in
the region and in the world by 2020. Kelkar notes that Pakistan has
been making some efforts at reforms to improve its economy, and
the relaxation of U.S. sanctions and infusion of aid since September
2001 have helped. Still, Pakistan’s economy will remain behind
India’s in terms of size and technological sophistication. And if
Pakistan is wracked by political instability, this will further damage
its economic growth prospects, particularly since foreign investors
would be scared off. Thus, India will continue to possess greater
economic capabilities than Pakistan in 2020. And with this situation,
India will have greater economic resources (in terms of capital,
technology, and skilled labor) to put toward military development.
Demographic trends reinforce these political and economic
factors. While regional disparities may cause some problems,
population trends in India over the next two decades should lead to
favorable conditions for economic growth, with falling growth rates
among young people freeing up resources for investments in
literacy, education, and capital investment as well as resources for
the military. India will benefit from this large but better trained work
force. Pakistan’s fertility rate will remain higher than India’s
(although it is expected to fall), and its education rates will continue
to lag, so that it will not receive the same type of demographic
“bonus” for economic growth that India will enjoy.
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India should also maintain its military advantages over Pakistan.
Based on its economic growth, India is beginning a cycle of major
military modernization that will significantly improve its land, sea,
and air capabilities.14 India is also likely to enhance its nuclear
capabilities and increase the number of nuclear warheads in its
inventory. As Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen note in their
contribution to this volume, the exact size of India’s nuclear arsenal
in 2020 could range from just below 100 warheads to over 250,
depending on a number of variables. Following past practice,
Pakistan should mimic the Indian increases. However, Islamabad’s
economic troubles and need to focus on its domestic economy would
limit the funds it can put toward a military build-up. Moreover, as
noted by Feroz Hassan Khan, Pakistan has decided to rely on
nuclear deterrence to prevent Indian aggression, thereby mitigating
the need to fully match the Indian modernization. Be that as it may,
India’s military capabilities will continue to outstrip those of
Pakistan. As a result, Pakistani security policymakers will perceive at
least a potential threat from India based on these capabilities.
Because of its weaker capabilities, Pakistan will not pose a
significant threat to India. The two principal caveats to this
statement are, of course, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to
cause India trouble in Kashmir if that dispute is not resolved. The
neighbor with the more worrisome capabilities for India will
continue to be China. As discussed in several of the chapters in this
volume, China already trumps India in terms of power resources:
economically, with a GDP in 2000 of $1.08 trillion and per capita
income of $840;15 demographically with higher literacy and
education rates and lower poverty rates; and militarily with a larger
armed forces and more numerous conventional and nuclear
capabilities.16
In 2020, assuming that it avoids serious political instability and
maintains reasonable economic growth, China should maintain its
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advantages over India particularly in the economic and military
realms. Economic forecasts predict the Chinese economy will be two
to three times that of India, and news articles over the last few
months have been touting China as the new workshop of the
world.17 In the military realm, China is already engaged in a
modernization drive that is significantly enhancing its capabilities
and its reach.18 And Beijing is widely expected to increase the
numbers and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal over the next two
decades, particularly in response to the U.S. plans to build a national
missile defense system. Just as Pakistan will worry about India’s
greater capabilities, India will worry about China’s.
Threat Perceptions in the Region. Capabilities plus intentions are
what cause a security threat by one country against another.
However, the intentions of a potential adversary are often unknown.
Nevertheless, security policymakers will perceive the intentions of
other countries—rightly or wrongly—and build these perceptions
into their views of the regional security environment.
These perceptions of enmity and security threat are drawn in part
from a country’s history of interactions with its neighbors. As they
build up over time, such axes of enmity can become rather “sticky”
or durable, and are not directly influenced by shifts in the balance of
power.19 With three major wars and several more crises in the 50
years since independence, the enmity between India and Pakistan is
likely to continue over the next 18 years, and to shape their
perceptions of threat.
Such historical experiences of hostility with other countries get
factored into the worldview of security elites in a country, helping to
create the strategic culture of these policymakers. Drawing on the
expositions of strategic culture in the preceding chapters, what can
we expect about Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese perceptions of
threat?
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The first point to consider is one raised by all three of the
contributors to Part V of this volume: strategic cultures are durable
and long-lasting, changing only slowly. We should expect to see
many of the core elements of the strategic culture in a country today
continuing through to 2020.
This is not good news for India. As Andrew Scobell explains,
Chinese security elites see India as a potential rival and future threat,
and they have a strongly negative perception of India’s own strategic
culture. Pakistan’s strategic culture is premised heavily on insecurity
vis-à-vis India, as Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues, and on a distrust of
India and its regional ambitions. Thus, based on the durability of
these elements of Pakistani and Chinese strategic cultures, India’s
two largest neighbors will see it—albeit to differing degrees—as a
threat.
The second point to consider is that while strategic cultures and
their threat perceptions are durable, this does not preclude gradual
change. In fact, we see the potential for change in Pakistan’s strategic
culture, but it is to a more hard-line view of India based on the
conservative Islam of the officers who joined the ranks in the 1970s
and 1980s. As Rizvi notes, the top Pakistani commanders have
drawn a line between conservative Islam and Islamic activism,
believing that the latter will undermine the professionalism,
discipline, and service ethos in the military. Thomas Simons also
discusses the efforts of President Pervez Musharraf, a senior general
himself, to return to the traditional view of Islam held by Pakistan’s
founding fathers. Nevertheless, if this more militant Islamic
conservatism is such a strong element of the social-religious and
strategic cultures of the middle officer corps, can the efforts of
President Musharraf and the current senior military leadership truly
halt the evolution of Pakistani strategic culture in this direction?
Indian strategic culture is already undergoing change, moving
away from the Nehruvianism which guided Indian foreign and
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security policy since independence. The question remains, however,
toward which competing school or worldview is it evolving:
neoliberalism or hyperrealism? In his contribution to this volume,
Kanti Bajpai sees the trend since 1990 as moving toward
neoliberalism, with its belief in the ability of India to negotiate
mutually beneficial deals with other countries, even with Pakistan.
However, he also notes that since September 11, and especially since
December 13, Indian thinking is evolving in the direction of
hyperrealism. In this school of strategic thought, force is seen as a
necessary and useful tool of statecraft, and is claimed to be the only
language that Pakistan understands. It also views China as the
principal threat to India, and believes that the Chinese only respect
power. Continued evolution in this direction could be very
problematic for the region. Moreover, India’s hard-line position in
the most recent crisis and Pakistan’s concessions (under U.S.
pressure and mediation) could add momentum to this trend.
To summarize then, China and Pakistan see India as a threat,
albeit to different degrees. Pakistan’s perception of threat from India
could be very strong if the more militant Islamic conservatism wins
the internal ideational struggle in that country. India will see these
two neighbors as threats if hyperrealism comes to dominate, but less
so if neoliberalism becomes the primary strategic guide. It is
important to remember that strategic culture does not determine the
security policy or actions of a country. It merely provides a set of
assumptions, a lens through which to view the world. As Rizvi
reminds us, other factors and forces can matter more than strategic
culture, but strategic culture does matter.
Alignments in South Asia: 2020.
Based on the distribution of capabilities and the perceptions of
threat derived from historical experiences and the strategic cultures,
we can expect to see Pakistan and China continue their alignment to
counter the threat from India. In his contribution, John Garver shows
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us that none of the forces currently at work to separate these two
partners is stronger than their common interests in maintaining the
entente. India’s capabilities will be adequate to cope with the threat
from Pakistan, but China should continue to be economically and
militarily more powerful than India. (India’s ability to cope with
China will depend in part on the growth of its nuclear arsenal.)
Therefore, we can expect India to develop some relationship of
alignment with the United States to counter the putative Chinese
threat. The United States is increasingly viewing China as a strategic
rival—at least in Asia—and the growth of Chinese economic and
military capabilities will pose a potential threat to U.S. interests and
forces in the region. However, as Sumit Ganguly warns, this
alignment may be weak: India’s strong desire for policy autonomy
and bilateral disagreements over the issue of nuclear proliferation
are two major potential barriers. Nevertheless, structural factors will
push India and the United States in this direction.
It is possible that India might form an alignment with other
countries as well, although these alternatives are much less likely.
The leading possibility among these would be an Indo-Russian
alignment. However, as Ganguly argues in his analysis, the
conditions to recreate the Indo-Soviet alignment do not exist and are
not likely to. For this to occur, Beijing would have to radically
change its policy and behavior to become aggressive toward both
Moscow and New Delhi.
The main axes of South Asian alignment in 2020 then will likely
be Pakistan and China on the one hand, and India and the U.S. on
the other. The degree of polarization between these two axes remains
uncertain, and may in fact be fairly weak. One mitigating factor is
that the actual behavior of the relevant countries might not be as
hostile and aggressive as some fear. Second, the strategic cultures of
India and Pakistan may not evolve toward the more strident views
discussed above. Finally, the role of the United States and the
triangular relationship that it has formed with India and Pakistan
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could prove crucial.
This triangular relationship is a recent development, dating only
since September 11. In this triangle, the United States is in the pivot
position, enjoying better relations with both India and Pakistan than
they have with each other. If the United States can sustain this
relationship until 2020, it will give Washington leverage with both
New Delhi and Islamabad to dampen the conflicts between them,
and possibly to push these neighbors toward resolving some of the
issues between them. The United States would be able to pursue
these objectives even through the implicit threat to side with one
rival against the other. Of course, this will only work so long as good
relations with the United States matter to the leaderships in New
Delhi and Islamabad—and only so long as religiously tinged
nationalism does not capture the leadership in one or both capitals.
If the United States does not maintain a policy of engagement
with both India and Pakistan, particularly if it draws back again
from Pakistan, we can expect greater polarization between the two
axes of alignment. Lacking a constructive relationship with the
United States, Pakistan’s fear of India will be greater, and it will take
actions to strengthen its security against that neighbor, including a
closer relationship with China.
Even if the axes of amity and enmity creating these alignments
become more polarized, we are not likely to see the creation of
formal alliances. The Sino-Pakistani entente has functioned for
nearly 40 years without being formalized into an alliance, and it is
highly unlikely this will change. In large measure this will be due to
China’s preference for less formal, more flexible relationships.
Moreover, drawing on their experiences with the Soviets in the
1950s, Beijing understands that formal alliances do not guarantee
support from an ally. Nor do the Chinese want to be pulled into a
war provoked by Pakistan; we saw China’s aversion to such
“entrapment” in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts.20 The chances for a
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formal U.S.-India alliance are greater, since the United States has
often formalized such relationships in the past. Still, the creation of a
formal alliance is not likely, as Ganguly’s caveats (some of which are
mentioned above) help to explain.
Thus, we should expect to see these two alignments characterized
by less formal, more flexible arrangements of security cooperation,
as Aaron Friedberg mentioned in his presentation at the conference.
In the case of the Sino-Pakistani relationship, their entente is
anticipated to continue. In the case of the United States and India,
the term used by the member states may be something along the
lines of “strategic partnership.” With this greater flexibility and
reduced specificity of the obligations each state has to the other, we
will have greater uncertainty on the part of India and Pakistan
regarding the willingness of their allies to assist them in a given
crisis. This being the case, the lack of formal alliances in South Asia
could push India and Pakistan toward reliance on their own military
capabilities for security, particularly their nuclear arsenals.
Heightening the risk of nuclear conflict, there will be even greater
need for a regional restraint regime along the lines proposed by
Khan in this volume.
Recommendations for the United States and South Asia
Based on these regional strategic balances and alignments, and on
the proposals offered by many of the conference participants, what
policy recommendations can be made for the United States and for
India and Pakistan?
(1) The United States should remain engaged in South Asia. South
Asia matters to U.S. national interests, and particularly to our
national security interests. As this region, and India in particular,
grows economically, it should emerge as a major trading partner of
the United States and location for American investment, with the
benefits accruing to both sides. India is the largest democracy in the
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world, with over one billion people; our political values and interests
should make us strive to see this political system pros per and
spread to other countries of the region. Moreover, potential security
threats to the United States and to the international community
emanate from South Asia. In particular, there is the threat that
unsecured nuclear weapons from the region could fall into the hands
of anti-American militants or—with a radical regime change—could
be proliferated to such groups intentionally. There is also the risk of
a regional nuclear war, with its attendant spillover effects and the
broader ramifications from the use of such weapons. Moreover, not
being engaged greatly increases the chance of armed conflict in the
region, even nuclear conflict. And as Sir John Thomson notes in his
contribution, U.S. policies will greatly affect the future of South Asia.
While “remain engaged” is of paramount importance for the
United States with regard to South Asia, it is a rather broad
enjoinder. The following recommendations add more specificity to
this.
• The United States should remain engaged with both India and
Pakistan, and to maintain the pivot position in this triangular relationship.
As mentioned above, the United States can use this pivot position in
the triangle to dampen conflicts between India and Pakistan, and to
promote resolution of the issues which separate them. In addition,
maintaining the triangular relationship will prevent the polarization
of the alignment patterns, thereby preventing the increased tensions
that would ensue. Because of the political, economic, and strategic
affinities developing between the U.S. and India, the greatest effort
here may be for the United States to remain engaged with Pakistan,
especially after the current campaign in Afghanistan is over. If we do
not maintain this relationship, the prospects for Pakistan dim
considerably; political instability, Islamic militancy, and economic
collapse are all more probable.
• The United States should provide benefits to India and Pakistan to
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encourage their continued relationships with Washington. Such benefits
could include aid, investment, political/diplomatic support, or
military cooperation in specific areas. By providing such
inducements, we could help to nudge the evolution of Indian
strategic culture toward neoliberalism, and encourage Pakistani
strategic culture to eschew an evolution toward the more militant
Islamic conservatism.
• The United States should maintain and further develop military-tomilitary relations with both India and Pakistan, including the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Such relationships
have proved valuable in the past and in the present, and should
continue to prove their worth in the future. These programs promote
understanding between militaries, offer foreign militaries the
opportunity to learn from the United States, and provide the U.S.
armed forces insights into the workings and beliefs of other
militaries. They also can facilitate access to key decisionmakers and
nurture cooperation between militaries, which can speed entry to
bases and other facilities during a crisis. Such relationships with
South and Central Asian states proved extremely important in
preparing the way for U.S. and allied military operations in
Afghanistan after September 11, 2001.
• The United States should provide technical advice and assistance to
improve the security and safety of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
arsenals. Proliferation of nuclear weapons to these two countries has
already occurred, and we cannot reverse it. However, our assistance
to both countries can enhance the safety and security of these
weapons in order to reduce the chances of accidental use by either
side or of theft of these weapons. Such assistance is in our own selfinterest, since we could very well be the intended target of any stolen
nuclear device.
These steps, as well as others detailed in the preceding chapters,
elaborate the ways the United States can stay engaged in South Asia.
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Most of the reasons for this American engagement pertain to benefits
to us directly or to the region (and therefore to the United States
indirectly). There is one additional reason of broader geostrategic
import. If U.S.-China relations deteriorate over the next two decades,
relations with India and Pakistan can help the United States contain
China, or at least reduce Chinese influence in this region on its
southwest border. Pakistan may not be willing to forsake its longtime ally, but if we play our cards right, it might be persuaded to at
least remain neutral.
Besides these recommendations for the United States, at least two
important suggestions need to be made for India and Pakistan.
(2) India and Pakistan should negotiate a restraint regime. While
neither country desires nuclear war and will try to avoid it, both
have recently been willing to play the nuclear card in an effort to
push the other. Moreover, as Scott Sagan argues in his contribution
to this volume, despite the rational fears of nuclear war, both
countries have displayed evidence of organizational pathologies that
could nonetheless take them into a nuclear conflict. It is thus
incumbent upon New Delhi and Islamabad to negotiate a restraint
agreement that would reduce the chances for and fears of accidents
and blunders, that would promote stability and peace in the region.
These objectives are necessary if both countries hope to achieve the
economic dreams for their societies. Prosperity can only be built on
peace and stability. The United States should also help in any way it
can, with advice, technical assistance, etc.
(3) India and Pakistan should negotiate a resolution of the Kashmir
conflict. This is the most contentious of the issues dividing these
neighbors, and the one that has led them into armed conflict or crisis
conditions on several occasions. Now that both are nuclear-armed
states, these conflicts and crises could escalate to a scale of death and
destruction heretofore unimagined. The United States should offer
its good offices and willingness to help mediate this dispute since it
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is one of the few countries that both India and Pakistan will trust in
such a role. For their part, India and Pakistan should realize that
they cannot solve this problem without external assistance, and be
willing to accept such help.
Because India and Pakistan now are both nuclear weapons states,
the pattern of crises that have characterized their relations over the
last 15 years or so must be brought to an end. The risk of nuclear war
is too great to allow these to continue. While we should expect to see
the Sino-Pakistani entente countered by some degree of IndoAmerican alignment, it is possible to reduce the polarization of these
axes so that conflict and tensions are less likely. The
recommendations offered above can move South Asia in this
desirable direction.
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